adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so al simple
ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple
ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the
CAUSES of them; but as if those ideas were real beings IN them. For,
though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the
power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated also
light and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire,
more than a power to excite these ideas in us; and therefore are called
qualities in or of the fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but
powers to excite such ideas in us, I must in that sense be understood,
when I speak of secondary qualities as being in things; or of their
ideas as being the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of
speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one
cannot be well understood, yet truly signify nothing but those powers
which are in things to excite certain sensations or ideas in us. Since
were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the
sight and touch, nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the ideas
of light and heat by those impressions from the fire or sun, there would
yet be no more light or heat in the world than there would be pain
if there were no sensible creature to feel it, though the sun should
continue just as it is now, and Mount AEtna flame higher than ever it
did. Solidity and extension, and the termination of it, figure, with
motion and rest, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world
as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them
or no: and therefore we have reason to look on those as the real
modifications of matter, and such as are the exciting causes of all our
various sensations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging
to this place, I shall enter no further into it, but proceed to show
what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.
3. Modes are all adequate.
Secondly, OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF MODES, being voluntary collections of
simple ideas, which the mind puts together, without reference to any
real archetypes, or standing patterns, existing anywhere, are and cannot
but be ADEQUATE IDEAS. Because they, not being intended for copies of
things really existing, but for archetypes made by the mind, to rank and
denominate things by, cannot want anything; they having each of them
that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection, which the mind
intended they should: so that the mind acquiesces in them, and can find
nothing wanting. Thus, by having the idea of a figure with three sides
meeting at three angles, I have a complete idea, wherein I require
nothing else to make it perfect. That the mind is satisfied with the
perfection of this its idea is plain, in that it does not conceive that
any understanding hath, or can have, a more complete or perfect idea of
that thing it signifies by the word triangle, supposing it to exist,
than itself has, in that complex idea of three sides and three angles,
in which is contained al that is or can be essential to it, or
necessary to complete it, wherever or however it exists. But in our
IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES it is otherwise. For there, desiring to copy things
as they really do exist, and to represent to ourselves that constitution
on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not
that perfection we intend: we find they still want something we should
be glad were in them; and so are all inadequate. But MIXED MODES and
RELATIONS, being archetypes without patterns, and so having nothing to
represent but themselves, cannot but be adequate, everything being so
to itself. He that at first put together the idea of danger perceived,
absence of disorder from fear, sedate consideration of what was justly
to be done, and executing that without disturbance, or being deterred by
the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of
that combination: and intending it to be nothing else but what is, nor
to have in it any other simple ideas but what it hath, it could not also
but be an adequate idea: and laying this up in his memory, with the name
COURAGE annexed to it, to signify to others, and denominate from thence
any action he should observe to agree with it, had thereby a standard to
measure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This idea, thus
made and laid up for a pattern, must necessarily be adequate, being
referred to nothing else but itself, nor made by any other original but
the good liking and wil of him that first made this combination.
4. Modes, in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.
Indeed another coming after, and in conversation learning from him the
word COURAGE, may make an idea, to which he gives the name courage,
different from what the first author applied it to, and has in his
mind when he uses it. And in this case, if he designs that his idea in
thinking should be conformable to the other's idea, as the name he uses
in speaking is conformable in sound to his from whom he learned it, his
idea may be very wrong and inadequate: because in this case, making the
other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man's
word or sound is the pattern of his in speaking, his idea is so far
defective and inadequate, as it is distant from the archetype and
pattern he refers it to, and intends to express and signify by the name
he uses for it; which name he would have to be a sign of the other man's
idea, (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed,) and of his
own, as agreeing to it: to which if his own does not exactly correspond,
it is faulty and inadequate.
5. Because then means, in propriety of speech, to correspond to the
ideas in some other mind.
Therefore these complex ideas of MODES, which they are referred by the
mind, and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other
intelligent being, expressed by the names we apply to them, they may be
very deficient, wrong, and inadequate; because they agree not to that
which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern: in which
respect only any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate.
And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to
be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper speaking than
knowing right.
6. Ideas of Substances, as referred to real Essences, not adequate.
Thirdly, what IDEAS WE HAVE OF SUBSTANCES, I have above shown. Now,
those ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they
are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things. 2.
Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations in
the mind of things that do exist, by ideas of those qualities that are
discoverable in them. In both which ways these copies of those originals
and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate.
First, it is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for
things as supposed to have certain real essences, whereby they are of
this or that species: and names standing for nothing but the ideas that
are in men's minds, they must constantly refer their ideas to such real
essences, as to their archetypes. That men (especially such as have been
bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do suppose
certain specific essences of substances, which each individual in its
several kinds is made conformable to and partakes of, is so far from
needing proof that it will be thought strange if any one should do
otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specific names they rank
particular substances under, to things as distinguished by such specific
real essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss if
it should be doubted whether he called himself a man, with any other
meaning than as having the real essence of a man? And yet if you demand
what those real essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know
them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their
minds, being referred to real essences, as to archetypes which are
unknown, must be so far from being adequate that they cannot be supposed
to be any representation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of
substances are, as it has been shown, certain collections of simple
ideas that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together.
