drank what he earned, he lived like a brute, and finished by killing and rob-
bing an old man. He was caught, tried, and condemned to death. They are
not sentimentalists there. And in prison he was immediately surrounded
by pastors, members of Christian brotherhoods, philanthropic ladies, and
the like. They taught him to read and write in prison, and expounded the
Gospel to him. They exhorted him, worked upon him, drummed at him
incessantly, till at last he solemnly confessed his crime. He was converted.
He wrote to the court himself that he was a monster, but that in the end God
had vouchsafed him light and shown grace. All Geneva was in excitement
about him—all philanthropic and religious Geneva. All the aristocratic and
well-bred society of the town rushed to the prison, kissed Richard and em-
braced him; ‘You are our brother, you have found grace.’ And Richard
does nothing but weep with emotion, ‘Yes, I’ve found grace! All my youth
and childhood I was glad of pigs’ food, but now even I have found grace. I
am dying in the Lord.’ ‘Yes, Richard, die in the Lord; you have shed blood
and must die. Though it’s not your fault that you knew not the Lord, when
you coveted the pigs’ food and were beaten for stealing it (which was very
wrong of you, for stealing is forbidden); but you’ve shed blood and you
must die.’ And on the last day, Richard, perfectly limp, did nothing but
cry and repeat every minute: ‘This is my happiest day. I am going to the
Lord.’ ‘Yes,’ cry the pastors and the judges and philanthropic ladies. ‘This
is the happiest day of your life, for you are going to the Lord!’ They all
walk or drive to the scaffold in procession behind the prison van. At the
scaffold they call to Richard: ‘Die, brother, die in the Lord, for even thou
hast found grace!’ And so, covered with his brothers’ kisses, Richard is
dragged on to the scaffold, and led to the guillotine. And they chopped
off his head in brotherly fashion, because he had found grace. Yes, that’s
characteristic.”
“That pamphlet is translated into Russian by some Russian philanthropists
of aristocratic rank and evangelical aspirations, and has been distributed
gratis for the enlightenment of the people. The case of Richard is interest-
ing because it’s national. Though to us it’s absurd to cut off a man’s head,
because he has become our brother and has found grace, yet we have our
own specialty, which is all but worse. Our historical pastime is the direct
satisfaction of inflicting pain. There are lines in Nekrassov describing how
a peasant lashes a horse on the eyes, ‘on its meek eyes,’ everyone must
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have seen it. It’s peculiarly Russian. He describes how a feeble little nag
has foundered under too heavy a load and cannot move. The peasant beats
it, beats it savagely, beats it at last not knowing what he is doing in the
intoxication of cruelty, thrashes it mercilessly over and over again. ‘How-
ever weak you are, you must pull, if you die for it.’ The nag strains, and
then he begins lashing the poor defenceless creature on its weeping, on its
‘meek eyes.’ The frantic beast tugs and draws the load, trembling all over,
gasping for breath, moving sideways, with a sort of unnatural spasmodic
action—it’s awful in Nekrassov. But that only a horse, and God has horses
to be beaten. So the Tatars have taught us, and they left us the knout as
a remembrance of it. But men, too, can be beaten. A well-educated, cul-
tured gentleman and his wife beat their own child with a birch-rod, a girl
of seven. I have an exact account of it. The papa was glad that the birch
was covered with twigs. ‘It stings more,’ said he, and so be began sting-
ing his daughter. I know for a fact there are people who at every blow
are worked up to sensuality, to literal sensuality, which increases progres-
sively at every blow they inflict. They beat for a minute, for five minutes,
for ten minutes, more often and more savagely. The child screams. At last
the child cannot scream, it gasps, ‘Daddy daddy!’ By some diabolical un-
seemly chance the case was brought into court. A counsel is engaged. The
Russian people have long called a barrister ‘a conscience for hire.’ The
counsel protests in his client’s defence. ‘It’s such a simple thing,’ he says,
‘an everyday domestic event. A father corrects his child. To our shame
be it said, it is brought into court.’ The jury, convinced by him, give a
favourable verdict. The public roars with delight that the torturer is acquit-
ted. Ah, pity I wasn’t there! I would have proposed to raise a subscription
in his honour! Charming pictures. But I’ve still better things about chil-
dren. I’ve collected a great, great deal about Russian children, Alyosha.
There was a little girl of five who was hated by her father and mother,
‘most worthy and respectable people, of good education and breeding.’
