Freedom and Equality in a Liberal Democratic State by Jasper Doomen - HTML preview

Chapter 12

1. I add the latter phrase in order to account for the fact that justified views, such as scientific ones,  may also change thus. In that case, however, this happens because an unexpected discovery is made that is not reconcilable with the prevalent theory rather than on the basis of something as unstable as a majority preference.
2. G. W. F. HEGEL, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 257-261 (pp. 328-342); cf. chapter 7, note 5.
3. These are, together with the capacity to enter into relations with the other states, the criteria set forth in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.
4. The existence of a population is not to be taken to mean, then, that a stable view would for that reason be in place. Some territory being more or less permanently inhabited by a population says nothing about the individuals’ outlooks, and the most realistic assessment of the situation in a democratic state is that various interest groups are vying for influence, so that one may speak of a fiction when the people as a unity with shared interests is concerned (H. KELSEN, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie, § 2 (p. 15)). Such a unity may on the other hand be manifested when the whole is concerned, notably, against an external enemy or a natural disaster, but that is another matter.
5. By a ‘worldview’ I mean an encompassing view with regard to religious, metaphysical and/or ‘moral’ matters. It may here be identified with what Rawls calls a ‘fully comprehensive’ conception or doctrine, the latter meaning a doctrine that “[…] covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of thought […]”, J. RAWLS, Political Liberalism, Lecture V, p. 175. (In Lecture I, p. 13, virtually the same formulation (only substituting ‘system’ for ‘articulated scheme of thought’) is used for a ‘fully comprehensive conception’.)
6. J. RAZ, The Morality of Freedom, p. 124.
7. Strictly speaking, the issue is slightly more complicated. Prescriptive equality is maintained, in a sense, but it bears on the equal treatment of worldviews rather than of citizens. Precisely for this reason it becomes meaningless when the relevant sense is concerned: the equal treatment of citizens is not prescribed by all worldviews, and if those worldviews that do not prescribe (or even condemn) such equal treatment cannot be treated differently from those that do (which is the situation in which material equality is accepted), prescriptive equality in the relevant sense cannot be maintained.
8. S. FISH, The Trouble with Principle, p. 4.
9. Even a worldview that – radically – includes all subjects, and thus maintains that all living beings should be treated – basically – equally is not based on a neutral starting point. Such a worldview would, using being alive, or being able to suffer, as the criterion to be treated equally, e.g. promote protecting all animals against being killed for their meat, even if this interferes with the interests of those who wish to do so. A state that would act in accordance with such a worldview (presuming this is possible) would have to take a stance against eating meat, and thus fail to take a neutral stance in treating beings equally. This is the clearest example of a situation in which the danger looms of confusing the extent of the subjects a (world)view includes with its – purportedly – neutral nature.
10. This may seem to complicate matters, and even contradict my own account (equal treatment (prescriptive equality) being based, after all, on citizens being basically equal, so that such equality seems to be presupposed), but it must be reminded that in the present discussion, ‘being equal’ points to citizens’ equality on the basis of a worldview, and is motivated by significantly different considerations than mine. This is easily understood if one considers that in any liberal democratic state, and in any state for that matter, basic equality (whatever its specification may be) must be acknowledged, while a worldview need not similarly serve as a directive.
11. As was remarked in various places, rationality is not necessarily the decisive criterion to specify basic equality, and I have merely argued its merit; as for the ignore principle, it may not be the decisive principle (namely, if I am simply mistaken), but it would then have to be replaced by a similar principle, which would either have to produce a non-neutral content, or, like the ignore principle, point to a domain where a non-neutral stance would, through a detour, be taken.
12. This does not preclude the possibility of a worldview incorporating basic rationality in its outlook, which is characteristic of the second worldview mentioned in the example above.
13. It may be argued that ‘libertarianism’ is a more fitting term to use here, but this is usually associated with the economic position of minimal government interference, a topic I have excluded from this inquiry, and I have observed this interpretation.
14. A. MACINTYRE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p. 339. Cf. chapter 1, note 15.
15. C. SCHMITT, Der Begriff des Politischen, § 9 (pp. 50-53).
16. C. SCHMITT, Der Begriff des Politischen, § 9 (p. 50). Liberalism, Schmitt argues, does not produce a political outlook of its own; its presence rather indicates that a domain appears where no political decisions are made, and any decision that is made is of another nature, such as economic.
17. In order not to be accused of committing a petitio principii, I will briefly indicate why the analysis does not include positive freedom (defined by Berlin as freedom to do or be something, in opposition to negative freedom, which stresses the freedom from something) (I. BERLIN, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, § 1, 2 (pp. 177, 178)). Positive freedom is not what I would deem characteristic of liberalism. There are variants of liberalism that incorporate it, but it is not a necessary element, nor is it exclusively found there: socialists, for example, can also claim to want to realize it. Negative freedom, on the other hand, is characteristic of liberalism.
18. That this absence is to be und