sacrificing the foetus whenever the interests of the
mother demand such a
sacrifice. General medical opinion is not, however,
prepared at present to
go further, and is distinctly disinclined to aid the
parents in exerting
an unqualified control over the foetus in the womb, nor is it yet disposed
to practice abortion on eugenic grounds. It is obvious, indeed, that
medicine cannot in this matter take the initiative, for it is the primary
duty of medicine to save life. Society itself must
assume the
responsibility of protecting the race.
Dr. S. Macvie ("Mother _versus_ Child,"
_Transactions Edinburgh
Obstetrical Society_, vol. xxiv, 1899) elaborately
discusses the
respective values of the foetus and the adult on the
basis of
life-expectancy, and concludes that the foetus is
merely
"a parasite performing no function whatever," and that "unless
the life-expectancy of the child covers the years in
which its
potentiality is converted into actuality, the
relative values of
the maternal and foetal life will be that of actual
as against
potential." This statement seems fairly sound.
Ballantyne
(_Manual of Antenatal Pathology: The Foetus_, p.
459)
endeavors to make the statement more precise by
saying that "the
mother's life has a value, because she is what she
is, while the
foetus only has a possible value, on account of what
it may
become."
Durlacher, among others, has discussed, in careful
and cautious
detail, the various conditions in which the
physician should, or
should not, induce abortion in the interests of the
mother ("Der
Künstliche Abort," _Wiener Klinik_, Aug. and Sept., 1906); so
also, Eugen Wilhelm ("Die Abtreibung und das Recht des Arztes zur
Vernichtung der Leibesfrucht," _Sexual-Probleme_, May and June,
1909). Wilhelm further discusses whether it is
desirable to alter
the laws in order to give the physician greater
freedom in
deciding on abortion. He concludes that this is not
necessary,
and might even act injuriously, by unduly hampering
medical
freedom. Any change in the law should merely be, he
considers, in
the direction of asserting that the destruction of
the foetus is
not abortion in the legal sense, provided it is
indicated by the
rules of medical science. With reference to the
timidity of some
medical men in inducing abortion, Wilhelm remarks
that, even in
the present state of the law, the physician who
conscientiously
effects abortion, in accordance with his best
knowledge, even if
mistakenly, may consider himself safe from all legal
penalties,
and that he is much more likely to come in conflict
with the law
if it can be proved that death followed as a result
of his
neglect to induce abortion.
Pinard, who has discussed the right to control the
foetal
life (_Annales de Gynécologie_, vols. lii and liii,
1899 and
1900), inspired by his enthusiastic propaganda for
the salvation
of infant life, is led to the unwarranted conclusion
that no one
has the rights of life and death over the foetus;
"the infant's
right to his life is an imprescriptible and sacred
right, which
no power can take from him." There is a mistake
here, unless
Pinard deliberately desires to place himself, like
Tolstoy, in
opposition to current civilized morality. So far
from the infant
having any "imprescriptible right to life," even the adult has,
in human societies, no such inalienable right, and
very much less
the foetus, which is not strictly a human being at
all. We assume
the right of terminating the lives of those
individuals whose
anti-social conduct makes them dangerous, and, in
war, we
deliberately terminate, amid general applause and
enthusiasm, the
lives of men who have been specially selected for
this purpose on
account of their physical and general efficiency. It
would be
absurdly inconsistent to say that we have no rights
over the
lives of creatures that have, as yet, no part in
human society at
all, and are not so much as born. We are here in
presence of a
vestige of ancient theological dogma, and there can
be little
doubt that, on the theoretical side at all events,
the
"imprescriptible right" of the embryo will go the same way as the
"imprescriptible right" of the spermatozöon. Both rights are
indeed "imprescriptible."
Of recent years a new, and, it must be admitted,
somewhat unexpected,
aspect of this question of abortion has been revealed.
Hitherto it has
been a question entirely in the hands of men, first,
following the Roman
traditions, in the hands of Christian ecclesiastics, and later, in those
of the professional castes. Yet the question is in
reality very largely,
and indeed mainly, a woman's question, and now, more
especially in
Germany, it has been actively taken up by women. The
Gräfin Gisela
Streitberg occupies the pioneering place in this
movement with her book
_Das Recht zur Beiseitigung Keimenden Lebens_, and was speedily followed,
from 1897 onwards, by a number of distinguished women
who occupy a
prominent place in the German woman's movement, among
others Helene
Stöcker, Oda Olberg, Elisabeth Zanzinger, Camilla
Jellinek. All these
writers insist that the foetus is not yet an independent human being, and
that every woman, by virtue of the right over her own
body, is entitled to
decide whether it shall become an independent human
being. At the Woman's
Congress held in the autumn of 1905, a resolution was
passed demanding
that abortion should only be punishable when effected by another person
against the wish of the pregnant women herself.[441] The acceptance of
this resolution by a representative assembly is
interesting proof of the
interest now taken by women in the question, and of the strenuous attitude
they are tending to assume.
Elisabeth Zanzinger ("Verbrechen gegen die
Leibesfrucht,"
_Geschlecht und Gesellschaft_, Bd. II, Heft 5, 1907)
ably and
energetically condemns the law which makes abortion
a crime. "A
woman herself is the only legitimate possessor of
her own body
and her own health.... Just as it is a woman's
private right, and
most intimate concern, to present her virginity as
her best gift
to the chosen of her heart, so it is certainly a
pregnant woman's
own private concern if, for reasons which seem good
to her, she
decides to destroy the results of her action." A
woman who
destroys the embryo which might become a burden to
the community,
or is likely to be an inferior member of society,
this writer
urges, is doing a service to the community, which
ought to reward
her, perhaps by granting her special privileges as
regards the
upbringing of her other children. Oda Olberg, in a
thoughtful
paper ("Ueber den Juristischen Schutz des Keimenden Lebens," _Die
Neue Generation_, June, 1908), endeavors to make
clear all that
is involved in the effort to protect the developing
embryo
against the organism that carries it, to protect a
creature, that
is, against itself and its own instincts. She
considers that most
of the women who terminate their pregnancies
artificially would
only have produced undesirables, for the normal,
healthy, robust
woman has no desire to effect abortion. "There are women who are
psychically sterile, without being physically so,
and who possess
nothing of motherhood but the ability to bring
forth. These, when
they abort, are simply correcting a failure of
Nature." Some of
them, she remarks, by going on to term, become
guilty of the far
worse offence of infanticide. As for the women who
desire
abortion merely from motives of vanity, or
convenience, Oda
Olberg points out that the circles in which these
motives rule
are quite able to limit their children without
having to resort
to abortion. She concludes that society must protect
the young
life in every way, by social hygiene, by laws for
the protection
of the workers, by spreading a new morality on the
basis of the
laws of heredity. But we need no law to protect the
young
creature against its own mother, for a thousand
natural forces
are urging the mother to protect her own child, and
we may be
sure that she will not disobey these forces without
very good
reasons. Camilla Jellinek, again (_Die
Strafrechtsreform_, etc.,
Heidelberg, 1909), in a powerful and well-informed
address before
the Associated German Frauenvereine, at Breslau,
argues in the
same sense.
The lawyers very speedily came to the assistance of
the women in
this matter, the more readily, no doubt, since the
traditions of
the greatest and most influential body of law
already pointed, on
one side at all events, in the same direction. It
may, indeed, be
claimed that it was from the side of law--and in
Italy, the
classic land of legal reform--that this new movement
first begun.
In 1888, Balestrini published, at Turin, his
_Aborto,
Infanticidio ed Esposizione d'Infante_, in which he
argued that
the penalty should be removed from abortion. It was
a very able
and learned book, inspired by large ideas and a
humanitarian
spirit, but though its importance is now recognized,
it cannot be
said that it attracted much attention on
publication.
It is especially in Germany that, during recent
years, lawyers
have followed women reformers, by advocating, more
or less
completely, the abolition of the punishment for
abortion. So
distinguished an authority as Von Liszt, in a
private letter to
Camilla Jellinek (op. cit.), states that he regards
the
punishment of abortion as "very doubtful," though he considers
its complete abolition impracticable; he thinks
abortion might be
permitted during the early months of pregnancy, thus
bringing
about a return of the old view. Hans Gross states
his opinion
(_Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie_, Bd. XII, p.
345) that the
time is not far distant when abortion will no longer
be punished.
Radbruch and Von Lilienthal speak in the same sense.
Weinberg has
advocated a change in the law (_Mutterschutz_, 1905,
Heft 8),
and Kurt Hiller (_Die Neue Generation_, April,
1909), also from
the legal side, argues that abortion should only be
punishable
when effected by a married woman, without the
knowledge and
consent of her husband.
The medical profession, which took the first step in
modern times in the
authorization of abortion, has not at present taken any further step. It
has been content to lay down the principle that when the interests of the
mother are opposed to those of the foetus, it is the
latter which must be
sacrificed. It has hesitated to take the further step of placing abortion
on the eugenic basis, and of claiming the right to
insist on abortion
whenever the medical and hygienic interests of society demand such a step.
This attitude is perfectly intelligible. Medicine has in the past been
chiefly identified with the saving of lives, even of
worthless and worse
than worthless lives; "Keep everything alive! Keep everything alive!"
nervously cried Sir James Paget. Medicine has confined itself to the
humble task of attempting to cure evils, and is only today beginning to
undertake the larger and nobler task of preventing them.
"The step from killing the child in the womb to
murdering a
person when out of the womb, is a dangerously narrow
one," sagely
remarks a recent medical author, probably speaking
for many
others, who somehow succeed in blinding themselves
to the fact
that this "dangerously narrow step" has been taken by mankind,
only too freely, for thousands of years past, long
before
abortion was known in the world.
Here and there, however, medical authors of repute
have advocated
the further extension of abortion, with precautions,
and under
proper supervision, as an aid to eugenic progress.
Thus,
Professor Max Flesch (_Die Neue Generation_, April,
1909) is in
favor of a change in the law permitting abortion
(provided it is
carried out by the physician) in special cases, as
when the
mother's pregnancy has been due to force, when she
has been
abandoned, or when, in the interests of the
community, it is
desirable to prevent the propagation of insane,
criminal,
alcoholic, or tuberculous persons.
In France, a medical man, Dr. Jean Darricarrère, has
written a
remarkable novel, _Le Droit d'Avortement_ (1906),
which advocates
the thesis that a woman always possesses a complete
right to
abortion, and is the supreme judge as to whether she
will or not
undergo the pain and risks of childbirth. The
question is, here,
however, obviously placed not on medical, but on
humanitarian and
feminist grounds.
We have seen that, alike on the side of practice and of theory, a great
change has taken place during recent years in the
attitude towards
abortion. It must, however, clearly be recognized that, unlike the control
of procreation by methods for preventing conception,
facultative abortion
has not yet been embodied in our current social
morality. If it is
permissible to interpolate a personal opinion, I may say that to me it
seems that our morality is here fairly reasonable.[442]
I am decidedly of
opinion that an unrestricted permission for women to
practice abortion in
their own interests, or even for communities to practice it in the
interests of the race, would be to reach beyond the
stage of civilization
we have at present attained. As Ellen Key very forcibly argues, a
civilization which permits, without protest, the
barbarous slaughter of
its carefully selected adults in war has not yet won the right to destroy
deliberately even its most inferior vital products in
the womb. A
civilization guilty of so reckless a waste of life
cannot safely be
entrusted with this judicial function. The blind and
aimless anxiety to
cherish the most hopeless and degraded forms of life,
even of unborn life,
may well be a weakness, and since it often leads to
incalculable
suffering, even a crime. But as yet there is an
impenetrable barrier
against progress in this direction. Before we are
entitled to take life
deliberately for the sake of purifying life, we must
learn how to preserve
it by abolishing such destructive influences--war,
disease, bad industrial
conditions--as are easily within our social power as
civilized
nations.[443]
There is, further, another consideration which seems to me to carry
weight. The progress of civilization is in the direction of greater
foresight, of greater prevention, of a diminished need for struggling with
the reckless lack of prevision. The necessity for
abortion is precisely
one of those results of reckless action which
civilization tends to
diminish. While we may admit that in a sounder state of civilization a few
cases might still occur when the induction of abortion would be desirable,
it seems probable that the number of such cases will
decrease rather than
increase. In order to do away with the need for
abortion, and to
counteract the propaganda in its favor, our main
reliance must be placed,
on the one hand, on increased foresight in the
determination of conception
and increased knowledge of the means for preventing
conception,[444] and
on the other hand, on a better provision by the State
for the care of
pregnant women, married and unmarried alike, and a
practical recognition
of the qualified mother's claim on society.[445] There can be little doubt
that, in many a charge of criminal abortion, the real
offence lies at the
door of those who have failed to exercise their social and professional
duty of making known the more natural and harmless
methods for preventing
conception, or else by their social attitude have made the pregnant
woman's position intolerable. By active social reform in these two
directions, the new movement in favor of abortion may be kept in check,
and it may even be found that by stimulating such reform that movement has
been beneficial.
