Colonel
Brigade
Corps and Above
Major
Colonel
Brigade Division
Captain
Major
Battalion
Brigade and Above
Lieutenant
Captain
Company
Battalion and Above
Lieutenant
Table 2-2. Possible staff liaison requirements
Unit going to
Unit size
represented
Battalion and above Brigade and above Division
Corps and above
Logistics
Division
Operations/Plans
Intelligence
Logistics
Logistics
Brigade
Operations/Plans Operations/Plans
Intelligence
Intelligence
Logistics
Logistics
Logistics
Battalion
Operations/Plans
Operations/Plans Operations/Plans
Company Operations/Plans Operations/Plans Operations/Plans Operations/Plans
Note: Under certain circumstances, multiple LNOs may be required due to the complexity of operations.
2-38. Integrating multinational liaison personnel into the staff of the multinational force totally depends on the commander’s desires. When integration creates a more effective organization, the multinational force should establish an orientation program for all liaison personnel. The multinational personnel reception center could perform this requirement. The multinational force must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall responsibility for liaison personnel reporting to the headquarters.
2-39. Special operations forces have proven particularly effective in multinational operations as LNOs or liaison teams. Their language capabilities, cultural training, and experience in working and training with other country’s militaries allow them to improve coordination and minimize misunderstanding.
2-40. U.S. Army mobile liaison teams are assigned to selected Army Service component commands. These teams provide the ARFOR commander with the capability to conduct liaison with subordinate or parallel joint and multinational headquarters within the operational area. These teams are composed of 23
functional staff experts capable of providing advice and assistance to supported units and ensuring rapid and accurate coordination between headquarters. Mobile liaison teams have organic transportation and receive communications support from Army theater signal units. Although mobile liaison teams may have qualified linguists, they will need to be augmented with specific language capabilities. In Korea, the combat support coordination teams are similar in function to the mobile liaison team. These teams serve to facilitate coordination for the unique U.S. aspects of combat, information, protection, and logistical support within CFC.
COORDINATION CENTERS
2-41. Using a coordination center is a proven means of enhancing stability and interaction. It also improves control within a multinational force. Multinational forces, especially one that operates under a parallel command structure, should routinely create such a center in the early stages of any effort. The coordination center can be used for C2 and can organize and control functional areas including logistics 20 May 2010
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and civil-military operations (CMO). Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, HN support, and movement control. However, as a multinational force matures, the center’s role can be expanded to include command activities. When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide action officers who are familiar with its activities. Multinational forces should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters. Early establishment and staffing of skilled personnel add to the success of such centers.
C2 INTEROPERABILITY
2-42. All multinational force troops must fully understand the mission, goals, and objectives of the operation. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) should be developed whenever appropriate. These SOPs should be easy to understand and address multinational procedures, not single-nation procedures. When there is a lead nation, its SOPs will be used for most purposes.
2-43. Even with SOPs, the lead nation will still need to provide a forum for deconflicting and resolving misunderstandings. This will require more than a platform to express ideas. There may be personnel, to include commanders from multinational forces, who do not have a working understanding of English. The multinational force must use some mechanism, such as sand tables, as a tool to overcome language deficiencies when describing operational requirements. Regardless of the mechanism used, the multinational force commander and staff will need patience and possibly detailed explanations to ensure understanding. A robust liaison team will help in bridging C2 interoperability gaps.
2-44. Terminology is also a problem between multinational forces and other organizations. For example, the use of acronyms could pose a problem between organizations. Therefore, all military forces and the agencies they work with should develop and distribute a lexicon of mutually agreed terms. The glossary in this manual can help provide a common basis for understanding. See also Field Manual (FM) 1-02.
2-45. The location of the multinational force headquarters is important. The multinational force must protect itself against various threats. However, it should be in a position to easily work with both the political and military sides of the operation.
2-46. The multinational force must remember that many countries are not staffed or equipped to offer full support. They may not possess a full array of combat support or combat service support assets, maps of the projected area of operations (AO), or the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by other multinational forces. These military forces probably will look to other nations for equipment and supplies. With regard specifically to UN operations, it is important to know what agreements exist between the UN and these militaries before their arrival in the projected AO.
