Chapter 5
1 I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 299/B 356.
2 I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 302/B 359.
3 I do not explicate here the crucial distinction in Kant’s theoretical philosophy between understanding (‘Verstand’) and reason (‘Vernunft’), as this would digress needlessly from the topic at hand.
4 I. KANT, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 435, 436; cf. notes 15 and 19, infra.
5 I. KANT, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 87. Autonomy (of the will) is defined by Kant (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 440) as “the state of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any state of the objects of volition).” (“[…] die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch derselbe ihm selbst (unabhängig von aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände des Wollens) ein Gesetz ist.”)
6 E.g., I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 532 ff./B 560 ff., A 702/B 730, A 800 ff./B 828 ff.
7 I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 435.
8 “Autonomy is the basis of the dignity of human and every reasonable nature.” (“Autonomie ist […] der Grund der Würde der menschlichen und jeder vernünftigen Natur.”), I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 436.
9 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, pp. 10-17.
10 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 10. On p. 24, Kateb says of human stature: “Human stature is essentially an existential, not a moral, value.”
11 Indeed, any objection must, I think, be such: the matter cannot be resolved a priori.
12 This is a, not the (only), difficulty, for several other issues remain which make Kant’s position
difficult to uphold; in some respects, the criticism of KATEB’s position can be directed at Kant’s as well.
13 I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 448, 461; on pp. 458, 459, Kant puts it as follows: “[…] alsdann würde die Vernunft alle ihre Grenze überschreiten, wenn es sich zu erklären unterfinge, wie reine Vernunft praktisch sein könne, welches völlig einerlei mit der Aufgabe sein würde, zu erklären, wie Freiheit möglich sei.” (“Reason would exceed all its limits if it were to undertake to explain how pure reason could be practical, which would be completely identical to the task to explain how freedom would be possible.”)
14 I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 449, 459. In Kritik der reinen Vernunft and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, this topic is dealt with in greater detail. This is not the place to elaborate on this theme.
15 I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 434, 435.
16 “[…] human dignity cannot depend on autonomy as its ultimate justification because most people, no matter how favorable the circumstances to individuality, will never break out of conformity to the extent that autonomy demands”, G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 108. Strictly speaking, by the way, this observation does not strike Kant’s viewpoint, as the place where he locates autonomy, if it exists at all, is not to be found through experience (pursuant to the characteristic distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal realms (e.g., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 42, 43/B 59, 60, A 238, 239/B 298)), but that very fact may be said to be part of the problem in that it contributes to the elusiveness of the notion.
17 “[…] Moralität [ist] die Bedingung, unter der allein ein vernünftiges Wesen Zweck an sich selbst sein kann, weil nur durch sie es möglich ist, ein gesetzgebend Glied im Reiche der Zwecke zu sein. Also ist Sittlichkeit und die Menschheit, so fern sie derselben fähig ist, dasjenige, was allein Würde hat”, I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 435.
18 Cf. I. KANT, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 408, 426, 428, 430, 436, 447.
19 I. KANT, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 435, 436.
20 I. KANT, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 436. A similar stance is exhibited by Fichte (Über die Würde des Menschen, pp. 87-89).
21 Schopenhauer observes, based on a similar line of thought as the one mentioned above (vide chapter 3, note 21), that value, and, a fortiori, ‘human dignity’, is to be understood as a relative rather than an absolute notion (Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, p. 166).
22 I. KANT, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, pp. 122-134.
23 I leave it to the reader whether he is indeed, perhaps with some effort, able to do this. I myself am not: for me, the word has no meaning, and no concept corresponds with it. One may use ‘autonomy’ in a ‘diluted’ way, referring to the liberty citizens have (expressed, e.g., through the political and legal rights that are the topic of this inquiry), but that is not a concept that would correspond with the encompassing (and literal) one of ‘autonomy’ addressed here. This means that Rawls’s notion of ‘full autonomy’, which is presented as a political rather than an ethical value (Political Liberalism, Lecture II, pp. 77, 78), may be upheld while the problems with a notion such as ‘rational autonomy’, which is said to be “[…] shown in [persons’] exercising their capacity to form, to revise, and to pursue a conception of the good, and to deliberate in accordance with it” (Lecture II, p. 72), are apparent in light of the considerations presented above (although it must be granted that Rawls’s version of even this variety of autonomy seems less ambitious than Kant’s).
24 B. SKINNER, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 14. Perhaps Skinner is also correct in saying: “Autonomous man is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed from our ignorance, and as our understanding increases, the very stuff of which he is composed vanishes”, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 200.
25 Taking the term ‘egalitarian’ in the radical interpretation, manifested in communism.
26 This has already been propagated by Mandeville (The Fable of the Bees, Part 2: Sixth Dialogue, pp. 414, 415, 429, 430). (Mandeville does not address fundamental rights here, but rather specific rewards (profits), but the analysis is essentially the same.)
27 I. KANT, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 214.
28 I. KANT, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 214, 219.
29 A situation such as the penalization of attempt (i.e., the failed attempt to commit a crime), in which case, strictly speaking, a motive is the critical aspect, must not be confused with this observation, since it is still irrelevant, except when the punishment is concerned, which motive may have been decisive (in the case of a justification, the outcome is significantly different, no punishment being administered, but the motive is in that case, too, not important to make an appeal to it).
30 Why human beings are those whose freedom (not in the ‘moral’ sense) must be taken into consideration, and why they must therefore be the bearers of rights, is not explicated by Kant when he presents this as the fundamental tenet