6-22. Agreements for transferring defense goods and services between nations must be done at the national government level. This may prove cumbersome and time consuming. Support provided and received in multinational operations must be in accordance with existing legal authorities. Under an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), national authorities enter into agreements for acquiring or cross-servicing logistic support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis. The ACSA is a broad overall agreement, generally supplemented by an implementing arrangement. The agreement is conducted by the J-4 and the Department of State with the country involved in the ACSA. Approval is provided by and the agreement is signed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the country involved in the ACSA. Major commands in country then negotiate the details with their 20 May 2010
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counterparts and reference the ACSA for exchange of support and services. The implementing arrangement contains specific details under which orders for logistic support are placed. ACSA can cover–
z
Food.
z
Billeting.
z
Transportation.
z
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
z
Clothing.
z
Communications.
z
Health service support.
z
Ammunition.
z
Base operations support to include construction.
z
Storage.
z
Use of facilities.
z
Training.
z
Spare parts.
z
Repair and maintenance.
z
Calibration.
z
Port services.
6-23. Items not included are–
z
Weapons systems.
z
Major end items.
z
Guided missiles.
z
Nuclear and chemical munitions other than riot control agents.
z
Cartridge and aircrew escape propulsion system components.
z
Chaff and chaff dispensers.
z
Guidance kits for bombs and other ammunition.
CONTRACTING
6-24. Contracting, such as theater-support contracting, is a means to acquire locally available logistic support for immediate use by deployed units at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating locations. Contracting may be conducted with foreign governments, commercial entities, or civilian agencies. Contracting does not replace HN support or existing supply systems where these systems are available or operational. When properly used, contracting is an essential tool for supporting the mission. Deployments in remote AOs are most likely to require contingency contracting support. FM 3-100.21 and FM 4-92 provide more information on contractor support to the Army. The commander or G-4
or S-4 must prioritize available contractor resources in the AO. Contracting can accomplish the following: z
Bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic or HN support is available.
z
Reduce dependence on a nationally based logistics system.
z
Improve response time and reduce footprints.
z
Augment the existing logistic support capability for critical supplies and services.
z
Transition from military to civilian-controlled operations.
z
Manage limited resources by using contractors instead of calling up reservists.
z
Reduce demands for military resources and improve relationships with the populace.
6-25. Contracting is valuable where no HN support agreements exist, or where HN support agreements do not provide for required supplies or services. Contracting can be expensive. Funding guidance is required.
Close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support is essential. Upon mission termination or redeployment, the command must close out all records or files and submit them to the appropriate authorities for disposition. The same economic considerations apply for contracting as for HN
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support (see previous). Contractors external to the AO may be used, but the logistics staff must consider such issues as taxes, cross border fees, and landing fees. The command must have a comprehensive contracting support plan to ensure the force uses proper legal methods when getting supplies and services.
The plan should meet the following requirements:
z
Include procedures and policies for contracting support in the AO. These procedures and policies should assure full use of HN support and contracting resources.
z
Ensure contracting receives consideration during logistics planning and becomes part of the OPORD or OPLAN.
z
Identify subordinate command’s requirements for HN support or contracting support.
z
Include an area database containing all available data concerning local resources from area studies, Foreign Service personnel, civilian agencies, and locally developed logistic support data. It should also contain a list of contracting and HN support agreements in the AO. A source of information on current global complex emergencies is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ relief internet site (http://www.reliefweb.int) that contains maps and current field reports from civilian agencies.
z
Address security performance measures and quality control aspects of contracting to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions.
6-26. The command should establish a multinational contracting office. This office, working with the multinational logistics procurement support board, coordinates contracting requirements for and assists in acquiring local logistic support. Highly trained contracting personnel, linguists and interpreters, and representatives from all the multinational forces staff the contracting office. If more than one contracting office is required, contracting officers will be assigned to provide support on an area basis. The contracting office should perform the following:
z
Provide coordination and cooperation among nations that maintain contractors performing parallel functions in the AO. This avoids competition for local services and obtains the best prices through consolidated requirements.
z
Coordinate with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.
z
Provide contracting representatives to subordinate logistics organizations.
