attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another, what he
would not have done to himselfe. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do
any thing contrary to that Law, it is a Crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and
perswade men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth to
disobedience of the Lawes of this Country, though he be never so well perswaded of the truth
of what he teacheth, he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not onely
because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in
another, namely, that comming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the Religion there.
But ignorance of the Civill Law, shall Excuse a man in a strange Country, till it be declared to
him; because, till then no Civill Law is binding.
Ignorance of the Civill Law excuseth sometimes.
In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not so sufficiently declared, as
he may know it if he will; nor the Action against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good
Excuse: In other cases Ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.
Ignorance of the Soveraign excuseth not.
Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordinary residence, Excuseth him
not; because he ought to take notice of the Power, by which he hath been protected there.
Ignorance of the Penalty excuseth not.
Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth no man: For in breaking the
Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth
the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action,
accepteth all the known consequences of it; but Punishment is a known consequence of the
violation of the Lawes, in every Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined
already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment. For
it is reason, that he which does Injury, without other limitation than that of his own Will,
should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his Will whose Law is thereby
violated.
Punishments declared before the Fact, excuse from greater punishments after it.
But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it selfe, or hath been usually
inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent is Excused from a greate penalty. For the
punishment foreknown, if not great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to
it: because when men compare the benefit of their Injustice, with the harm of their
punishment, by necessity of Nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves: and
therefore when they are punished more than the Law had formerly determined, or more than
others were punished for the same Crime; it is the Law that tempted, and deceiveth them.
Nothing can be made a Crime by a Law made after the Fact.
No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because if the Fact be against the Law
of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it
be made; and therefore cannot be Obligatory. But when the Law that for-biddeth a Fact, is
made before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact, is lyable to the Penalty ordained
after, in case no lesser Penalty were made known before, neither by Writing, nor by Example,
for the reason immediatly before alledged.
False Principles of Right and Wrong causes of Crime
From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are prone to violate the Lawes,
three wayes. First, by Presumption of false Principles: as when men from having observed how
in all places, and in all ages, unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force, and victories of
those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the Cob-web Lawes
of their Country, the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been
esteemed the onely Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds of their
Reasoning, That Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever a man can get by his own
Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice of all Nations cannot be unjust: That
Examples of former times are good Arguments of doing the like again; and many more of that
kind: Which being granted, no Act in it selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the
Law, but) by the successe of them that commit it; and the same Fact be vertuous, or vicious,
as Fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a Crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Cæsar (the same Lawes standing) turn again into a Crime, to the perpetuall disturbance of the Peace of the Common-wealth.
False Teachers mis-interpreting the Law of Nature,
Secondly, by false Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby
repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes, such Doctrines of their own, or
Traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a Subject.
And false Inferences from true Principles, by Teachers.
Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens commonly to men that
are hasty, and præcipitate in concluding, and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have
both a great opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require
not time and study, but onely common experience, and a good naturall wit; whereof no man
thinks himselfe unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of Right and Wrong, which is no lesse
difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects in
Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse (though some of them may Extennate) a Crime, in
any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private businesse; much lesse in
them that undertake a publique charge; because they pretend to the Reason, upon the want
whereof they would ground their Excuse.
By their Passions;
Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one, is Vain-glory, or a foolish
over-rating of their own worth; as if difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches,
or bloud, or some other naturall quality, not depending on the Will of those that have the
Soveraign Authority. From whence proceedeth a Presumption that the punishments ordained
by the Lawes, and extended generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with
the same rigour they are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under
the name of the Vulgar.
Presumption of Riches,
Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the greatnesse of their
wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting publique
Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Mony, or other rewards.
And Friends;
And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular men, that have gained
reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage to violate the Lawes, from a hope of
oppressing the Power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.
Wisedome.
