Notes
1. The logic here is that terrorists crave attention—for themselves and/or their cause—above al , and that by acknowledging their influence in the conflict, the mediator feeds their appetite for attention and makes them less likely to commit further attention-grabbing violence.
2. President Barack Obama entered office in 2009 declaring that his administration would consider dialogue with interlocutors that the preceding administration considered beyond the diplomatic pale, yet while the Obama administration has talked with governments formerly treated as pariahs by Washington, it has not publicly, at least, talked with terrorist organizations.
3. Audrey Kurth Cronin, When Should We Talk to Terrorists? Special Report no. 240 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010), 3.
4. The manuscript was written with the support of the Smith Richardson Foundation as well as the United States Institute of Peace. Faure and Zartman have published a book, Negotiating with Terrorists: Strategies, Tactics, and Politics (London: Routledge, 2010), that focuses on hostage situations.
5. See, for example, David G. Savage, “Supreme Court Upholds Law against Advising Terrorists,” Los Angeles Times, June 22, 2010, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-court-terror-20100622,0,5090110.story. The article begins: “The Supreme Court ruled Monday that human rights advocates led by a USC professor could be prosecuted if they offered advice to a foreign terrorist group, even if the advice was to settle disputes peaceful y.”
6. Crocker made his comments at a roundtable discussion of the Supreme Court’s Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project decision held at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., on September 10, 2010. See the online report “When Is International Peacemaking Illegal?” http://www.usip.org/events/when-international-peacemaking-illegal-the-supreme-court-decision-in-holder-v-humanitarian-la.
7. The impact of antiterrorism proscription regimes on mediating peace processes is discussed at length in Veronique Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups, Special Report no. 239 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, May 2010), 8–11.
8. Cronin, When Should We Talk to Terrorists? 4.
9. Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups, 4.
10. See Arun Kumar, “Nepal Maoists Were Never Called a Terrorist Outfit: US,” SIFY News, May 15, 2008, http://www.sify.com/news/nepal-maoists-were-never-called-a-terror-outfit-news-international-jegr8kfgcac.html.
11. See Fernando Reinares and Rogelio Alonso, “Spain and the ETA,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, ed. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 128 and 114.
12. Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups, 6.
13. See David Smock, “Uganda/Lord’s Resistance Army Peace Negotiations,” Peace Brief (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 2008), http://www.usip.org/resources/ugandalords-resistance-army-peace-negotiations.
14. Aharaon Kleiman, “Israeli Negotiating Culture,” in How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process, ed. Tamara Cofman Wittes (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 110.
15. See George J. Mitchel , Making Peace (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 19 and 110.
16. Mitchel , Making Peace, 33.
17. Kirsten Sparre coined the phrase. See, for example, her article, “Megaphone Diplomacy in the Northern Irish Peace Process: Squaring the Circle by Talking to Terrorists through Journalists,” International Journal of Press/Politics 6, no. 1 (January 2001): 88–104
18. See Jessica Elgot, “David Abrahams Meets Hamas,” Jewish Chronicle, January 21, 2010, http://www.thejc.com/news/israel-news/26296/david-abrahams-meets-hamas.
19. This point is made in John Darby, The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 39.
20. Quoted in Princeton Lyman, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002), 48.
21. See Dudouet, Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups, 10.
22. See Mitchel , Making Peace, 19.
23. For a detailed description of this peace process, see Anthony Regan, Light Intervention: Lessons from Bougainvil e (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010).
24. See Carolin Goerzig, Talking to Terrorists: Concessions and the Renunciation of Violence (Abingdon, UK, and New York: Routledge, 2010).
25. Reinares and Alonso, “Spain and the ETA,” 128–129.
26. Mitchel , Making Peace, 113.
27. Darby, Effects of Violence on Peace Processes, 67.
28. Ibid., 69.
29. Many of these ideas are taken from Darby, Effects of Violence on Peace Processes, 44–45.
30. John Wal ach with Michael Wal ach, The Enemy Has a Face: The Seeds of Peace Experience (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 112.
31. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, “Conclusion,” in Democracy and Counterterrorism, ed. Art and Richardson, 574.
32. Ibid., 578. For more details, see the chapter in Art and Richardson’s volume by David Scott Palmer, “‘Terror in the Name of Mao’: Revolution and Response in Peru,” 209.
33. Paddy Woodworth, “ETA Seeks Talks after Ceasefire Claim Rejected,” Irish Times, September 20, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/0920/
1224279262500.html.
34. Alvaro de Soto, “Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador,” in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 381.
35. Mitchel , Making Peace, 54.
36. See ibid., 62.
37. See ibid., 146.
38. See ibid., 72.
39. Darby, Effects of Violence on Peace Processes, 51–52.
40. Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 10–11.
41. See Cronin, When Should We Talk to Terrorists? 8.
42. Darby, Effects of Violence on Peace Processes, 99–100.
43. Cronin, When Should We Talk to Terrorists? 4.