“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato In such a case, is the substance which is anointed sort?
the same as the colour or ointment?
The latter, he said.
What do you mean? he said.
Then that which is neither good nor evil may be This is what I mean: Suppose that I were to cover in the presence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that your auburn locks with white lead, would they be has happened before now?
really white, or would they only appear to be white?
Yes.
They would only appear to be white, he replied.
And when anything is in the presence of evil, not And yet whiteness would be present in them?
being as yet evil, the presence of good arouses the True.
desire of good in that thing; but the presence of But that would not make them at all the more evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the de-white, notwithstanding the presence of white in sire and friendship of the good; for that which was them—they would not be white any more than once both good and evil has now become evil only, black?
and the good was supposed to have no friendship No.
with the evil?
But when old age infuses whiteness into them, None.
then they become assimilated, and are white by the And therefore we say that those who are already presence of white.
wise, whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of Certainly.
wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom who are Now I want to know whether in all cases a sub-ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or stance is assimilated by the presence of another ignorant person is a lover of wisdom. There remain substance; or must the presence be after a peculiar those who have the misfortune to be ignorant, but 32
“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of Why do you say so? said Menexenus.
understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friend-know what they do not know: and therefore those ship is false: arguments, like men, are often pre-who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither good tenders.
nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more How do you mean? he asked.
than the good; for, as we have already seen, neither Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is unlike the friend of unlike, nor like of like. You is the friend of some one; is he not?
remember that?
Certainly he is.
Yes, they both said.
And has he a motive and object in being a friend, And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discov-or has he no motive and object?
ered the nature of friendship—there can be no doubt He has a motive and object.
of it: Friendship is the love which by reason of the And is the object which makes him a friend, dear presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him?
good, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.
I do not quite follow you, he said.
They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I moment I rejoiced and was satisfied like a hunts-put the matter in another way, you will be able to man just holding fast his prey. But then a most un-follow me, and my own meaning will be clearer to accountable suspicion came across me, and I felt myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is that the conclusion was untrue. I was pained, and the friend of the physician—is he not?
said, Alas! Lysis and Menexenus, I am afraid that Yes.
we have been grasping at a shadow only.
And he is the friend of the physician because of 33
“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato disease, and for the sake of health?
Clearly.
Yes.
Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the And disease is an evil?
friend, and because of the enemy?
Certainly.
That is to be inferred.
And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and neither?
be on our guard against deceptions. I will not again Good, he replied.
repeat that the friend is the friend of the friend, And we were saying, I believe, that the body be-and the like of the like, which has been declared by ing neither good nor evil, because of disease, that is us to be an impossibility; but, in order that this to say because of evil, is the friend of medicine, and new statement may not delude us, let us attentively medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into examine another point, which I will proceed to ex-this friendship for the sake of health, and health is plain: Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or a good.
dear to us for the sake of health?
True.
Yes.
And is health a friend, or not a friend?
And health is also dear?
A friend.
Certainly.
And disease is an enemy?
And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?
Yes.
Yes.
Then that which is neither good nor evil is the And surely this object must also be dear, as is im-friend of the good because of the evil and hateful, plied in our previous admissions?
and for the sake of the good and the friend?
Yes.