Clearly not.
would not be the being of the one; nor would the Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor one have participated in being, for the proposi-opined, nor known, nor does anything that is tion that one is would have been identical with perceive it.
the proposition that one is one; but our hypoth-So we must infer.
esis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if But can all this be true about the one?
one is:—am I not right?
I think not.
Quite right.
1.b. Suppose, now, that we return once more to We mean to say, that being has not the same the original hypothesis; let us see whether, on a significance as one?
further review, any new aspect of the question Of course.
appears.
And when we put them together shortly, and I shall be very happy to do so.
say ‘One is,’ that is equivalent to saying, ‘par-We say that we have to work out together all takes of being’?
the consequences, whatever they may be, which Quite true.
follow, if the one is?
Once more then let us ask, if one is what will Yes.
follow. Does not this hypothesis necessarily im-Then we will begin at the beginning:—If one is, ply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?
can one be, and not partake of being?
How so?
Impossible.
In this way:—If being is predicated of the one, Then the one will have being, but its being will if the one is, and one of being, if being is one; not be the same with the one; for if the same, it and if being and one are not the same; and since 76
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the one, which we have assumed, is, must not Certainly.
the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in mul-parts, one and being?
tiplicity?
Certainly.
Clearly.
And is each of these parts—one and being—to Let us take another direction.
be simply called a part, or must the word ‘part’
What direction?
be relative to the word ‘whole’?
We say that the one partakes of being and there-The latter.
fore it is?
Then that which is one is both a whole and has Yes.
a part?
And in this way, the one, if it has being, has Certainly.
turned out to be many?
Again, of the parts of the one, if it is—I mean True.
being and one—does either fail to imply the other?
But now, let us abstract the one which, as we is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?
say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart Impossible.
from that of which, as we say, it partakes—will Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one this abstract one be one only or many?
and being, and is at the least made up of two parts; One, I think.
and the same principle goes on for ever, and every Let us see:—Must not the being of one be other part whatever has always these two parts; for be-than one? for the one is not being, but, consid-ing always involves one, and one being; so that ered as one, only partook of being?
one is always disappearing, and becoming two.
Certainly.