ROLE SPECIALIZATION
6-27. Role specialization is where a nation or organization assumes the sole responsibility for procuring and providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of a multinational force. Normally performed at echelons above corps, role specialization may be executed at a lower level depending upon the size of the multinational force. Role specialization is normally used for a finite mission and time because of the great burden it places upon the nation or organization. First, unless reimbursement across national lines is agreed to before deployment of the force, the providing nation bears an unfair portion of the financial cost of the operation. Secondly, the nation or organization may use an inordinate amount of its own resources supporting others. This leads to internal supply shortfalls or delays in resupply and increases wear and tear on vehicles and personnel. Other multinational force members may then have to provide other support to the partner doing the role specialization.
6-28. If properly planned and negotiated, this approach promotes greater efficiency in cases where one multinational force member is already well established in the area and has contractual arrangements in place, has a unique relationship with the populace, or has a much greater capability than other nations. One example is Saudi Arabia’s role of supplying fuel to multinational members during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Another is the French role in supplying theater-level transportation and certain logistics commodities to members of the UN protection force in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
ORGANIZATION
6-29. The logistics organization should include specialists from all logistics functional areas. Some or all logistics responsibilities will follow single-nation channels so the logistics staff should have representatives from each multinational nation. Representatives should have sufficient expertise in logistics to interface with their national channels.
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6-30. The G-4 or S-4 should assign an officer or team to prepare the daily logistics status report for the command. One point of contact becomes the command expert for logistics status and issues. The capabilities of any civilian agency logistics organization should be incorporated into the logistics status report. The logistics status report should clearly identify what critical shortfalls exist and are anticipated, what actions are being taken to resolve the shortfalls, and if any assistance is required. A secure means of communications, such as a secure coalition email system, should be used as a means to receive and forward the logistics status report.
6-31. The multinational headquarters must establish effective logistics coordination and communications links with multinational forces and civilian agencies. Links to civilian agencies should be established in cooperation with the CMOC. Much of this coordination can be accomplished by establishing a logistics readiness center that can perform the following:
z
Monitor current and evolving multinational force logistics capabilities.
z
Coordinate logistic support and maintain total assets visibility.
z
Recommend the priority of logistics resources.
z
Determine logistics sustainment requirements for planning and execution.
z
Provide a central point for logistics-related boards, offices, and centers.
6-32. Additionally, the following positions in the logistics readiness center require personnel with multinational experience:
z
Supply and contracting officers with appropriate warrants.
z
Explosive ordnance disposal personnel for mines and other UXO.
z
Transportation officers.
z
Materiel support officers.
z
Customs officials.
z
Engineers or facility managers.
z
Bulk liquid specialists—water and POL.
BOARDS, OFFICES, AND CENTERS
6-33. While not all of the following organizations may be required, the logistics staff should evaluate the need for each to assist in coordinating logistics efforts:
z
Multinational petroleum office. This office coordinates POL planning and execution, as well as the supply of common bulk petroleum products.
z
Multinational civil-military engineering board. This board establishes policies, procedures, and priorities for civil-military construction and engineering requirements.
z
Multinational facilities utilization board. This board evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, inter-Service support, and construction in compliance with the multinational civil-military engineering board.
z
Multinational logistics procurement support board. This board coordinates contracting operations with national authorities and host nation for acquiring supplies and services.
z
Multinational materiel priorities and allocation board. This board modifies and recommends priorities for allocating materiel assets for multinational forces.
z
Multinational movement center. This center establishes the taskings and priorities for movement. It also coordinates the employment of all transportation assets in the AO, to include movement into and out of the airports and seaports of debarkation. This center is responsible for establishing priorities for troop contributing nations for the movement of their forces into the AO.
z
Multinational mortuary affairs office. This office plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs. It provides guidance to facilitate mortuary programs and maintain data.
z
Multinational deployment agency. This agency deconflicts the movement of forces into the AO
and creates the deployment plan.
z
Multinational contracting office. The responsibilities of this office are explained in detail in the contracting section.
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TRANSPORTATION
6-34. The G-4 or S-4 must understand the roles and functions and capabilities of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the multinational force. Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations. The multinational force must be able to track multinational assets into and within the AO. Logistics flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and continually updated during operations.
