Chapter 2
1 J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, Lecture IV, pp. 139, 140.
2 J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, Lecture V, p. 183.
3 J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, Lecture VIII, pp. 302, 303.
4 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 3 (p. 10); in chapter 3, Rawls phrases this as follows: “[the first principles of justice] are those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would accept […]”, A Theory of Justice, § 20 (p. 102).
5 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 43 (p. 248).
6 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 78 (p. 453).
7 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 86 (p. 497).
8 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 46 (p. 266).
9 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 25 (p. 128).
10 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 77 (p. 442).
11 I will use ‘animal’ in the sense of non-human animal, unless specified otherwise.
12 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 3 (p. 15), § 77 (p. 441). Cf., though in a different context, J. FICHTE, Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, § 22 (p. 246): “Wie es in Beziehung auf die vernunftlose Natur keine Rechte giebt, eben so wenig giebt es in Beziehung auf sie Pflichten” (“Just as there are no rights regarding nature, being devoid of reason, there are no duties with regard to it.”).
13 Cf. Th. HOBBES, Leviathan, Ch. 14 (p. 97): “To make Covenants with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another: and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.”
14 Cf. P. SINGER, Practical Ethics, pp. 18, 19. Rawls does not discuss the position of such people in detail (and does not include them in his assumption (cf. note 2, supra)), and even deals with physical impairments only in passing (J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, Lecture V, p. 184).
15 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 14 (p. 74).
16 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 39 (p. 222).
17 Lloyd Thomas reaches a similar conclusion when he remarks that: “[…] there is a problem about how it is possible to avoid drawing back the veil, as one hardly can remain ignorant of one’s capacities for rational deliberation in the original position”, “Equality Within the Limits of Reason Alone”, pp. 549, 550.
18 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 77 (p. 443). In order to paint a representative picture of RAWLS’s position, it must be added that he leaves it open whether moral personality is, besides a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice, a necessary condition (A Theory of Justice, § 77 (pp. 441, 442)).
19 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 77 (p. 446).
20 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 25 (p. 124).
21 I say ‘presumably’, since I suspend judgment about such matters altogether here.
22 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 60 (p. 348). It is also clear from the following: “[…] moral personality is characterized by two capacities: one for a conception of the good, the other for a sense of justice. When realized, the first is expressed by a rational plan of life, the second by a regulative desire to act upon certain principles of right” (A Theory of Justice, § 85 (p. 491)).
23 J. RAWLS, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, § 23 (p. 81). The parallel with Kant’s work is, incidentally, already clear in A Theory of Justice (e.g., § 40 (p. 221-227)).
24 J. RAWLS, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, § 23 (p. 82). In addition, the account of ‘rationality’ in Political Liberalism is relatively complex; means-ends reasoning and self-interest do not exclusively constitute it (Lecture II, pp. 50, 51).
25 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 60 (p. 348).
26 Whether it has a meaning at all is not an issue here, as this would result in a meta-ethical analysis that would mean too great a detour to justify, given the confines of this inquiry.
27 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 18 (p. 95).
28 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 18 (p. 95).
29 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 62 (p. 356).
30 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 62 (p. 357).
31 MacIntyre puts it, somewhat more poignantly, as follows: “[…] the introduction of the word ‘intuition’ by a moral philosopher is always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with an argument”, After Virtue, p. 69. A radical stance in this regard is taken by Cappelen, who argues that philosophers don’t even genuinely rely on intuitions (Philosophy without Intuitions, e.g., pp. 3, 18, 115).
32 Which is something else than ‘immoral’. It