The Snap Election Plan by Martin Bristow - HTML preview

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Introduction

16

First Past the Post Must Be Replaced

19

The First-Past-the-Post Conundrum

57

The Snap Election Plan

72

A Call to Action

94

Appendix: My Facebook Posts Since the EU Referendum 95

Preface

At 07:00 on 23rd June 2016, I walked into my local polling station

and voted in the referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership

of the European Union. As I walked home, a sense of gratitude

consumed me. I thought of my freedoms and rights, and of my

British grandfather who had risked his life in World War II for his

country. Just under 20 hours after walking home from the polling

station, at 03:00 on 24th June 2016, my phone alarm sounded.

I crept downstairs, excitedly turned on the television, and was

surprised to see the latest vote count of 52:48 in favour of leaving

the EU. I wasn't initially concerned: the results so far weren’t a good

representation of the whole, I thought. As the morning progressed,

the results remained more or less consistent. I couldn’t believe what

was happening. Initially, my dominant emotion was that of

excitement: democracy was writing history in the country that I

called home. Then, as the magnitude of the event dawned on me,

devastation took hold: how could we turn our backs on a project of

freedom, peace, prosperity, unity, collaboration, and diversity? How

could we turn our backs on a project that had emerged from the

ashes of World War II, and one that had aimed to bring stability to

Europe? The EU had its faults, but how could we possibly justify

this decision, to ourselves and to future generations, I asked myself.

As the morning wore on, and the outcome became increasingly

certain (the figures settled on 52:48 to Leave, 72 % turnout), my

mind was racing. How would this affect the lives of future

generations, European peace, world peace, opportunities, Britons'

identity, the UK's immediate and long-term economy? How would

this affect the stability of the union between England, Scotland,

Wales and Northern Ireland? Amongst these questions, I tried to take

what positives I could from the result. I thought whether Britons

might pull together more as a result of their new identity.

The consensus, just before the vote took place, was that the

result would be for the UK to remain a member of the EU, a

membership that it had held since 1973 (then of the European

Economic Community). And now, over 40 years later, I found

myself grappling with the concept that my wish to remain in the EU

had been a minority one.

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5

After I had got over the shock, my hope was that the UK would

unite in its belief in democracy, in unity, in mutual respect, and in

tolerance. I hoped that we would pull together and make the best of

leaving the EU according to the expectation, just prior to the

referendum, of what a Leave result would mean. I turned to news

and social media in an attempt to ground myself, to make some

sense of what was happening.

My feeling of hope soon turned to frustration: news and social

media were filled with comments and opinions that seemingly

showed no respect for the UK’s democracy. I could understand the

level of shock, disbelief, and even horror, that people were feeling—

I had similar feelings myself. But what shook me was how all those

emotions were being channelled. What I was reading was all manner

of attempts to justify annulling or diluting the result. A petition to re-

run the referendum, on the basis that the turnout and majority were

insufficient, was racking up votes by the second. There were also

reports of Leave voters disowning their decision, and wishing to be

given another chance to vote. Other Leave voters claimed that they

had actually wanted to remain in the EU, and had only voted Leave

to narrow what they thought would be a comfortable win for

Remain. It seemed that, whatever reason people could find to

disrespect, dilute, or annul the result, they would find it.

I started to think for myself what the reasons were, why the UK

had voted to leave. When I looked beyond the complaints of lying

politicians, of David Cameron’s supposed mistake, and of a poor

Remain campaign, what I started to believe was this: the UK

electorate voted to leave the EU because, for decades, they had been

starved of being able to shape their own country. They had become

increasingly disillusioned, disengaged, and disenfranchised with the

very institutions that were supposed to serve them.

Although people voted to leave the EU for a whole host of

reasons, the following two reasons, in my opinion, decided the EU

referendum result:

Many voted to leave because they were frustrated with politics

generally, and saw the EU referendum as a means to bring about

meaningful change, the last chance that they might have to do

this for decades to come.

Many voted to leave because they thought that leaving the EU

would solve problems that had, in actual fact, very little, if

nothing, to do with the EU.

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6

Unfortunately, the media played a big role in Brexit. Much of the

media was owned by wealthy corporations and individuals who

benefited from the existing constitutional arrangements in the UK.

