1 K. LOEWENSTEIN, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II”, p. 657.
2 Cf. K. LOEWENSTEIN, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I”, pp. 421, 422.
3 K. LOEWENSTEIN, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II”, pp. 657, 658.
4 Th. HOBBES, Leviathan, Ch. 18 (p. 124).
5 Th. HOBBES, Leviathan, Ch. 17 (pp. 117, 118).
6 I pointed out in section 7.2 that negative freedom is always to be understood within the context of a state. This is not to be taken to mean that freedom is to be practically hollowed out, which is the outcome, or at least danger, in Hobbes’s line of reasoning: “[…] when private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty, they ask not for liberty, but dominion, which yet for want of understanding, they little consider; for if every man would grant the same liberty to another, which he desires for himselfe, as is commanded by the law of nature, that same naturall state would return again, in which all men may by Right doe all things, which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse then all kind of civill subjection whatsoever. But if any man desire to have his single freedome, the rest being bound, what does he else demand but to have the Dominion? for who so is freed from all bonds, is Lord over all those that still continue bound”, Th. HOBBES, De Cive (the English version), Ch. 10, § 8 (p. 135).
7 This does not mean, however, that their concepts of freedom would differ, as Israel argues (Radical Enlightenment, pp. 258, 259). Spinoza does use various concepts of freedom (J. DOOMEN, “Spinozan Freedom”, pp. 53-58), but the one that is relevant here is negative freedom as Hobbes understands it (J. DOOMEN, “Spinozan Freedom”, pp. 60, 61); the difference between their outlooks (at least in this respect) is one of appreciation rather than of conception.
8 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 20 (p. 245).
9 Th. HOBBES, Leviathan, Ch. 20 (pp. 144, 145).
10 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 16 (p. 195).
11 Th. HOBBES, Leviathan, Ch. 30 (pp. 233, 234).
12 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 3 (p. 48).
13 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 20 (p. 241).
14 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 5 (pp. 73, 74), Ch. 16 (pp. 191-193).
15 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 16 (p. 195).
16 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 5 (p. 74), Ch. 16 (p. 194).
17 Incidentally, Hobbes’s philosophy is not fully a priori in nature (and those who designate him as an empiricist are not necessarily entirely mistaken), but rather partly based on a priori analyses and partly on empirical observations (J. DOOMEN, “A Systematic Interpretation of Hobbes’s Practical Philosophy”, pp. 467-469), but in the present respect the latter are absent.
18 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 17 (p. 201).
19 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 20 (p. 240).
20 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 20 (pp. 243, 244).
21 “[…] salvo summarum potestatum jure nemo quidem contra earum decretum agere potest, at omnino sentire, & judicare, & consequenter etiam dicere, modo simpliciter tantum dicat vel doceat, & sola ratione, non autem dolo, irâ, odio, nec animo aliquid in rempublicam ex authoritate sui decreti introducendi, defendat”, B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 20 (p. 241).
22 J. S. MILL, On Liberty, Ch. 2 (p. 252); cf. Ch. 2 (pp. 229, 243, 254), Ch. 3 (p. 267).
23 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 20 (p. 241). One may add to this that in order for a democratic state to function at all, free expression is necessary: “[…] freedom of expression is required in order for citizens to participate effectively in political life. […] Free expression means not just that you have a right to be heard. It also means that you have a right to hear what others have to say”, R. DAHL, “What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require?”, pp. 195, 196.
24 B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Ch. 20 (p. 243); cf. (with regard to the sciences) H. KELSEN, Was ist Gerechtigkeit?, Ch. 9, § 34 (pp. 42, 43).
25 This issue bears both on matters that are of a political nature and on those that are not (or not directly), Galileo’s statements alluded to above (i.e., the heliocentric thesis, expounded, inter alia, in the Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina of Lorraine, pp. 8, 44) being of the latter kind. One may in general say that “[…] ideas, systems and conceptions of all sorts can only prove themselves insofar as they are exposed to the risk of failing.” (“[…] bewähren können sich Ideen, Systeme und Konzeptionen aller Art nur insoweit, als sie dem Risiko des Scheiterns ausgesetzt werden.”) H. ALBERT, Plädoyer für kritischen Rationalismus, p. 17 (the political consequences of this perspective are discussed on pp. 69-75).
26 Cf. I. KANT, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nichts für die Praxis, part 2, p. 304.
27 To be clear, the fact that this is a positive reason does not detract from the fact that negative freedom remains at stake.
28 R. DWORKIN, Sovereign Virtue, p. 121. (In light of what I argued above, I cannot concur with