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by St. Anselm”

Canterbury Cathedral, Library of Congress, ©Detroit Publishing

About the author. . .

St. Anselm (1033-1109), a member of the Benedictine Order and Bishop

of Canterbury, extended the Augustine tradition of seeking to believe in

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Chapter 10. “The Ontological Argument by St. Anselm”

order to understand the truth and existence of God rather that seeking to

understand in order to believe in the truth and existence of God. Even so,

St. Anselm does not distinguish clearly between religious and philosoph-

ical pursuits. Many theologians avoid trusting reason from the fear of the

specter of skepticism; however, Anselm believes reason is necessary to

elucidate and validate faith. Anselm is often considered to be the father of

scholastic philosophy since his work emphasizes linguistic and analytical

thinking. Scholasticism was the dominant approach to philosophical and

theological problems during the medieval period.

About the work. . .

Although Anselm’s argument for God’s existence presented in this article

is based on predominately on reason, Anselm presents the argument as

clarification Christian faith. The heart of his argument is the insight that

if God is defined as a “being than which no greater can be conceived,”

then God could not be conceived of as not existing because perfection, he

thinks, implies existence. Baruch Spinoza and René Descartes employed

versions of the ontological argument where the very concept of God as a

perfect being implies existence as a property. In philosophical jargon, a

feature of the essence of God is said to be existence.

From the reading. . .

“. . . we believe that you are a being of which nothing greater can be

conceived. . . ”

Ideas of Interest from the Proslogium

1. Explain whether you think St. Anselm believes understanding the na-

ture of religious belief is a necessary condition for believing in the

nature and existence of God.

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Chapter 10. “The Ontological Argument by St. Anselm”

2. As clearly as possible, restate Anselm’s ontological argument.

3. Clearly explain what St. Anselm means when he writes there is only

one way God can be conceived not to exist.

4. Explain why, according to St. Anselm, only God and nothing else

cannot not exist? According to Anselm, why couldn’t other necessary

beings exist?

The Reading Selection from the Proslogium

Lord, I acknowledge and I thank you that you have created me in this your

image, in order that I may be mindful of you, may conceive of you, and

love you; but that image has been so consumed and wasted away by vices,

and obscured by the smoke of wrong-doing, that it cannot achieve that

for which it was made, except you renew it, and create it anew. I do not

endeavor, O Lord, to penetrate your sublimity, for in no wise do I compare

my understanding with that; but I long to understand in some degree your

truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand

that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand. For this also I

believe, —that unless I believed, I should not understand. . . .

Truly there is a God, although the fool has said in his heart, There is no

God.

AND so, Lord, do you, who do give understanding to faith, give me, so

far as you knowest it to be profitable, to understand that you are as we

believe; and that you are that which we believe. And indeed, we believe

that you are a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is

there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart, there is no God?

( Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this

being of which I speak—a being than which nothing greater can be con-

ceived—understands what be hears, and what he understands is in his un-

derstanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to

understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he

will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but be does not yet

understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has

made the painting, be both has it in his understanding, and he understands

that it exists, because he has made it.

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Chapter 10. “The Ontological Argument by St. Anselm”

Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understand-

ing, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he

hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the

understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be con-

ceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in

the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which

is greater.

From the reading. . .

“That which can be conceived not to exist is not God.”

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in

the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can

be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obvi-

ously this is impossible. Hence, there is doubt that there exists a being,

than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the un-

derstanding and in reality. . . .

God cannot be conceived not to exist. —God is that, than which nothing

greater can be conceived. —That which can be conceived not to exist is

not God.

AND it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist.

For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not

to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to ex-

ist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be

conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be

conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so

truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it

cannot even be conceived not to exist;. and this being you are, O Lord, our

God.

So truly, therefore, do you exist, O Lord, my God, that you can not be

conceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind could conceive of a be-

ing better than you, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is

most absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there is, except you alone, can

be conceived not to exist. To you alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more

truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others.

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Chapter 10. “The Ontological Argument by St. Anselm”

For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree

it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no

God ( Psalms xiv. 1), since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that you do

exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull and a fool?

. . .

How the fool has said in his heart what cannot be conceived. —A thing

may be conceived in two ways: (1) when the word signifying it is con-

ceived; (2) when the thing itself is understood. As far as the word goes,

God can be conceived not to exist; in reality he cannot.

BUT how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive; or how

is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? since it is the

same to say in the heart, and to conceive.

But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said in his

heart; and did not say in his heart, because he could not conceive; there

is more than one way in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived.

For, in one sense, an object is conceived, when the word signifying it is

conceived; and in another, when the very entity, which the object is, is

understood.