Whenever the UK faced issues, much of the media was all too keen

to use the EU as a scapegoat. But to ask wealthy corporations and

individuals to want to be, well, less wealthy, would be to start

breaking up the foundations of capitalism, with all the good that it

brings.

The cause of this disillusionment, disengagement, and

disenfranchisement in politics wasn’t the fault of individual

politicians either: they, too, had been suffering. After all, who

wanted to be disliked, disrespected, and unappreciated? Who wanted

to be put under prolonged intense pressure, to be sent hate mail and

publicly disrespected? Who wanted to go into a profession to stand

up for what one believed in, but have to compromise on it, every

day, to continue to earn a living? Who wanted to have to fight

internal party battles? Who wanted to have to join a party that didn’t

really stand for one’s views, simply because it was the only way to

make any real progress? Who wanted to govern but with little

mandate? Unfortunately, the vast majority of those politicians who

filled influential roles were the ones who, very early in their political

careers, learned to accept the status quo. To do good in a

malfunctioning environment was better than to do no good at all.

Of course, there were some politicians who, even behind closed

doors, wouldn’t have agreed with the failings of the system that I’ve

described in this book. But, in my view, this is only because, ever

since they were old enough to know what politics was, they had

internalised the system that they were presented with.

If the electorate were starved of being able to shape their own

country, and if wealthy corporations, wealthy individuals, and

individual politicians weren’t responsible, what was the cause? As I

see it now, it all boiled down to one thing: how the nation’s views

were translated into positions of power in the most powerful

legislature in the UK. I refer to the voting system that is used to

elect members to the House of Commons, and the system goes by

the name of ‘first past the post’ (FPTP).

FPTP favours the UK’s biggest two political parties:

Conservative and Unionist, and Labour. FPTP’s winner-takes-all

approach means that, within each constituency, all the losing

candidates’ efforts count for nothing. When aggregated across the

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7

country, this amounts to a huge waste. Millions of votes are

therefore cast, not to maximise a positive result, but to minimise a

negative one, in trying to avoid ending up on this waste heap. The

result of this tactical voting is that the two dominant parties have an

unfair advantage, in that, between them, they win far more seats

than they have support for. For the last ten general elections, and not

even taking account of tactical voting, the mean percentage increase

from vote share to seat share is 37 %.

Under FPTP, all votes cast for candidates that didn’t win, and

all votes cast in excess of what the winner needed to win, are

wasted. That is, if those voters hadn’t voted that day, it would have

made no difference to the allocation of seats in the House of

Commons. At the 2017 general election, 68.4 % of all valid votes

cast were wasted in this way. At the 2015 general election, the figure

was 74.3 %.

I firmly believe that, over the decades, if the UK’s views had

been represented more proportionally in parliament, the UK

wouldn’t have voted in 2016 to leave the EU. Instead, over the

decades, there would have been a gradual and visible increase in

support for leaving the EU. Britons would have been much more

engaged in politics, current affairs, democracy, economics etc.,

because they would have been empowered to shape their own

futures. The whole culture and ethos around politics would have

been more positive, collaborative, direct, open, honest, and

progressive. The media and individual politicians would have

wielded less power simply because the electorate would have

wielded more. All this would have resulted in much more debate,

debate that wouldn’t have been grounded in rhetoric, falsehoods,

and melodrama, but in pragmatism, facts, and realities.

In addition to this increased engagement, empowerment, and

enfranchisement of the electorate, there would have been less

internal pressure within political parties. If there had been a

divergence in a party, the party would have had far more to gain by

splitting into two parties, or by encouraging dissenting individuals to

join a party that did represent their views. The Conservative party

would likely have been a pro-EU party, unified, and with a clear

vision. UKIP would have been the party of choice for Eurosceptics,

and would have grown to a size much more in keeping with public

opinion. The Conservative party would have been under no pressure

to use a referendum to solve internal party problems, as it attempted

to do in 2015/2016.

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8

There would also have been more trust in the UK’s political and

democratic institutions, and those people who represented them.

