“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato And that something dear involves something else him, he would value the wine?
dear?
He would.
Yes.
And also the vessel which contains the wine?
But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not ar-Certainly.
rive at some first principle of friendship or dear-But does he therefore value the three measures of ness which is not capable of being referred to any wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them, other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all equally with his son? Is not this rather the true state other things are dear, and, having there arrived, we of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the shall stop?
means which are provided for the sake of an object, True.
but to the object for the sake of which they are My fear is that all those other things, which, as provided. And although we may often say that gold we say, are dear for the sake of another, are illusions and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the and deceptions only, but where that first principle truth; for there is a further object, whatever it may is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put be, which we value most of all, and for the sake of the matter thus: Suppose the case of a great trea-which gold and all our other possessions are acquired sure (this may be a son, who is more precious to his by us. Am I not right?
father than all his other treasures); would not the Yes, certainly.
father, who values his son above all things, value And may not the same be said of the friend? That other things also for the sake of his son? I mean, for which is only dear to us for the sake of something instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hem-else is improperly said to be dear, but the truly dear lock, and the father thought that wine would save is that in which all these so-called dear friendships 35
“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato terminate.
sire the good because of the evil, and as the remedy That, he said, appears to be true.
of the evil, which was the disease; but if there had And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friend-been no disease, there would have been no need of ship is not for the sake of any other or further dear.
a remedy. Is not this the nature of the good—to be True.
loved by us who are placed between the two, be-Then we have done with the notion that friend-cause of the evil? but there is no use in the good for ship has any further object. May we then infer that its own sake.
the good is the friend?
I suppose not.
I think so.
Then the final principle of friendship, in which And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let all other friendships terminated, those, I mean, me put the case in this way: Suppose that of the which are relatively dear and for the sake of some-three principles, good, evil, and that which is neithing else, is of another and a different nature from ther good nor evil, there remained only the good them. For they are called dear because of another and the neutral, and that evil went far away, and in dear or friend. But with the true friend or dear, the no way affected soul or body, nor ever at all that case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to be class of things which, as we say, are neither good dear because of the hated, and if the hated were nor evil in themselves;—would the good be of any away it would be no longer dear.
use, or other than useless to us? For if there were Very true, he replied: at any rate not if our present nothing to hurt us any longer, we should have no view holds good.
need of anything that would do us good. Then But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil would be clearly seen that we did but love and de-were to perish, we should hunger any more, or thirst 36
“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato any more, or have any similar desire? Or may we And must not a man love that which he desires suppose that hunger will remain while men and and affects?
animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful? And He must.
the same of thirst and the other desires,—that they Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain will remain, but will not be evil because evil has some elements of love or friendship?
perished? Or rather shall I say, that to ask what Yes.
either will be then or will not be is ridiculous, for But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in who knows? This we do know, that in our present that case nothing will be the friend of any other condition hunger may injure us, and may also ben-thing after the destruction of evil; for the effect can-efit us:—Is not that true?
not remain when the cause is destroyed.
Yes.
True.
And in like manner thirst or any similar desire And have we not admitted already that the friend may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to loves something for a reason? and at the time of us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?
making the admission we were of opinion that the To be sure.
neither good nor evil loves the good because of the But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, evil?
that which is not evil should perish with it?
Very true.
None.
But now our view is changed, and we conceive Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are that there must be some other cause of friendship?
neither good nor evil will remain?
I suppose so.
Clearly they will.
May not the truth be rather, as we were saying 37
“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato just now, that desire is the cause of friendship; for affected him, if he had not been in some way con-that which desires is dear to that which is desired genial to him, either in his soul, or in his character, at the time of desiring it? and may not the other or in his manners, or in his form.
theory have been only a long story about nothing?
Yes, yes, said Menexenus. But Lysis was silent.
Likely enough.
Then, I said, the conclusion is, that what is of a But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of congenial nature must be loved.
which he is in want?
It follows, he said.
Yes.
Then the lover, who is true and no counterfeit, And that of which he is in want is dear to him?
must of necessity be loved by his love.
True.
Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?
and Hippothales changed into all manner of colours Certainly.
with delight.
Then love, and desire, and friendship would ap-Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: pear to be of the natural or congenial. Such, Lysis Can we point out any difference between the con-and Menexenus, is the inference.
genial and the like? For if that is possible, then I They assented.
think, Lysis and Menexenus, there may be some Then if you are friends, you must have natures sense in our argument about friendship. But if the which are congenial to one another?
congenial is only the like, how will you get rid of Certainly, they both said.
the other argument, of the uselessness of like to And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or de-like in as far as they are like; for to say that what is sires another would ever have loved or desired or useless is dear, would be absurd? Suppose, then, 38
“Lysis, or Friendship” - Plato that we agree to distinguish between the congenial We remember.
and the like—in the intoxication of argument, that Then what is to be done? Or rather is there any-may perhaps be allowed.
thing to be done? I can only, like the wise men who Very true.
argue in courts, sum up the arguments:—If neither And shall we further say that the good is conge-the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the un-nial, and the evil uncongenial to every one? Or again like, nor the good, nor the congenial, nor any other that the evil is congenial to the evil, and the good of whom we spoke—for there were such a number to the good; and that which is neither good nor evil of them that I cannot remember all—if none of these to that which is neither good nor evil?
are friends, I know not what remains to be said.
They agreed to the latter alternative.
Here I was going to invite the opinion of some Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old older person, when suddenly we were interrupted discarded error; for the unjust will be the friend of by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who came the unjust, and the bad of the bad, as well as the upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers, good of the good.
and bade them go home, as it was getting late. At That appears to be the result.
first, we and the by-standers drove them off; but But again, if we say that the congenial is the same afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went as the good, in that case the good and he only will on shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got an-be the friend of the good.
gry, and kept calling the boys—they appeared to us True.
to have been drinking rather too much at the But that too was a position of ours which, as you Hermaea, which made them difficult to manage—
will remember, has been already refuted by ourselves.
we fairly gave way and broke up the company.