In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist; but in the lat-

ter, not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water are can con-

ceive fire to be water, in accordance with the nature of the facts themselves,

although this is possible according to the words. So, then, no one who un-

derstands what God is can conceive that God does not exist; although he

says these words in his heart, either without any or with some foreign, sig-

nification. For, God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived. And

he who thoroughly understands this, assuredly understands that this being

so truly exists, that not even in concept can it be non-existent. Therefore,

he who understands that God so exists, cannot conceive that he does not

exist.

I thank you, gracious Lord, I thank you; because what I formerly believed

by your bounty, I now so understand by your illumination, that if I were

unwilling to believe that you do exist, I should not be able not to under-

stand this to be true.

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Chapter 10. “The Ontological Argument by St. Anselm”

Related Ideas

Anselm of Canterbury (http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/a/anselm.htm)

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A summary of life, writings, and

theology of Anselm.

St. Anselm (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01546a.htm) Catholic En-

cyclopedia. An extensive historical background summary of St. Anselm’s

life and works by W. H. Kent.

Canterbury Cathedral, Norman Staircase, Library of Congress, ©Detroit

Publishing

Topics Worth Investigating

1. Anselm believes even a foolish person can understand the definition

of “God” as “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.” Is

this phrase clear and distinct? For example, does a number than which

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Chapter 10. “The Ontological Argument by St. Anselm”

no greater number can be conceived, exist in the same manner as any

given number is said to exist?

2. If an apple has the qualities of being red, fresh, round, and on a tree,

need we add an additional quality assuring the apple exists? Is exis-

tence a characteristic of things? In what way is something existing in

reality greater than something existing only in the mind?

3. Compare “being in the highest degree” with “existence in the highest

degree.” Is existence an ordinal or a cardinal property? Can a thing

partly or imperfectly exist?

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Chapter 11

“An Answer to Anselm” by

Gaunilo

Abbey at Marmoutier, www.thais.it

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Chapter 11. “An Answer to Anselm” by Gaunilo

About the author. . .

Gaunilo, a Benedictine monk of Marmoutier, expressed his objections to

Anselm’s argument by means of devising a logical analogy. Gaunilo’s ar-

gument appeared soon after the writing of the Proslogion and was ac-

cepted by many philosophers.

About the work. . .

Gaunilo replies to Anselm’s ontological argument in his Pro Insipiente 1

(a “take-off” of Anselm’s reference to the fool of Psalms) that the use of

a concept does not imply that the concept has an existent reference. He

argues by analogy that many ideas are only hypothetical. Note how in a

later reading St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with Gaunilo’s analysis. Nathan

Salmon has observed, “Philosophers who address the questions of what

it is for an individual to exist, or what it is for an individual to be actual,

often do so with reference to the fallacy they have uncovered in the clas-

sical Ontological Argument for God’s existence. Indeed, the Ontological

Argument is useful as a vehicle by which this and other issues in ontology

and the philosophy of logic may be introduced and sharpened.”2

From the reading. . .

“This, in the mean time, is the answer the fool could make in the argu-

ments urged against him. . . ”

Ideas of Interest from Pro Insipiente

1. Restate in your own words, Gaunilo’s perfect island objection.

1.

Gaunilo. Pro Insipiente. “In Behalf of the Fool.” 1078.

2.

Nathan Salmon. “Existence” in Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics, Volume

1. Edited by James E. Tomberlin. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co, 1987, 49.

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Chapter 11. “An Answer to Anselm” by Gaunilo

2. Does the concept of a being “than which no greater can be conceived”

differ from other kinds of concepts on the basis that this concept can-

not be conceived not to exist?

3. Does the ontological argument of Anselm or does the perfect island

objection of Gaunilo commit the fallacy of petitio principii?

The Reading Selection from Pro Insipiente

For example: it is said that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which,

because of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of discovering what

does not exist, is called the lost island. And they say that this island has an

inestimable wealth of all manner of riches and delicacies in greater abun-

dance than is told of the Islands of the Blest; and that having no owner or

inhabitant, it is more excellent than all other countries, which are inhabited

by mankind, in the abundance with which it is stored.

Now if some one should tell me that there is such an island, I should easily

understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose that he

went on to say, as if by a logical inference: “You can no longer doubt

that this island which is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere,

since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is

more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in

the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does

not exist, any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and

so the island already understood by you to be more excellent will not be

more excellent.”

If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that this island truly

exists, and that its existence should no longer be doubted, either I should

believe that he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard as the

greater fool: myself, supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if

he should suppose that he had established with any certainty the existence

of this island. For he ought to show first that the hypothetical excellence

of this island exists as a real and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any

unreal object, or one whose existence is uncertain, in my understanding.

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Chapter 11. “An Answer to Anselm” by Gaunilo

From the reading. . .

