An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding by John Locke - HTML preview

body, of which the complex idea of that kind of things is usual y made,

are but a very few, in comparison of what a man that has several ways

tried and examined it knows of that one sort of things; and all that the

most expert man knows are but a few, in comparison of what are really

in that body, and depend on its internal or essential constitution. The

essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very

few ideas: three lines including a space make up that essence: but the

properties that flow from this essence are more than can be easily known

or enumerated. So I imagine it is in substances; their real essences lie

in a little compass, though the properties flowing from that internal

constitution are endless.

25. Ideas, when called false.

To conclude, a man having no notion of anything without him, but by the

idea he has of it in his mind, (which idea he has a power to call by

what name he pleases,) he may indeed make an idea neither answering the

reason of things, nor agreeing to the idea commonly signified by other

people's words; but cannot make a wrong or false idea of a thing which

is no otherwise known to him but by the idea he has of it: v.g. when I

frame an idea of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a

horse's head and neck, I do not make a false idea of anything; because

it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a MAN or TARTAR,

and imagine it to represent some real being without me, or to be the

same idea that others cal by the same name; in either of these cases I

may err. And upon this account it is that it comes to be termed a false

idea; though indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea, but in that

tacit mental proposition, wherein a conformity and resemblance is

attributed to it which it has not. But yet, if, having framed such an

idea in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name MAN

or TARTAR, belongs to it, I wil call it MAN or TARTAR, I may be justly

thought fantastical in the naming; but not erroneous in my judgment; nor

the idea any way false.

26. More properly to be caled right or wrong.

Upon the whole matter, I think that our ideas, as they are considered

by the mind,--either in reference to the proper signification of their

names; or in reference to the reality of things,--may very fitly be

called RIGHT or WRONG ideas, according as they agree or disagree to

those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather

call them true or false, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one

has, to cal things by those names he thinks best; though, in propriety

of speech, TRUTH or FALSEHOOD wil , I think, scarce agree to them,

but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental

proposition. The ideas that are in a man's mind, simply considered,

cannot be wrong; unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are

jumbled together. Al other ideas are in themselves right, and the

knowledge about them right and true knowledge; but when we come to refer

them to anything, as to their patterns and archetypes then they are

capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

1. Something unreasonable in most Men.

There is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems

odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions,

reasonings, and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at

al different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in

another, and wil by the authority of reason forwardly condemn; though

he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and

conduct, which he never perceives, and wil very hardly, if at al , be

convinced of.

2. Not wholy from Self-love.

This proceeds not wholly from self-love, though that has often a great

hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the overweening of

self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many cases one with

amazement hears the arguings, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a

worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before

him as clear as daylight.

3. Not from Education.

This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and

prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not

the bottom of the disease, nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises,

or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause,

and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: but yet, I

think, he ought to look a little further, who would trace this sort

of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show

whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds, and

wherein it consists.

4. A Degree of Madness found in most Men.

I shall be pardoned for caling it by so harsh a name as madness, when

it is considered that opposition to reason deserves that name, and is

really madness; and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that if

he should always, on all occasions, argue or do as in some cases he

constantly does, would not be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil

conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly

passion, but in the steady calm course of his life. That which wil yet

more apologize for this harsh name, and ungrateful imputation on the

greatest part of mankind, is, that, inquiring a little by the bye into

the nature of madness, (b. i . ch. xi., Section 13,) I found it to

spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause we

are here speaking of. This consideration of the thing itself, at a time

when I thought not I the least on the subject which I am now treating

of, suggested it to me. And if this be a weakness to which all men are

so liable, if this be a taint which so universally infects mankind, the

greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name, thereby

to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

5. From a wrong Connexion of Ideas.

Some of our ideas have a NATURAL correspondence and connexion one with

another: it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these,

and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded

in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connexion of

ideas wholly owing to CHANCE or CUSTOM. Ideas that in themselves are not

al of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds, that it is very

hard to separate them; they always keep in company, and the one no

sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associate

appears with it; and if they are more than two which are thus united,

the whole gang, always inseparable, show themselves together.

6. This Connexion made by custom.

This strong combination of ideas, not allied by nature, the mind makes

in itself either voluntarily or by chance; and hence it comes in

different men to be very different, according to their different

inclinations, education, interests, &c. CUSTOM settles habits of

thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will,

and of motions in the body: all which seems to be but trains of motions

in the animal spirits, which, once set a going, continue in the same

steps they have been used to; which, by often treading, are worn into a

smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural.

As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced

in our minds; or, if they are not, this may serve to explain their

following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into

their track, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body. A

musician used to any tune wil find that, let it but once begin in his

head, the ideas of the several notes of it will follow one another

orderly in his understanding, without any care or attention, as

regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play

out the tune he has begun, though his unattentive thoughts be elsewhere

a wandering. Whether the natural cause of these ideas, as wel as of

that regular dancing of his fingers be the motion of his animal spirits,

I wil not determine, how probable soever, by this instance, it appears

to be so: but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual

habits, and of the tying together of ideas.

7. Some Antipathies an Effect of it.

That there are such associations of them made by custom, in the minds of

most men, I think nobody will question, who has wel considered himself

or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the

sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly,

and produce as regular effects as if they were natural; and are

therefore called so, though they at first had no other original but the

accidental connexion of two ideas, which either the strength of the

first impression, or future indulgence so united, that they always

afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but

one idea. I say most of the antipathies, I do not say all; for some of

them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are

born with us; but a great part of those which are counted natural, would

have been known to be from unheeded, though perhaps early, impressions,

or wanton fancies at first, which would have been acknowledged the

original of them, if they had been warily observed. A grown person

surfeiting with honey no sooner hears the name of it, but his fancy

immediately carries sickness and qualms to his stomach, and he cannot

bear the very idea of it; other ideas of dislike, and sickness, and

vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturbed; but he knows

from whence to date this weakness, and can tell how he got this

indisposition. Had this happened to him by an over-dose of honey when

a child, al the same effects would have followed; but the cause would

have been mistaken, and the antipathy counted natural.

