Parmenides by Plato. - HTML preview

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72

Parmenides

True.

Right.

And if greater or less than things which are And if it were of one measure, it would be equal commensurable with it, the one will have more to that measure; yet it has been shown to be in-measures than that which is less, and fewer than capable of equality.

that which is greater?

It has.

Yes.

Then it will neither partake of one measure, And so of things which are not commensurate with nor of many, nor of few, nor of the same at all, it, the one will have greater measures than that nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater which is less and smaller than that which is greater.

or less than itself, or other?

Certainly.

Certainly.

But how can that which does not partake of Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, sameness, have either the same measures or or younger than anything, or of the same age have anything else the same?

with it?

Impossible.

Why not?

And not having the same measures, the one Why, because that which is of the same age with cannot be equal either with itself or with another?

itself or other, must partake of equality or like-It appears so.

ness of time; and we said that the one did not But again, whether it have fewer or more mea-partake either of equality or of likeness?

sures, it will have as many parts as it has mea-We did say so.

sures; and thus again the one will be no longer And we also said, that it did not partake of in-one but will have as many parts as measures.

equality or unlikeness.