Step 2
Design a Strategy for Engagement
If Step 1 indicates that it is worth trying to engage a group that uses terror, the negotiator or mediator must design an appropriate strategy. The key questions to be addressed are whom to talk to, when to talk, what to talk about, under what conditions to talk, and how to talk. The answer to any one of these questions will influence the answers to the others, so none should be considered in isolation. Throughout the process, mediators should also be aware of when to stop talking—when to disengage from a process that is not productive and may only be strengthening a terrorist movement’s capacity for violence.
Decide Whom to Talk To
The question of whom to talk to is twofold: the mediator or negotiator needs to decide, first, which group to talk to, and then, second, which individuals within that group to engage. In both cases, however, the criteria are much the same.
Know Whom You Need at the Table, and Whom You Don’t Need
A conflict involving terrorist groups is likely to also involve parties with similar goals to the terrorists but who work peaceful y within the established political process to achieve those goals. Such parties are far readier than the terrorist groups to talk with a mediator or government negotiator, and their participation in a peace process is almost always desirable. But that participation is not always necessary—not, that is, if the parties represent only a small constituency and if the parties have little or no control over the violence that the peace process seeks to halt.
By contrast, groups that have the power and incentive to spoil any agreement reached do need to be included in the peace process if a sustainable peace is to be achieved. Some of the more radical factions within a terrorist group may never be prepared to make peace, but these can be marginalized political y and weakened militarily to a sufficient extent that an agreement can hold. The “mainstream” within a powerful and committed terrorist movement, however, must be represented— directly or indirectly—at the table if a lasting agreement is to be reached.
In 1991 and 1992, the governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland held negotiations involving the four constitutional political parties in Northern Ireland. Those negotiations failed, in part, the governments believed, because they did not include the political parties associated with the paramilitary organizations; as a result, the negotiations were not accompanied by a cessation of violence. When, in the 1990s, Sinn Fein joined the talks, two of the Unionist constitutional parties walked out in protest, but the talks were nonetheless able to go forward toward a successful conclusion because the IRA (in the form of Sinn Fein) was now at the table and could deliver (more or less) on any negotiated commitments to reduce violence. (The absence of the two parties also helped facilitate negotiations because it gave the Ulster Unionist Party, the largest of the Unionist parties, the ability to maneuver free of attacks from the two smal er parties on its policies and leaders.)15
Select an Interlocutor Who Straddles the Moderate/ Hard-line Divide
One’s interlocutor needs to be sufficiently moderate—or at least sufficiently disenchanted with the ability of violence to achieve the PAG’s goals—to consider participating in talks but sufficiently hard-line to be able to sell any agreement to other hard-liners. For this reason, militants who come to accept the need to negotiate are likely to be more influential than committed moderates.
Track II efforts can be useful ways of identifying leaders who have hard-line reputations but may be open to nonviolent approaches, sounding them out about the possibility of talks, exploring points of contact, and conducting prenegotiations.
Make Sure Your Interlocutor Can Deliver
At the most basic level, the mediator needs to make sure that his or her interlocutor actual y represents the group the interlocutor claims to represent. In one extreme case, negotiators in Iraq had to determine whether the voice on the other end of the telephone real y was the spokesman for an insurgent group. They tested this by saying “Shoot a rocket now”; if a rocket came, it was the right group.
Determining an interlocutor’s ability to deliver, however, is a much more complex undertaking than just determining that the interlocutor is who he or she claims to be. Authorities need to know they are facing a valid spokesperson for the terrorists, one who speaks for all or at least a major part of the terrorist group, who is strong enough to survive criticism from within the group for talking with the authorities, and who can deliver on any agreement that might be reached. The mediator or negotiator needs evidence that potential spoilers excluded from the negotiations are not strong enough to upset any ensuing agreement. Such evidence can take the form of a public statement by the PAG endorsing talks or some more concrete sign of cooperation, such as the declaration of a cease-fire or the honoring of a no-violence pledge.
