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Use of space assets, location of intelligence assets, and location of intelligence collection targets.
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Intelligence centers, which should be multinational, serving both the multinational and national needs. Such centers require the personal involvement of the multinational commander to make this a reality.
4-6. The CCIR and priority information requirements should serve as the focus of the intelligence effort, the answers to which can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.
SUPPORT TO STABILITY OPERATIONS
4-7. There are no standard templates for intelligence support to stability operations. Commanders must use the same approach for stability operations as for war. In stability operations, the nature and intensity of a potential threat can change even more suddenly and dramatically than in other operations.
4-8. Stability operations demand greater attention to the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an AO than conventional war demands. Stability operations expand intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) beyond geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently are not military forces or terrain. Cultural information is critical to gauging the potential reactions of the population to the operation, to avoiding misunderstandings, and to improving the effectiveness of operations. Changes in the behavior of the populace may suggest a needed change in multinational strategy. Biographic information and leadership analyses are key factors to understanding adversaries or potential adversaries, their methods of operation, and how they interact with the environment. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the hostilities underlying the deployment are vital to mission success. Such information helps to prevent unintentional mission creep and ultimately achieve the objectives of the operation. Mission creep consists of tangential efforts to assist in areas of concern unrelated to assigned duties that cripple efficient mission accomplishment.
4-9. The commander’s understanding of the local infrastructure improves his or her situational understanding. While traditional reconnaissance elements still provide much information, local media, diplomatic mission personnel, and civilian agencies can provide information not available elsewhere.
Special consideration must be given to the intelligence role that all Soldiers have in stability operations.
Medical, transportation, CA, PSYOP, military police, and engineer personnel and peace observers are superb sources of information. These personnel routinely operate in the HN environment and can discern change within it.
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Intelligence
4-10. The primary source of intelligence in stability operations is normally derived from human intelligence (HUMINT). Interpreters, elicitations, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are primary sources for assessing the economic and health needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance. Emphasize to all personnel the importance of always being intelligence conscious and provide basic guidelines to improve their intelligence-gathering capability.
Multinational commanders should be aware that each nation has a set of established legal norms that govern HUMINT and counterintelligence. Therefore, to achieve a multinational HUMINT effort requires coordination at the national level.
4-11. In multinational operations, the intelligence community may work with a variety of government agencies. Synthesizing and leveraging intelligence information from the various agencies presents many challenges. To overcome this, agencies may assign personnel to a multinational headquarters to improve interagency coordination. For example, during past operations–
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Central Intelligence Agency analysts have worked with military intelligence analysts.
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Federal Bureau of Investigation agents have worked with military members conducting forensic analysis of explosions.
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Department of the Treasury agents have worked with military analysts on foreign funding of insurgency operations.
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Drug Enforcement Administration agents have worked with military analysts to determine linkage of drug trafficking and insurgent actions.
Agents have served as liaisons to a multinational corps or a multinational force to facilitate intelligence support and synchronize agency operations with military operations. Interagency players have access to many forms of specialized information that will help to complete intelligence picture.
4-12. Counterintelligence operations are a good source of security intelligence. (UN operations may inhibit collection of information.) This intelligence will aid in determining any threats to the multinational force or its mission by adversarial intelligence personnel. It will aid in determining the host nation’s willingness and ability to protect multinational resources and personnel. Counterintelligence also provides input into protection and OPSEC estimates.
4-13. Approaches to civilian organizations, including the media, for information should be characterized by openness and transparency, including a clear statement of the use of the information, to avoid undermining cooperative efforts with such agencies. If you keep the media informed, they may become willing to exchange information with your staff.
INFORMATION VERSUS INTELLIGENCE
4-14. In multinational operations, national sensitivities may exist concerning the dissemination of intelligence. These sensitivities may even extend to the term intelligence. Consider the ramifications of labeling information as intelligence, especially when dealing with civilian organizations. In many cultures, intelligence connotes information gathered on the nation’s citizens for use against them. Further, attempts to exchange information with civilian agencies may be stifled as they try to maintain neutrality by not being part of any perceived intelligence programs. To enhance exchanging information, the command should consider labeling unclassified data as “information” rather than “intelligence” and using “information collection” rather than “all-source intelligence collection.”