2-47. The multinational force commander will have to look at which nations can offer special capabilities such as airlift, special operations, intelligence collection, communications, security, and logistics. These capabilities can offset other countries’ shortfalls and enhance overall operational competence. The multinational force commander may have difficulty removing particular forces or individuals from the force unless they are from his or her own nation.
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
2-48. Multinational force commanders must focus on cooperation and coordination rather than C2 when dealing with most nonmilitary agencies. These agencies will have their own missions and goals. Coalition commanders will have a limited ability to influence their actions. Ensuring that they can accomplish the mission and end state—while allowing these agencies to do the same—requires that commanders seek agency cooperation. It also requires that efforts be coordinated to prevent interference in one another’s missions. Additionally, these agencies may be in a position to help commanders accomplish the mission.
Developing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is one way of achieving cooperation and coordination with nonmilitary agencies. The CMOC, described in detail in Chapter 9, provides a single point of contact between these agencies and the commander.
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STAFFING
2-49. The multinational staff organization will be based on what option is used to form the headquarters, either the lead-nation concept or a composite headquarters. The commander may not have a choice if the establishing authority designates an organization. If the lead-nation concept is used, the routine duties of the commander and staff will be those assigned by the doctrine of the lead nation, modified as necessary for the specific situation. If a composite headquarters is selected, the commander and staff will have to specify duties in more detail. It may be necessary to change the names of various multinational functions based on sensitivities when working with organizations such as the UN. This section covers several responsibilities unique to multinational operations.
2-50. The multinational staff should be composed of appropriate members in key positions from each country providing forces. Positions on the staff should be divided so that country representation and influence generally reflect the composition of the force. These positions should also stem from the mission and type of operations to be conducted. Multinational commanders must also look at force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support. The importance of knowing, trusting, and quickly reaching a comfort level with staff members may make it desirable for the multinational commander to handpick some members of the staff such as the chief of staff or G-3.
2-51. When mission requirements exceed staff capabilities, the commander must request the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment from either the national chain of command or the multinational establishing authorities. They may have a “cell” of experts prepared to augment a multinational force to provide assistance in the early stages of organization and planning. Staff officers who augment the staff nucleus should be trained as part of a multinational training and exercise program. The staff should include experienced operators for the C2 systems. Personnel nominated to fill multinational augmentation billets should possess the following attributes:
z
Knowledge, confidence, and forcefulness.
z
Preparedness to represent their nations and units.
z
Understanding that they are the de facto country “experts.”
z
Ability to work as part of a multinational team without country parochialism.
2-52. The command should establish a staff orientation program to ensure that all individuals joining the staff become thoroughly familiar with their surroundings. This could be accomplished by establishing a multinational personnel reception center under the G-1 or S-1. The “buddy system” is another program that the command could establish with the reception center or by itself. This system assigns an experienced staff member to a new staff member to assist in the familiarization process.
MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER
2-53. The multinational force commander is responsible to the member nations for the successful accomplishment of the mission. The following responsibilities are provided as a guide. They may be adapted to the specific mission and forces assigned:
z
Making recommendations to the establishing authorities on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces for mission accomplishment. This includes identifying requirements for additional forces as needed.
z
Exercising control over assigned and attached forces. The commander must also determine when to transfer forces to the multinational force OPCON or TACON.
z
Developing an OPORD or campaign plan within the planning guidelines as directed by the establishing authorities. The commander determines applicability of existing OPLANs, if any, to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning.
z
Requesting supplemental ROE needed to accomplish the assigned mission.
z
Establishing combat identification measures.
z
Notifying the establishing authorities when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned AO.
z
Ensuring that cross-nation support is provided.
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z
Ensuring the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting multinational team.
z
Determining the requirement for and providing guidance on establishing the necessary boards, centers, and bureaus (such as multinational visitor’s bureau, multinational movement center, or CMOC). If a staff proposes creating an organization, the commander should require that the staff provide criteria, supporting rationale, and membership. The final decision is the commander’s. If it is not required, the commander should not establish it.
z
Defining the subordinate AOs for each subordinate force, to include the Special Operations Force. The commander should–
Ensure accurate accountability of forces deployed.
Monitor the operational situation and maintain daily contact with the establishing
authorities to keep fully informed of the situation.
Coordinate with forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, multinational nation agencies, NGOs, or international organizations as
appropriate.
Build a cohesive team, to include NGOs, international organizations, and others.
