Chapter 3
1 Justice as fairness “[…] conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair”, J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 3 (p. 11).
2 R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 182.
3 J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, § 3 (p. 10); cf. chapter 2, note 4.
4 R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, p. 181.
5 R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 198, 199.
6 Indeed, this is the way Nussbaum approaches the matter: “We should probably avoid thinking that dignity has an obvious specific content all on its own: it seems to be a notion that gets fleshed out through its relationship with other notions, such as that of respect (dignity is that attribute of a person that makes the person an appropriate object of respect), and a variety of more specific political principles”, The New Religious Intolerance, p. 62. This still carries with it the need to explain what is meant by ‘respect’, of course. Nussbaum considers conscience to be the source of respect (“Liberty of Conscience: The Attack on Equal Respect”, p. 342), but this does not yield much, for the reasons put forward in chapters 4 and 5.
7 R. DWORKIN, Sovereign Virtue, p. 126.
8 R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 226, 227; cf. A Matter of Principle, p. 190, and Sovereign Virtue, p. 11.
9 R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 272, 273.
10 R. DWORKIN, Justice for Hedgehogs, Chs. 2-6 (pp. 23-122).
11 R. DWORKIN, Justice for Hedgehogs, pp. 25, 31. ‘Dignity’ is an important notion in this work (e.g., p. 204), but for the present discussion it does not yield any relevant results.
12 R. DWORKIN, Sovereign Virtue, p. 1.
13 ARISTOTLE, Politica, 1279b.
14 Th. HOBBES, De Cive (the English version), Ch. 7, § 3 (p. 108).
15 Conversely, a government can be democratically legitimate without adhering to the rule of law (as I said in the introduction (vide note 11), in the case of liberal democracy this is somewhat more complicated); cf. C. SCHMITT, Verfassungslehre, p. 258: “Der demokratische Gesetzbegriff ist ein politischer, kein rechtstaatlicher Gesetzbegriff; er geht aus von der potestas des Volkes und besagt, daß Gesetz alles ist, was das Volk will; lex est quod populus jussit […].” (“The democratic concept of law is a political concept, not one of a state of law (‘Rechtsstaat’); it is based on the power of the people and expresses that law is anything the people wants; the law is what the people has commanded.”) Besides, ‘state of law’, or ‘Rechtsstaat’, is no clearly delineated term (cf. C. SCHMITT, Legalität und Legitimität, p. 19). Alternatively, one may argue that governing legitimately includes equal concern for those that are governed and respecting their freedom (R. DWORKIN, Justice for Hedgehogs, p. 2), but that is just a matter of vocabulary (whether something meets one’s criterion depends on the definition with which one starts).
16 J. RAZ, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue”, p. 14. Schmitt, when dealing with ‘freedom’ in this context, puts it as follows: “Domestic political freedom is the principle of the civil state of law (‘Rechtsstaat’), which modifies the principles of political form when it is joined with them, whether they be monarchical, aristocratic or democratic.” (“Die innerpolitische Freiheit ist das Prinzip des bürgerlichen Rechtstaates, das zu den politischen Formprinzipien – mögen sie nun monarchisch, aristokratisch oder demokratisch sein – modifizierend hinzutritt.”), Verfassungslehre, p. 224.
17 For example, in article 20a of the German Constitution the position of (inter alia) animals is considered, but the article starts as follows: “Der Staat schützt auch in Verantwortung für die künftigen Generationen die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen und die Tiere…” (“The state protects, mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the natural foundations of life and animals…”), so that animals are (at least partly) considered, just as natural resources, as means (for future human beings).
18 R. DWORKIN, Sovereign Virtue, p. 128.
19 L. POJMAN, “Are Human Rights Based on Equal Human Worth?”, p. 609.
20 R. DWORKIN, Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 9.
21 Cf. Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s notions of an ‘end in itself’ (“Zweck an sich”, or “Zweck an sich selbst”) and ‘absolute value’ (“absoluter Werth”) in Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, p. 161. (This important part of Kant’s philosophy will be discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4.) Schopenhauer goes so far as to say that these definitions affront logic (Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, p. 161) as relative terms are formulated as if they were absolute.
22 Cf. A. SCHOPENHAUER, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, p. 162.
23 R. DWORKIN, Is Democracy Possible Here?, p. 35.