unto Esau, as being the First-born of Isaac, if himself had not sold it, (Gen. xxv. 30.) or that the Father
had not otherwise appointed.
XVI. Saint Paul writing to the Corinthians, 1 Epist. vi., reprehends the Corinthians of that City for going
to Law one with another before infidell Judges who were their enemies, calling it a fault, that they would
not rather take wrong, and suffer themselves to be defrauded; for that is against that Law, whereby we
are commanded to be helpful to each other. But if it happen the Controversie be concerning things
necessary, what is to be done? Therefore the Apostle, Ver. 5. speaks thus, I speak to your shame. Is it
so that there is not one wise man among you, no, not one that shall be able to judge between his
brethren? He therefore, by those words confirmes that Law of Nature which we call'd the fifteenth, to
wit, Where Controversies cannot be avoided, there by the consent of Parties to appoint some Arbiter,
and him some third man; so as (which is the 16 Law) neither of the Parties may be judge in his own
Cause.
XVII. But that the Judge, or Arbiter, must receive no reward for his Sentence, (which is the 17. Law)
appears, Exod. xxiii. 8. Thou shalt take no gift; for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous. Eccles. xx. 29. Presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise. Whence it followes, that he must not be more oblig'd to one part than the other, which is the 19. Law, and is also confirm'd, Deut. i.
17. Ye shall not respect Persons in Judgment, ye shall hear the small as well as the great; and in all
those places which are brought against respect of Persons.
XVIII. That in the judgement of Fact, witnesses must be had, (which is the 18. Law) the Scripture not
only confirmes, but requires more than one, Deut. xvii. 6. At the mouth of two witnesses, or three
witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death. The same is repeated, Deut. xix. 15.
XIX. Drunkennesse, which we have therefore in the last place numbred among the breaches of the
Naturall Law, because it hinders the use of right Reason, is also forbid in sacred Scripture for the same
reason. Prov. xx. 1. Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging, whosoever is deceived thereby is not
wise. And Prov. xxxi. 4, 5. It is not for Kings to drink wine, lest they drink, and forget the Law, and pervert the judgement of any of the afflicted: but that we might know that the malice of this vice
consisted not formally in the quantity of the drink, but in that it destroyes Judgement and Reason, it
fol owes in the next Verse, Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish, and wine to those that be
heavy of heart. Let him drink, and forget his poverty, and remember his misery no more. Christ useth
the same reason in prohibiting drunkenesse, Luk. xxi. 34. Take heed to your selves, lest at any time
your hearts be overcharg'd with surfetting and drunkennesse.
XX. That we said in the foregoing Chapter, The Law of Nature is eternall, is also prov'd out of Matth. v.
18. Verily I say unto you, till Heaven and Earth Passe, one jot, or one tittle, shall in no wise Passe from the Law, and Psal. cxix. 160. Every one of thy righteous judgements endureth for ever.
XXI. We also said, That the Lawes of Nature had regard chiefly unto Conscience; that is, that he is just,
who by all possible endeavour strives to fulfill them. And although a man should order al his actions
(so much as belongs to externall obedience) just as the Law commands, but not for the Lawes sake,
but by reason of some punishment annext unto it, or out of Vain glory, yet he is unjust. Both these are
proved by the Holy Scriptures. The first, Isaiah lv. 7. Let the wicked forsake his way, and unrighteous
man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he wil have mercy upon him, and to our God,
for he will abundantly pardon. Ezek. xviii. 31. Cast away from you all your transgressions whereby you have transgressed, & make you a new heart, and a new spirit; for why will you die O house of Israel?
By which, and the like places, we may sufficiently understand that God will not punish their deeds
whose heart is right. The second out of Isaiah xxix. 13, 14. The Lord said, Forasmuch as this people
draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips doe honour me, but have removed their heart far
from me, therefore I will proceed, &c. Mat. v. 20. Except your righteousnesse shall exceed the righteousnesse of the Scribes and Pharisees ye shall in no case enter into the Kingdom of Heaven;
and in the following verses our Saviour explains to them how that the commands of God are broken,
not by Deeds only, but also by the Will; for the Scribes and Pharises did in outward act observe the
Law most exactly, but for Glories sake onely; else they would as readily have broken it. There are
innumerable places of Scripture in which is most manifestly declar'd that God accepts the Will for the
Deed, and that as well in good, as in evill actions.
XXII. That the Law of Nature is easily kept, Christ himself declares in Matthew xi. 28, 29, 30. Come
unto me, &c. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, &c. for my yoke is easie, and my burthen light.