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Chapter 4
GEOSPATIAL DATA
4-15. Multinational operations require interoperable geospatial information and services data and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to and ensure all work is on a standard datum. A geospatial information and services plan must coordinate all multinational products, to include access approval procedures and blending multinational assets into a cohesive production program. The following concepts should guide multinational intelligence operations:
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Adjust for national differences in intelligence concepts.
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Create an integrated multinational staff and intelligence center with representatives from all participating nations within the national limits on intelligence sharing.
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View the mission from a multinational as well as a national perspective. Treat an adversary’s threat to one member as a threat to all members.
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Agree to and plan for multinational intelligence requirements in advance of the operation.
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Plan complementary intelligence operations using all multinational intelligence resources, focusing on national strengths to enhance and overcome weaknesses in others.
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Exchange LNOs to help reduce problems of culture, language, doctrine, and intelligence requirements.
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Intelligence
CHECKLIST
Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the intelligence portion of the operation.
WARNING/PLANNING PHASE
4-16. What are the CCIRs? Have the CCIRs been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?
4-17. Does the multinational force have an initial all-source cell and collection management cell? What are their positions in the deployment timetable?
4-18. Has the command conducted initial IPB, to include counterintelligence estimates?
4-19. Does the collection plan identify gaps in intelligence? Does the collection plan incorporate all collection assets available for tasking?
4-20. Are there any unique cultural, historical, or religious relationships between the multinational force partners and the adversary?
4-21. Have the cultural, social, political, and economic factors in the AO been included in the intelligence estimate?
4-22. Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed? Have requests for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?
4-23. What is the intelligence architecture?
4-24. Does the intelligence architecture meet mission requirements? Are there any gaps in coverage?
4-25. Has the C2 system been established with the capability to rapidly disseminate to all participants the time-sensitive information for targeting or rapid reaction?
4-26. Do multinational forces have the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by other multinational forces?
4-27. Have sufficient intelligence collection resources been placed under the control of the multinational force? Are the national resources immediately responsive to the multinational force?
4-28. Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers?
4-29. What are the commander’s requirements for intelligence briefings and products?
4-30. What is the counterintelligence plan?
4-31. Is there a single focus for asset management?
4-32. Are intelligence-gathering tasks assigned in accordance with the CCIR and the capability of the multinational equipment under multinational force control?
4-33. Has theater reconnaissance been undertaken to utilize available assets?
4-34. What are the multinational force intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities and plans?
4-35. What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies?
Are all multinational partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national sensitivities?
4-36. How is strategic intelligence shared among other forces?
4-37. What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems, to include database compatibility?
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Chapter 4
4-38. What are the staffing requirements for the G-2 or S-2 staff including specialists, linguists, and LNOs to include a subordinate J-2X staff? What support is available from the G-1 or S-1?
4-39. What are the requirements for national intelligence centers?
4-40. What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?
4-41. What are the requirements for ROE governing intelligence aspects of the operation such as HUMINT activities or reporting?
4-42. What are the contingency plans when normal communication channels fail?
4-43. What are the multinational or force security procedures?
4-44. What links should be established with civilian agencies, to include the media? Have efforts been made to pool information with applicable civilian agencies?
4-45. Have HUMINT and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted through the J-2X?
4-46. Has the use of a counterintelligence coordinating authority and HUMINT operations chief been staffed and resources within the J-2X to deconflict and synchronize collection, debriefing, and interrogation activities within the AO?
4-47. Do the subordinate forces have collection assets available? What type? What are their capabilities and limitations?
4-48. Is the analysis effort prioritized and have analytical production responsibilities been clearly laid out for coalition members?
4-49. Are intelligence LNOs planned for in the operation?
4-50. Is the intelligence support package planned for with capabilities and limitations explained to supporting units?
4-51. Have intelligence staff attachments and detachments been planned?
4-52. Are training programs in place with a focus creating a common view of the enemy, enemy dispositions, order of battle, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?
4-53. Has intelligence daily cycle been established? Does it include reporting timelines and routine briefings and conferences? Have collection management timelines been defined?
4-54. Have intelligence-reporting formats been defined and rehearsed?
4-55. Does the deployment plan provide for early deployment of intelligence assets in theater?
4-56. Have routine and emergency “classified” destruction procedures been promulgated along with classified handling procedures?
4-57. What is the criminal threat? How is criminal intelligence incorporated into the CCIR?
THREATS
4-58. What enemy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, delivery means, and employment doctrine exists?