You see, I must repeat again, it is a peculiar characteristic of many people,
this love of torturing children, and children only. To all other types of hu-
manity these torturers behave mildly and benevolently, like cultivated and
humane Europeans; but they are very fond of tormenting children, even
fond of children themselves in that sense. it’s just their defencelessness
that tempts the tormentor, just the angelic confidence of the child who has
no refuge and no appeal, that sets his vile blood on fire. In every man, of
course, a demon lies hidden—the demon of rage, the demon of lustful heat
at the screams of the tortured victim, the demon of lawlessness let off the
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chain, the demon of diseases that follow on vice, gout, kidney disease, and
so on.”
Four Children in Hayfield, Russia, Library of Congress
“This poor child of five was subjected to every possible torture by those
cultivated parents. They beat her, thrashed her, kicked her for no reason till
her body was one bruise. Then, they went to greater refinements of cru-
elty—shut her up all night in the cold and frost in a privy, and because she
didn’t ask to be taken up at night (as though a child of five sleeping its an-
gelic, sound sleep could be trained to wake and ask), they smeared her face
and filled her mouth with excrement, and it was her mother, her mother did
this. And that mother could sleep, hearing the poor child’s groans! Can you
understand why a little creature, who can’t even understand what’s done
to her, should beat her little aching heart with her tiny fist in the dark and
the cold, and weep her meek unresentful tears to dear, kind God to protect
her? Do you understand that, friend and brother, you pious and humble
novice? Do you understand why this infamy must be and is permitted?
Without it, I am told, man could not have existed on earth, for he could
not have known good and evil. Why should he know that diabolical good
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and evil when it costs so much? Why, the whole world of knowledge is not
worth that child’s prayer to dear, kind God! I say nothing of the sufferings
of grown-up people, they have eaten the apple, damn them, and the devil
take them all! But these little ones! I am making you suffer, Alyosha, you
are not yourself. I’ll leave off if you like.”
“Nevermind. I want to suffer too,” muttered Alyosha.
[The Death of an Innocent Child]
“One picture, only one more, because it’s so curious, so characteristic,
and I have only just read it in some collection of Russian antiquities. I’ve
forgotten the name. I must look it up. It was in the darkest days of serf-
dom at the beginning of the century, and long live the Liberator of the
People! There was in those days a general of aristocratic connections, the
owner of great estates, one of those men—somewhat exceptional, I be-
lieve, even then—who, retiring from the service into a life of leisure, are
convinced that they’ve earned absolute power over the lives of their sub-
jects. There were such men then. So our general, settled on his property
of two thousand souls, lives in pomp, and domineers over his poor neigh-
bours as though they were dependents and buffoons. He has kennels of
hundreds of hounds and nearly a hundred dog-boys—all mounted, and in
uniform. One day a serf-boy, a little child of eight, threw a stone in play
and hurt the paw of the general’s favourite hound. ‘Why is my favourite
dog lame?’ He is told that the boy threw a stone that hurt the dog’s paw. ‘So
you did it.’ The general looked the child up and down. ‘Take him.’ He was
taken—taken from his mother and kept shut up all night. Early that morn-
ing the general comes out on horseback, with the hounds, his dependents,
dog-boys, and huntsmen, all mounted around him in full hunting parade.
The servants are summoned for their edification, and in front of them all
stands the mother of the child. The child is brought from the lock-up. It’s
a gloomy, cold, foggy, autumn day, a capital day for hunting. The general
orders the child to be undressed; the child is stripped naked. He shivers,
numb with terror, not daring to cry. . . ‘Make him run,’ commands the gen-
eral. ‘Run! run!’ shout the dog-boys. The boy runs. . . ‘At him!’ yells the
general, and he sets the whole pack of hounds on the child. The hounds
catch him, and tear him to pieces before his mother’s eyes!. . . I believe the
general was afterwards declared incapable of administering his estates.
Well—what did he deserve? To be shot? To be shot for the satisfaction of
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our moral feelings? Speak, Alyosha!”
“To be shot,” murmured Alyosha, lifting his eyes to Ivan with a pale,
twisted smile.
“Bravo!” cried Ivan delighted. “If even you say so. . . You’re a pretty
monk! So there is a little devil sitting in your heart, Alyosha Karamazov!”
“What I said was absurd, but. . . ”
“That’s just the point, that ‘but’!” cried Ivan. “Let me tell you, novice, that
the absurd is only too necessary on earth. The world stands on absurdities,
and perhaps nothing would have come to pass in it without them. We know
what we know!”
“What do you know?”
“I understand nothing,” Ivan went on, as though in delirium. “I don’t want
to understand anything now. I want to stick to the fact. I made up my mind
long ago not to understand. If I try to understand anything, I shall be false
to the fact, and I have determined to stick to the fact.”
“Why are you trying me?” Alyosha cried, with sudden distress. “Will you
say what you mean at last?”
From the reading. . .
