publique Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Common-
wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing
Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appeares by the late small Revenue of the Crown) Subject to
Alienation, and Diminution. It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the Common-wealth;
which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their
Representative.
The Places and matter of Traffique depend, as their Distribution, on the Soveraign.
As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what places, and for what
commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth to the Soveraign. For if it did
belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn
for gaine, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it
themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be neverthelesse noxious,
or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is, to
the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of forraign
Traffique.
The Laws of transferring propriety belong also to the Soveraign.
Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth, that every man have
a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few commodities, or a naturall property in some
usefull art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being
almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare,
and transferre their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutuall
contract. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the Soveraign,)
to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling,
exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what
words, and signes they shall be understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of
the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth, thus much (considering the
modell of the whole worke) is sufficient.
Mony the Bloud of a Common-wealth.
By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are not presently
consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to some thing of equall value, and
withall so portable, as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man
may have in what place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing
else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony. For Gold and Silver, being (as it happens) almost in all
Countries of the world highly valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all things else
between Nations; and Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Common-
wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the Subjects of that
Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all commodities, Moveable, and
Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all places of his resort, within and without the
place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-
wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as
this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in
like manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every
Member of the Body of Man.
And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self; they have first this
priviledge, that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few
Common-wealths; as being a common measure of the commodities of all places. But base
Mony, may easily be enhansed, or abased. Secondly, they have the priviledge to make
Common-wealths move, and stretch out their armes, when need is, into forraign Countries;
and supply, not only private Subjects that travell, but also whole Armies with Provision. But
that Coyne, which is not considerable for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being
unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the
change of Laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times of
those that have it.
The Conduits and Way of mony to the Publique use.
The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use, are of two sorts; One,
that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other, that Issueth the same out againe for
publique payments. Of the first sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second
are the Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall publique or
private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man maintains his resemblance with the
Naturall; whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the severall Parts of the Body, carry it to the
Heart; where being made Vitall, the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and
enable for motion all the Members of the same.
The Children of a Common-wealth Colonies.
The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or
Governour, to inhabit a Forraign Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd
then, by warre. And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of themselves,
discharged of their subjection to their Soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many
Common-wealths of antient time,) in which case the Common-wealth from which they went,
was called their Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then Fathers require of
the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestique government, which
is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies
of the people of Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces, and
parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of Colonies (saving Honour, and
League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their
Soveraign authorised them to Plant.
CHAP. XXV.
Of COUNSELL.
Counsell what.
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of
words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising
from the Imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides.
For the words Doe this, are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these
are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it
is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding
those phrases in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration
of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of
them that Command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the
conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and
render to those termes of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct
significations. I define them thus.
Differences between command, and Counsell.
COMMAND is where a man saith, Doe this, or Doe not this, without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth,
pretendeth thereby his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own | Will onely,
and the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.
COUNSELL, is where a man saith, Doe, or Doe not this, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that
giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he
giveth it.
Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that Command is directed
to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth
another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath
covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of
not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned
into the nature of a Command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a
right to be of another mans Counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe:
but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some
other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans will the proper object.
This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it, cannot
in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such
Counsell as he shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to his Soveraign,
(whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it,
whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition
in debate. For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended,
they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the
Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth
Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no
man else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to the
Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is
punishable by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse, where
every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is subject.
Exhortation and Dehortation what.
EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes in him that giveth it,
of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, Counsell vehemently pressed.
For he that Exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and
tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages him he Counselleth, to
Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their speeches,
a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make
use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their
Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.
From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation, is directed to the Good
of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a
Counsellour; who (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his
whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough,
by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificiall giving thereof; which being not required
of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed principally to his own
benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is Counselled, or not at all.
Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where a man is to speak to
a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and
examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to
enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.
Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are required to give Counsell, are corrupt
Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell they give be
never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just
Sentence for a reward, is a Just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father
in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not onely lawfull,
but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but Commands; which
when they are for Execution of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity
requireth to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of
Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.
Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take from the formes of
Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no
graven Image; Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill
not; Steale not, &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is
drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, Sell all
thou hast; give it to the poore; and follow me, are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have Treasure in
heaven. These words, Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me, are a Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words, Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of
Jesus, are Counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of
God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who
have no other means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for our sins.
Differences of fit and unfit Counsellours.
As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from the nature of
Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be
Counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may
also the differences between apt, and inept Counsellours be derived from the same. For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and
Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the Vertues, and
Defects of Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the
Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory, and Mentall
Discourse. But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one
dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall man receiveth his
experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or
interest of their own; whereas they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a
Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render
their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull. And therefore we may set down
for the first condition of a good Counsellour, That his Ends, and Interest, be not inconsistent
with the Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth.
Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes into deliberation, is to
make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly
and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may
make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant
and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore rash, and
unevident Inferences; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and
are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,) obscure,
confused, and ambiguous Expressions, also all metaphoricall Speeches, tending to the stirring
up of Passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the Office of a
Counsellour.
Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience, and long study; and no
man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the Administration of a great
Common-wealth are necessary to be known, No man is presumed to be a good Counsellour,
but in such Businesse, as he hath not onely been much versed in, but hath also much
meditated on, and considered. For seeing the businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to
preserve the people in Peace at home, and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall
find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government,
and of the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without study; And of
the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country, and their Neighbours; as also of
the inclinations, and designes of all Nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not
attained to, without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe, but every
one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than
ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel, as I have said before (Chap. 8.) is Judgement.
And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of
study, or businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be
Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the
world cannot equal his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no
such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the
best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.
Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse that hath reference
to another Common-wealth, It is necessary to be acquainted with the Intelligences, and Letters
that come from thence, and with all the records of Treaties, and other transactions of State
between them; which none can doe, but such as the Representative shall think fit. By which we
may see, that they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to
obtrude.
Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better Counselled by hearing
them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you
have the advice of every man; but in an Assembly many of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of
another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by
contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded
the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some
whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their Interests make
passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice. For the
Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like
many brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one another with
Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it.
Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or
probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions,
and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a
man is rather astonied, and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the
course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for
advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also
learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but
of the applause of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of
Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation,
and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided. Fourthly, in Deliberations that
ought to be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the
Counsells of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great
Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers, and of such persons as
are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.
To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell from a great Assembly of
Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of
marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his
private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that
doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting
apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed
in their proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has
no Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a framed Counsell,
which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is
commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and
like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other
frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of
them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most
of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it
be true, that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many
Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because
many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private
benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet
they never ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept
up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one
eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of
equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little
Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome can uphold
them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours.
CHAP. XXVI.
Of CIVILL LAWES.
Civill Law what.
BY CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore bound to observe, because
they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth.
For the knowledge of particular Lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes
of their severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall, to any man. The antient
Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the word Civitas, which signifies a Commonwealth: And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire, and governed by
that Law, retaine still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civill Law, to
distinguish it from the rest of their own Civill Lawes. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here, and there; but what is Law; as Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the Law.
And first it is manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell, but Command; nor a Command of
any man to any man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged
to obey him. And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which
is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.
Which considered, I define Civill Law in this manner. CIVILL LAW, Is to every Subject, those
Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient
Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule.
In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident. For every man seeth, that