a mixt Monarchie forsooth. But if it were possible that there could be such a State, it would no whit
advantage the liberty of the subject; for as long as they all agree, each single Citizen is as much
subject as possibly he can be; but if they disagree, the State returns to a Civill War, and the Right of
the private Sword, which certainly is much worse than any subjection whatsoever: But that there can be
no such kind of Government 1 hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter, Artic: 6-12.
V. Let us see a little now in the constituting of each Form of Government, what the constitutours doe.
Those who met together with intention to erect a City, were almost in the very act of meeting a
Democraty; for in that they willingly met, they are suppos'd oblig'd to the observation of what shall be
determin'd by the major part: which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourn'd to some certain dayes, and
places, is a clear Democraty; for that convent, whose will is the will of all the Citizens, hath the
Supreme Authority; and because in this Convent every man is suppos'd to have a Right to give his
voice, it followes, that it is a Democraty by the definition given in the first Article of this Chap. But if they depart, and break up the Convent, and appoint no time, or place, where, and when they shall meet
again, the publick weal returns to Anarchy, and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is,
to the state of all men warring against all. The People therefore retains the supreme power no longer
than there is a certain day and place publiquely appointed, and known, to which whosoever will, may
resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times, and places,
that is in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer demos, the People, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attribute any Action, or Right: Two things therefore frame a Democratie, whereof
one (to wit the perpetuall prescription of Convents) makes demos, the People, the other (which is a plurality of voyces) to kratos or the power.
VI. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the People, so as to maintain its supremacy, to have some
certain known times, and places of meeting, unlesse that either the intervals of the times be of lesse
distance, than that any thing may in the mean time happen whereby (by reason of the defect of power)
the City may be brought into some danger, or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be,
during the intervall, granted to some one man, or Councell. For unlesse this be done, there is not that
wary care, and heed taken for the defence and Peace of single men which ought to be, and therefore
will not deserve the name of a City, because that in it for want of security, every mans Right of
defending himselfe at his own pleasure, returns to him again.
VII. Democraty is not framed by contract of particular persons with the People, but by mutuall compacts of single men each with other. But hence it appears in the first place, that the Persons contracting,
must be in being before the contract it selfe. But the People is not in being before the constitution of government, as not being any Person, but a multitude of single Persons; wherefore there could then no
contract passe between the People and the Subject. Now, if after that government is framed, the
subject make any contract with the People, it is in vain, because the People contains within its will, the
will of that subject to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure
disengage it selfe, and by consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that single
Persons doe contract each with other may be inferred from hence, that in vain sure would the City have
been constituted, if the Citizens had been engaged by no contracts to doe, or omit what the City should
command to be done or omitted. Because therefore such kind of compacts must be understood to
passe as necessary to the making up of a City, but none can be made (as is already shewed) between
the Subject and the People; it followes, that they must be made between single Citizens, namely that
each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on condition that the rest also doe the
like, as if every one should say thus, I give up my Right unto the People for your sake, on condition,
that you also deliver up yours, for mine.
VIII. An Aristocraty, or Councell of Nobles endued with supreme authoritie, receives its originall from a Democraty, which gives up its Right unto it; where we must understand that certain men distinguisht
from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or some other Character, are propounded to the People,
and by plurality of voyces are elected; and being elected, the whole Right of the People, or City, is
conveighed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the People might doe before, the same by Right may
this Court of elected Nobles now doe. Which being done, it is clear that the People, considered as one
Person, (its supreme authority being already transferred on these) is no longer now in being.
IX. As in Democraty the People, so in an Aristocraty the Court of Nobles is free from all manner of
obligation; for seeing subjects not contracting with the People, but by mutuall compacts among
themselves, were tyed to all that the People did, hence also they were tyed to that act of the People in
resigning up its Right of government into the hands of Nobles. Neither could this Court, although
elected by the People, be by it obliged to any thing; for being erected, the People is at once dissolved,
as was declared above, and the authority it had as being a Person utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the
obligation which was due to the Person must also vanish, and perish together with it.
X. Aristocraty hath these considerations, together with Democraty; First, that without an appointment of some certain times, and places, at which the Court of Nobles may meet, it is no longer a Court, or one
Person, but a dissolute multitude without any supreme power; Secondly, that the times of their
assembling cannot be disjoyned by long intervalls, without prejudice to the supreme power, unlesse its
administration be transferred to some one man: Now the reasons why this happens, are the same
which we set down in the fifth Article.
