Freedom and Equality in a Liberal Democratic State by Jasper Doomen - HTML preview

REMAINING ISSUES

1. In the gravest conditions, one’s economic situation obviously outweighs one’s political needs; a starving person is not even able to express himself, let alone concerned (at that moment) with the right to do so. Economic equality may therefore be said to be at least on a par with formal equality, which would lead to other rights (cf. H. SHUE, Basic Rights, pp. 7, 8, 24, 25, 29, 30, 70, 75, 78, 81, 82) (I do not agree, by the way, with Shue’s characterization of ‘moral’ rights (o.c., p. 13)).
2. I add this caveat since this situation does apply (at least in theory) in a system such as communism.
3.  Irrespective of that, it would be nigh impossible to realize material equality if other than pecuniary aspects were taken into consideration. Someone who is unemployed may not merely care about money but may want to work, and – more dramatically – a handicapped person may wish to function as ‘normal’ people do.
4. L. W. SUMNER, “Incitement and the Regulation of Hate Speech in Canada: A Philosophical Analysis”, p. 207.
5.  I add the phrase ‘at this level’, since external factors, such as a natural  disaster or a commonly  shared enemy, may contribute to the rise of the desired stability, but, first, such factors, while providing a union, would presumably render a situation dire enough to render the present issue moot, and, second, there would be no reason to presume that once they would abide the union would continue to exist, so that the stability problem would once again arise.