And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own Wisedome, take upon them to
reprehend the actions, and call in question the Authority of them that govern, and so to
unsettle the Lawes with their publique discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime, but what
their own designes require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all
such Crimes, as consist in Craft, and in deceiving of their Neighbours; because they think their
designes are too subtile to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their
own Wisdome. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of Common-wealth,
(which can never happen without a Civill Warre,) very few are left alive long enough, to see
their new Designes established: so that the benefit of their Crimes, redoundeth to Posterity,
and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they thought
they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive
themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their
own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than Children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.
And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall timorous,) are subject to Anger;
as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of
conversation: And there are few Crimes that may not be produced by Anger.
Hatred, Lust, Ambition, Covetousnesse, causes of Crime.
As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse, what Crimes they are apt to
produce, is so obvious to every mans experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing
to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and
all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred, but by extra-ordinary use of
Reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a
continuall, and unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans patience must be everlasting,
or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him: The former is
difficult; the later is many times impossible, without some violation of the Law. Ambition, and
Covetousnesse are Passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas
Reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of
impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in
the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie, or uncertain
punishments.
Fear sometimes cause of Crime, as when the danger is neither present, nor corporeall.
Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes, is Fear. Nay, (excepting
some generous natures,) it is the onely thing, (when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure
by breaking the Lawes,) that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be
committed through Feare.
For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely of corporeall hurt, which
we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding
him that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no Crime; because no man is
supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or
limbes, where the Law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because
from his actions, or his threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have
time, and means to demand protection, from the Soveraign Power,) is a Crime. Again, a man
receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries (for which they that made the Lawes, had
assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason, to take
notice of,) and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be
obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the Law, and protects
himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private revenge. This is a Crime: For the hurt is
not Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and (though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a
custome not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant
man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand
in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other
men, that tell him of strange Dreams and Visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt
him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do or omit, is contrary to the
Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime.
For (as I have shewn before in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the fancies
remaining in sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly received waking; and when
men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be reall Visions; and therefore he
that presumes to break the Law upon his own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or
upon other Fancy of the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth,
leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or
another private mans brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or
nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man
should have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of Nature, if any one have it) there could no
Law be made to hold, and so all Common-wealth would be dissolved.
Crimes not equall.
From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that all Crimes are not (as the
Stoicks of old time maintained) of the same allay. There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by
which that which seemed a Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by
which the Crime, that seemed great, is made lesse. For though all Crimes doe equally deserve
the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is equally crookednesse, which the
Stoicks rightly observed; yet it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than
that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not observing, held it as great a
Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill ones Father.
Totall Excuses.
That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of a Crime, can be none
but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the Law. For the fact
committed once against the Law, if he that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other
than a Crime.
The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law whereof a man has no
means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be
considered as a want of means; Nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the
Government of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Lawes of Nature;
because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only Children, and Madmen are Excused
from offences against the Law Naturall.
Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in the power of the
enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if it be without his own fault, the
Obligation of the Law ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or dye; and consequently
such obedience is no Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law faileth,) not
to protect himself, by the best means he can.
If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the Law, he is
totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And
supposing such a Law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, If I doe it not, I die
presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained; Nature therefore compells him to the fact.
When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve
himselfe any other way, but by some fact against the Law; as if in a great famine he take the
food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtaine for mony, nor charity; or in defence of his
life, snatch away another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason next before
alledged.
Excuses against the Author.
Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another, are by that authority Excused
against the Author; because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his
instrument: but it is not Excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the
violation of the Law, both the Author, and Actor are Criminalls. From hence it followeth that
when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, commandeth a man to do that
which is contrary to a former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not to
condemn it himselfe, because he is the Author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the
Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth
any thing to be done against his own former Law, the Command, as to that particular fact, is
an abrogation of the Law.
If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, disclaime any Right essentiall to the
Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the Subject, any liberty inconsistent with the
Soveraign Power, that is to say, with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall
refuse to obey the Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is neverthelesse
a Sinne, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for he ought to take notice of what is
inconsistent with the Soveraignty, because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own
defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the
evill consequence thereof. But if he not onely disobey, but also resist a publique Minister in the
execution of it, then it is a Crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of
the Peace,) upon complaint.