XI. As an Aristocratie, so also a monarchy is derived from the Power of the People, transferring its Right, (that is) its Authoritie on one man: Here also we must understand, that some one man, either by
name, or some other token, is propounded to be taken notice of above all the rest, and that by a
plurality of voyces the whole Right of the People is conveighed on him, insomuch as whatsoever the
People could doe before he were elected, the same in every Respect may he by Right now doe, being
elected; which being done, the People is no longer one Person, but a rude multitude, as being only one
before by vertue of the supreme command, whereof they now have made a conveyance from
themselves on this one Man.
XII. And therefore neither doth the Monarch oblige himselfe to any for the command he receives, for he
receives it from the People; but as hath been shewed above, the People, as soon as that act is done,
ceaseth to be a Person; but the Person vanishing, all obligation to the Person vanisheth. The subjects therefore are tyed to perform obedience to the Monarch, by those compacts only by which they
mutually obliged themselves to the observation of all that the People should command them, (that is) to
obey that Monarch, if he were made by the People.
XIII. But a Monarchy differs as well from an Aristocraty, as a Democratie, in this chiefly, that in those there must be certain set times and places for deliberation, and consultation of affaires, that is, for the
actual exercise of it in all times, and places; For the People, or the Nobles not being one naturall
Person must necessarily have their meetings. The Monarch who is one by nature, is alwayes in a
present capacity to execute his authority.
XIV. Because we have declared above in the 7. 9. and 12. Articles, that they who have gotten the
supreme command are by no compacts obliged to any man, it necessarily followes, that they can doe
no injury to the subjects; for injury according to the definition made in the third Article of the third Chapter, is nothing else but a breach of contract: and therefore where no contracts have part, there can
be no injury. Yet the People, the Nobles, and the Monarch may diverse wayes transgresse against the
other Lawes of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely, and other like vices, which come not under
this strict, and exact notion of injury. But if the subject yeeld not obedience to the supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious as well to his fellow subjects, because each man hath
compacted with the other to obey, as to his chief Ruler, in resuming that Right, which he hath given
him, without his consent. And in a Democraty, or Aristocraty, if any thing be decreed against any Law of nature, the City it selfe (i.e.) the civill Person sinnes not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed; for sinne is a consequence of the naturall expresse will, not of the politicall, which is
artificiall; for if it were otherwise, they would be guilty, by whom the decree was absolutely disliked: But
in a Monarchie, if the Monarch make any decree against the Lawes of nature, he sins himselfe, because in him the civill will and the naturall are all one.
XV. The people who are about to make a Monarch, may give him the supremacy either simply without limitation of time, or for a certaine season; and time determined; if simply, we must understand that he
who receives it, hath the selfe-same power which they had, who gave it, on the same grounds:
therefore that the People by Right could make him a Monarch, may he make another Monarch:
insomuch as the Monarch to whom the command is simply given, receives a Right not of possession
onely, but of succession also, so as he may declare whom hee pleaseth for his successor.
XVI. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must have regard to somewhat more than the bare
gift onely: First, whether the People conveighing its authority, left it selfe any Right to meet at certain times, and places, or not. Next, if it have reserved this power, whether it were done, so as they might
meet before that time were expired, which they prescribed to the Monarch. Thirdly, whether they were
contented to meet onely at the will of that temporary Monarch and not otherwise. Suppose now the
People had delivered up its Power to some one man for term of life onely; which being done, let us
suppose in the first place, that every man departed from the Counsell without making any order at all
concerning the place where (after his death) they should meet again to make a new election. In this
case it is manifest by the fifth Article of this Chapter, that the People ceaseth to be a Person, and is become a dissolute multitude, every one whereof hath an equall, to wit, a naturall Right to meet with
whom he lists at divers times, and in what places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engrosse
the supreme power to himselfe, and settle it on his own head. What Monarch soever therefore hath a
command in such a condition, he is bound by the Law of nature (set down in the [8.] Article of the third Chapter of not returning evill for good) prudently to provide, that by his death the City suffer not a
dissolution, either by appointing a certain day & place, in which those subjects of his who have a mind
to it may assemble themselves, or else by nominating a successor: whether of these shall to him seem
most conducible to their common benefit. He therefore who on this foresaid manner hath received his
command during life, hath an absolute Power, and may at his discretion dispose of the succession. In
the next place, if we grant that the people departed not from the election of the temporary Monarch, before they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his death, then the Monarch being dead,
the authority is confirmed in the people, not by any new acts of the subjects, but by vertue of the former
Right; for all the supreme command (as Dominion) was in the People, but the use, and exercise of it
was only in the temporary Monarch, as in one that takes the benefit, but hath not the Right. But if the
People after the election of a temporary Monarch, depart not from the Court before they have
appointed certain times, and places to convene, during the time prescribed him (as the Dictators in
