Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, mediated settlements of intrastate conflicts, codified in peace agreements, have included the disarmament, demobil- ization, and reintegration (DDR) of fighting forces. In these peace processes, mediators have been confronted with intense negotiations between governments and rebel fighting forces to control, disband, or downsize their respective fighting forces; destroy collected armaments and munitions; and provide transitional support for demobilized fighters. Transitional security provisions have built confidence between former belligerents and prevented the easy resumption of armed conflict. Equally important, the DDR of fighting forces has provided a conducive environment for the implementation of vital aspects of a peace accord, such as the holding of elections; the (re)establishment of governmental authority and services; the return of displaced populations; the reconstruction of markets and infrastructure; and societal reconciliation. In turn, satisfactory resolution of key conflict issues, such as political power sharing, constitutional reform, wealth sharing, and redress for perpetrated crimes, have facilitated the willingness of former conflict parties to submit their forces to DDR programs. Thus, DDR programs have become central to the overall success of a peace process.
Yet there appears to be a knowledge deficit in terms of how to manage the political dimensions of DDR in a mediation process. For mediators, this shortage has resulted in a compromised ability to manage the misperceptions about and fears of DDR held by armed groups and their negotiating representatives. Furthermore, mediators have sometimes failed to fully assess the interests and positions of negotiating parties and accurately identify the strategies and tactics conflict parties employ to avoid disarming and demobilizing their fighting forces. An overtly programmatic approach-as opposed to a political one-by the mediator, coupled with unrealistic planning assumptions, have further compromised the viability of DDR programs. For their part, conflict parties plagued by a lack of knowledge of this co