Chapter 7
1 ‘Movement’ is to be taken broadly, encompassing any action one may perform.
2 Cf. Th. HOBBES, Leviathan, Ch. 14 (p. 91), Ch. 21 (pp. 145, 146); De Cive (the English version), Ch. 9, § 9 (p. 125).
3 This statement can in practice be nuanced somewhat; there may, for example, be informal ways (within groups of people or communities) to steer individuals’ behavior. Still, any act to discourage the actions mentioned above must be considered to constitute a prohibition.
4 Cf. Th. HOBBES, De Cive (the English version), Ch. 13, § 15 (p. 165).
5 This is not to be confused with the conception that the state is also necessary for a full-fledged freedom to come to fruition, as Hegel claims (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 260 (pp. 337339); cf. § 153 (p. 235)). It is not surprising to find Hegel scorning the identification of freedom with the freedom to do whatever one wants (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 319 (p. 428)). Hegel defends a view of the state that is based on a separation I have not made, namely, between the state and civil society, considering the state from an ethical point of view while restricting the interest of individuals as the characteristic trait of civil society (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 258 (p. 329)). This is not the proper place to evaluate these views, and I already indicated in the introduction (note 7) that Hegel’s concept of ‘freedom’ is not inquired here, so that I suspend judgment on the matter here, as is justified, given the fact that I started without the aspiration to take a comprehensive stance (cf. my remark to this effect in the introduction).
6 Cf. J. LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, An Essay of Civil Government (the second Treatise), Ch. 6, § 57 (p. 370).