4-59. What infrastructure (such as nuclear power plants, chemical industries, hospital radiotherapy sources) exists that could result in low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards?
4-60. What intelligence-gathering assets are available to monitor CBRN threat changes?
PREDEPLOYMENT PHASE
4-61. Have the commander and staff been briefed on the initial IPB?
4-62. Who are the HN, civilian agency, and media contacts?
4-63. Have all intelligence systems, to include communications and information systems, been rehearsed?
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4-64. Do subordinate forces have sufficient personnel to handle the amount of intelligence available?
4-65. Has all familiarization training on deploying intelligence systems been completed?
4-66. How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence between multinational nations?
DEPLOYMENT PHASE
4-67. Has the intelligence architecture, including communications and information systems and supporting LNOs, been established and tested?
4-68. Are links with the HN, civilian agencies, and the media functioning?
4-69. Has the collection management plan been refined?
4-70. Have the commander’s briefing and intelligence product requirements been refined?
4-71. What additional specialist personnel or equipment is required?
4-72. What is the effectiveness of SOPs for–
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Handover by the in-country force?
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Operations of all-source cell, collection, coordination and intelligence requirements management cell, and national intelligence cell?
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Compatibility of intelligence communications and information systems?
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Protocols for the handling of HUMINT sources?
4-73. Was the actual process for the national intelligence cells to exchange intelligence between nations effective?
4-74. Have HUMINT and counterintelligence operations been deconflicted?
4-75. Have national intelligence summaries, imagery, and threat assessments approved for dissemination been shared?
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS THREAT
4-76. What are the explosive hazards (such as mine, unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO), booby trap, or improvised explosive device (IED) in the AO?
4-77. What data is available on mines already in place or the types of booby traps/IEDs that have been employed in the AO?
4-78. What types of friendly munitions have been employed in the AO and at what location? What is the likelihood of components of those becoming IEDs?
4-79. Are there indications that booby traps have been or will be emplaced by withdrawing forces or threat elements that stay behind?
REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
4-80. What are the handover procedures for intelligence and physical architecture to the UN or other agencies? Do the procedures include protocols for information exchange and handling, resettlement, or handover of HUMINT sources?
4-81. Are security procedures for the redeployment of personnel, equipment, and documentation adequate and properly supervised?
4-82. What are the requirements for briefings, and have necessary debriefings been conducted?
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Chapter 5
Operations and Planning
Operations conducted by a multinational force require continuous coordination
among throughout the process. Coordination must occur in all phases of the operation
from planning and deployment to redeployment. Multinational force commanders
and their staffs should involve their partners in each phase to the greatest extent
possible. Exchanging information among multinational formations must occur as
soon as possible.
PLAN EARLY
5-1. Multinational planning should start well before the actual operation and may use generic plans to build the specific plan around. Depending on the type and nature of operations to be conducted, planning may include governmental agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. Predeployment, deployment, sustainment, and transition operations must be addressed in the plans.
STRATEGIC SCHEME
5-2. Military advice to the president and the secretary of defense or another nation’s national authority is critical in the early stages of multinational planning to determine the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of the multinational force. Commanders should take every opportunity to ensure that political leaders fully understand the force’s abilities and limitations and the time required to successfully plan and prepare for an operation. See Appendix A for further details on multinational capabilities.
5-3. Strategic planning is also supported by the mandate of a legitimizing authority, such as the UN or other multinational political organization. The mandate is usually expanded by TOR that establish for the military the limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct operations.
(For example, the right to search civilians and seize property.) Nations often supplement the TOR with national guidance for their own military force.
5-4. Whether in TOR or another form, this guidance must be secured because it is the starting point for the military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This process, which precedes or is the first step in campaign planning, establishes a common understanding of the mandate among multinational partners.
Without a common understanding, agreement on such factors as the role of the military, required forces, acceptable risk, and ROE cannot be formed.
CAMPAIGN PREPARATION
5-5. Thorough campaign planning is a vital factor in achieving unity of effort among multinational partners and civilian agencies. Processes must be simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and understand. Habitual relationships in peacetime or sufficient training time before operations allows enough time for multinational planners to teach others the key points of the process and build consensus on the approach to the particular operation.
5-6. The mandate expresses political will. The TOR establish conditions for execution. The campaign plan translates these into military and political tasks, ways, and means. Transition planning should be an integral part of campaign planning and should be done simultaneously with the other elements. This not only assists in the timely creation of the follow-on force, but also promotes a smooth transition.
