Freedom and Equality in a Liberal Democratic State by Jasper Doomen - HTML preview

Chapter 13

1. Presuming in each case, of course, that nothing is done which cannot reasonably be ignored. After all, the ignore principle applies to any worldview.
2. A complicating factor is that it is virtually impossible to speak of private domains to which all individuals would be confined (e.g., someone may belong to one domain on the basis of his religious conviction but belong to another on the basis of his political view (presuming these don’t fully overlap)); I have left this element out of the analysis since it would needlessly complicate matters.
3. I dealt with the problems involved with a word like ‘likely’ in sections 11.4 and 11.6, where the problems with the word ‘potentially’ and the phrase ‘possible consequences’ were addressed.
4. H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophie des Als Ob, part 1, Ch. 5 (pp. 46-49).
5. “[…] Weil die Gesetze nicht alle einzelnen Fälle in ihren Formeln umfassen können, so werden einzelne besondere Fälle abnormer Natur so betrachtet, als ob sie unter jene gehörten. Oder aus irgend einem praktischen Interesse wird ein einzelner Fall einem allgemeinen Begriff subsumiert, dem er eigentlich nicht angehört”, H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophie des Als Ob, part 1, Ch. 5 (p. 46).
6. “Die praesumtio ist eine Vermutung, die fictio ist eine absichtliche, eine bewusste Erfindung”, H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophie des Als Ob, part 1, Ch. 5 (p. 48).
7. H. VAIHINGER, Die Philosophie des Als Ob, part 1, Ch. 21 (pp. 144-153).
8. Of course, any individual – and, a fortiori, any political party – must, if the first part of this inquiry is correct, observe the demands of prescriptive equality, but those who operate on a conviction that does not accept basic rationality as the specification of basic equality may be hard to convince on the basis of rational analyses. (This is not to say, incidentally, that such a conviction is for that reason ‘wrong’ in any sense of the word; to support such a claim, or the contrary one, that it would be ‘right’ in any sense of the word, would necessitate an excursion to epistemology or meta-ethics and thus a transgression of the present inquiry’s limitations.)
9. This does not derogate from the fact that taxes must be paid for a state to prosper (or even function at all (cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 184 (p. 264)). The extent and distribution of the taxes and the way in which they are imposed are, then, the issues that lend themselves to discussions.
10. Cf. B. SPINOZA, Tractatus Politicus, Ch. 3, § 5 (p. 286): “[…] quia imperii corpus unâ veluti mente duci debet, & consequenter Civitatis voluntas pro omnium voluntate habenda est, id quod Civitas justum, & bonum esse decernit, tanquam ab unoquoque decretum esse, censendum est; atque adeò, quamvis subditus Civitatis decreta iniqua esse censeat, tenetur nihilominùs eadem exequi.” (“Because the body of the sovereignty is to be ruled as if by one mind and the will of the state is, consequently, to be taken to be the will of all, that which the state determines to be right and good is to be considered as if decreed by everyone, and therefore, however much the subject may judge the state decrees to be iniquitous, he is nonetheless bound to carry them out.”) (I have translated both ‘veluti’ and ‘tanquam’, I think justifiably, as ‘as if’ here; although one must avoid projecting one’s own thoughts on another’s line of reasoning, it would be difficult to read anything but a fictitious account here.) Incidentally, Rousseau, to whose thoughts these remarks bear a similarity, is more radical in this respect than Spinoza (e.g., J.-J. ROUSSEAU, Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Ch. 7 (p. 22)), especially if his ideas concerning the content of what he perceives to be the general will are taken into consideration (Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Ch. 1 (p. 31), Ch. 3 (pp. 35-37)). Such a view, presuming that a minority is necessarily mistaken (cf. chapter 6, note 21), I do not endorse, unless the general will is interpreted as a fiction. What complicates this issue is that ‘mistaken’ may be taken in two ways, first in the sense of ‘truth’, and second in the sense of what is most desirable. The majority may be mistaken in the first sense but not in the second, as what is most desirable is defined in a (liberal) democratic state by what the majority considers to be such. Chapter 16 will elaborate on this issue.
11. In a similar vein, Kant distinguishes between the ‘juridische’ (juridical) and ‘ethische’ (ethical) laws of freedom, the former regarding only external actions and their conformity to the law (Die Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 214, 219 (cf. chapter 5, notes 27 and 28). As he says further on (p. 225), “Die Übereinstimmung einer Handlung mit dem Pflichtgesetze ist die Gesetzmäßigkeit (legalitas) – die der Maxime der Handlung mit dem Gesetze die Sittlichkeit (moralitas) derselben”. (“The conformity of an action with the law of duty is legality; that of the maxim of an action with the law is its morality.”) What Kant argues with respect to ‘moral’ duties (on the basis of considerations such as those presented in chapter 5) constitutes a worldview.
12. It is crucial that one acknowledge the totalitarian character of this state of affairs, and that one not be led astray by an outcome one deems desirable. In other words, the fact that the equality mentioned is deemed desirable does not mean that the process that is intent on forcing people to acknowledge it is not, for that reason, totalitarian. The universal acknowledgement of the equality of men and women that follows in the case of the example just given (forgoing here the fact that acknowledgement cannot be enforced, just as no one can be forced to believe something) may indeed be considered something desirable, but it comes at the expense of losing the freedom to express (or in very extreme – totalitarian – cases even preserve) one’s own viewpoint, which may for some people amount to losing part of their identity. This may in itself be considered sufficient not to force an outlook on people, but I would in addition point out that some people may consider such an intrusion on the private domain sufficient justification to (violently) resist a government implementing such policies.
13. It would be difficult to argue that the state, apart from those that govern the people, should have any view at all, as was indicated in chapter 12. Still, I am not using this space to cavil about semantic matters (besides, one might metaphorically speak thus) but would rather point out that a state need not acknowledge such equality. (Since some specification of basic equality must in any case be acknowledged by citizens in a liberal democratic state, at least insofar as the outward acts are concerned, the difference will in practice be nonexistent.)
14. This dichotomy is describ