Decision Sciences: How the Game Is Played (http://www.nsf.gov \
/od/lpa/news/publicat/nsf0050/decision/decision.htm). National Science
Foundation. An introductory overview of utility and game theory,
including a discussion of its limitations.
Jeremy Bentham (http://www.utm.edu/research/ep/b/bentham.htm). In-
ternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. An excellent encyclopedic overview
of Bentham’s life and thought.
From the Bentham’s The Commonplace Book
“The greatest happiness for the greatest number is the foundation of
morals and legislation.”
Houses of Parliament from the River, Library of Congress
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Chapter 23. “Happiness Is the Greatest Good” by Jeremy Bentham
Topics Worth Investigating
1. Utilitarianism is often cited as a consequentialist or teleological
ethics. Consequentialism is the doctrine that the morally correct
action is an action maximizing the good; hence, consequentialism
is not so much concerned with the means used as it is concerned
with probable outcomes, ends, or goals of activities. Utilitarianism
holds only pleasure or happiness is an intrinsic good, whereas
consequentialism implies that there may well be other intrinsic
goods, such as knowledge, that some persons might not desire. In any
case, the question arises whether or not something instrumentally
bad can lead to something intrinsically good. Do we actually judge
the goodness of an action only by its consequences? Do the ends
justify the means in some cases? Construct and analyze a few
examples in support of your view.
2. Bentham seems to equate happiness with pleasure. Are there signifi-
cant differences between pleasure and happiness? Do the characteris-
tics of time, sensation, or emotion differ for each? Can one be happy
while in painful circumstances? Provide some specific examples in
support of some of the distinctions you notice.
3. If pleasure for Bentham is intrinsically good, would anything count
as being intrinsically bad? Bentham is often called a hedonist. He-
donism is the ethical view that pleasure alone is an intrinsic good
for persons. Does Bentham believe the descriptive generalization that
all persons in fact do seek pleasure (a view called psychological he-
donism), or does he believe that all persons should or ought to seek
pleasure, even though some persons might not (a view called ethical
hedonism)? Relate your answer to Bentham’s theory of motives.
4. When Bentham explains the principle of utility in terms of the in-
dividual and in terms of the community, does he commit the fallacy
of composition?3 He writes above, Chapter I, V, “It is in vain to talk
3.
The fallacy of composition involves the implication that a characteristic of a part
of a something is attributable as the same characteristic of the whole. For example, the
inference, “ Since human beings are mortal, someday the human race must come to
an end” is an instance of this fallacy. If all the players on an all-star team are excellent players, it would not logically follow that the team is an excellent team. In other
words, in the fallacy of composition, the name of the characteristic in the predicate is
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of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the
interest of the individual.”
5. Vince Lombardi, the legendary football coach has said, “Show me a
good loser, and I’ll show you a loser” and “Winning isn’t everything;
it’s the only thing.” Compare these statements to “As a man thinketh
in his heart so is he.”4 What would be Bentham’s reaction to the later
statement? Has Bentham overlooked anything in asserting that mo-
tives are not an exception to his theory?
6. Attempt to do a detailed calculation of the total amount of pleasure
and pain comparing sleeping-in with attending philosophy class. If
you are sleeping, then would it follow that you are experiencing nei-
ther pleasure nor pain because you are not conscious? In your calcu-
lation, be sure to include the extent of the pleasure you bring to the
other members of the class. If you have problems, try assigning plea-
sure as an ordinal relation rather than a cardinal relation, or check the
Internet to see if anyone else has attempted calculating some specific
instances.
used ambiguously.
4.
Proverbs, 23: 7.
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265
Chapter 24
“Slave and Master Morality”
by Friedrich Nietzsche
Nietzsche, Thoemmes
About the author. . .
Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) intuitive and visceral rejection of the
economics, politics, and science of European civilization in the 19th cen-
tury led him to predict, “There will be wars such as there have never
been on earth before.” His dominant aphoristic style of writing and his
insistence of truth as convenient fiction, or irrefutable error, have puzzled
philosophers who think in traditional ways. Nietzsche seeks to undermine
the traditional quest of philosophy as recounted by Russell and, instead,
seeks to reveal the objects of philosophy (truth, reality, and value) to be
based on the “Will to Power.”
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Chapter 24. “Slave and Master Morality” by Friedrich Nietzsche
About the work. . .
In Beyond Good and Evil 1 Nietzsche detects two types of morality mixed
not only in higher civilization but also in the psychology of the individ-
ual. Master-morality values power, nobility, and independence: it stands
“beyond good and evil.” Slave-morality values sympathy, kindness, and
humility and is regarded by Nietzsche as “herd-morality.” The history of
society, Nietzsche believes, is the conflict between these two outlooks: the
herd attempts to impose its values universally but the noble master tran-
scends their “mediocrity.”
From the reading. . .
“Every elevation of the type man, has hitherto been the work of an
aristocratic society and so. . . requiring slavery in one form or another.”
Ideas of Interest from Beyond Good and Evil
1. How does Nietzsche explain the origins of society? What are the es-
sential characteristics of a healthy society?
2. Nietzsche states that a consequence of the “Will to Power” is the ex-
ploitation of man by man, and this exploitation is the essence of life.
What does he mean by this statement? Is exploitation a basic biologi-
cal function of living things?
3. What does Nietzsche mean when he says that the noble type of man
is “beyond good and evil” and is a creator of values?
4. Explain in some detail the differences among the master-morality and
the slave-morality. Are these concepts useful in the analysis of inter-
personal dynamics?
1.
Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. by Helen Zimmern (1909-
1913), 257-261.
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Chapter 24. “Slave and Master Morality” by Friedrich Nietzsche
5. Explain Nietzsche’s insight into the psychology of vanity. Why is
vanity essential to the slave-morality? How does it relate to the in-
dividual’s need for approval? Is Nietzsche noting that the vanity of
an individual is a direct consequence of the individual’s own sense of
inferiority?
The Reading Selection from Beyond Good
and Evil
[Origin of Aristocracy]
257. Every elevation of the type “man,” has hitherto been the work of an
aristocratic society and so it will always be—a society believing in a long
scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human beings,
and requiring slavery in some form or other. Without the pathos of dis-
tance, such as grows out of the incarnated difference of classes, out of the
constant out-looking and down-looking of the ruling caste on subordinates
and instruments, and out of their equally constant practice of obeying and
commanding, of keeping down and keeping at a distance—that other more
mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new
widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher,
rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short, just the
elevation of the type “man,” the continued “self-surmounting of man,” to
use a moral formula in a supermoral sense.
To be sure, one must not resign oneself to any humanitarian illusions about
the history of the origin of an aristocratic society (that is to say, of the pre-
liminary condition for the elevation of the type “man”): the truth is hard.
Let us acknowledge unprejudicedly how every higher civilization hitherto
has originated! Men with a still natural nature, barbarians in every terrible
sense of the word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength
of will and desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral,
more peaceful races (perhaps trading or cattle-rearing communities), or
upon old mellow civilizations in which the final vital force was flickering
out in brilliant fireworks of wit and depravity. At the commencement, the
noble caste was always the barbarian caste: their superiority did not con-
sist first of all in their physical, but in their psychical power—they were
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Chapter 24. “Slave and Master Morality” by Friedrich Nietzsche
more complete men (which at every point also implies the same as “more
complete beasts”).
[Higher Class of Being]
258. Corruption—as the indication that anarchy threatens to break out
among the instincts, and that the foundation of the emotions, called “life,”
is convulsed—is something radically different according to the organiza-
tion in which it manifests itself. When, for instance, an aristocracy like
that of France at the beginning of the Revolution, flung away its privi-
leges with sublime disgust and sacrificed itself to an excess of its moral
sentiments, it was corruption:—it was really only the closing act of the
corruption which had existed for centuries, by virtue of which that aristoc-
racy had abdicated step by step its lordly prerogatives and lowered itself to
a function of royalty (in the end even to its decoration and parade-dress).