“And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest
man I am bound to give it back as soon as possible.”
“Of course, I will; that’s what I’ve been leading up to. You are dear to me,
I don’t want to let you go, and I won’t give you up to your Zossima.”
Ivan for a minute was silent, his face became all at once very sad.
[The Problem of Evil]
“Listen! I took the case of children only to make my case clearer. Of the
other tears of humanity with which the earth is soaked from its crust to
its centre, I will say nothing. I have narrowed my subject on purpose. I
am a bug, and I recognise in all humility that I cannot understand why the
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world is arranged as it is. Men are themselves to blame, I suppose; they
were given paradise, they wanted freedom, and stole fire from heaven,
though they knew they would become unhappy, so there is no need to pity
them. With my pitiful, earthly, Euclidian understanding, all I know is that
there is suffering and that there are none guilty; that cause follows effect,
simply and directly; that everything flows and finds its level—but that’s
only Euclidian nonsense, I know that, and I can’t consent to live by it!
What comfort is it to me that there are none guilty and that cause follows
effect simply and directly, and that I know it?—I must have justice, or
I will destroy myself. And not justice in some remote infinite time and
space, but here on earth, and that I could see myself. I have believed in
it. I want to see it, and if I am dead by then, let me rise again, for if it all
happens without me, it will be too unfair. Surely I haven’t suffered simply
that I, my crimes and my sufferings, may manure the soil of the future
harmony for somebody else. I want to see with my own eyes the hind lie
down with the lion and the victim rise up and embrace his murderer. I
want to be there when everyone suddenly understands what it has all been
for. All the religions of the world are built on this longing, and I am a
believer. But then there are the children, and what am I to do about them?
That’s a question I can’t answer. For the hundredth time I repeat, there are
numbers of questions, but I’ve only taken the children, because in their
case what I mean is so unanswerably clear. Listen! If all must suffer to
pay for the eternal harmony, what have children to do with it, tell me,
please? It’s beyond all comprehension why they should suffer, and why
they should pay for the harmony. Why should they, too, furnish material
to enrich the soil for the harmony of the future? I understand solidarity in
sin among men. I understand solidarity in retribution, too; but there can be
no such solidarity with children. And if it is really true that they must share
responsibility for all their fathers’ crimes, such a truth is not of this world
and is beyond my comprehension. Some jester will say, perhaps, that the
child would have grown up and have sinned, but you see he didn’t grow
up, he was torn to pieces by the dogs, at eight years old. Oh, Alyosha,
I am not blaspheming! I understand, of course, what an upheaval of the
universe it will be when everything in heaven and earth blends in one
hymn of praise and everything that lives and has lived cries aloud: ‘Thou
art just, O Lord, for Thy ways are revealed.’ When the mother embraces
the fiend who threw her child to the dogs, and all three cry aloud with
tears, ‘Thou art just, O Lord!’ then, of course, the crown of knowledge
will be reached and all will be made clear. But what pulls me up here is
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that I can’t accept that harmony. And while I am on earth, I make haste to
take my own measures. You see, Alyosha, perhaps it really may happen
that if I live to that moment, or rise again to see it, I, too, perhaps, may cry
aloud with the rest, looking at the mother embracing the child’s torturer,
‘Thou art just, O Lord!’ but I don’t want to cry aloud then. While there is
still time, I hasten to protect myself, and so I renounce the higher harmony
altogether. It’s not worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat itself
on the breast with its little fist and prayed in its stinking outhouse, with its
unexpiated tears to ‘dear, kind God’! It’s not worth it, because those tears
are unatoned for. They must be atoned for, or there can be no harmony.
But how? How are you going to atone for them? Is it possible? By their
being avenged? But what do I care for avenging them? What do I care for
a hell for oppressors? What good can hell do, since those children have
already been tortured? And what becomes of harmony, if there is hell?
I want to forgive. I want to embrace. I don’t want more suffering. And
if the sufferings of children go to swell the sum of sufferings which was
necessary to pay for truth, then I protest that the truth is not worth such a
price. I don’t want the mother to embrace the oppressor who threw her son
to the dogs! She dare not forgive him! Let her forgive him for herself, if
she will, let her forgive the torturer for the immeasurable suffering of her
mother’s heart. But the sufferings of her tortured child she has no right to
forgive; she dare not forgive the torturer, even if the child were to forgive
him! And if that is so, if they dare not forgive, what becomes of harmony?
Is there in the whole world a being who would have the right to forgive
and could forgive? I don’t want harmony. From love for humanity I don’t
want it. I would rather be left with the unavenged suffering. I would rather
remain with my unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, even if
I were wrong. Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it’s beyond
our means to pay so much to enter on it. And so I hasten to give back my
entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am bound to give it back as
soon as possible. And that I am doing. It’s not God that I don’t accept,
Alyosha, only I most respectfully return him the ticket.”
