in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each?
Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is
health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere
something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the
sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an
end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if
there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.
So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we
must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than
one end, and we choose some of these ( e.g. , wealth, flutes, and in general
instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final
ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there
is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are
more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now
we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which
is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never
desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that
are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and
therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable
in itself and never for the sake of something else.
Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose
always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour,
pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if
nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we
choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them
we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the
sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow;
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for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient
we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who
lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for
his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. But some
limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirements to ancestors
and descendants and friends’ friends we are in for an infinite series. . . the
self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life de-
sirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and
further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as
one good thing among others—if it were so counted it would clearly be
made desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which
is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always
more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and
is the end of action.
. . . [H]uman good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue,
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most
complete.
But we must add “in a complete life.” For one swallow does not make a
summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not
make a man blessed and happy.
13 [Kinds of Virtue]
Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we
must consider the nature of virtue, for perhaps we shall thus see better the
nature of happiness. . . .
Virtue too is distinguished into kinds in accordance with this difference;
for we say that some of the virtues are intellectual and others moral, philo-
sophic wisdom and understanding and practical wisdom being intellectual,
liberality and temperance moral. For in speaking about a man’s character
we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is good-
tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to
his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those which merit praise
virtues. . . .
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Book II [Moral Virtue]
1 [How Moral Virtue is Acquired]
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue
in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason
it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result
of habit, whence also its name ethike is one that is formed by a slight
variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none
of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature
can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by
nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even
if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire
be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature
behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature,
then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted
by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.
Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the
potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the
senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these
senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them. and did
not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first
exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the
things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them,
e.g. , men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre;
so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate
acts, brave by doing brave acts. . . .
Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue
is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from play-
ing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the
corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be
good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were
not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have
been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues
also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we
become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of
danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave
or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men
become temperate and good tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible,
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by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances.
Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is
why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the
states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes
no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of an-
other from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all
the difference. . . .
5 [Moral Virtue Is Character]
Next we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the
soul are of three kinds—passions, faculties, states of character—virtue
must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence,
envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in gen-
eral the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the
things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. , of
becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the
things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the pas-
sions, e.g. , with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or
too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately, and similarly with reference
to the other passions.
Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not
called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the
ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised
nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not
praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who
feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised
or blamed.
Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of
choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we are said to
be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be
moved but to be disposed in a particular way.
For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good
nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the
passions; again, we have the faculties of nature, but we are not made good
or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are
neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states
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of character.
Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.
From the reading. . .
“The life of money-making is one under taken under compulsion, and
wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful
for the sake of something else.”
6 [Disposition to Choose the Mean]
We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but
also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or
excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the ex-
cellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. , the excellence
of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence
of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a
horse both good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider and
at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case,
the virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man
good and which makes him do his own work well.
How this is to happen. . . will be made plain. . . by the following consider-
ation of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and
divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that
either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an
intermediate between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object
I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one
and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is
neither too much nor too little—and this is not one, nor the same for all.
For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken
in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount;
this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the interme-
diate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a
particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer
will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who
is to take it, or too little.. . . Thus a master of any art avoids excess and
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defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this—the intermediate not
in the object but relatively to us.
If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well—by looking to the in-
termediate and judging its works by this standard (so that we often say
of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add
anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works
of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this
in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art,
as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the inter-
mediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions
and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For
instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in
general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in
both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to
the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the
right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic
of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and
the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in
which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate
is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful
are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since,
as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.
Athens, Greece, 400 BC, Book illustration by Theodor Horydazak, Library
of Congress
Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean,
i.e. , the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational princi-
ple,and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would
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determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on
excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because
the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions
and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is interme-
diate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its
essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right and extreme.
But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have
names that already imply badness, e.g. , spite, shamelessness, envy, and in
the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike
things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the
excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right
with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or
badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with
the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do
any of them is to go wrong. It would be equally absurd, then, to expect
that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there should be a mean, an
excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess
and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But
as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage because
what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have
mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however
they are done they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of
excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.
