A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person,
Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular.
For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.
Every one is Author.
And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, or doth in their name; Every man
giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the
actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when
they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more,
than they gave him commission to Act.
An Actor may be Many men made One by Plurality of Voyces.
And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the greater number, must be
considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the
Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than enough to
destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are
the onely voyce the Representative hath.
Representatives, when the number is even, unprofitable.
And a Representative of even number, especially when the number is not great, whereby the
contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of
Action. Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as
in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve;
but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard; not to
condemne, is to absolve: but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not
true. The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time: For
when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.
Negative voyce.
Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;) whereof every one has by
a Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This
number is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men, it
becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as
for many things else, so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.
Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be
him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action, or
Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it
not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called
SURETYES, in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Prædes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.
OF COMMON-WEALTH.
CHAP. XVII.
Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a COMMON-WEALTH.
The End of Common-wealth, particular Security:/Chap. 13.
THE finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over
others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in
Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life
thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre,
which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when
there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the
performance of their Covenants, and observation of those Lawes of Nature set down in the
fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.
Which is not to be had from the Law of Nature:
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to,) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge,
and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a
man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept,
when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or
not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength
and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small
Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed
against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour;
and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from
cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small Familyes did
then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security)
enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that
may be given to Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their
neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are
remembred for it in after ages with honour.
Nor from the conjunction of a few men or familyes:
Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because
in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of
strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to
an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any
certain number, but by comparison with the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the
odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event of
warre, as to move him to attempt.
Nor from a great Multitude, unlesse directed by one judgement:
And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their
particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor
protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For
being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do
not help, but hinder one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing:
whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when
there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests.
For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and
other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well
suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any
Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.
And that continually.
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that
they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one
Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign
enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is
held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of
their interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.
Why certain creatures without reason, or speech, do neverthelesse live in Society, without any
coërcive Power.
It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably one with another,
(which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them
can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some
man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer,
First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures
are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and
finally Warre; but amongst these not so.
Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and
being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man,
whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think they
see any fault, in the administration of their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there
are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the
rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby
bring it into Distraction and Civill warre.
Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making knowne to one
another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some
men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the
likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill;
discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.
Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellowes: whereas Man is then
most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome,
and controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.
Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is
Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somwhat else required (besides Covenant)
to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in
awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.
The Generation of a Commonwealth./The Definition of a Commonwealth.
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion
of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as
that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and
live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one
Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is
as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every
one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their
Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and
Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his
Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the
same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every
man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this
Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and
Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN,
or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the
Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular
man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on
him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and
mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-
wealth; which (to define it,) is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may
use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and
Common Defence.
Soveraigne, and Subject, what.
And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Soveraigne Power;
and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by Naturall force; as when a
man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being
able to destroy them if they refuse; or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them
their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to
some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all
others. This later, may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Common-wealth
by Institution.
CHAP. XVIII.
Of the RIGHTS of Soveraignes by Institution.
The act of Instituting a Common-wealth, what.
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same
manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be
protected against other men.
The Consequences to such Institution, are
From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.
1. The Subjects cannot change the forme of government.
First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former Covenant
to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a
Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of
one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other,
in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a
Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited
Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other
Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author
of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any
one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is
injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their
Person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so
again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or
punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the
Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do any
thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust.
And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new
Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with
God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods
Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so
evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust,
but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.
2. Soveraigne Power cannot be forfeited.
Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make
Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can
happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his
Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is
made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects before-hand, is manifest; because
either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must
make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible;
because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there
be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever can
be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the
rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular. Besides,
if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at his
Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no
such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns therefore to
the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own
strength, contrary to the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant
Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power
by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie
truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain,
or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands
of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched
by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an Assembly
of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the
Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions; which not performed,
the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike
in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are
kinder to the goverment of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of
Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.
3. No man can without injustice protest against the Institution of the Soveraigne declared by
the major part.
Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he that
dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall
do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation
of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely
covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to
stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his
Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether
his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition
of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man
whatsoever.
4. The Soveraigns Actions cannot be justly accused by the Subject.
Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and Judgments
of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of
his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any
thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth:
But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the
Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne,
complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man
but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is
true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in
the proper signification.
5. What soever the Soveraigne doth, is unpunishable by the Subject.
Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath Soveraigne power can
iustly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every
Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions
committed by himselfe.
6. The Soveraigne is judge of what is necessary for the Peace and Defence of his Subjects.
And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all; and whosoever
has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or
Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence;
and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think
necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by
prevention of Discord at home, and Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are
lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,
And Judge of what Doctrines are fit to be taught them.
Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are
averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and
what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall
examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed
from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of
mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing
ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by
Peace. For Doctrine repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be
against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or
unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received;
the contrary Truths may be generally offensive: Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a
new Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but only somtimes awake the Warre. For
those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or
introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of
Armes for feare of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually.
It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all
Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace; therby to prevent Discord
and Civill Warre.
7. The Right of making Rules, whereby the Subjects may every man know what is so his owne,
as no other Subject can without injustice take it from him.
Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the Rules, whereby
every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he may doe, without being
molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men call Propriety. For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which
necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and
depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of that Power, in order to the publique peace. These
Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull, and Unlawfull in the actions of Subjects, are the Civill Lawes; that is to say, the Lawes of each Commonwealth in
particular; though the name of Civill Law be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the
City of Rome; which being the head of