Parmenides by Plato. - HTML preview

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73

Parmenides

Very true.

different; it is different, and if its different has How then can one, being of this nature, be ei-become, it has become different; if its different ther older or younger than anything, or have the will be, it will be different; but of that which is same age with it?

becoming different, there cannot have been, or In no way.

be about to be, or yet be, a different—the only Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the different possible is one which is becoming.

same age, either with itself or with another?

That is inevitable.

Clearly not.

But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be the younger, and to nothing else.

in time at all; for must not that which is in time, True.

be always growing older than itself?

Then that which becomes older than itself must Certainly.

also, at the same time, become younger than it-And that which is older, must always be older self?

than something which is younger?

Yes.

True.

But again, it is true that it cannot become for a Then, that which becomes older than itself, also longer or for a shorter time than itself, but it becomes at the same time younger than itself, if must become, and be, and have become, and be it is to have something to become older than.

about to be, for the same time with itself?

What do you mean?

That again is inevitable.

I mean this:—A thing does not need to become Then things which are in time, and partake of different from another thing which is already time, must in every case, I suppose, be of the 74

Parmenides

same age with themselves; and must also become becoming, or is, or will become, or will have be-at once older and younger than themselves?

come, or will be, hereafter.

Yes.

Most true.

But the one did not partake of those affections?

But are there any modes of partaking of being Not at all.

other than these?

Then it does not partake of time, and is not in There are none.

any time?

Then the one cannot possibly partake of be-So the argument shows.

ing?

Well, but do not the expressions ‘was,’ and That is the inference.

‘has become,’ and ‘was becoming,’ signify a Then the one is not at all?

participation of past time?

Clearly not.

Certainly.

Then the one does not exist in such way as to And do not ‘will be,’ ‘will become,’ ‘will have be one; for if it were and partook of being, it would become,’ signify a participation of future time?

already be; but if the argument is to be trusted, Yes.

the one neither is nor is one?

And ‘is,’ or ‘becomes,’ signifies a participa-True.

tion of present time?

But that which is not admits of no attribute or Certainly.

relation?

And if the one is absolutely without participa-Of course not.

tion in time, it never had become, or was becom-Then there is no name, nor expression, nor per-ing, or was at any time, or is now become or is ception, nor opinion, nor knowledge of it?