Don’t Try and Appoint the Other Side’s Negotiator
Mediators and governments may be tempted—if only for the sake of effective communications—to indicate their preferred interlocutors, yet they must stay out and let the moderates (or the converted militants) within the PAG emerge on their own. The mediator can meet them as they emerge but must be careful not to compromise them, because their eventual participation in negotiation is useful only if they carry some of their colleagues along with them.
Decide When to Talk
While the assessment of conflict ripeness (discussed in Step 1) will help determine in broad terms if and when to suggest or launch talks, exactly when to make such moves will depend on a variety of context-specific
factors. Each conflict environment, for instance, will have its own
symbolic dates (anniversaries of historic events, national celebrations, commemorations of defeats and atrocities, religious holidays, etc.), and
these may be either highly appropriate or highly inappropriate times on
which to open talks.
When one of the parties to the talks is a government or political party, factor in the schedules for election campaigns, including both national elections and internal elections for a party’s leadership. Don’t expect a party to take a potential y embarrassing or otherwise political y costly step during an election campaign. Similarly, don’t expect a new government to automatical y accede to or implement the terms of an agreement negotiated by its predecessor.
In the United States, where abrupt changes in foreign policy often accompany changes in the presidency, political y sensitive initiatives such as talking to terrorists require very careful handling if they are not to be rejected by incoming administrations determined not to inherit their predecessor’s political baggage. Thus, the United States waited to respond to Arafat’s statement renouncing terrorism until after elections in both the United States and Israel in 1988 but before President George H. W. Bush was sworn into office, minimizing the political price for the incoming administration of talking to the PLO.
The tides of violence should also be factored in. If a mediator or negotiator wants to bring a reluctant PAG into talks, the PAG may be more willing to take that step if it has just suffered a defeat at the hands of government forces. The aftermath of a government victory also gives that government the opportunity to reassure its supporters that it is entering talks from a position of strength.
By the same token, however, it is important for a mediator and it is vital for a government negotiator not to give the impression that talks are a concession to the terrorist group that the group has won through its use of violence. It need hardly be said that once cultivated, this impression will drive the terrorist group’s calculations and negotiating behavior thereafter, with any rejection of the terrorists’ demands precipitating a fresh outbreak of violence intended to wring new concessions.
Decide What to Talk About
Determine the scope of the negotiation: what will be discussed and, no less importantly, what won’t be discussed. For instance, will the talks encompass the history of the conflict or will they focus only on the present and future? Will secession be a topic for discussion or will only autonomy feature on the agenda? Will some highly sensitive issues be kept off the table? Will the parties talk about only those issues—such as confidence-building measures—on which some agreement is possible rather than about more intractable issues? Will issues be linked or deliberately de-linked?
Some mediators and negotiators recommend focusing on concrete issues and avoiding discussion of values, principles, and beliefs, because they are essential y non-negotiable. Others argue that these abstract concepts cannot be divorced from the concrete realities they shape so profoundly, and that they cannot therefore be neglected if a lasting agreement is to be forged. Whichever approach a mediator or negotiator takes, he or she should not expect to change a terrorist’s core beliefs. Strategic political negotiations occur in a highly charged issue-laden context, but one does not negotiate a belief system. Perhaps in the course of implementing the outcome of the negotiations, one can sow doubt about the bases of the terrorists’ motivating beliefs, but the negotiation needs to focus on specific items and will best result in an agreement between enemies that places the next challenge on implementation, not a coming together between new partners. At best, that comes later.
Decide under What Conditions to Talk
Establishing preconditions that the terrorist group must accept before talks can begin is a common practice. The chief advantages of adopting this approach are twofold. In the first place, they offer some reassurance to the public, members of the government, and all other parties to the conflict who have played by the constitutional rules that the terrorists must change their behavior in return for a seat at the bargaining table. In the second place, they gauge the readiness of the terrorists to make concessions and test the ability of terrorist negotiators to control their comrades.