“That’s rebellion,” murmured Alyosha, looking down.
From the reading. . .
“I don’t want harmony. From love of humanity I don’t want it.”
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“Rebellion? I am sorry you call it that,” said Ivan earnestly. “One can
hardly live in rebellion, and I want to live. Tell me yourself, I challenge
your answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with
the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest
at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one
tiny creature—that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance—and
to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the
architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth.”
“No, I wouldn’t consent,” said Alyosha softly.
Kasan Cathedral, St. Petersburg, Library of Congress
Related Ideas
TPM Online (http://www.philosophers.co.uk/portal_article.php?id=33).
Free to Do Evil: An Interview with Richard Swinbirne . Philosopher and
theologian Richard Swinburne explains his theodicy, i.e. , his attempt to
reconcile God’s goodness with the presence of evil in the world.
Dostoevsky Research Station (http://www.kiosek.com/dostoevsky/) . If
you wish to track down anything about Dostoevsky, this site constructed
by Christiaan Stange is a good place to begin.
Dostoevsky as Philosopher, Lecture Notes, Philosophy 151 (http://www-
philosophy.ucdavis.edu/phi151/NOV28LEC.HTM). A guest lecture at the
University of California—Davis by Jay Gallagher.
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Chapter 17. “The Problem of Evil ” by Fyodor Dostoevsky
Dostoevsky
on
Freedom,
Lecture
Notes,
Philosophy
151
(http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/phi151/nov30lec.htm). Lecture at
the University of California on the problem of evil.
Topics Worth Investigating
1. The problem of evil is often put in this form of a dilemma:
If God is perfectly good, then God would seek to abolish all evil.
If God is all-powerful, then God could abolish all evil
Yet, evil exists.
Therefore, either God is not perfectly good or God is not all powerful or both.
From a logical point of view, what kind is dilemma is the problem
of evil? It does not appear to be either a constructive or a destructive
dilemma.
2. Many medieval thinkers thought of evil as a privation or the absence
of good. Since a privation or absence has no cause, God is not causally
implicated in the existence of evil. Discuss the adequacy of this argu-
ment.
3. Joseph de Maistre states, “If there were no moral evil upon earth, there
would be no physical evil.”2 What must we assume for this conditional
statement to be true?
4. In the Apology, Socrates states, “No evil can happen to a good man,
either in life or after death.” Given Ivan’s story of the death of an
innocent child, how can this be so?
2.
Joseph de Maistre. “First Dialogue” in The Works of Joseph de Maistre. Ed. by
Jack Lively. New York: Schocken Books, 1965.
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Part III. Philosophical
Ethics
Auction’s End, Douglas Georgia, Library of Congress
Even though philosophy apparently cannot prove conclusively the exis-
tence of God, still the question of how we should lead our lives is a ques-
tion of the utmost gravity. Whether I can “live well and do well” in the af-
fairs of the world, as Aristotle suggests, or whether I have no free choices
as Spinoza thought, is intrinsically related to what it is to be human.
In this section of our introductory readings, the close relation between phi-
losophy and psychology is explored from the standpoint as to what con-
stitutes a good life. Readings from the philosophies of Baruch Spinoza,
William James, Plato, Aristotle, Jeremy Bentham, Friedrich Nietzsche,
and Jean Paul Sartre suggest a number of insights into the questions of
human existence—especially those concerning free will and determinism,
egoism and altruism, obligation and hedonism, as well as the individual’s
relation to society.
We begin Part III of the readings with a thumbnail sketch of some of the
main philosophic positions on the free will-determinism issue. The crux of
this problem is sometimes related as the dilemma known as Hume’s Fork.
This dilemma recognizes, on the one hand, if my actions are entirely sub-
ject to causal laws, then I cannot be responsible for my actions—anymore
than an apple can be responsible for falling from a tree. (Notice on this
view, an uncaused event would be the same thing as what is called “a mir-
acle”— i.e. , an event without cause or explanation.) On the other hand, if
my actions are not causally determined then my actions are uncaused and
so must be random events. In that case also I could not be responsible for
my actions because outcomes of random processes cannot be controlled
by willing or choosing. Therefore, whether or not events are caused, I can-
not be held accountable for my actions. Viewed in this manner, the heart
of the philosophical problems of ethics becomes the clarification of the
notion of choice.
Baruch Spinoza argues in the first reading that there is a complete unity of
God with nature. The soul is part of God and, consequently, is not subject
to free will. Since God is “all that there is,” the world and everything in
it is perfect. William Jam