DEPUTY MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER
2-54. Normally, the deputy commander is from a different country than the commander. The selection may be based on the mission assigned or the number and type of forces in the multinational force. The deputy usually is of equal or senior rank to the subordinate force commanders. He or she should possess a broad understanding of the operation to be conducted. The deputy performs special duties as directed by the commander. Examples of these duties include the following:
z
Chairing committees.
z
Coordinating with liaison personnel.
z
Coordinating for incoming and outgoing requirements.
z
Coordinating interagency requirements.
CHIEF OF STAFF
2-55. In most cases, the chief of staff will come from the same country as the commander, probably from the same command. Because the staff may have officers from different nations, the chief of staff places special emphasis on training, coordinating, and directing the work of the staff. The chief of staff must pay particular attention to establishing routine procedures that ensure necessary coordination takes place and in reviewing staff actions for completeness and clarity.
G-1 (S-1), PERSONNEL
2-56. See Chapter 3, Personnel, for details. It discusses human resources, financial, legal, and religious support to the command.
G-2 (S-2), INTELLIGENCE
2-57. See Chapter 4, Intelligence, for details.
G-3 (S-3), OPERATIONS
2-58. See Chapter 5, Operations and Planning, for details.
G-4 (S-4), LOGISTICS
2-59. See Chapter 6, Logistics, for details. This chapter includes health service support (HSS) and contracting.
G-5 (S-5), PLANS
2-60. See Chapter 5, Operations and Planning, for details.
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G-6 (S-6), SIGNAL
2-61. See Chapter 2, Command and Control, for details of establishing communications.
G-7 (S-7), INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT
2-62. See Chapter 7, Army Information Tasks, for details.
G-8, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
2-63. See Chapter 10, Financial Management, for details.
G-9 (S-9), CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
2-64. See Chapter 9, Civil Affairs Operations, for details.
COMMANDER’S PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFF
2-65. The commander’s personal and special staff groups may include the following:
z
Political advisor.
z
Inspector general.
z
Command historian.
z
Engineer.
z
Public affairs (PA) officer.
z
Legal officer.
z
Surgeon.
z
Provost marshal.
z
Chaplain.
z
Others as directed.
2-66. Each member has specific tasks and responsibilities. In addition to the G-1, Chapter 3 covers the chaplain, legal officer, and provost marshal. Chapter 11 covers the surgeon. Chapter 12 covers the engineer. See FM 6-0 for information on personal and special staff groups.
Political Advisor
2-67. Commanders will routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. The commander should establish a close, efficient, and effective relationship with the political advisor. The responsibilities of the political advisor include the following:
z
Working with the commander and assisting the national government in creating policies that meet multinational objectives and are realistically executed.
z
Acting as the principal contact with ambassadors and informing the appropriate diplomatic personnel of multinational force plans within the AO.
z
Supplying information regarding policy goals and objectives of the diplomatic agencies relevant to the operation.
Inspector General
2-68. The inspector general (IG) is a confidential advisor and fact finder for the commanding general. He or she serves as the extension of the commander's eyes, ears, voice, and conscience. The IG has the responsibility to inform the commander of IG observations, findings, and impressions on all aspects of the command. When directed by the commanding general, the IG–
z
Assesses the operational and administrative effectiveness of the command.
z
Informs the commanding general on all matters affecting mission accomplishment.
z
Inquires into the reports on the state of the economy, efficiency, discipline, morale, esprit de corps, and quality of command management and leadership of all assigned and attached units and organizations.
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z
Assists the commanding general in sustaining readiness by taking care of Soldiers, civilians and family members.
z
Advises the commanding general on inspections policy and effectiveness of the organizations inspections program.
Command Historian
2-69. All too often, important events, important decisions, and lessons learned from an operation are not recorded. Thus, they are not available for use as learning tools by multinational forces in future operations.
The commander should establish a staff section to collect historical information and lessons learned about the operation from the initial planning process to redeployment. A command historian should head this section. The historian is responsible for–
z
Capturing and recording events for historical purposes (to include photographs).
z
Collecting lessons learned and ensuring turnover files are properly developed.
z
Assisting in the development of SOPs.
2-70. Additionally, the historian should record all events daily. This record must be created at the time of each event. It should include available sources as well as a synopsis of rationales for actions taken. This staff section should not become entangled in the decisionmaking process.
