Platos Gorgias
CALLICLES: I will.
and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this?whether he should follow after that SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call sought for the sake of that which is good, and not that which the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating is good for the sake of pleasure?
rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the CALLICLES: To be sure.
life of philosophy;and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distin-SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures guish them, as I did before, and when we have come to an are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowl-agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to con-edge of them in detail?
sider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even CALLICLES: He must have art.
now understand what I mean?
SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying CALLICLES: No, I do not.
to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: see-at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and ing that you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as there are other processes which know good and evil. And I good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and only an experience, was of the former class, which is con-process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is differ-cerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of ent from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by which is goodI wish that you would tell me whether you the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, agree with me thus far or notdo you agree?
or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinionfor you will CALLICLES: I do.
observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; 124
Platos Gorgias
SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, truth when I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.
in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the na-SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two ture and constitution of the patient, and has principles of or more?
action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more.
pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollec-and yet have no regard for their true interests?
tion of what she has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have CALLICLES: Yes.
proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul
SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight some of them processes of art, making a provision for the mankindor rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and souls highest interestothers despising the interest, and, as do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort CALLICLES: I assent.
of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil.
as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ.
CALLICLES: Yes.