But such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance;
for then the properties we discover in that body would depend on that
complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion
with it be known; as al properties of a triangle depend on, and, as far
as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three
lines including a space. But it is plain that in our complex ideas
of substances are not contained such ideas, on which al the other
qualities that are to be found in them do depend. The common idea men
have of iron is, a body of a certain colour, weight, and hardness; and a
property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet
this property has no necessary connexion with that complex idea, or any
part of it: and there is no more reason to think that malleableness
depends on that colour, weight, and hardness, than that colour or that
weight depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of
these real essences, there is nothing more ordinary than that men should
attribute the sorts of things to such essences. The particular parcel of
matter which makes the ring I have on my finger is forwardly by most men
supposed to have a real essence, whereby it is gold; and from whence
those qualities flow which I find in it, viz. its peculiar colour,
weight, hardness, fusibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon
a slight touch of mercury, &c. This essence, from which all these
properties flow, when I inquire into it and search after it, I plainly
perceive I cannot discover: the furthest I can go is, only to presume
that, it being nothing but body, its real essence or internal
constitution, on which these qualities depend, can be nothing but the
figure, size, and connexion of its solid parts; of neither of which
having any distinct perception at all can I have any idea of its
essence: which is the cause that it has that particular shining
yellowness; a greater weight than anything I know of the same bulk; and
a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quicksilver. If any
one wil say, that the real essence and internal constitution, on which
these properties depend, is not the figure, size, and arrangement or
connexion of its solid parts, but something else, called its particular
FORM, I am further from having any idea of its real essence than I was
before. For I have an idea of figure, size, and situation of solid
parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, size, or
putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above mentioned are
produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter
that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I
cut the pen I write with. But, when I am told that something besides
the figure, size, and posture of the solid parts of that body in its
essence, something cal ed SUBSTANTIAL FORM, of that I confess I have no
idea at al , but only of the sound form; which is far enough from an
idea of its real essence or constitution. The like ignorance as I have
of the real essence of this particular substance, I have also of the
real essence of all other natural ones: of which essences I confess I
have no distinct ideas at al ; and, I am apt to suppose, others, when
they examine their own knowledge, wil find in themselves, in this one
point, the same sort of ignorance.
7. Because men know not the real essence of substances.
Now, then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my
finger a general name already in use, and denominate it GOLD, do they
not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name, as
belonging to a particular species of bodies, having a real internal
essence; by having of which essence this particular substance comes to
be of that species, and to be called by that name? If it be so, as it is
plain it is, the name by which things are marked as having that essence
must be referred primarily to that essence; and consequently the idea to
which that name is given must be referred also to that essence, and be
intended to represent it. Which essence, since they who so use the names
know not, their ideas of substances must be al inadequate in that
respect, as not containing in them that real essence which the mind
intends they should.
8. Ideas of Substances, when regarded as Collections of their Qualities,
are all inadequate.
Secondly, those who, neglecting that useless supposition of unknown
real essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the
substances that exist in the world, by putting together the ideas of
those sensible qualities which are found co-existing in them, though
they come much nearer a likeness of them than those who imagine they
know not what real specific essences: yet they arrive not at perfectly
adequate ideas of those substances they would thus copy into their
minds: nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to
be found in their archetypes. Because those qualities and powers of
substances, whereof we make their complex ideas, are so many and
various, that no man's complex idea contains them al . That our complex
ideas of substances do not contain in them ALL the simple ideas that are
united in the things themselves is evident, in that men do rarely put
into their complex idea of any substance al the simple ideas they do
know to exist in it. Because, endeavouring to make the signification of
their names as clear and as little cumbersome as they can, they make
their specific ideas of the sorts of substance, for the most part, of
a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them: but these
having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the
specific idea, more than others that are left out, it is plain that both
these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate. The
simple ideas whereof we make our complex ones of substances are all of
them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers; which being
relations to other substances, we can never be sure that we know ALL the
powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes it is
fitted to give to or receive from other substances in their several ways
of application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one body,
much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate ideas of
any substance made up of a collection of al its properties.
9. Their powers usually make up our complex ideas of substances.
Whosoever first lighted on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote
by the word GOLD, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he
observed in that lump to depend on its real essence, or internal
constitution. Therefore those never went into his idea of that species
of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the first he
abstracted from it, to make the complex idea of that species. Which both
are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after such a manner, and to
produce in us that idea we cal yellow; and the other to force upwards
any other body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal
scales, one against another. Another perhaps added to these the ideas of
fusibility and fixedness, two other passive powers, in relation to the
operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and solubility in aqua
regia, two other powers, relating to the operation of other bodies, in
changing its outward figure, or separation of it into insensible parts.
These, or parts of these, put together, usually make the complex idea in
men's minds of that sort of body we cal GOLD.
10. Substances have innumerable powers not contained in our complex
ideas of them.
