Parmenides by Plato. - HTML preview

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77

Parmenides

If being and the one be two different things, it of them both?

is not because the one is one that it is other than Certainly.

being; nor because being is being that it is other And if I speak of being and the other, or of the than the one; but they differ from one another one and the other,—in any such case do I not speak in virtue of otherness and difference.

of both?

Certainly.

Yes.

So that the other is not the same—either with And must not that which is correctly called the one or with being?

both, be also two?

Certainly not.

Undoubtedly.

And therefore whether we take being and the And of two things how can either by any possi-other, or being and the one, or the one and the bility not be one?

other, in every such case we take two things, It cannot.

which may be rightly called both.

Then, if the individuals of the pair are together How so.

two, they must be severally one?

In this way—you may speak of being?

Clearly.

Yes.

And if each of them is one, then by the addi-And also of one?

tion of any one to any pair, the whole becomes Yes.

three?

Then now we have spoken of either of them?

Yes.

Yes.

And three are odd, and two are even?

Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak Of course.