6-35. Commanders must integrate the strategic and theater movement requirements to prevent congestion at seaports and airports. Establishing in-theater hubs maximizes cargo throughput and improves theater distribution. Nations must provide movement data to the multinational force theater movement control system. This data provides information for the direct delivery or transloading of passengers and cargo. It can be used to deconflict strategic movements with other theater movements.
6-36. Civilian agencies, in an effort to help by shipping relief supplies, will likely cause transportation
“choke points” en route to and within the theater. A G-4 or S-4 link with the CMOC may help provide a solution to this type of circumstance.
6-37. The multinational force should designate a director of mobility forces. The director is normally a senior officer familiar with the AO with an extensive background in airlift operations. The director serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues in the AO and for other duties as directed.
WASTE AND DISPOSAL PLANS
6-38. Inadequate waste disposal plans cause conflicts with public and international law and increase costs.
Waste and disposal must be addressed in the OPLAN or OPORD from initial planning to redeployment.
When cost becomes paramount during redeployment, waste and disposal are particularly important. These commodities may require disposal:
z
Usable property and scrap.
z
Munitions list and strategic list items.
z
Captured and confiscated weapons.
z
Hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.
z
Rations and food.
z
Ammunition, explosives, and dangerous articles.
z
Radioactive materiel.
z
Medical waste.
z
Classified items.
z
Drugs, biological substances, and controlled substances.
UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
6-39. The UN logistics system requires member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level, normally for 60
to 120 days. This allows the UN to organize a logistics structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and local memorandums of understanding and letters of assist to provide support for the multinational. Once established, the UN logistics structure provides continuing support through a system of lead nations, civilian contracts, a UN force logistic support group, or a combination of the above.
6-40. A UN survey and assessment team will evaluate operational requirements and develop planning data for sustainment. When participating in UN missions, the command should send a logistics representative with the UN survey team if possible. The multinational force should coordinate with UN forces to improve the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts.
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LEAD-NATION CONCEPT
6-41. A lead nation is a nation assigned to provide the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement. The lead nation would assume responsibility for providing an agreed upon list of logistic support for itself and other troop-contributing nations. Supported nations then rely on the lead nation for the agreed level of support. National contingents must have representatives within the lead nation’s logistics organization.
FORCE LOGISTIC SUPPORT CONCEPT
6-42. In most cases, the UN will ask a member state, or states, to form a force logistic support group. The group incorporates logistics units from participating nations. A state accepting the group role will be responsible, along with the chief logistics officer at the force headquarters, for establishing local contracts to support the force. Even with a force logistic support group, member states remain responsible for unique national elements of resupply—such as repair parts, clothing, food, and major end item replacements—
unless an agreement is established between nations to provide this support. This would be on a reimbursable basis under either a wet or dry lease arrangement agreed before deployment between the UN
and the contributing nation’s government.
CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR CONCEPT
6-43. The UN will attempt to economize the logistic support by using civilian contractors. The goal is to achieve the most economical logistics organization that both meets the demands of the force and releases military manpower for redeployment. Force headquarters will coordinate the process. UN contracting does not fall under the logistics division but rather the purchasing and transport services division. The UN
procurement process can be bureaucratic and slow. It is decentralized, with each agency using its own procedures. The interagency procurement services office of the UN development program is slated to create a standard procurement system.
6-44. The UN chief administrative officer does not work for the force commander, but reports to the special representative of the secretary general. The civilian logistics infrastructure, to include the budget officer, reports to the chief administrative officer. Logistics problems will not be resolved unless the chief administrative officer is involved in the process. Maximum liaison between military and civilian counterparts is required to allow synchronization of effort.
6-45. The UN normally coordinates such logistics areas as bulk supplies and services. National standards such as consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels may exceed UN standards. Sophisticated multinational military equipment may require different standards of support than what the UN has agreed to provide or fund. UN standards must be clearly understood concerning level and quality of support provided and funded. Logistic support that significantly extends beyond what is outlined in the UN
agreement may not be reimbursable. The multinational force must be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient.
MOVEMENT
6-46. Movement is critical to multinational force operations. A multinational force headquarters, or its supporting combatant command, normally plans and executes all intertheater movement. However, it remains a national responsibility to move forces into the operating area. The multinational force headquarters is responsible for coordinating these deployments to support the commander’s plan and then for planning and controlling intratheater movement through the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process.