Some pragmatists argue that preconditions do not work, because terrorists are not going to give away their power and leverage in advance of negotiations, especial y if they view the use of violence as the only thing pressing their adversaries to the table. But most mediators and negotiators question not the use of preconditions per se but the nature of those preconditions. The key issue is achieving a balance: setting preconditions that facilitate a process by testing good faith rather than blocking it by demanding the kinds of concessions that are bound to be refused because they would humiliate or emasculate any group that accepted them.
Avoid Strict Preconditions, but Ensure Preconditions Have Substance
Strict preconditions are general y excuses for non-negotiation. This is true both of preconditions concerned with practical, concrete issues and those focused on more abstract, ideological matters. In terms of concrete issues, it may be realistic and appropriate to insist that a terrorist group reduce or cease violence as a precursor to talks, but it is fanciful to expect the terrorists to promptly disarm or join the ranks of the government’s army or police force. On the more abstract level, do not require a PAG to abandon its dreams as a precondition of talks. The purpose of those talks is not to deprive the PAG of its aspirations, but to persuade it to agree to pursue them through peaceful democratic means.
Of course, when the PAG’s aspirations are extreme and zero-sum— such as the physical elimination of a government, regime, or country— then even a seemingly reasonable set of preconditions may prove too strict for the PAG. In such cases, the PAG’s rejection of preconditions probably signals that talks, even without preconditions, will lead nowhere.
There is little point in establishing preconditions if the terrorist group can agree to them at no cost to itself. Preconditions must require a concession or admission by the group of sufficient stature as to persuade the mediator that the group is approaching the talks in earnest and dent the public’s skepticism over the group’s readiness to change its ways.
One approach is to demand recognition of responsibility—and even an apology—for acts of violence as a precondition. In the case of Libya, after a lot of pushing, Gaddafi’s regime took steps to curb terrorism and agreed to compensate the families of the Lockerbie bombing victims. Libyan leaders ultimately came to understand that the destruction of a civilian airliner had been so shocking that Americans needed this tacit admission of guilt. Gaddafi also had to accept humiliating concessions such as sending senior intel igence officials to face trial in order for the United States to begin the process of ending the sanctions against Libya. Some other issues, however, were left for negotiations.
Remember That Moderation Is a Process
Decide how much moderation to demand as a precondition and how much to nurture through the engagement process. Bear in mind that moderation is a process, not a condition. Negotiation depends on some sort of sign of moderation but it can also itself promote the moderating of the terrorists. True negotiations imply a change in the terrorists’ attitude toward the means of the struggle, and eventual y toward its ends. The challenge lies in discerning how much moderation is necessary as a precondition and how much is likely to occur as a result of negotiations.
Consider Requiring the Same Preconditions of All Parties
In some cases, mediators may craft different preconditions for different parties, tailoring terms to suit each party’s particular character, composition, and behavior. In other cases, however, mediators may wish to advertise to all parties that the talks are fundamental y equitable by insisting that al parties accept the same conditions. This approach, if it includes as a precondition the cessation of violence, has the merits of catering to the desire of PAGs to be treated as an equal while requiring far greater concessions from the PAG than from nonviolent parties to the talks.
Senator George Mitchell, when mediating in Northern Ireland, was faced with the dilemma that the British government and Unionists would oppose entering negotiations before the IRA had agreed to disarm, while the IRA refused to give up its weapons in advance of talks. “Our response was to formulate a set of principles to which any party wanting to enter negotiations would have to commit itself. We cal ed them principles of democracy and nonviolence, and they eventual y became known as the Mitchell Principles. We worked on them for several days, testing them for logic and practicality. They had to be strong and meaningful enough to attract the unionists, while not so impractical as to turn off the other political parties.”16
Ground rules for negotiations should also not prejudice the outcome of the talks. If they do, they will either be rejected at the outset by the party they disfavor or, subsequently, when their implications become evident during the course of negotiations. In either case, the negotiations will lead nowhere. More general y, do not try to trick a PAG or a government into reaching an agreement by some mediation sleight of hand; any inherent contradictions must be laid bare and any hidden implications revealed during, if not before, negotiations if an agreement is to endure.
Don’t Insist on Perfect Compliance
Talks conditioned on the establishment and maintenance of a cease-fire or a cessation of violence should not let themselves be held hostage by spoilers. Terrorists are usual y so decentral y organized that a leader’s agreement to a cease-fire is often broken by uncontrolled splinter groups. Despite the fact that the cease-fire may have been stated as a precondition, governments need to show that they will not be derailed by spoilers. Processes that make cease-fires a precondition should have mechanisms to help distinguish between violations by the negotiating partners and violations by splinter groups. (For further discussion, see Step 6.)
Work through or around the Problem of Recognition
A common type of precondition, but also a common stumbling block, involves the issue of recognition. One or both parties—the government and/or the PAG—may refuse to recognize the other as a legitimate entity or legitimate interlocutor, and the other party may refuse to contemplate negotiations until such recognition is forthcoming. Such standoffs can last many years. American presidents played cat-and-mouse games for more than a decade with Yasser Arafat, urging him to recognize Israel’s right to exist in exchange for negotiations. He always promised to amend his organization’s founding charter to accept the Jewish state, but in the end, both the United States and Israel effectively settled for his wil ingness to openly negotiate with Israel—and fudged the question of the charter.
Explicit mutual recognition is not necessarily essential at the start of a negotiation but it is essential if a peace agreement is to be agreed upon and implemented. Fortunately, the process of talking may itself encourage such recognition, and if the mediator decides to proceed in that hope, he or she has several options for launching talks in the absence of recognition. For instance, as discussed in Step 4, the mediator may shuttle between the parties, facilitate the exchange of documents rather than a face-to-face encounter, enlist other actors to act as go-betweens or speak on behalf of the parties, or select a venue that indicates it is not a formal exchange between equals (such as a panel to hear complaints from each side rather than a negotiation).
Recognize That the Terrorists May Have Their Own Preconditions
Mediators and government negotiators are not necessarily the only players who may want to set preconditions for talks. The terrorist group may insist on preconditions, too. It may, for example, make talks contingent upon an acceptance of the need to tackle issues high on its agenda, such as the treatment and fate of its fighters who are prisoners of the government. If they involve promises to discuss the issue rather than to take concrete action on the issue, such preconditions should be seriously considered, not least because they signal a real interest on the part of the PAG in substantive talks. Terrorists’ demands for concrete action as the price of beginning talks are harder to accept, but they are not necessarily unacceptable and should be judged on their merits. If a demand can be met at little or no cost to the mediator or government involved, then it might well be worth acceding to as a confidence-building measure.
Decide When to Stop Talking
While preparing a strategy for engagement—and throughout the implementation of that plan—always keep in mind options for disengagement. More particularly, at every step establish and maintain a clear view of your own red lines, which if crossed will signal that it is time to suspend or terminate the talks. Some of these red lines should be communicated and explained to the PAG, especial y those that it is in the PAG’s power to respect or violate—such as a return to a sustained campaign of violence. Other criteria for disengagement, however, may be kept secret, especial y those that if widely known may encourage spoilers to transgress them—such as the occurrence of any violent act.
A decision to disengage should not necessarily be taken as a sign of failure or a reflection of a misguided decision to engage in the first place. The process of engagement will almost certainly have left the mediator more knowledgeable about the PAG, the grievances of its constituency, and the peace process as a whole. In addition, it may have sown the seeds of relationships between the mediator and current leaders or rising figures within the group. These relationships may well grow into opportunities for future engagement.
Decide How to Talk
A broad spectrum of options exists for signaling intent and conducting talks. This spectrum runs from very indirect, highly deniable contacts, through public diplomacy and covert channels, all the way to direct, public negotiations between the terrorists and a mediator or negotiator. These options—and their implementation—are discussed in Step 3.