ancient times were made by the People of Rome) such an one is not to be accounted a Monarch, but
the Prime Officer of the People; and if it shall seem good, the People may deprive him of his office
even before that time, as the People of Rome did, when they conferred an equall power on Minutius,
Master of the horse, with Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made Dictator. The reason
whereof is, that it is not to be imagined, that, whether Man or Counsell who hath the readiest, and most
immediate power to act, should hold his command on such termes as not to be able actually to execute
it; for command is nothing else but a Right of commanding, as oft as nature allowes it possible. Lastly,
if the People having declared a temporary Monarch, depart from the Court on such termes, as it shall not be lawfull for them to meet without the command of the Monarch, we must understand the People
to be immediately dissolved, and that his authority who is thus declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is
not in the power of all the subjects to frame the City anew, unlesse he give consent who hath now
alone the authority. Nor matters it, that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his Subjects
on some certain times, since there remains no Person now in being, but at his discretion, to whom the
promise was made. What we have spoken of these four cases of a People electing a Temporary
Monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing them with an absolute Monarch, who hath no heir apparent; for the People is Lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no Heir but whom it
self doth appoint. Besides, the spaces between the times of the subjects meeting may be fitly compar'd
to those times wherein the Monarch sleepes, for in either the Acts of commanding ceases, the Power
remaines: Farthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet againe, is the death of the
People; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the death of a man: As therefore a King,
who hath no Heir, going to his rest, so as never to rise again, (i.e.) dying, if he commit the exercise of
his Regall Authority to any one till he awake, does by consequence give him the Succession; the
People also electing a Temporary Monarch, and not reserving a power to convene, delivers up to him the whole Dominion of the Country: Furthermore, as a King going to sleep for some season, entrusts
the administration of his Kingdome to some other, and waking takes it again; so the people having
elected a Temporary Monarch, and withall retaining a right to meet at a certain day, and place, at that day receives its supremacy again. And as a King who hath committed the execution of his Authority to
another, himself in the mean while waking, can recall this commission againe when he pleaseth; so the
People, who during the time prescribed to the Temporary Monarch, doth by Right convene, may if they please, deprive the Monarch of his Authority. Lastly, the King, who commits his Authority to another
while himself sleeps, not being able to wake againe till he whom he entrusted, give consent, loses at
once both his power, and his life; so the people, who hath given the Supreme Power to a temporary
Monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is absolutely dissolv'd, and the
power remaines with him whom they have chosen.
XVII. If the Monarch promise ought to any one, or many subjects together, by consequence whereof the
exercise of his power may suffer prejudice, that Promise or Compact whether made by Oath, or without it, is null: for all Compact is a conveyance of Right, which by what hath been said in the fourth Article of the second Chapter, requires meet, and proper signes of the Will in the conveyer. But he who
sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his Right to the means necessary to that end. Now he who hath promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the
Supreme Power, and yet retaines the Power it selfe, gives sufficient tokens, That he no otherwise
promis'd it then so farre forth as the power might be retain'd without it. Whensoever therefore it shall
appear that what is promis'd cannot be perform'd without prejudice to the Power, the promise must be
valued as not made, (i.e.) of no effect.
XVIII. We have seen how Subjects, nature dictating, have oblig'd themselves by mutuall Compacts to
obey the Supreme Power. We will see now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are releas'd
from these bonds of obedience. And first of all this happens by rejection, namely, if a man cast off, or forsake, but conveigh not the Right of his Command on some other; for what is thus rejected, is openly
expos'd to all alike, catch who catch can; whence again, by the Right of nature, every subject may heed
the preservation of himselfe according to his own judgement. In the second place, If the Kingdome fall
into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them, we must
understand that he, who before had the Supreme Authority, hath now lost it: For when the Subjects
have done their full indeavour to prevent their falling into the enemies hands, they have fulfill'd those
Contracts of obedience which they made each with other, and what, being conquer'd, they promise
afterwards, to avoid death, they must, with no lesse endeavour, labour to performe. Thirdly, in a
Monarchy, (for a Democraty, and Aristocraty cannot fail) if there be no successour, all the subjects are
discharg'd from their obligations; for no man is suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom, for in such a
case it were impossible to perform ought. And by these three wayes all subjects are restor'd from their
civill subjection to that liberty, which all men have to all things, to wit, naturall, and salvage, (for the
naturall state hath the same proportion to the Civill, I mean liberty to subjection, which Passion hath to
Reason, or a Beast to a Man:) Furthermore, each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by
the will of him who hath the Supreme Power, namely, if he change his soile, which may be done two
wayes, either by permission, as he, who gets license to dwell in another Country; or Command, as he,
who is Banisht: In both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country, because he is tyed to
observe those of the latter.