8. Influence of association to be watched educating young children.

I mention this, not out of any great necessity there is in this present

argument to distinguish nicely between natural and acquired antipathies;

but I take notice of it for another purpose, viz. that those who have

children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their

while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue connexion

of ideas in the minds of young people. This is the time most susceptible

of lasting impressions; and though those relating to the health of the

body are by discreet people minded and fenced against, yet I am apt

to doubt, that those which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and

terminate in the understanding or passions, have been much less

heeded than the thing deserves: nay, those relating purely to the

understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most men wholly overlooked.

9. Wrong connexion of ideas a great Cause of Errors.

This wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and

independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so great

force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions,

reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one

thing that deserves more to be looked after.

10. As instance.

The ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness

than light: yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind

of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be

able to separate them again so long as he lives, but darkness shal ever

afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so

joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.

11. Another instance.

A man receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and

that action over and over, and by ruminating on them strongly, or much,

in his mind, so cements those two ideas together, that he makes them

almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he

suffered comes into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes

them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds

are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions, and quarrels

propagated and continued in the world.

12. A third instance.

A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place; he saw his friend

die in such a room: though these have in nature nothing to do one with

another, yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings

(the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with

it: he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the

other.

13. Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind, which Reason cannot cure.

When this combination is settled, and while it lasts, it is not in the

power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. Ideas

in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their

natures and circumstances. And here we see the cause why time cures

certain affections, which reason, though in the right, and al owed to be

so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those

who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child that

was the daily delight of its mother's eyes, and joy of her soul, rends

from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her al the

torment imaginable: use the consolations of reason in this case, and

you were as good preach ease to one on the rack, and hope to al ay, by

rational discourses, the pain of his joints tearing asunder. Til time

has by disuse separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss, from

the idea of the child returning to her memory, all representations,

though ever so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some in whom the

union between these ideas is never dissolved, spend their lives in

mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.

14. Another instance of the Effect of the Association of Ideas.

A friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and

offensive operation. The gentleman who was thus recovered, with great

sense of gratitude and acknowledgment owned the cure al his life

after, as the greatest obligation he could have received; but, whatever

gratitude and reason suggested to him, he could never bear the sight of

the operator: that image brought back with it the idea of that agony

which he suffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable

for him to endure.

15. More instances.

Many children, imputing the pain they endured at school to their books

they were corrected for, so join those ideas together, that a book

becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and

use of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to

them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure

of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough, that some men cannot

study in, and fashions of vessels, which, though ever so clean and

commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reason of some

accidental ideas which are annexed to them, and make them offensive; and

who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance,

or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him,

but because, having once on some occasion got the ascendant, the idea of

authority and distance goes along with that of the person, and he that

has been thus subjected, is not able to separate them.

16. A curious instance.

Instances of this kind are so plentiful everywhere, that if I add one

more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a young

gentleman, who, having learnt to dance, and that to great perfection,

there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt. The

idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself

with the turns and steps of all his dances, that though in that chamber

he could dance excellently wel , yet it was only whilst that trunk was

there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that or some

such other trunk had its due position in the room. If this story shall

be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances, a little

beyond precise nature, I answer for myself that I had it some years

since from a very sober and worthy man, upon his own knowledge, as I

report it; and I dare say there are very few inquisitive persons who

read this, who have not met with accounts, if not examples, of this

nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

17. Influence of Association on intellectual Habits.

Intellectual habits and defects this way contracted, are not less

frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the ideas of being and

matter be strongly joined, either by education or much thought; whilst

these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings,

will there be about separate spirits? Let custom from the very childhood

have joined figure and shape to the idea of God, and what absurdities

will that mind be liable to about the Deity? Let the idea of

infallibility be inseparably joined to any person, and these two

constantly together possess the mind; and then one body in two places at

once, shall unexamined be swal owed for a certain truth, by an implicit

faith, whenever that imagined infallible person dictates and demands

assent without inquiry.

18. Observable in the opposition between different Sects of philosophy

and of religion.

Some such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to

establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of

philosophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their

followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth

offered by plain reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in

the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so

universal a perverseness, as that every one of them to a man should

knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be al owed to do what

al pretend to, i.e. to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must

be something that blinds their understandings, and makes them not see

the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus

captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from

common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking

of: some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are, by

education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in

their minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no

more separate them in their thoughts than if they were but one idea,

and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon,

demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the

foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of al the errors in

the world; or, if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most

dangerous one, since, so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing

and examining. When two things, in themselves disjoined, appear to the

sight constantly united; if the eye sees these things riveted which are

loose, where wil you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two

ideas that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds as to

substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without

perceiving it themselves? This, whilst they are under the deceit of

it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as

zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error;

and the confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connexion

of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their

heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences.

19. Conclusion.

Having thus given an account of the original, sorts, and extent of our

IDEAS, with several other considerations about these (I know not whether

I may say) instruments, or materials of our knowledge, the method I at

first proposed to myself would now require that I should immediately

proceed to show, what use the understanding makes of them, and what

KNOWLEDGE we have by them. This was that which, in the first general

view I had of this subject, was al that I thought I should have to do:

but, upon a nearer approach, I find that there is so close a connexion

between ideas and WORDS, and our abstract ideas and general words have

so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to

speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which all consists

in propositions, without considering, first, the nature, use, and

signification of Language; which, therefore, must be the business of the

next Book.

END OF VOLUME I

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