The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by the malignity of the
Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the
Effect; and Fourthly, by the concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.
Presumption of Power, aggravateth.
The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption of strength, riches, or
friends to resist those that are to execute the Law, is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from
hope of not being discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity by force, is a
Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all Lawes;
whereas in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him
more obedient for the future. A Crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same Crime
proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull: For he that committeth it against his own
conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same
again: but he that doth it by errour, after the errour shewn him, is conformable to the Law.
Evill Teachers, Extenuate.
Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or an Interpreter of the Law
publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory
pursute of his own principles, and reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by
publique Authority, the Common-wealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of Law, till the
same Authority controuleth it; and in all Crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the
Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth
his actions, on his private Judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof, to
stand, or fall.
Examples of Impunity, Extenuate.
The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is a greater Crime, than if
there have been many precedent Examples of impunity. For those Examples, are so many
hopes of Impunity, given by the Soveraign himselfe: And because he which furnishes a man
with such a hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in
the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.
Prœmeditation, Aggravateth.
A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the same ariseth from long
meditation: For in the former case there is a place for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of
humane nature: but he that doth it with præmeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his
eye, on the Law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane society; all
which in committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and postposed to his own appetite. But
there is no suddennesse of Passion sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the
first knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for a time of
deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to rectifie the irregularity of his
Passions.
Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people read, and interpreted; a
fact done against it, is a greater Crime, than where men are left without such instruction, to
enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and be informed by
private men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the
former, there is apparent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the Soveraign
Power.
Tacite approbation of the Soveraign, Extenuates.
Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker by other manifest signes
of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes, than the same facts, condemned both by the
Law, and Law-maker. For seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear in this case
two contradictory Lawes; which would totally Excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the
Soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his command. But
because there are punishments consequent, not onely to the transgression of his Law, but also
to the observing of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot
reasonably impute the whole Crime to the Delinquent. For example, the Law condemneth
Duells; the punishment is made capitall: On the contrary part, he that refuseth Duell, is
subject to contempt and scorne, without remedy; and sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe
thought unworthy to have any charge, or preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell,
considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the
Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished; seeing part of the fault
may be discharged on the punisher: which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or
any other kind of disobedience; but a care in Governours, not to countenance any thing
obliquely, which directly they forbid. The examples of Princes, to those that see them, are, and
ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes themselves. And though
it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be
performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow
that Precept.
Comparison of Crimes from their Effects.
Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects, First, the same fact, when it
redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And
therefore, when a fact hurteth, not onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it
is a greater Crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: for the former, is a fertile Crime, and
multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the
Religion established in the Common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than
in a private person: So also is it, to live prophanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act
whatsoever. Likewise in a Professor of the Law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that
tendeth to the weakning of the Soveraign Power, is a greater Crime, than in another man: Also
in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his counsells are followed, or his
actions imitated by many, his fact against the Law, is a greater Crime, than the same fact in
another: For such men not onely commit Crime, but teach it for Law to all other men. And
generally all Crimes are the greater, by the scandall they give; that is to say, by becomming
stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the
light that other men carry before them.
Lœsœ Majestas.
Also Facts of hostility against the present state of the Common-wealth, are greater Crimes,
than the same acts done to private men: For the dammage extends it selfe to all: Such are the
betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy;
also all attempts upon the Representative of the Common-wealth, be it a Monarch, or an
Assembly; and all endeavours by word, or deed to diminish the Authority of the same, either in
the present time, or in succession: which Crimes the Latines understand by Crimina lœsœ
Majestatis, and consist in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamentall Law.
Bribery and False testimony.
Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are greater Crimes, than Injuries
done to one, or a few persons; as to receive mony to give False judgement, or testimony, is a
greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; because not
onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements are rendered uselesse,
and occasion ministred to force, and private revenges. <