Chapter 4
1 E.g., M. NUSSBAUM, Frontiers of Justice, p. 79: “The basic intuitive idea of my version of the capabilities approach is that we begin with a conception of the dignity of the human being, and of a life that is worthy of that dignity […].”
2 The first part of the following text corresponds with what is said in my review of George Kateb’s Human Dignity, which appeared in Dialogue, vol. 51, no. 2 (2012), pp. 329-333.
3 This brings to mind Hobbes’s remark that philosophy can only take place in a commonwealth (Leviathan, Ch. 46 (p. 459); cf. Ch. 13 (p. 89)).
4 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, pp. 5, 6.
5 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 9; cf. p. 18.
6 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 8.
7 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 17.
8 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 133.
9 Incidentally, it would be a non sequitur to conclude from the mere fact that the human species is unique that it should eo ipso be ‘elevated’ in some way compared to the other species. One need only point to some conspicuous actions in history that humans uniquely perform to know that caution in making such an inference is warranted. As far as I know, the systematic destruction of one’s own species and others, apart from that of the planet as a whole, is not behavior consistently manifested by any animal. Of course, the very reason why humans are, in contradistinction to animals, capable of performing such acts in the first place may be said to testify to the presence of a special quality, but if the mere capacity to act in some way or other (i.e., in a positive of negative, or, less vaguely, desirable or non-desirable way) is sufficient to have ‘human dignity’, this may perhaps be said to detract from the notion’s value (irrespective of the more fundamental issue of its possible semantic voidness).
10 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, pp. 22, 23. Kateb does not ignore animals’ suffering, though, and speaks of animal rights as “[…] made up of two components: the quasi-moral and the quasi-existential, in analogy with human rights”, Human Dignity, p. 117.
11 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 21.
12 Ch. TAYLOR, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p. 196. Incidentally, in Sources of the Self, Taylor upholds a contingent sense of ‘dignity’, so to speak, and points out its problems involved with it: “[…] my sense of myself as a householder, father of a family, holding down a job, providing for my dependants; all this can be the basis of my sense of dignity. Just as its absence can be catastrophic, can shatter it by totally undermining my feeling of self-worth. Here the sense of dignity is woven into this modern notion of the importance of ordinary life, which reappears again on this axis”, Sources of the Self, pp. 15, 16.
13 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 8; cf. p. 115.
14 E.g., G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 179.
15 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 19.
16 The fact that he does not characterize the matter in such a way does not, of course, relieve him of the task to take the problem seriously.
17 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, pp. 125, 126; cf. p. 179.
18 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 30.
19 One may define ‘dignity’ as “[…] a matter of status – one’s status as a member of society in good standing” (J. WALDRON, “Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate”, pp. 1611, 1612 (cf. p. 1610)), but while this provides a notion that has practical merit, it would be difficult to underpin it in terms of the present discussion, especially if it is added that “Philosophically speaking, we may say that dignity is inherent in the human person – and so it is.”, “Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate”, p. 1612.
20 It is not necessary to dwell on the issue of whether praise is in each case warranted. The example is merely used to make a point.
21 The contrast with those who are quite unable to walk (some handicapped people) is of course irrelevant here.
22 Cf. C. SCHMITT, Verfassungslehre, p. 227 and Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, p. 14. On p. 17 of the latter work, he says: “Eine absolute Menschengleichheit wäre […] eine Gleichheit, die sich ohne Risiko von selbst versteht, eine Gleichheit ohne das notwendige Korrelat der Ungleichheit und infolgedessen eine begrifflich und praktisch nichtssagende, gleichgültige Gleichheit.” (“An absolute equality of human beings would be an equality that is understood by itself without any risk, an equality without the necessary correlate of inequality and consequently an equality that is both conceptually and practically void and indifferent.”)
23 G. W. F. HEGEL, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 49 (pp. 102, 103).
24 L. POJMAN, “Are Human Rights Based on Equal Human Worth?”, p. 621.
25 Th. HOBBES, Leviathan, Ch. 10 (p. 63): “The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another.”
26 Th. HOBBES, Leviathan, Ch. 10 (p. 63).
27 I place the word between inverted commas as it may not have been contrived but rather (gradually) have become a workable notion. If this is indeed the case, the inquiry must be just as critical as when the outcome is a deliberate result.
28 Incidentally, any argumentation in which a criterion is used by humans to bestow ‘dignity’ on humans is suspicious for that reason alone, especially if other species (animals) are claimed to be deprived of it.
29 This brings to mind the dilemma with which Kateb finds (or should find) himself confronted (cf. section 4.5).
30 S. BENN, “Egalitarianism and the Equal Consideration of Interests”, p. 71.
31 This may be defined as follows: “To base judgements and/or treatment of an individual on their species where species is not relevant.” (J. TANNER, “The Argument from Marginal Cases: Is Species a Relevant Difference”, p. 228), or as “[…] a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species”, P. SINGER, Animal Liberation, p. 6.
32 D. A. LLOYD THOMAS, “Equality Within the Limits of Reason Alone”, p. 541.
33 G. KATEB, Human Dignity, p. 179.
34 J. TANNER, “The Argument from Marginal Cases: Is Species a Relevant Difference”, p. 228.
35 Cf. C. SCHMITT, Verfassungslehre, p. 226: “Daraus, daß alle Menschen Menschen sind, läßt sich weder religiös, noch moralisch, noch politisch, noch wirtschaftlich etwas Spezifisches entnehmen.” (“Nothing distinctive can be derived from the given that all human beings are human beings, be it in religious, moral, political or economic terms.”)
36 It features at the national level as well. Article 1 of the German constitution, e.g., starts as follows: “Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.” (“The dignity of man is inviolable. It is the duty of all state authority to respect and to protect it.”) Incidentally, ‘dignity’ seems not<