XXIII. Lastly, the Rule by which I said any man might know whether what he was doing, were contrary
to the Law, or not, to wit, what thou wouldst not be done to, doe not that to another, is almost in the self
same words delivered by our Saviour, Mat. vii. 12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men
should do unto you, do you even so to them.
XXIV. As the law of nature is all of it Divine, so the Law of Christ by conversion, (which is wholly
explain'd in the v. vi. and vii. Chapter of S. Matthewes Gospell) is all of it also (except that one
Commandement of not marrying her who is put away for adultery, which Christ brought for explication
of the divine positive Law, against the Jewes, who did not rightly interpret the Mosaicall Law) the
doctrine of Nature: I say the whole Law of Christ is explain'd in the fore-named Chapters, not the whole
Doctrine of Christ; for Faith is a part of Christian Doctrine, which is not comprehended under the title of
a Law; for Lawes are made, and given, in reference to such actions as follow our will, not in order to
our Opinions, and, Belief which being out of our power, follow not the Will.
Dominion
Chapter V.
Of the causes, and first begining of civill Government
I. It is of it selfe manifest, that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope, and
feare, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good, or lesse evill, likely to happen to them by the
breach, than observation of the Lawes, they'l wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which each
man hath of his security, and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint
his neighbour, either openly, or by stratagem. Whence we may understand, that the naturall lawes,
though well understood, doe not instantly secure any man in their practise, and consequently, that as
long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others, there remains to every man that same
primitive Right of selfe-defence, by such means as either he can or will make use of (that is) a Right to
all things, or the Right of warre; and it is sufficient for the fulfiling of the naturall law, that a man be
prepared in mind to embrace Peace when it may be had.
II. It is an old saying, That al lawes are silent in the time of warre, and it is a true one, not onely if we
speak of the civill, but also of the naturall lawes, provided they be referr'd not to the mind, but to the
actions of men, by the third Chapter, Art. 29. And we mean such a war as is of all men against all men;
such as is the meer state of nature; although in the warre of nation against nation a certain mean was
wont to be observed. And therefore in old time there was a manner of living, and as it were a certain
oeconomy, which they called leotrikon, living by Rapine, which was neither against the law of nature,
(things then so standing) nor voyd of glory to those who exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their
custome was, taking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from Oxen fit for plough, and every
instrument serviceable to husbandry, which yet is not so to be taken, as if they were bound to doe thus
by the law of nature, but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by too much cruelty, they
might be suspected guilty of feare.
III. Since therefore the exercise of the naturall law is necessary for the preservation of Peace, and that
for the exercise of the naturall law security is no lesse necessary, it is worth the considering what that is
which affords such a security: for this matter nothing else can be imagined, but that each man provide
himselfe of such meet helps, as the invasion of one on the other may bee rendered so dangerous, as
either of them may think it better to refrain, than to meddle. But first it is plain, that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on the
other side, is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure, and hartens the enemy to attacque us. It
is therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained, that the number of them
who conspire in a mutuall assistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the enemies party
may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory.
IV. Farthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on selfe-defence, if yet they agree
not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compasse this, but every man after his
own manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done; because that divided in their
opinions they will be an hinderance to each other, or if they agree well enough to some one action
through hope of victory, spoyle, or revenge, yet afterward through diversity of wits, and Counsels, or
emulation, and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so torne and rent, as they will
neither give mutuall help, nor desire peace, except they be constrained to it by some common feare.
Whence it followes, that the consent of many, (which consists in this onely, as we have already defined
in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions to the same end, and the common good) that is
to say, that the society proceeding from mutuall help onely, yeelds not that security which they seek for,
who meet, and agree in the exercise of the above-named lawes of nature; but that somewhat else must
be done, that those who have once consented for the common good, to peace and mutuall help, may
by fear be restrained, lest afterward they again dissent, when their private Interest shall appear
discrepant from the common good.
V. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls Politique, not man only, but divers others; as
the Ant, the Bee, &c. which though they be destitute of reason, by which they may contract, and submit
to government, notwithstanding by consenting, (that is to say) ensuing, or eschewing the same things,
they so direct their actions to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions.