The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it
should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the common-
wealth, but as the significance highest justification thereof—that it should
therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of indi-
viduals, who, for its sake, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect
men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely
that society is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foun-
dation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may
be able to elevate themselves to their higher duties, and in general to a
higher existence: like those sun-seeking climbing plants in Java—they are
called Sipo Matador,—which encircle an oak so long and so often with
their arms, until at last, high above it, but supported by it, they can unfold
their tops in the open light, and exhibit their happiness.
[Life Denial]
259. To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from exploitation,
and put one’s will on a par with that of others: this may result in a cer-
tain rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary
conditions are given (namely, the actual similarity of the individuals in
amount of force and degree of worth, and their co-relation within one or-
ganization). As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more
generally, and if possible even as the fundamental principle of society, it
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Chapter 24. “Slave and Master Morality” by Friedrich Nietzsche
would immediately disclose what it really is—namely, a Will to the denial
of life, a principle of dissolution and decay.
Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimen-
tal weakness: life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of
the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms,
incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation;—but why
should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a dis-
paraging purpose has been stamped?
Even the organization within which, as was previously supposed, the indi-
viduals treat each other as equal—it takes place in every healthy aristoc-
racy—must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organization, do all that
towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing to
each other it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeav-
our to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy—not
owing to any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and because
life is precisely Will to Power. On no point, however, is the ordinary con-
sciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this mat-
ter, people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about
coming conditions of society in which “the exploiting character” is to be
absent—that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life
which should refrain from all organic functions.
From the reading. . .
“The noble type of man regards himself as a determiner of values; he
does not require to be approved of. . . he is a creator of values.”
“Exploitation” does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive
society it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic
function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is pre-
cisely the Will to Life—Granting that as a theory this is a novelty—as
a reality it is the fundamental fact of all history let us be so far honest
towards ourselves!
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Chapter 24. “Slave and Master Morality” by Friedrich Nietzsche
[Master Morality]
260. In a tour through the many finer and coarser moralities which have
hitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth, I found certain traits recur-
ring regularly together, and connected with one another, until finally two
primary types revealed themselves to me, and a radical distinction was
brought to light.
There is master-morality and slave-morality,—I would at once add, how-
ever, that in all higher and mixed civilizations, there are also attempts at the
reconciliation of the two moralities, but one finds still oftener the confu-
sion and mutual misunderstanding of them, indeed sometimes their close
juxtaposition—even in the same man, within one soul. The distinctions of
moral values have either originated in a ruling caste, pleasantly conscious
of being different from the ruled—or among the ruled class, the slaves and
dependents of all sorts.
In the first case, when it is the rulers who determine the conception “good,”
it is the exalted, proud disposition which is regarded as the distinguishing
feature, and that which determines the order of rank. The noble type of
man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of this ex-
alted, proud disposition displays itself he despises them. Let it at once be
noted that in this first kind of morality the antithesis “good” and “bad”
means practically the same as “noble” and “despicable”,—the antithesis
“good” and “evil” is of a different origin. The cowardly, the timid, the in-
significant, and those thinking merely of narrow utility are despised; more-
over, also, the distrustful, with their constrained glances, the self-abasing,
the dog-like kind of men who let themselves be abused, the mendicant flat-
terers, and above all the liars:—it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats
that the common people are untruthful. “We truthful ones”—the nobility
in ancient Greece called themselves.