But no one who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or
this sort in particular, can doubt that this, called GOLD, has infinite
other properties not contained in that complex idea. Some who have
examined this species more accurately could, I believe, enumerate ten
times as many properties in gold, all of them as inseparable from its
internal constitution, as its colour or weight: and it is probable, if
any one knew al the properties that are by divers men known of this
metal, there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex
idea of gold as any one man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be
the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes that
that one body is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due
application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to
imagine. Which wil not appear so much a paradox to any one who wil but
consider how far men are yet from knowing al the properties of that
one, no very compound figure, a triangle; though it be no small number
that are already by mathematicians discovered of it.
11. Ideas of Substances, being got only by collecting their qualities,
are all inadequate.
So that al our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and
inadequate. Which would be so also in mathematical figures, if we were
to have our complex ideas of them, only by collecting their properties
in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our
ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it, but some few of
its properties? Whereas, having in our plain idea the WHOLE essence
of that figure, we from thence discover those properties, and
demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.
12. Simple Ideas, [word in Greek], and adequate.
Thus the mind has three sorts of abstract ideas or nominal essences:
First, SIMPLE ideas, which are [word in Greek] or copies; but yet
certainly adequate. Because, being intended to express nothing but the
power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation, that sensation,
when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the
paper I write on, having the power in the light (I speak according to
the common notion of light) to produce in men the sensation which I cal
white, it cannot but be the effect of such a power in something without
the mind; since the mind has not the power to produce any such idea in
itself: and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power
that simple idea is [* words missing] the sensation of white, in my
mind, being the effect of that power which is in the paper to produce
it, is perfectly adequate to that power; or else that power would
produce a different idea.
13. Ideas of Substances are Echthypa, and inadequate.
Secondly, the COMPLEX ideas of SUBSTANCES are ectypes, copies too; but
not perfect ones, not adequate: which is very evident to the mind, in
that it plainly perceives, that whatever collection of simple ideas it
makes of any substance that exists, it cannot be sure that it exactly
answers all that are in that substance. Since, not having tried all
the operations of all other substances upon it, and found al the
alterations it would receive from, or cause in, other substances, it
cannot have an exact adequate collection of all its active and passive
capacities; and so not have an adequate complex idea of the powers of
any substance existing, and its relations; which is that sort of complex
idea of substances we have. And, after al , if we would have, and
actually had, in our complex idea, an exact collection of all the
secondary qualities or powers of any substance, we should not yet
thereby have an idea of the ESSENCE of that thing. For, since the powers
or qualities that are observable by us are not the real essence of that
substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any col ection whatsoever
of these qualities cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it
is plain, that our ideas of substances are not adequate; are not what
the mind intends them to be. Besides, a man has no idea of substance in
general, nor knows what substance is in itself.
14. Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot be adequate.
Thirdly, COMPLEX ideas of MODES AND RELATIONS are originals, and
archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real
existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly
to answer. These being such collections of simple ideas that the mind
itself puts together, and such col ections that each of them contains
in it precisely all that the mind intends that it should, they are
archetypes and essences of modes that may exist; and so are designed
only for, and beling only to such modes as, when they do exist, have an
exact conformity with those complex ideas The ideas, therefore, of modes
and relations cannot but be adequate.
CHAPTER XXXII.
OF TRUE AND FALSE IDEAS.
1. Truth and Falsehood properly belong to Propositions, not to Ideas.
Though truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to
PROPOSITIONS: yet IDEAS are oftentimes termed true or false (as what
words are there that are not used with great latitude, and with some
deviation from their strict and proper significations?) Though I think
that when ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still
some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that
denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions
wherein they come to be cal ed true or false. In al which we shall
find some kind of affirmation or negation, which is the reason of that
denomination. For our ideas, being nothing but bare APPEARANCES, or
perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be
said to be true or false, no more than a single name of anything can be
said to be true or false.
2. Ideas and words may be said to be true, inasmuch as they really are
ideas and words.
Indeed both ideas and words may be said to be true, in a metaphysical
sense of the word truth; as all other things that any way exist are
said to be true, i.e. really to be such as they exist. Though in things
called true, even in that sense, there is perhaps a secret reference to
our ideas, looked upon as the standards of that truth; which amounts to
a mental proposition, though it be usually not taken notice of.
3. No Idea, as an Appearance in the Mind, either true or false.
But it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here,
when we examine, whether our ideas are capable of being true or false,
but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words: and so I say that
the ideas in our minds, being only so many perceptions or appearances
there, none of them are false; the idea of a centaur having no more
falsehood in it when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur has
falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on
paper. For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or
negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them,
of being false, til the mind passes some judgment on them; that is,
affirms or denies something of them.
4. Ideas referred to anything extraneous to them may be true or false.
Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to
them, they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the
mind, in such a reference, makes a tacit supposition of their conformity
to that thing; which supposition, as it happens to be true or false,
so the ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual cases
wherein this happens, are these following:
5. Other Men's Ideas; real Existence; and supposed real Essences, are
what Men usually refer their Ideas to.
First, when the mind supposes any idea it has CONFORMABLE to th