“. . . I know not which I ought to regard as the greater fool: myself,

supposing that I should allow this proof; or him. . . ”

This, in the mean time, is the answer the fool could make to the arguments

urged against him. When he is assured in the first place that this being is

so great that its non-existence is not even conceivable, and that this in turn

is proved on no other ground than the fact that otherwise it will not be

greater than all things, the fool may make the same answer, and say:

When did I say that any such being exists in reality, that is, a being greater

than all others?—that on this ground it should be proved to me that it also

exists in reality to such a degree that it cannot even be conceived not to

exist? Whereas in the first place it should be in some way proved that a

nature which is higher, that is, greater and better, than all other natures,

exists; in order that from this we may then be able to prove all attributes

which necessarily the being that is greater and better than all possesses.

[The Island], NOAA, John Bortnaik

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Chapter 11. “An Answer to Anselm” by Gaunilo

Moreover, it is said that the non-existence of this being is inconceivable. It

might better be said, perhaps, that its non-existence, or the possibility of its

non-existence, is unintelligible. For according to the true meaning of the

word, unreal objects are unintelligible. Yet their existence is conceivable

in the way in which the fool conceived of the non-existence of God. I

am most certainly aware of my own existence; but I know, nevertheless,

that my non-existence is possible. As to that supreme being, moreover,

which God is, I understand without any doubt both his existence, and the

impossibility of his non-existence. Whether, however, so long as I am most

positively aware of my existence, I can conceive of my non-existence, I

am not sure. But if I can, why can I not conceive of the non-existence

of whatever else I know with the same certainty? If, however, I cannot,

God will not be the only being of which it can be said, it is impossible to

conceive of his non-existence.

From the reading. . .

“Moreover, it is said that the non-existence of this being is inconceiv-

able. It might better be said, perhaps, that its non-existence. . . is unin-

telligible.”

Related Ideas

Existence (http://plato.standford.edu/entries/existence/) An excellent his-

torical summary of the topic of “existence” in the Standford Internet En-

cyclopedia of Philosophy.

Ontological Arguments (http://http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-

arguments/) Summary of all ontological arguments including recent work

by the Standford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Reading For Philosophical Inquiry: A Brief Introduction

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Chapter 11. “An Answer to Anselm” by Gaunilo

Abbey Ruins at Marmoutier, France

Topics Worth Investigating

1. Do you think that Gaunilo would agree the following objection applys

to Anselm’s Ontological Argument?

Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction.

Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever

we can conceive as existent, we can also conceive of as nonexistent.

There is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Conse-

quently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.3

2. Explain the differences between “inconceivable” and “unintelligible.”

3.

David Hume. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. 1779.

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Chapter 12

“Existence Is Not a

Predicate” by Immanuel

Kant

Immanuel Kant, Thoemmes

About the author. . .

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) studied in Königsberg, East Prussia. Before

he fully developed an interest in philosophy, he was fascinated with

physics and astronomy—in fact, he anticipated William Herschel’s

discovery of Uranus by a few years. Kant’s critical philosophy, one of

the truly profound philosophies in the history of Western Civilization,

was constructed to forge empiricism and rationalism into a “critical”

philosophy which sought to overcome the many pressing shortcomings of

each. What we call objective reality, Kant argues, is subject to whatever

conforms to the structures of our perception and thinking. Virtually every

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Chapter 12. “Existence Is Not a Predicate” by Immanuel Kant

epistemological theory since Kant, directly or indirectly, is oriented in

reference to his The Critique of Pure Reason.

About the work. . .

In “Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Exis-

tence of God,” 1 drawn from his Critique, Kant addresses the logical problem of existential import. How do we talk or think about things without

supposing, in some sense at least, that they exist? Bertrand Russell ex-

pressed one aspect of the problem this way: If it’s false that the present

King of France is bald, then why doesn’t this fact imply that it’s true the

present King of France is not bald? When the existence of the subjects of

our statements are in question, the normal use of logic becomes unreli-

able. Kant argues that the use of words (or “predicates”) alone does not

necessarily imply the existence of their referents. We can only assume the

existence of entities named by our words; we cannot prove “existence” by

means of the use of language alone.

From the reading. . .

“Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of some-

thing which is added to the conception of some other thing. ”

Ideas of Interest from The Critique of Pure

Reason

1. Define the term “á priori judgment” with the help of a dictionary, and

give several different examples of an á priori judgment.

1.

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. 1781.

Bk.2 Ch. 3 § IV, ¶ 55.

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Chapter 12. “Existence Is Not a Predicate” by Immanuel Kant

2. Use a good dictionary to define the term “analytic judgment,” and

give several different examples. Is there any difference between an

analytic judgment and a tautology?

3. Construct a good definition of the term “synthetic judgment,” and give

several examples.

4. What is Kant’s argument that “existence is not a predicate”? How

does this argument relate to Anselm’s Ontological argument?

The Reading Selection from The Critique of