Platos Gorgias
GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.
persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.
SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:If a person were to say to you, Is there, SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?you would reply, if to be your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-I am not mistaken, that there is.
and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the GORGIAS: Yes.
argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well one anothers words; I would have you develope your own as a true?
views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.
GORGIAS: No.
GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates.
SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowl-SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is edge and belief differ.
such a thing as having learned?
GORGIAS: Very true.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as SOCRATES: And there is also having believed?
those who have believed are persuaded?
GORGIAS: Yes.
GORGIAS: Just so.
SOCRATES: And is the having learned the same as hav-SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persua-ing believed, and are learning and belief the same things?
sion,one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?