William Paley in his Natural Theology; or Evidences of the Existence and
Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature 1 argues
for the existence of God based upon the intricate design of the universe.
On Paley’s view, just as the function and complexity of a watch implies
a watch-maker so likewise the function and complexity of the universe
implies the existence of a universe-maker.
From the reading. . .
“It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient opera-
tive cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent. . . ”
Ideas of Interest from Natural Theology
1. What are the similarities between Paley’s watch argument and
Thomas’s fifth way?
2. State Paley’s argument for God’s existence as clearly as possible.
3. How does Paley answer the objection that the universe could have
come into order and pattern by chance?
4. To what extent is Paley’s argument an ad hominem 2 attack on the skep-
tic?
5. Explain whether laws of nature are discovered or whether they are
invented.
1.
William Paley. Natural Theology. Philadelphia: Parker, 1802.
2.
An ad hominem is the fallacy of attacking the character or circumstances of an
individual who is advancing an argument rather than trying to disprove the truth or
validity of what that individual is attempting to prove.
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The Reading Selection from Natural
Theology
[Statement of the Watch Argument]
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were
asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for
anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever; nor would it,
perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I
found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch
happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which
I had given-that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been
there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for
the stone? why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first? For
this reason, and for no other; viz., that, when we come to inspect the watch,
we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts
are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that they are so formed and
adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out
the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped
from what they are, if a different size from what they are, or placed after
any other manner, or in any other order than that in which they are placed,
either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none
which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up
a few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one
result:—We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which,
by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a
flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure) communicating
the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of
wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting
the motion from the fusee to the balance, and from the balance to the
pointer, and, at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so
regulating that motion as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable
and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We
take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from
rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face
of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part
of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than
a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the
case. This mechanism being observed, (it requires indeed an examination
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Chapter 14. “The Teleological Argument” by William Paley
of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject,
to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed
and understood,) the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must
have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some
place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which
we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and
designed its use.
I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never
seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making
one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of work-
manship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed;
all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite remains of an-
cient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more
curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million
know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this kind exalts our opin-
ion of the unseen and unknown artists skill, if he be unseen and unknown,
but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an
artist, at some former time, and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive
that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arise concerning a
human agent, or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent
possessing, in some respect, a different nature.
II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch
sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose
of the machinery, the design, and the designer, might be evident, and, in
the case supposed, would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for
the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or
not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with
what design it was made; still less necessary, where the only question is,
whether it were made with any design at all.3
III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there
were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover, or
had not yet discovered, in what manner they conduced to the general ef-
fect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether
they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first
branch of the case, if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in
question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or
3.
Relate this possible objection to the problem of evil. Ed.
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disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the util-
ity or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate
the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate
effect depended upon their action or assistance; and the more complex is
the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the sec-
ond thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared
without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that he had proved
this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if we were completely
assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had
instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained,
with respect to them, nearly as it was before.
IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the
watch, with its various machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was
one out of possible combinations of material forms; that whatever he had
found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some
internal configuration or other; and that this configuration might be the
structure now exhibited, viz. , of the works of a watch, as well as a different
structure.
V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction, to be answered,
that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the
parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a
watch made by the principle of order; nor can he even form to himself an
idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence
of the watchmaker.
VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch
was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so.
VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand
was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a
perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause
of anything. A law presupposes an agent; for it is only the mode according
to which an agent proceeds; it implies a power; for it is the order according
to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are
both distinct from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing. The expression,
“the law of metallic nature,” may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic
ear; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar
to him such as “the law of vegetable nature,” “the law of animal nature,”
or, indeed, as “the law of nature” in general, when assigned as the cause
of phenomena in exclusion of agency and power, or when it is substituted
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Chapter 14. “The Teleological Argument” by William Paley
into the place of these.
VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion,
or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all
about the matter. He knows enough for his argument: he knows the utility
of the end: he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the
end.
These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts con-
cerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The con-
sciousness of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which he
does know. . .
[Application of the Argument]
Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which ex-
isted in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on
the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which
exceeds all computation. I mean that the contrivances of nature surpass the
contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtlety, and curiosity of the mech-
anism; and still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number and
variety; yet in a multitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical, not
less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accommodated to their end,
or suited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human
ingenuity. . .
From the reading. . .
“Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which
exists in the watch, exists in the works of nature. . . ”
Related Ideas
Teleological argument (http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleological_ ar-
gument/) Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia A summary article of the his-
tory of the teleological argument for God’s existence.