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FORCE PROJECTION
5-7. Force projection, especially for a multinational force, is critical to overall mission success.
Participants must know from the beginning the multinational considerations to smoothly deploy forces and to effectively use lift assets. Multinational operations often have duplicated effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the UN protection force deployed to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer reconnaissance of the infrastructure. This resulted in duplications and omissions. The multinational force must coordinate and anticipate requirements during this phase to maximize capabilities and minimize resources. Planners must review national military contingents and HN
assets. They should also agree on a division of labor.
5-8. Limited lift calls for maximizing its efficiency during deployment. This requires coordination with the host nation so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some cases, one multinational force may transport another nation’s forces to the AO. LNOs from national contingents either must coordinate directly with the nation moving its forces or with the multinational force headquarters responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift. Chapter 6 provides additional information on logistics.
MISSION FOCUS
5-9. Political considerations and the military capabilities of the multinational force are the most important factors in multinational operations. The commander must remain focused on the assigned mission. He or she must understand the reason each national contingent is participating. This determines the structure and resultant taskings of the multinational force. Failure to understand may cause the force to split into components operating under differing political directions. While agreeing to the overall goal, national contingents may have different ideas about how to execute the mission. The commander must recognize that political considerations may force the choice of an acceptable course of action, rather than the optimum military solution. The commander must remain flexible to adjust to unforeseen political influences, keep the multinational forces focused on the military objective, and avoid mission creep.
5-10. To overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment, leaders may assign selected functions to a smaller group of partners. For example, the multinational force could assign the mission of support area security to home defense or police forces. Commanders may also entrust one member of the multinational force with air defense (AD), coastal defense, or some special operation based on the threat’s special capabilities. They must recognize the strengths and differences of the cultures from which these forces come. Their decisions on employment, made with the military leadership, must consider the capabilities of the forces. Subordinate commanders may request control of forces that provide capabilities not organic to that nation’s forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as they are needed, while maintaining concentrated critical capabilities.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
5-11. The glue that binds a multinational operation together is the commander’s ability to understand and integrate each nation’s capabilities into a cohesive force. This requires the commander to clearly articulate his or her intent. This enables each nation to form the same picture of the end state and the rules governing engagements. Given the language difficulties found in many multinational forces, the commander’s intent must be clearly and simply stated.
TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
5-12. At some point, national units come under the control of the designated multinational commander.
This process, known as TOA, should be accomplished as early as possible. The timing of the transfer must be part of the initial negotiations that govern how the multinational force forms. Planners must determine where the TOA—and the follow-on integration of units and headquarters—occurs. Early TOA enables the multinational commander to plan and conduct effective integration training.
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Operations and Planning
5-13. The first option is to arrange TOA to the multinational force before deploying a unit’s home station.
Commanders can then control the unit arrival sequence to best suit operational requirements and facilitate reception area base operations. This option also assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on national participation, and a significant lead time for planning and setting up the multinational force headquarters.
5-14. A second option is to have TOA at an intermediate staging base (ISB) en route to the operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area. They deploy only when fully ready and in the sequence required by the multinational force.
5-15. The third option is to have TOA occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option leaves each nation responsible to deploy its contingent and prepare it for operations. It does not allow the multinational force positive control of deployment into the AO. This option is less than optimum if immediate combat is likely.
5-16. Whichever option is chosen, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred. Then reception operations are not done by repetitive crisis management. Centralized control of force flow provides the best support to the multinational force’s requirements and the best support to the forces.
5-17. Each multinational nation has a slightly different process for planning operations. If a lead nation commands the multinational force, then the planning process that will be used is that of the lead nations. At national contingent headquarters, nations will use their own planning process.
PLANNING GROUP
5-18. Forming a multinational planning group will facilitate the multinational planning process. When the multinational force is formed, the commander decides on the organization and functions of the planning group as well as how the group and the staff sections will interact during planning and execution. This planning group should–
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Conduct crisis action planning.
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Be the focal point for OPLAN or OPORD development.
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Perform future planning.
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Perform other tasks as directed.
The planning group comprises representatives from appropriate multinational staff sections, national formations, and others as deemed necessary.
TRANSITION PLANNING
5-19. Most multinational operations end in a transition from multinationa