Yet is not their gathering together a civill government, and therefore those animals not to be termed
politicall, because their government is onely a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as
is necessary in civill government) one will. It is very true that in those creatures, living only by sense
and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of any thing more to secure it,
and (by consequence) to preserve peace among them, than barely their naturall inclination. But among
men the case is otherwise. For first among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment;
among beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and warre, is among
men; among beasts no such matter. Next, the naturall appetite of Bees, and the like creatures, is
conformable, and they desire the common good which among them differs not from their private; but
man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more
than that which others doe possesse. Thirdly, those creatures which are voyd of reason, see no defect,
or think they see none, in the administration of their Common-weales; but in a multitude of men there
are many who supposing themselves wiser than others, endeavour to innovate, and divers Innovators
innovate divers wayes, which is a meer distraction, and civill warre. Fourthly, these brute creatures,
howsoever they may have the use of their voyce to signify their affections to each other, yet want they
that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is
represented to it as being better, and evill as worse than in truth it is; But the tongue of man is a
trumpet of warre, and sedition; and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant
speeches thundered, and lightened, and confounded whole Greece it selfe. Fiftly, they cannot
distinguish between injury and harme; Thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellowes: But those men are of most trouble to the Republique, who have most leasure
to be idle; for they use not to contend for publique places before they have gotten the victory over
hunger, and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutall creatures is naturall, that of men by compact
onely, (that is to say) artificiall; it is therefore no matter of wonder if somewhat more be needfull for men
to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent, or contracted society, without some common
power whereby particular men may be ruled through feare of punishment, doth not suffice to make up
that security which is requisite to the exercise of naturall justice.
VI. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace,
and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that in those necessary matters which concern Peace and
selfe-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be done, unlesse every man will so
subject his will to some other one, to wit, either Man or Counsell, that whatsoever his will is in those
things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in generall, and
of every one in particular. Now the gathering together of many men who deliberate of what is to be
done, or not to be done, for the common good of all men, is that which I call a COUNSELL.
VII. This submission of the wils of all those men to the will of one man, or one Counsell, is then made,
when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that
one man, or counsell, to which he hath submitted himselfe; that is, that he refuse him not the use of his
wealth, and strength, against any others whatsoever (for he is supposed still to retain a Right of
defending himselfe against violence) and this is called UNION. But we understand that to be the will of
the counsell, which is the will of the major part of those men of whom the Counsell consists.
VIII. But though the will it self be not voluntary, but only the beginning of voluntary actions (for we will
not to will, but to act) and therefore falls least of all under deliberation, and compact; yet he who
submits his will to the will of an other, conveighs to that other the Right of his strength, and faculties;
insomuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted hath so much power,
as by the terrour of it hee can conforme the wills of particular men unto unity, and concord.
IX. Now union thus made is called a City, or civill society, and also a civill Person; for when there is one
will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one Person, and by the word ( one) it is to be knowne, and
distinguished from all particular men, as having its own Rights and properties; insomuch as neither any
one Citizen, nor all of them together (if we except him whose will stands for the will of all) is to be
accounted the City. A CITY therefore (that we may define it) is one Person, whose will, by the compact
of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use al the power and faculties of
each particular person, to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.
X. But although every City be a civill Person, yet every civill Person is not a City; for it may happen that
many Citizens, by the permission of the City, may joyne together in one Person, for the doing of certain
things. These now will be civill Persons, as the companies of Merchants, and many other Convents; but
Cities they are not, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the company simply, and
in all things, but in certain things onely determined by the City; and on such termes as it is lawfull for
any one of them to contend in judgement against the body it selfe of the sodality; which is by no means
allowable to a Citizen against the City; such like societies therefore are civill Persons subordinate to the
City.
XI. In every city, That Man, or Counsell, to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will (so as
hath been declared) is said to have the SUPREME POWER, or CHIEFE COMMAND, or DOMINION;
which Power, and Right of commanding, consists in this, that each Citizen hath conveighed all his
strength and power to that man, or Counsell; which to have done (because no man can transferre his
power in a naturall manner) is nothing else than to have parted with his Right of resisting. Each Citizen,
as also every subordinate civill Person, is called the SUBJECT of him who hath the chiefe command.
XII. By what hath been sayed, it is sufficiently shewed, in what manner, and by what degrees many
naturall Persons, through desire of preserving themselves, and by mutuall feare, have growne together
into a civill Person, whom we have called a City. But they who submit themselves to another for feare,
either submit to him whom they feare, or some other whom they confide in for protection; They act
according to the first manner who are vanquished in warre, that they may not be slain; they according
to the second, who are not yet overcome, that they may not be overcome. The first manner receives its
beginning from naturall Power, and may be called the naturall beginning of a City; the latter from the
Counsell, and constitution of those who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence it is,
that there are two kinds of Cities, the one naturall, such as is the paternall, and despoticall; the other
institutive, which may be also called politicall. In the first the Lord acquires to himselfe such Citizens as
he will; in the other the Citizens by their own wills appoint a Lord over themselves, whether he be one
man, or one company of men endued with the command in chiefe. But we will speak in the first place of
a City politicall or by institution, and next of a City naturall.