Over the decades, people wouldn’t have lost trust in politicians,

economists etc., to lead them, in a similar way that they wouldn’t

have lost trust in a doctor to heal them or a teacher to teach them.

Of course, these are all generalisations. But the result of the

referendum on 23rd June 2016 was a generalisation; it was the

balanced view of the UK at the time. So, although the result of the

EU referendum could be attributed to all manner of reasons, I do

believe that the UK’s system for electing representatives to the

House of Commons was the underlying reason the UK voted to

leave the EU.

Despite this flaw in the UK’s democracy, one institution that

was still serving the UK’s democracy well on 23rd June 2016 was

the most fundamental and direct tools of democracy: the binary

referendum. One simple question and two simple answers, to make a

decision on a national level. So, on that fateful day, when the UK

government asked its people, its clients, its customers, what they

wanted it to do, I had hoped that the institution of the referendum

would be honoured and respected by all. To the contrary, and to my

dismay, it was undermined. Just as it is unfair to blame a postal

worker for delivering a hefty bill, it is unfair to blame the institution

of the referendum for Brexit. Personally, I hope that the referendum

and what has followed will be the lens that will bring into focus

what the UK desperately needs: reform of its general-election voting

system.

***

My frustration at what I was reading in the news and social media

on 24th and 25th June urged me to action, and I took to Facebook to

share my views. My first post was on Saturday 25th June 2016,

which read as follows:

Thank you to all those who exercised their democratic right on

Thursday and voted. I voted _______ [removed for legal reasons]

and respect the result to Leave. The binary vote was democracy at

its purest, simple and to the point. Sadly it seems there are very few

chances for the people of the U.K. to have a direct influence in this

way. Our far-from-perfect first-past-the-post voting system comes

nowhere close; 16 % [sic*] of votes resulting in 1 UKIP MP

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9

anyone? And who knows what 16 % [sic] would have been were it

not for the reality of a “wasted vote”. Had those voices been heard

sooner, I suspect Thursday's result may have been different.

Democracy got off the sofa on Thursday, went outside into the

sunshine, and stretched its legs. Let's now pull together to achieve

what the majority of us want.

*The UKIP vote share was actually 12.6 %; I think I was quoting the combined

vote share of UKIP and the Green party, which was 16 % rounded to the nearest

integer. If we inflate the 12.6 % by, say, 20 %, because of those who would have

voted for UKIP had they not been put off by the prospect of wasting their vote, then

UKIP’s vote share would have been 15 %. 15 % of the seats in the House of

Commons is 97 seats, nothing close to the one seat that they were awarded.

Since this first post, I have posted several more times, and I have

included all my Facebook posts since the referendum in the

appendix at the back of this book.

***

It was February 2017. I had been following the news since the

referendum, and I was still just as passionate about the state of UK

politics and democracy. I had also spent time since the referendum

writing Facebook posts on the subject. This led me to the decision of

using this interest and material as a starting point for writing a book

on Brexit, politics, and democracy. I played around with different

titles and ideas, and whether the book should be fiction or non-

fiction. Non-fiction suited me better and, on 19th March 2017, I

settled—or so I thought—on the simple title of ‘My Thoughts on

Brexit’. After setting to work, I quickly realised that the title was

bland, so I changed it to ‘Brexit Means Leave’, a play on ‘Brexit

means Brexit’. This evolved again a few days later. I thought that

the working title could be confusing, so I changed it to ‘Democracy

First’. All my notes up to that point indicated that the book was,

ultimately, all about democracy, and about putting that above all

else. So it seemed like the natural title.

I had always seen the book as being a basis of discussion and

debate, but not directly leading to anything more. But why not take

it one step further, I thought. If democracy was central to the book,

and if the UK’s general election voting system was central to the

UK’s democracy, why not write the book to do more than just

stimulate debate? Why not set out how the UK might go about

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10

reforming the UK general election voting system? At that point, in

the morning of 22nd March 2017, I decided to do just that. What I

needed was a plan.

***

I had long been aware of the FPTP cycle that went like this: those in

government (and those in the official opposition) benefited from the

voting system that gave them that power, and so were unlikely to

want to change the system; but the system could only be changed by

those who were in power. This was an obvious barrier to bringing

about voting reform. Could enough members of parliament (MPs)

be persuaded to support it, so that the necessary legislation could be

pushed through parliament, I asked myself. This was a possibility.

