Footnotes
1. Exod. 32. 1, 2.
2. Judges 2. 11.
3. 1 Sam. 8. 3.
CHAP. XIII.
Of the NATURALL CONDITION of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and
Misery.
Men by nature Equall.
NATURE hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee
found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet
when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as
that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend,
as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the
strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same
danger with himselfe.
And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and
especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science; which very
few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as
Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than
that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all
men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such
equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think
they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few
others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature
of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more
eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves:
For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that
men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the
equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.
From Equality proceeds Diffidence.
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore
if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they
become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation,
and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And
from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other
mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may
probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him,
not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.
From Diffidence Warre.
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so
reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can,
so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his
own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking
pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther
than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within
modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long
time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of
dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping
company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his
companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of
contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that
have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each
other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the
example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition;
Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation.
The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children,
and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in
their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.
Out of Civil States, there is alwayes Warre of every one against every one.
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all
in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man,
against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a
tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the
notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination
thereto of many dayes together; So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in
the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All
other time is PEACE.
The Incommodities of such a War.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every
man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what
their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there
is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of
the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much
force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of
man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should
thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may
therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the
same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a
journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks
his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knowes there bee
Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he
has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores;
and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse
mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The
Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that
proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made
they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall
make it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this;
and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where
they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of
small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all;
and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived
what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the
manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to
degenerate into, in a civill Warre.
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of
warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority,
because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of
Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their
Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon
their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of
their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of
particular men.
In such a Warre, nothing is Unjust.
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be
Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there
is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in
warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the
Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as
his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is
consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and
Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in;
though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his
Reason.
The Passions that incline men to Peace.
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are
necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason
suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These
Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak more
particularly, in the two following Chapters.
CHAP. XIV.
Of the first and second NATURALL LAWES, and of CONTRACTS.
Right of Nature what.
THE RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man
hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is
to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and
Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
Liberty what.
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of
externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do
what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his
judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.
A Law of Nature. what./Difference of Right and Law.
A LAW OF NATURE, ( Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by
which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means
of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For
though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas
LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as
Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.
Naturally every man has Right to everything./The Fundamentall Law of Nature.
And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a
condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his
own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in
preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a
Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right
of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or
wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And
consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour
Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek,
and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the
first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it. The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, By all means we can, to defend our selves.
The second Law of Nature.
From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace, is
derived this second Law; That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for
Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against
himselfe. For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he;
then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose
himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is
that Law of the Gospell; Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to
them. And that Law of all men, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.
What it is to lay down a Right.
To lay downe a mans Right to any thing, is to devest himselfe of the Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away
his Right, giveth not to any other man a Right which he had not before; because there is
nothing to which every man had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that
he may enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from
another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is
but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.
Renouncing a Right what it is./Transferring Right what./Obligation./Duty./Injustice.
Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By
TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons.
And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said
to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned,
from the benefit of it: and that he ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the
Right being before renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity.
For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in
the world, it is called Injustice, and injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning
he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth
his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes,
that he doth so Renounced, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to
him that accepteth it. And these Signes are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it
happeneth most often) both Words, and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men
are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for
nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from Feare of some evill consequence
upon the rupture.
Not all Rights are alienable.
Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either in consideration of
some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby.
For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to
himselfe. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words,
or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of
resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be
understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and
Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience; as
there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a
man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his
death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of
Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the
means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other
signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which those signes were intended; he is not
to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such
words and actions were to be interpreted.
Contract what.
The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.
There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and transferring, or tradition,
that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the Thing may be delivered together with the
Translation of the Right; as in buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or
lands: and it may be delivered some time after.
Covenant what.
Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the
other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted;
and then the Contract on his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract
now, to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being
trusted, his performance is called Keeping of Promise, or Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation of Faith.
Free-gift.
When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to
gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the
reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or
in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREE-GIFT, GRACE: which words
signifie one and the same thing.
Signes of Contract Expresse.
Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or by Inference. Expresse, are words spoken with understanding of what they signifie: And such words are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I have Given, I have Granted, I will that this be yours: Or of the future; as, I will Give, I will Grant: which words of the future, are called PROMISE.
Signes of Contract by Inference.
Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; sometimes the consequence of
Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; somtimes the consequence of Forbearing an
Action: and generally a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues
the will of the Contractor.
Free gift passeth by words of the Present or Past.
Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient
signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to Come, as, To
morrow I will Give, they are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But if the words be of the time
Present, or Past, as, I have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow, then is my to morrows Right given away to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no other
argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words, Volo
hoc tuum esse cras, and Cras dabo; that is, between I will that this be thine to morrow, and, I will give it thee to morrow: For the word I will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and
therefore the former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the later, that be of
the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other signes of the Will to transferre a Right,
besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by
words of the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race,
The gift is Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he would
not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them runne.
Signes of Contract are words both of the Past, Present, and Future.
In Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time Present, or Past; but
also where they are of the Future: because all Contract is mutuall translation, or change of
Right; and therefore he that promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for
which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right should passe: for unlesse
he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his
part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, a Promise is
equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.
Merit what.
He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT that which he is to receive
by the performance of the other; and he hath it as Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to
many, which is to be given to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be
enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a Free gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to
Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the Event of the
contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I
Merit by vertue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of Free gift, I am
enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver: In Contract, I merit at the Contractors
hand that hee should depart with his right; In this case of Gift, I Merit not that the giver should
part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than
anothers. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schooles, between
Meritum congrui, and Meritum condigni. For God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that can walk through this world according to the
Precepts, and Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise Ex congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righteousnesse, or any
other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of God onely; they say, no man can Merit
Paradise ex condigno. This I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because
Disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it serves
their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this I say; when a gift is given
indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize
as Due.
Covenants of Mutuall trust, when Invalid.
If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties p