Assess
4-47. Once the target as been engaged, the next step is to assess the engagement’s effectiveness. This is done through combat assessment, which involves determining the effectiveness of force employment during military operations. It consists of three elements:
z
Munitions effects assessment.
z
Battle damage assessment.
z
Re-attack recommendations.
4-48. The first two elements, munitions effects assessment and battle damage assessment, are used to inform the commander on the effects achieved against targets and target sets. From this information, the G-2 or S-2 continues to analyze the threat’s ability to further conduct and sustain combat operations (sometimes articulated in terms of the effects achieved against the threat’s centers of gravity). The last element involves the assessment and recommendation whether or not to re-attack the targets.
4-49. The assessment of a jamming mission used against an enemy’s command and control system is unlike fires that can be observed visually. The signals intelligence staff element and units executing the electronic attack mission coordinate continuously to assess mission effectiveness. Close coordination between sensor and shooter allows instant feedback on the success or failure of the intended jamming effects. It also can quickly provide the necessary adjustments to produce desired effects.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SYNCHRONIZATION
4-50. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization is the task that accomplishes the following: analyzes information requirements and intelligence gaps; evaluates available assets internal and external to the organization; determines gaps in the use of those assets; recommends intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets controlled by the organization to collect on the commander’s critical information requirements; and submits requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support (FM 3-0). ISR synchronization considers all assets—both internal and external to the organization. It identifies information gaps and the most appropriate assets for collecting information to fill them.
4-51. Planning for ISR operations begins during mission analysis. Although led by the G-3 or S-3, it is supported by the entire staff, subordinate units, and external partners. ISR operations collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information from a multitude of collection sources. The staff thoroughly understands, integrates, and synchronizes the ISR plan across all echelons.
4-52. The EW officer ensures the ISR plan supports the EW-related information requirements determined during the planning process. The EW officer coordinates these requirements with the signals intelligence staff element through the G-2 or S-2.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
4-53. EW has specific ground-based, airborne, and functional (electronic attack, electronic warfare support, or electronic protection) employment considerations. The EW officer ensures EW-related employment considerations are properly articulated early in the operations process. Each capability employed has certain advantages and disadvantages. The staff plans for all of these before executing EW
operations.
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GROUND-BASED ELECTRONIC WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS
4-54. Ground-based EW capabilities support the commander’s scheme of maneuver. Ground-based EW
equipment can be employed by a dismounted Soldier or on highly mobile platforms. Due to the short-range nature of tactical signals direction finding, electronic attack assets are normally located in the forward areas of the battlefield, with or near forward units.
4-55. Ground-based EW capabilities have certain advantages. They provide direct support to maneuver units (for example, through counter-radio-controlled improvised-explosive-device EW and communications or sensor jamming). Ground-based EW capabilities support continuous operations and respond quickly to EW requirements of the ground commander. However, to maximize the effectiveness of ground-based EW capabilities, maneuver units must protect EW assets from enemy ground and aviation threats. EW equipment should be as survivable and mobile as the force it supports. Maneuver units must logistically support the EW assets, and supported commanders must clearly identify EW requirements.
4-56. Ground-based EW capabilities have certain limitations. They are vulnerable to enemy attack and can be masked by terrain. They are vulnerable to enemy electromagnetic deceptive measures and electronic protection actions. In addition, they have distance or propagation limitations against enemy electronic systems.
AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS
4-57. While ground-based and airborne EW planning and execution are similar, they significantly differ in their EW employment time. Airborne EW operations are conducted at much higher speeds and generally have a shorter duration than ground-based operations. Therefore, the timing of airborne EW support requires detailed planning.
4-58. Airborne EW requires the following:
z
A clear understanding of the supported commander’s EW objectives.
z
Detailed planning and integration.
z
Ground support facilities.
z
Liaisons between the aircrews of the aircraft providing the EW support and the aircrews or ground forces being supported.
z
Protection from enemy aircraft and air defense systems.
4-59. Airborne EW capabilities have certain advantages. They can provide direct support to other tactical aviation missions such as suppression of enemy air defenses, destruction of enemy air defenses, and employment of high-speed antiradiation missiles. They can provide extended range over ground-based assets. Airborne EW capabilities can provide greater mobility and flexibility than ground-based assets. In addition, they can support ground-based units in beyond line-of-sight operations.
4-60. The limitations associated with airborne EW capabilities are time-on-station considerations, vulnerability to enemy electronic protection actions, electromagnetic deception techniques, and limited assets (support from nonorganic EW platforms need to be requested).
ELECTRONIC ATTACK CONSIDERATIONS
4-61. Electronic attack includes both offensive and defensive activities. (Chapter 1 provides a full definition of electronic attack). These activities differ in their purpose. Defensive electronic attack protects friendly personnel and equipment or platforms. Offensive electronic attack denies, disrupts, or destroys enemy capability. In either case, certain considerations are involved in planning for employing electronic attack:
z
Friendly communications.
z
Intelligence collection.
z
Other effects.
z
Nonhostile local electromagnetic spectrum use.
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z
Hostile intelligence collection.
z
Persistency of effect.
4-62. The EW officer, the G-2 or S-2, the G-3 or S-3, the G-6 or S-6, the spectrum manager, and the G-7
or S-7 coordinate closely to avoid friendly communications interference that can occur when using EW
systems on the battlefield. Coordination ensures that electronic attack systems frequencies are properly deconflicted with friendly communications and intelligence systems or that ground maneuver and friendly information tasks are modified accordingly.
4-63. The number of information systems, EW systems, and sensors operating simultaneously on the battlefield makes deconfliction with communications systems a challenge. The EW officer, the G-2 or S-2, the G-6 or S-6, and the spectrum manager plan and rehearse deconfliction procedures to quickly adjust their use of EW or communications systems.
4-64. Electronic attack operations depend on EW support and signals intelligence to provide targeting information and battle damage assessment. However, EW officers must keep in mind that not all intelligence collection is focused on supporting EW. If not properly coordinated with the G-2 or S-2 staff, electronic attack operations may impact intelligence collection by jamming or inadvertently interfering with a particular frequency being used to collect data on the threat, or by jamming a given enemy frequency or system that deprives friendly forces of that means of collecting data. Either can significantly deter intelligence collection efforts and their ability to answer critical information requirements.
Coordination between the EW officer, the fire support coordinator, and the G-2 or S-2 is prevents this interference. In situations where a known conflict between the intelligence collection effort and the use of electronic attack exists, the EW working group brings the problem to the G-3 or S-3 for resolution.
4-65. Other forms of effects rely on electromagnetic spectrum. For example, psychological operations may plan to use a given set of frequencies to broadcast messages, or a military deception plan may include the broadcast of friendly force communications. In both examples, the use of electronic attack could unintentionally interfere or disrupt such broadcasts if not properly coordinated. To ensure electronic attack does not negatively impact planned operations, the EW officer coordinates between fires, network operations, and other functional or integrating cells as required.
4-66. Like any other form of electromagnetic radiation, electronic attack can adversely affect local media and communications systems and infrastructure. EW planners consider unintended consequences of EW
operations and deconflict these operations with the various functional or integrating cells. For example, friendly jamming could potentially deny the functioning of essential services such as ambulance or fire fighters to a local population. EW officers routinely synchronize electronic attack with the other functional or integrating cells responsible for the information tasks. In this way, they ensure that electronic attack efforts do not cause fratricide or unacceptable collateral damage to their intended effects.
4-67. The potential for hostile intelligence collection also affects electronic attack. A well-equipped enemy can detect friendly EW capabilities and thus gain intelligence on friendly force intentions. For example, the frequencies Army forces jam could indicate where they believe the enemy’s capabilities lie. The EW
officer and the G-2 or S-2 develop an understanding of the enemy’s collection capability. Along with the red team (if available), they determine what the enemy might gain from friendly force use of electronic attack. (A red team is an organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. [JP 2-0]) 4-68. The effects of jamming only persist as long as the jammer itself is emitting and is in range to affect the target. Normally this time frame is a matter of seconds or minutes, which makes the timing of such missions critical. This is particularly true when jamming is used in direct support of aviation platforms. For example, in a mission that supports suppression of enemy air defense, the time on target and duration of the jamming must account for the speed of attack of the aviation platform. They must also account for the potential reaction time of enemy air defensive countermeasures. The development of directed-energy weapons may change this dynamic in the future. However, at present (aside from antiradiation missiles), the effects of jamming are less persistent than effects achieved by other means.
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ELECTRONIC PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS
4-69. Electronic protection is achieved through physical security, communications security measures, system technical capabilities (such as frequency hopping and shielding of electronics), spectrum management, and emission control procedures. The EW officer and EW working group members must consider the following key functions when planning for electronic protection operations: z
Vulnerability analysis and assessment.
z
Monitoring and feedback.
z
Electronic protection measures and how they affect friendly capabilities.
Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment
4-70. Vulnerability analysis and assessment forms the basis for formulating electronic protection plans.
The Defense Information Systems Agency operates the Vulnerability Analysis and Assessment Program, which specifically focuses on automated information systems and can be very useful in this effort.
Monitoring and Feedback
4-71. The National Security Agency monitors communications security. Their programs focus on telecommunications systems using wire and electronic communications. Their programs can support and remediate the command’s communications security procedures when required.
Electronic Protection Measures and Their Effect on Friendly Capabilities
4-72. Electronic protection measures include any measure taken to protect the force from hostile electronic attack actions. However, these measures can also limit friendly capabilities or operations. For example, denying frequency usage to counter-radio-controlled improvised-explosive-device EW systems on a given frequency to preserve it for a critical friendly information system could leave friendly forces vulnerable to certain radio-controlled improvised explosive devices. The EW officer and the G-6 or S-6 carefully consider these second-order effects when advising the G-3 or S-3 regarding electronic protection measures.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
4-73. The distinction between whether a given asset is performing a signals intelligence or EW support mission is determined by who tasks and controls the assets, what they are tasked to provide, and the purpose for which they are tasked. Operational commanders task assets to conduct EW support for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning the conduct of future operations, and other tactical actions (such as threat avoidance and homing). The EW officer coordinates with the G-2 or S-2 to ensure all EW support needed for planned EW operations is identified and submitted to the G-3 or S-3 for approval by the commander. This ensures that the required collection assets are properly tasked to provide the EW support. In cases where planned electronic attack actions may conflict with the G-2 or S-2
intelligence collection efforts, the G-3, S-3, or commander decides which has priority. The EW officer and the G-2 or S-2 develop a structured process within each echelon for conducting this intelligence gain-loss calculus during mission rehearsal exercises and predeployment work-ups.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE REPROGRAMMING CONSIDERATIONS
4-74. Electronic warfare reprogramming refers to modifying friendly EW or target sensing systems in response to validated changes in enemy equipment and tactics or the electromagnetic environment. (See paragraph 1-40 for the complete definition.) Reprogramming EW and target sensing system equipment falls under the responsibility of each Service or organization through its respective EW reprogramming support programs. It includes changes to self-defense systems, offensive weapons systems, and intelligence collection systems. During joint operations, swift identification and reprogramming efforts are critical in a rapidly evolving hostile situation. The key consideration for EW reprogramming is joint coordination. Joint coordination of Service reprogramming efforts ensures reprogramming requirements are identified, 4-18
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processed, and implemented consistently by all friendly forces. During joint operations, EW
reprogramming coordination and monitoring is the responsibility of the joint force commander’s EW staff.
(For more information on EW reprogramming, see FM 3-13.10).
SECTION II — ELECTRONIC WARFARE PREPARATION
4-75. Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation.
Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement (FM 3-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels.
4-76. During preparation, the EW officer and members of the EW working group focus their actions on the following activities:
z
Revising and refining the EW estimate, EW tasks supporting command and control warfare, and EW support to the overall plan.
z
Rehearsing the synchronization of EW support to the plan (including integration into the targeting process, request procedures for joint assets, deconfliction procedures, and asset determination and refinement).
z
Synchronizing the collection plan and intelligence synchronization matrix with the attack guidance matrix and EW input to the operation plan or order annexes and appendixes.
z
Assessing the planned task organization developed to support EW operations, including liaison officers and organic and nonorganic capabilities required by echelon.
z
Coordinating procedures with ISR operational elements (such as signals intelligence staff elements).
z
Training the supporting staff members of the EW working group during mission rehearsal exercises.
z
Completing precombat checks and inspections of EW assets.
z
Completing sustainment preparations for EW assets.
z
Coordinate with the G-4 or S-4 to develop EW equipment reporting formats.
z
Completing briefbacks by subordinate EW working groups on planned EW operations.
z
Refining content and format for the EW officer’s portion of the battle update assessment and brief.
SECTION III — ELECTRONIC WARFARE EXECUTION
4-77. Execution is putting the plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 3-0).
Commanders focus their subordinates on executing the concept of operations by issuing their intent and mission orders.
4-78. During execution, the EW officer and EW working group members—
z
Serve as the EW expert for the commander.
z
Maintain the running estimate for EW operations.
z
Monitor EW operations and recommend adjustments during execution.
z
Recommend adjustments to the commander’s critical information requirements based on the situation.
z
Recommend adjustments to EW-related control measures and procedures.
z
Maintain direct liaison with the fires and network operations cells and the command and control warfare working group (if formed) to ensure integration and deconfliction of EW operations.
z
Coordinate and manage EW taskings to subordinate units or assets.
z
Coordinate requests for nonorganic EW support.
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z
Continue to assist the targeting working group in target development and recommend targets for attack by electronic attack assets.
z
Receive, process, and coordinate subordinate requests for EW support during operations.
z
Receive and process immediate support requests for suppression of enemy air defense or EW
from joint or multinational forces; coordinate through fire support officer and fire support coordinator with the battlefield coordination detachment and joint or multinational liaisons for support request.
z
Coordinate with airspace control section on all suppression of enemy air defense or EW
missions.
z
Provide input to the overall assessment regarding effectiveness of electronic attack missions.
z
Maintain, update, and distribute the status of EW assets.
z
Validate and disseminate cease-jamming requests.
z
Coordinate and expedite electromagnetic interference reports with the analysis and control element for targeting and the spectrum manager for potential deconfliction.
z
Perform jamming control authority function for ground-based EW within the assigned area of operations (when designated by the jamming control authority).
SECTION IV — ELECTRONIC WARFARE ASSESSMENT
4-79. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation (FM 3-0). Commanders, assisted by their staffs, continuously assess the current situation and progress of the operation and compare it with the concept of operations, mission, and commander’s intent. Based on their assessment, commanders direct adjustments, ensuring that the operation remains focused on the mission and commander’s intent.
4-80. As depicted in figure 4-5 (page 4-10), assessment occurs throughout every operations process activity and includes three major tasks:
z
Continuously assessing the enemy’s reactions and vulnerabilities.
z
Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of the operation towards the commander’s desired end state.
z
Evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.
4-81. The EW officer and supporting members of the EW working group make assessments throughout the operations process. During planning and preparation activities, assessments of EW are made during the MDMP, IPB, targeting, ISR synchronization, and composite risk management integration.
4-82. The EW officer, in conjunction with the G-5 or S-5, helps develop the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for evaluating EW operations during execution. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 3-0). A measure of effectivene ss is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (JP 3-0). In the context of EW, an example of a measure of performance is the percentage of known enemy command and control nodes targeted and attacked by electronic attack means (action) versus the number of enemy command and control nodes that were actually destroyed or rendered inoperable for the desired duration (task accomplishment). Measures of effectiveness are used to determine the degree to which an EW action achieved the desired result. This is normally measured through analysis of data collected by both active and passive means. For example, effectiveness is measured by using radar or visual systems to detect changes in enemy weapons flight and trajectory profiles.
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4-83. During execution, the EW officer and members of the EW working group participate in combat assessments within the fires cell to determine the effectiveness of electronic attack employment in support of operations. Combat assessment consists of three elements: munitions effects assessment, battle damage assessment, and reattack recommendations. (Paragraphs 4-47 to 4-49 discuss combat assessment.) SUMMARY
4-84. The EW officer and staff members supporting the EW working group ensure the successful integration of EW capabilities into operations. The EW officer leads the EW integration effort throughout the operations process. The EW officer must be familiar with and participate in the applicable integrating processes and continuing activities discussed within this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Coordination, Deconfliction, and Synchronization
Once the commander approves an operation plan or order and preparations are
complete, the electronic warfare officer and supporting staff turn to coordinating, deconflicting, and synchronizing the electronic warfare efforts. They ensure
electronic warfare actions are carried out as planned or are modified in response to current operations. This chapter discusses major areas and activities that require continuous coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization by the electronic warfare officer and supporting staff of the electronic warfare working groups.
COORDINATION AND DECONFLICTION
5-1. A certain amount of coordination is part of the planning process. However, once a plan is approved and an operation begins, the electronic warfare (EW) staff effort shifts to the coordination and deconfliction necessary to ensure units carry out EW actions as planned or modify actions to respond to the dynamics of the operation.
5-2. The EW officer and members of the EW working group continuously monitor several key areas.
These include EW coordination across organizations (higher, lower, and adjacent units), support request coordination, electromagnetic spectrum management, EW asset management, functional coordination between EW subdivisions, EW reprogramming, and EW deconfliction. Normally, EW personnel on watch in the operations center monitor and coordinate activities of these key areas. They alert the EW officer or other EW support personnel to address the required actions.
COORDINATION ACROSS ORGANIZATIONS
5-3. At the joint level, the information operations division of the J-3 performs EW coordination. The EW
section of the information operations staff engages in all EW functions. This section performs peacetime contingency planning, completes day-to-day planning and monitoring of routine theater EW activities, and crisis action planning for contingencies as part of emergent joint operations. The EW section coordinates closely with other appropriate staff sections and other larger joint planning groups as required. (JP 3-13.1
discusses joint EW coordination.)
5-4. In the early stages of contingencies, the joint force commander’s EW staff assesses the staffing requirements for planning and execution. This staff also coordinates EW planning and course of action development with the joint force commander’s components. Services begin component EW planning and activate their EW working groups per combatant command or Service guidelines. When the scope of a contingency bec