Another option was to persuade all the smaller parties to demand

voting reform as a pre-requisite for any government deal following a

hung parliament, then try to take as many seats away from the big

two parties as possible to bring about a hung parliament. But both

these options didn’t appeal to me. I knew that I would need public

support to make any plan work. Unfortunately, with the level of trust

that the public had in established politicians and parties, I saw this

as an uphill struggle. What I wanted was a plan that would put

matters entirely in the hands of the UK electorate.

What I quickly realised was that the power of the vote, not that

of the pound, would be central to the plan, and therefore so would

be the next general election. I considered founding a political party

that stood for voting reform that the public would be able to vote for.

But there were already several voting-reform-supporting parties out

there, so why would voters vote for the new one, I asked myself.

The new party would have the advantage of being fresh on the

scene, from which it could build trust with the electorate, but how

would that be sufficient to convince enough voters to vote for the

party? To stand out from the crowd further, I could have the party

stand only for voting reform. This would eliminate the possibility of

voters being put off by other policies that they might not agree with.

But if I took this approach, why would voters vote for a party that

would, for up to five years until the next general election, only put

in place voting-system legislation? Also, I would face the same

challenges that all the other smaller parties faced, in that many

voters would be put off voting for it because of the risk that their

vote would go to waste. The system was against me—I thought on.

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11

What seemed central to breaking into the FPTP cycle was this:

how could I minimise the risk to voters of their vote for a voting-

reform-supporting party going to waste? I identified three questions:

How could I maximise the chance that, in any given

constituency, a vote for this new party would result in the party’s

candidate becoming an MP?

How could I maximise the chance that, if a voter did vote for the

candidate of this new party, and the candidate did win the seat,

the resulting MP would be able to assist in bringing about voting

reform?

How could I maximise the chance that, even if the MP did assist

in bringing about voting reform, once the MP had done that,

they would continue to provide value to the voter for the rest of

the parliamentary term?

The ideas for all these questions came to me in quick succession

and, in the afternoon of 22nd March 2017, The Snap Election Plan

was born.

***

The following day, I started to flesh out the details of the plan, but I

quickly realised that the book would take longer to write than I had

first thought. I had no intention to rush the book, but at the same

time I was eager to get a book published. To meet these needs, I put

the ‘The Snap Election Plan’ (in inverted commas to indicate that

the book was in progress) on hold and came up with an idea for a

much shorter book that I could write and publish first. My Year in

Germany (now A Year in Germany) was that idea. I had lived and

studied for one academic year in Dresden in 2005/2006 as part of

my four-year Civil Engineering with German university course, and

My Year in Germany was my account of that year. On 27th March

2017, I got back to work on ‘The Snap Election Plan’.

I was expecting the next general election to be in 2020, and I

continued to build up the book with that in mind. Then, on 18th April

2017, things changed. I was in the local park with my children when

my wife texted me the news: the UK prime minister, Theresa May,

had announced her intention to hold a snap general election on 8th

June! When I got a chance to think, I questioned whether I should

try to publish my plan for voting reform so that I could try to

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12

implement it for the forthcoming election. I worked out what it

would have needed: register a political party; find candidates while

the party application was being processed; raise funds for candidate

deposits; raise funds for administration; and convince enough people

to vote for the candidates. When I looked at the timescale, I realised

that it was too farfetched. Instead of investing my time on what I

saw as a fruitless exercise, I decided to let the 2017 general election

go, and focus, instead, on planning for the next one.

I continued to work on this book but, as the election campaign

progressed, I became increasingly conscious that my efforts might

not be necessary. I read articles that suggested that Labour might

include voting reform in its manifesto. I also questioned whether a

voting-reform referendum might result from a hung parliament, as

happened in 2010. So, while I waited for election day, I focused my

efforts elsewhere. I recalled that, from February to December 2008,

I had written email updates to my family and friends during my

travels around parts of Oceania and Asia. Since I already had the

material, in lots of 1s and 0s in storage somewhere in the world, I

decided to write and publish a boo