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Watch, freeimage
Topics Worth Investigating
1. What disanalogies or points of difference are there between the design
of the watch and the design of the universe?
2. Should a distinction be made between “prescriptive law” and “de-
scriptive law”? I.e. , a distinction between legal rules and laws of sci-
ence?
3. If the watch or universe were defective in any way, would that point
to an imperfection in the maker?
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Chapter 15
“Critique of the Design
Argument” by David Hume
David Hume, Thoemmes
About the author. . .
Often considered a skeptic, David Hume (1711-1776) is perhaps the most
influential philosopher to write in English. Although he sought acclaim as
a historian, his empirical thought places “Logic, Morals, Criticism, and
Politics” as a “science of man.” As part of his radical empiricism, Hume
rejected the existence of causation, scientific law, material substance, spir-
itual substance, and the individual self. For him, only relationships among
ideas can be known.
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Chapter 15. “Critique of the Design Argument” by David Hume
About the work. . .
Hume, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion published several
years after his death, argued that God’s existence can neither be proved by
á priori nor á posteriori means. Hume’s skepticism, however, left some
room for empirical inquiry into the nature of the world. Nevertheless, con-
sider his famous conclusion in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Under-
standing:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for
instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quan-
tity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning, concerning
matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to flames: for it can contain
nothing but sophistry and illusion.1
From the reading. . .
“For, as the cause ought only be proportioned to the effect. . . what pre-
tensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe perfection to the
deity?”
Ideas of Interest from Natural Religion
1. Explain the meaning of the phrase, “as the cause ought only be pro-
portioned to the effect. . . ” Aren’t the effects of causes often surpris-
ing? How do you think the notion of cause is related to scientific law?
2. List the analogical respects, pointed out by Philo, between the char-
acteristics of the world and the inferred characteristics of the Deity.
1.
David Hume. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 1779.
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Chapter 15. “Critique of the Design Argument” by David Hume
The Reading Selection from Natural Religion
[Cleanthes’s Design Argument]
Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said Cleanthes, addressing him-
self to Demea, much less in replying to the pious declamations of Philo;
I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the world:
contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing
but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser ma-
chines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human
senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and
even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy
which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them.
The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles
exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance;
of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the
effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy,
that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat
similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties,
proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this
argument á posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the
existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.
[Philo’s Objections]
What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said Philo, is not so much that all
religious arguments are by Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that they
appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior kind.
That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have
observed a thousand and a thousand times; and when any new instance of
this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed infer-
ence. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a
similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after.
But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you
diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very
weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After
having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we
make no doubt that it takes place in Titius and Maevius. But from its cir-
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culation in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one,
from analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical
reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in veg-
etables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those,
who hastily followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate
experiments, to have been mistaken.
If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty,
that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that species of
effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause.
But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance
to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that
the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking, that
the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption
concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be received in the
world, I leave you to consider. . .
Now, Cleanthes, said Philo, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the
consequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim
to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only
to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our
cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, upon your suppo-
sitions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? You will still insist,
that, by removing him so much from all similarity to human creatures, we
give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at the same time weaken all
proofs of his existence.
From the reading. . .
“Could a peasant, if the Æneid were read to him, pronounce that poem
to be absolutely faultless. . . ”
Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to
the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from every
error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many inex-
plicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a perfect
author to be proved á priori, are easily solved, and become only seeming
difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace infinite
relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these difficulties be-
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come all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new instances of likeness
to human art and contrivance. At least, you must acknowledge, that it is
impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system con-
tains any great faults, or deserves any considerable praise, if compared to
other possible, and even real systems. Could a peasant, if the Æneid were
read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even as-
sign to it its proper rank among the productions of human wit, he, who
had never seen any other production?
Building the John N. Cobb, NOAA
But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncer-
tain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the
workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the
ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beauti-
ful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a stupid
mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long
succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliber-
ations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds
might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this sys-
tem was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a
slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art
of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth;
nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number
of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may be
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imagined?
And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from
your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men
join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a common-
wealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a
world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs. By shar-
ing the work among several, we may so much further limit the attributes
of each, and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge, which must
be supposed in one deity, and which, according to you, can only serve
to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such foolish, such vicious
creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing and executing one plan,
how much more those deities or demons, whom we may suppose several
degrees more perfect!
From the reading. . .
“This world, for aught he knows. . . was only the first rude essay of
some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame
performance. . . ”
To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true philoso