Public Affairs and the Media
2-71. The modern battlefield has changed dramatically and so has the ability of the media to report from the battlefield. Technological advances ensure that future operations will unfold on a global stage before a worldwide audience. Tactical actions and the hardships of Soldiers and civilians alike have an increasing impact on strategic decisionmaking. Real-time visual images of operations, both positive and negative, will continue to influence public understanding and support.
2-72. Media presence on the battlefield is a factor that commanders must consider during mission planning. They must understand and account for media capabilities and requirements. Failure in this regard will not prevent the media from covering multinational operations. It will, however, ensure that the media will use alternate sources for information and multinational forces will have lost the ability to influence the outcome of the story.
Information Environments
2-73. The global information environment (GIE) contains those information processes and systems that are beyond the direct influence of the military, but which may directly impact on the success or failure of military operations. The media, international organizations, and even individuals are players in the GIE.
Multinational operations can be influenced through planned or inadvertent messages communicated via the GIE. Media coverage of multinational operations can be broadcast in real-time, or near real-time, to our troops, our national publics, our allies, and our adversaries.
2-74. The military information environment (MIE) consists of information systems and organizations, both friendly and enemy—or belonging to one of the belligerent factions in stability operations—military and nonmilitary, that support, enable, or significantly influence military operations. Information superiority is a key factor in the GIE and essential in the MIE for a commander to achieve success.
2-75. Commanders must understand the pervasiveness and capability of the media, not only in its ability to report on an operation, but also on its ability to influence target audiences with respect to the legitimacy of that operation. Commanders must anticipate how an adversary may attempt to use the media to achieve their own version of information superiority. Commanders must also have the means to counter these attempts at misinformation and propaganda to mitigate the effects on the morale of the troops.
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Public Affairs Objectives
2-76. PA aims to help ensure information superiority. The public affairs office (PAO) seizes the initiative with respect to media operations and puts in place programs that do the following:
z
Protect Soldiers and local civilians from the effects of enemy propaganda, misinformation, and rumor.
z
Support open, independent reporting and access to units and Soldiers (within the limits of operations security [OPSEC]).
z
Establish the conditions leading to confidence in the multinational force.
z
Provide a balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information that communicates the multinational force’s story and messages through an expedited flow of complete, accurate, and timely information.
Public Affairs Operations
2-77. PA operations assist the commander in understanding and operating in the GIE. These operations support the commander’s efforts to meet the information requirements of internal and external audiences without compromising the mission.
2-78. Understanding that the perception of an operation can be as important as the execution of the operation. PA staff supports the commander by monitoring media perceptions and reporting trends. The staff prepares and disseminates clear and objective messages about the operation to target audiences to address any instances of misinformation or imbalanced reporting.
2-79. Successful operations require an accurate PA assessment of the situation. The PA assessment is the continual analysis of the GIE and its potential impact on the operation. This assessment provides the commander with a thorough examination of critical PA factors such as–
z
The number, types, and nationalities of news media representatives in theater.
z
The identification of media personalities and their respective reporting trends or biases.
z
Media needs and limitations.
z
Media transportation and communication capabilities or requirements.
z
The perception of past, current, or potential operations by internal and external audiences.
2-80. The chief challenge for the multinational PA staff is to develop a plan that not only supports the commander’s concept of operations, but also takes into account the PA requirements of the multinational partners.
2-81. The forces of each nation forming the multinational force are familiar with their respective national media organizations and their methods. However, these may be dissimilar between countries. Commanders and PA staffs must take these differences into account when developing working relationships that will allow for open and accurate reporting with a minimum of ground rules to ensure OPSEC. Policies on media accreditation and release or nonrelease of information must be developed at the multinational force headquarters level and adhered to by all units in the command regardless of nationality.
2-82. PA operations consist of four key elements: planning, media operations, internal communications, and training.
Planning
2-83. PA planning is an integral part of operational planning. It must be included at the very outset of the planning process. PA officers seek to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the multinational force. They expedite the flow of complete, accurate, and timely information that communicates the multinational force’s perspective. This helps to ensure media understanding of the events covered and thus contributes to fair and balanced reporting. Included in this planning element is the requirement to provide issues management and crisis communications advice to the commander and senior staff on a wide range of issues, both operational and nonoperational.
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Media Operations
2-84. Commanders and their staffs must accurately assess the level and intensity of media interest in th