Altar of Peace by Tiago Bonacho - HTML preview

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I

– Kant stated that everything that is perceived and made conscious is only phenomenon, manifestation of something that is ungraspable in its true being. That is, information, so to become something in consciousness, inevitably appears predetermine by what cognitively enables us to consciously know whatever it may be, hence the things in-themselves and unconditional understanding, so to say, the unconditioned knowledge is thus impossible to us, given the preconditions that every experience is invariably invested with so we can even know at all. God, then, understood as in being of transcendental Nature, that is, in theory, not only deemed unavailable in the world of phenomena (the only one where we obtain experience and knowledge from), but also without correspondence in the abilities of our intellectual grasp, God is then an issue on which reason might dwell on, but on grounds where its unable to grasp or at least affirm anything that could be settled for universally valid, since we don’t seem to have appropriate cognitive instruments, alike the ones that make mathematic and geometry possible, that would enable us to produce affirmations about God as we do for the latter issues (that don’t need exterior proof so to be reckon as evidential truth, but already hold as evidence by intuitive logic and conceptual demonstration alone). Under this scenario, theology is therefore understood to be an area on which reason can dwell on, but only to deliberate about it in antinomies, as in, reason can assent to the existence of God as well as to its opposite, because both the existence of God as well as His inexistence are things that can’t be proved, neither by objective, exterior perception (because we condition everything we experience, and God is subjectively understood as objectively unconditioned) neither by self-evident conceptual reasoning (because we don’t understand ourselves as in possessing similar cognitive instruments as to those that make mathematics and geometry possible, so to turn the existence of God self-evident by logical demonstration alone).

 

»Let’s say that there are two kinds of evidences or ways to obtain proof: the ones that require proof by practical demonstration, by experience, and the ones that don’t need exterior demonstration, but can make themselves evident solely by logical reasoning. Kant seems to say that human understanding inevitably imposes conditions on what is experienced, adding or changing already what is experienced, as it inevitably contextualizes it into a sum of conditions just to make the act of knowing even possible. Dogma is thus impossible and all that might be said about God is only speculation, because we are already unable to prove His existence, for two reasons:1. Objectively, exteriorly speaking, because God  is understood as in being of unconditioned Nature (and since we inevitably condition whatever we experience so to know, the unconditioned, like God, is impossible to experience, to point Him out in nature, so to speak, which we wouldn’t be able to do even if we saw Him, as in, in the world of phenomena, God seems to be unrecognizable ); and 2. as far as proving His existence by logic alone, we don’t seem to have an inherent cognitive ability, alike the ones that we have that make mathematics and geometry possible, that would somehow make the existence of God irrefutable by idiosyncrasies’ comparison alone, so to speak.

»Consciousness seems to be related to God understood immediately as an infinite beginning. A self-evident Conscious Origin. Self-evident because the concept of consciousness (and thus our fundamental sense of self) is impossible, if taken in any way deriving from unconsciousness. If denying that premise, that is, if denying consciousness or awareness as not being accidental but expression of Origen, one seems to be denying all consciousness beyond and prior to oneself; we’d be saying that consciousness is exclusive of whomsoever claims that attribute for himself – needless to say, bound to believe in that claim solely when affirmed in our regard – unless we realize now that in fact we are not alive, but dead, and, although writing or reading these words, we are actually unaware or unconscious of ourselves thinking that we are – not by mistake but by illusion – which seems to make death less of an end, but a door out of a paradoxical dream.