1. But that there can be no such kinde of Government. Most men grant, That a Government ought not
to be divided, but they would have it moderated, and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very
reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of moderating, and limiting, do
understand dividing it, they make a very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not onely Kings,
but all other Persons endued with Supreme Authority would so temper themselves as to commit no
wrong, and onely minding their charges contain themselves within the limits of the naturall, and divine
Lawes: But they who distinguish thus, they would have the chief Power bounded, and restrain'd by
others; which, because it cannot be done, but that they who doe set the limits, must needs have some
part of the Power, whereby they may be enabled to doe it, the Government is properly divided, not
moderated.
Chapter VIII.
Of the Rights of Lords over their Servant
I. In the two fore-going Chapters we have treated of an institutive, or fram'd Government, as being that which receives its originall from the consent of many, who by Contract and Faith mutually given, have
oblig'd each other. Now followes, what may be said, concerning a naturall Government, which may also
be call'd, Acquired, because it is that which is gotten by power, and naturall force. But we must know in the first place by what means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons of men. Where
such a Right is gotten, there is a kind of a little Kingdome; for to be a King, is nothing else but to have Dominion over many Persons; and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom, & a Little Kingdome a Family. Let
us return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and
suddainly (like Mushromes) come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other: There
are but three wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion over the Person of another; whereof the
first is, if by mutuall Contract made between themselves (for Peace, & self-defences sake) they have
willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some man, or Councel of Men, & of this we
have already spoken. The 2d is, If a man taken Prisoner in the Wars, or overcome; or else distrusting
his own forces, (to avoid Death) promises the Conquerour, or the stronger Party, his Service, i.e. to do all whatsoever he shall command him; in which Contract the good which the vanquisht, or inferiour, in
strength doth receive, is the grant of his life, which by the Right of War in the naturall state of men he
might have depriv'd him of, but the good which he promises, is his service and obedience. By vertue
therefore of this promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquisht, to the
vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns the Divine Lawes; for he who is oblig'd to obey
the Commands of any man before he knowes what he will command him, is simply, and without any
restriction tyed to the performance of all Commands whatsoever. Now he that is thus tyed, is call'd a
SERVANT, he to whom he is tyed, a LORD. Thirdly, there is a Right acquir'd over the Person of a Man,
by Generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following Chapter.
II. Every one that is taken in the War, and hath his life spar'd him, is not suppos'd to have Contracted
with his Lord; for every one is not trusted with so much of his naturall liberty, as to be able, if he desir'd
it, either to flie away, or quit his service, or contrive any mischief to his Lord. And these serve indeed
but within Prisons, or bound within Irons, and therefore they were call'd not by the common name of
Servant onely, but by the peculiar name of Slave, even as now at this day un serviteur, and un serf or un esclave have diverse significations.
III. The obligation therefore of a Servant to his Lord ariseth not from a simple grant of his life, but from hence rather, That he keeps him not bound, or imprison'd, for all obligation derives from Contract; but
where's no trust, there can be no Contract, as appears by the 2. Chap. Artic. 9. where a Compact is
defin'd to be the promise of him who is trusted. There is therefore a confidence and trust which
accompanies the benefit of pardon'd life, whereby the Lord affords him his corporall liberty; so that if no obligation, nor bonds of Contract had happen'd, he might not onely have made his escape, but also
have kill'd his Lord, who was the preserver of his life.
IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants as are restrain'd by imprisonment, or bonds, are not
comprehended in that definition of Servants given above, because those serve not for the Contracts
sake, but to the end they may not suffer; and therefore if they flie, or kill their Lord, they offend not against the Lawes of Nature, for to bind any man is a plain signe, that the binder supposes him that is
bound not to be sufficiently tyed by any other obligation.
V. The Lord therefore hath no less Dominion over a Servant that is not, than over one that is bound, for
he hath a Supreme Power over both, and may say of his Servant no lesse than of another thing,
whether animate, or inanimate, This is mine; whence it followes, that whatsoever the Servant had
before his servitude, that afterwards becomes the Lords; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten
for his Lord: for he that can by Right dispose of the Person of a man, may surely dispose of all those
things which that Person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the Servant may retaine as
his own against the will of his Lord; yet hath he, by his Lords distribution, a propriety, and Dominion
over his own goods, insomuch as one Servant may keep, and defend them against the invasion of his
fel ow Servant, in the same manner as hath been shewed before, th