7 [The Mean Illustrated]
We must, however, not only make this general statement, but also apply it
to the individual facts. For among statements about conduct those which
are general apply more widely, but those which are particular are more
genuine, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and our statements
must harmonize with the facts in these cases. We may take these cases
from our table. With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is
the mean, of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has
no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in
confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence
is a coward. With regard to pleasures and pains—not all of them, and not so
much with regard to the pains—the mean is temperance, the excess self-
indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often
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found; hence such persons also have received no name. But let us call
them “insensible.”
With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess
and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people exceed
and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls
short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in
spending.. . . With regard to money there are also other dispositions—a
mean, magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man;
the former deals with large sums, the latter with small ones), and excess,
tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency. . . With regard to honour and
dishonour the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of “empty
vanity,” and the deficiency is undue humility; and as we said liberality
was related to magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums,
so there is a state similarly related to proper pride, being concerned with
small honours while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to de-
sire honour as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man
who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short
unambitious, while the intermediate person has no name. The dispositions
also are nameless, except that that of the ambitious man is called ambi-
tion. Hence the people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle
place; and we ourselves sometimes call the intermediate person ambitious
and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious man and
sometimes the unambitious. . . .
With regard to anger also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean.
Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since we call the
intermediate person good-tempered let us call the mean good temper; of
the persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds be called irascible,
and his vice irascibility, and the man who falls short an inirascible sort of
person, and the deficiency inirascibility.
Book X [Pleasure; Happiness]
6 [Happiness Is Not Amusement]
. . . what remains is to discuss in outline the nature of , since this is what
we state the end of human nature to be. Our discussion will be the more
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concise if we first sum up what we have said already. We said, then, that
it is not a disposition; for if it were it might belong to some one who was
asleep throughout his life, living the life of a plant, or, again, to some
one who was suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these implications are
unacceptable, and we must rather class happiness as an activity, as we
have said before, and if some activities are necessary, and desirable for the
sake of something else, while others are so in themselves, evidently hap-
piness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among
those desirable for the sake of something else; for happiness does not lack
anything, but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in them-
selves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature
virtuous actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing
desirable for its own sake.
Pleasant amusements also are thought to be of this nature; we choose
them not for the sake of other things; for we are injured rather than ben-
efited by them, since we are led to neglect our bodies and our property.
. . . Happiness, therefore, does not lie in amusement; it would, indeed, be
strange if the end were amusement, and one were to take trouble and suffer
hardship all one’s life in order to amuse oneself. For, in a word, everything
that we choose we choose for the sake of something else—except hap-
piness, which is an end. Now to exert oneself and work for the sake of
amusement seems silly and utterly childish. But to amuse oneself in order
that one may exert oneself, as Anacharsis puts it, seems right; for amuse-
ment is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot
work continuously. Relaxation, then, is not an end; for it is taken for the
sake of activity.
The happy life is thought to be virtuous; now a virtuous life requires ex-
ertion, and does not consist in amusement. And we say that serious things
are better than laughable things and those connected with amusement, and
that the activity of the better of any two things—whether it be two ele-
ments of our being or two men—is the more serious; but the activity of the
better is ipso facto superior and more of the nature of happiness. And any
chance person—even a slave—can enjoy the bodily pleasures no less than
the best man; but no one assigns to a slave a share in happiness—unless
he assigns to him also a share in human life. For happiness does not lie in
such occupations, but, as we have said before, in virtuous activities.
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7 [Happiness Is the Contemplative Life]
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it
should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of
the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this
element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take
thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only
the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its
proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative
we have already said.
Now this would seem to be in agreement with what we said before and
with the truth. For, firstly, this activity is the best (since not only is reason
the best thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best of knowable ob-
jects); and, secondly, it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate
truth more continuously than we can do anything. And we think happi-
ness has pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of philosophic wisdom
is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities; at all events the pursuit
of it is thought to offer pleasures marvellous for their purity and their en-
duringness, and it is to be expected that those who know will pass their
time more pleasantly than those who inquire. And the self-sufficiency that
is spoken of must belong mos