We have seen that the deliberate restraint of conception has become a part
of our civilized morality, and that the practice and
theory of facultative
abortion has gained a footing among us. There remains a third and yet more
radical method of controlling procreation, the method of preventing the
possibility of procreation altogether by the performance of castration or
other slighter operation having a like inhibitory effect on reproduction.
The other two methods only effect a single act of union or its results,
but castration affects all subsequent acts of sexual
union and usually
destroys the procreative power permanently.
Castration for various social and other purposes is an ancient and
widespread practice, carried out on men and on animals.
There has,
however, been on the whole a certain prejudice against it when applied to
men. Many peoples have attached a very sacred value to the integrity of
the sexual organs. Among some primitive peoples the
removal of these
organs has been regarded as a peculiarly ferocious
insult, only to be
carried out in moments of great excitement, as after a battle. Medicine
has been opposed to any interference with the sexual
organs. The oath
taken by the Greek physicians appears to prohibit
castration: "I will not
cut."[446] In modern times a great change has taken place, the castration
of both men and women is commonly performed in diseased conditions; the
same operation is sometimes advocated and occasionally performed in the
hope that it may remove strong and abnormal sexual
impulses. And during
recent years castration has been invoked in the cause of negative
eugenics, to a greater extent, indeed, on account of its more radical
character, than either the prevention of conception or abortion.
The movement in favor of castration appears to have
begun in the United
States, where various experiments have been made in
embodying it in law.
It was first advocated merely as a punishment for
criminals, and
especially sexual offenders, by Hammond, Everts, Lydston and others. From
this point of view, however, it seems to be
unsatisfactory and perhaps
illegitimate. In many cases castration is no punishment at all, and indeed
a positive benefit. In other cases, when inflicted
against the subject's
will, it may produce very disturbing mental effects,
leading in already
degenerate or unbalanced persons to insanity,
criminality, and anti-social
tendencies generally, much more dangerous than the
original state.
Eugenic considerations, which were later brought
forward, constitute a
much sounder argument for castration; in this case the castration is
carried out, by no means in order to inflict a barbarous and degrading
punishment, but, with the subject's consent, in order to protect the
community from the risk of useless or mischievous
members.
The fact that castration can no longer be properly
considered a
punishment, is shown by the possibility of
deliberately seeking
the operation simply for the sake of convenience, as
a preferable
and most effective substitute for the adoption of
preventive
methods in sexual intercourse. I am only at present
acquainted
with one case in which this course has been adopted.
This subject
is a medical man (of Puritan New England ancestry)
with whose
sexual history, which is quite normal, I have been
acquainted for
a long time past. His present age is thirty-nine. A
few years
since, having a sufficiently large family, he
adopted preventive
methods of intercourse. The subsequent events I
narrate in his
own words: "The trouble, forethought, etc., rendered necessary by
preventive measures, grew more and more irksome to
me as the
years passed by, and finally, I laid the matter
before another
physician, and on his assurances, and after mature
deliberation
with my wife, was operated on some time since, and
rendered
sterile by having the