It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were at first
applied to men; and were only derivatively and at a later period applied
to actions; it is a gross mistake, therefore, when historians of morals start
with questions like, “Why have sympathetic actions been praised?” The
noble type of man regards himself as a determiner of values; he does not
require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: What is injurious to
me is injurious in itself; he knows that it is he himself only who confers
honour on things; he is a creator of values. He honours whatever he recog-
nizes in himself: such morality equals self-glorification. In the foreground
there is the feeling of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the
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Chapter 24. “Slave and Master Morality” by Friedrich Nietzsche
happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain
give and bestow:—the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not—or
scarcely—out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the super-
abundance of power. The noble man honours in himself the powerful one,
him also who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and how
to keep silence, who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and
hardness, and has reverence for all that is severe and hard. “Wotan placed a
hard heart in my breast,” says an old Scandinavian Saga: it is thus rightly
expressed from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is even
proud of not being made for sympathy; the hero of the Saga therefore adds
warningly: “He who has not a hard heart when young, will never have
one.” The noble and brave who think thus are the furthest removed from
the morality which sees precisely in sympathy, or in acting for the good of
others, or in dèintèressement, the characteristic of the moral; faith in one-
self, pride in oneself, a radical enmity and irony towards “selflessness,”
belong as definitely to noble morality, as do a careless scorn and precau-
tion in presence of sympathy and the “warm heart.”
It is the powerful who know how to honour, it is their art, their domain for
invention. The profound reverence for age and for tradition—all law rests
on this double reverence,— the belief and prejudice in favour of ancestors
and unfavourable to newcomers, is typical in the morality of the powerful;
and if, reversely, men of “modern ideas” believe almost instinctively in
“progress” and the “future,” and are more and more lacking in respect
for old age, the ignoble origin of these “ideas” has complacently betrayed
itself thereby.
A morality of the ruling class, however, is more especially foreign and ir-
ritating to present-day taste in the sternness of its principle that one has
duties only to one’s equals; that one may act towards beings of a lower
rank, towards all that is foreign, just as seems good to one, or “as the heart
desires,” and in any case “beyond good and evil”: it is here that sympathy
and similar sentiments can have a place. The ability and obligation to ex-
ercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge—both only within the
circle of equals,—artfulness in retaliation, refinement of the idea in friend-
ship, a certain necessity to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions of
envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance—in fact, in order to be a good friend):
all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality, which, as has
been pointed out, is not the morality of “modern ideas,” and is therefore at
present difficult to realize, and also to unearth and disclose.
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Chapter 24. “Slave and Master Morality” by Friedrich Nietzsche
[Slave Morality]
It is otherwise with the second type of morality, slave-morality. Suppos-
ing that the abused, the oppressed, the suffering, the unemancipated, the
weary, and those uncertain of themselves should moralize, what will be
the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic sus-
picion with regard to the entire situation of man will find expression, per-
haps a condemnation of man, together with his situation. The slave has an
unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful; he has a skepticism and
distrust, a refinement of distrust of everything “good” that is there hon-
oured—he would fain persuade himself that the very happiness there is
not genuine. On the other hand, those qualities which serve to alleviate the
existence of sufferers are brought into prominence and flooded with light;
it is here that sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart, patience,
diligence, humility, and friendliness attain to honour; for here these are the
most useful qualities, and almost the only means of supporting the burden
of existence. Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility.
Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis “good” and
“evil”:—power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, a
certain dreadfulness, subtlety, and strength, which do not admit of being
despised. According to slave-morality, therefore, the “evil” man arouses
fear; according to master-morality, it is precisely the “good” man who
arouses fear and seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is regarded as the
despicable being.
The contrast attains its maximum when, in accordance with the logical
consequences of slave-morality, a shade of depreciation—it may be slight
and well-intentioned—at last attaches itself to the “good” man of this
morality; because, according to the servile mode of thought, the good man
must in any case be the safe man: he is good-natured, easily deceived, per-
haps a little stupid, un bonhomme. Everywhere that slave-morality gains
the ascendancy, language shows a tendency to approximate the significa-
tions of the words “good” and “stupid.”
[Creation of Values]
A l