Chapter VI.
Of the right of him, whether Counsell, or one Man onely, who hath the supreme power in the City
I. We must consider first of all what a multitude 1 of men (gathering themselves of their owne free wills
into society) is, namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one hath his owne
will, and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be propos'd. And though by particular
Contracts each single man may have his own Right, and Propriety, so as one may say This is mine, the
other, That is his; yet will there not be any thing of which the whole multitude, as a Person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, This is mine, more than anothers. Neither must we ascribe any action to
the multitude, as it's one, but (if all, or more of them doe agree) it will not be an Action, but as many
actions, as Men. For although in some great Sedition, it's commonly said, That the People of that City
have taken up Armes; yet is it true of those onely who are in Armes, or who consent to them. For the
City, which is one Person, cannot take up Armes against it selfe. Whatsoever therefore is done by the
multitude, must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he,
who being in the Multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the things that were done by
it, must be judg'd to have done nothing. Besides, in a multitude not yet reduc'd into one Person, in that
manner as hath been said, there remaines that same state of nature in which all things belong to all
men and there is no place for Meum & Tuum, which is call'd Dominion, and Propriety, by reason that that security is not yet extant which we have declar'd above to be necessarily requisite for the practise
of the Naturall Laws.
II. Next, we must consider that every one of the Multitude (by whose meanes there may be a beginning
to make up the City) must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded by any
one in the Assembly, that be received for the will of all which the major part shall approve of; for
otherwise there will be no will at all of a Multitude of Men, whose Wills and Votes differ so variously.
Now if any one will not consent, the rest notwithstanding shall among themselves constitute the City
without him: Whence it will come to passe, that the City retaines its primitive Right against the
Dissentour, that is, the Right of war, as against an Enemy.
III. But because we said in the foregoing Chapter, the sixth Article, That there was requir'd to the
security of men, not onely their Consent, but also the Subjection of their wills in such things as were
necessary to Peace and Defence; and that in that Union, and Subjection, the nature of a City
consisted; We must discerne now in this place, out of those things which may be propounded,
discuss'd, and stated in an Assembly of men, (all whose wills are contain'd in the will of the major part)
what things are necessary to Peace, and common defence: But first of all, it is necessary to Peace, that
a man be so farre forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live securely, that is, that
he may have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men
altogether safe from mutuall harmes, so as they cannot be hurt, or injuriously kill'd, is impossible, and
therefore comes not within deliberation. But care may be had there be no just cause of fear; for security
is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others, which if it be not had, no man is suppos'd to
have submitted himselfe to ought, or to have quitted his Right to all things, before that there was a care
had of his security.
IV. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those who are now growing up into a City,
doe covenant with the rest, either by words, or writing, Not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like Lawes; for the pravity of humane disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how
little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties, through conscience of their promises. We
must therefore provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments; and there is then
sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as
apparently it prove a greater evill to have done it, than not to have done it: for all men, by a necessity of
nature, chuse that which to them appears to be the lesse evill.
V. Now the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every man Contracts not
to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this Right, The Sword of Justice. But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves, or their near friends are to
suffer.
VI. Because therefore for the security of particular men, and, by consequence for the common peace, it
is necessary that the right of using the Sword for punishment, be transferred to some Man or Counsell,
that Man or Counsell is necessarily understood by Right to have the supreme Power in the City. For he
that by Right punisheth at his own discretion, by Right compells all men to all things which he himselfe
wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.
VII. But in vain doe they worship peace at home, who cannot defend themselves against forrainers;
neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against forrainers, whose forces are not united; and
therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars, that there be some one Counsell, or one
man, who hath the Right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many Citizens in all dangers, and on all
occasions, as shall be needfull for common defence against the certain number, and strength of the
enemy; and again, (as often as he shall finde it expedient) to make peace with them. We must
understand therefore, that particular Citizens have conveighed their whole Right of Warre, and Peace,
unto some one Man or Counsell; And that this right (which we may call the Sword of Warre) belongs to
the same Man, or Counsell, to whom the Sword of Justice belongs; for no Man can by Right compell
Citizens to take up armes, and be at the expences of Warre, but he who by Right can punish him who
doth not obey. Both Swords therefore, as well this of War