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INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE
6-47. The decision on use of an ISB outside the operating area requires a conscious decision to balance numerous requirements, including greater lift requirements against better efficiency. Multinational forces should assemble and stage in an ISB, especially if combat is imminent. The ISB provides a secure area to assemble, train, equip, and bond the coalition or alliance force into a cohesive one. It is better to solve problems and correct deficiencies in a nonhostile environment. The multinational force headquarters staff should assemble first and work together, followed by the rest of the multinational force. The ISB should have sufficient billeting and training capacity to support the entire multinational force at once. Access to airports and seaports for smooth reception of the force and its subsequent deployment is critical. If the multinational operation is a lesser regional contingency or a second major regional contingency, an ISB
may not be possible.
6-48. Planners should anticipate disruptions from many factors, ranging from weather to political decisions. This will alter the planned flow of personnel, forces, and equipment. The Army Service component commander, or a supporting combatant command, operates the ISB and deploys fully ready forces into the operating area. When the lodgment is well established, the ISB may shift into the operating area if it will not drain additional resources. Larger areas, such as Europe or Korea, allow for a reception center or ISB in theater from the beginning. In the Korean War, UN forces operated the UN reception center where incoming contingents were equipped, trained, and linked up with U.S. liaison elements.
THEATER RECEPTION
6-49. At ports of debarkation, units work with HN contracted, HN support, and multiservice personnel to secure the port, discharge equipment, process equipment and personnel, and move units to marshaling areas. HN forces can perform and assist in many of these functions. The multinational force headquarters may assign a troop-contributing nation to oversee and assist the host nation in performing these functions.
If no HN support forces are available, national units must perform those functions. All units must be planned for in the strategic flow and some, because of their limited capability, may be assigned a certain function.
THEATER STAGING
6-50. Staging is that part of the RSOI operation in which several key activities take place in controlled areas in the ongoing incremental buildup of combat power. During this phase the following is accomplished:
z
Units are reassembled and united with their equipment and scheduled for movement toward the tactical assembly area.
z
Materiel is segregated, prioritized, and prepared for transport.
z
Class V supplies are uploaded.
z
Life support is provided to personnel.
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THEATER ONWARD MOVEMENT
6-51. This phase begins when units are configured to move to their final destination. Such movement is accomplished through a carefully devised movement program that employs convoy, rail, and HN contract assets (such as heavy equipment transporters and other trucks) to ensure the forward and concurrent movement of troops and supplies. Centralized control of transportation assets is required. Real estate management may be a problem unless a multinational counterpart to the U.S. joint force utilization board (usually controlled by engineers) is given authority to allocate terrain to all forces and agencies.
6-52. Movement planning must account for differences in how nations conduct road marches or similar administrative movements. These differences can lead to confusion and disorganization. For example, one multinational force contingent may consider any movement made by a tactical unit to be a tactical movement. Terminology must be coordinated through the movement control center to avoid confusion.
6-53. When planning the movement of a multinational force, planners must know the details of the organization, equipment, capabilities, and limitations of the forces. Planners must know how to efficiently request intratheater movement of multinational operational forces consistent with the operational commander’s OPLAN. The movement should complement sequencing of operations and time-phased force deployment. Movement planners should consider all assets (joint, allied, host nation, and third country) and modes (air, land, or sea) of transport. During execution of these movements, movement control personnel must locate where they can validate actual movements.
THEATER INTEGRATION
6-54. This phase covers both the effective management of RSOI movement of units, as well as, the TOA of units to the tactical commander.
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CHECKLIST
Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the logistics portion of the operation.
SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES
6-55. What areas will come under multinational control? What areas will remain national issues?
6-56. What logistic support is available?
6-57. Does the unit have sufficient assets (such as maintenance, communications, transportation) to conduct its movement and/or mission? Will it require support?
6-58. What are the unique logistics capabilities of each nation of the multinational force? Understanding these capabilities is essential to effective and efficient logistics planning and support.
6-59. What mortuary affairs capabilities does the command have?
6-60. What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistic support?
6-61. Do national legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support among multinational nations?
6-62. Are mutual logistic support agreements in accordance with existing legal authorities?
6-63. What is the system for property accountability?
6-64. What are the special clothing and equipment requirements that may require a long lead-time to obtain? (For example, nonmilitary supplies or riot control gear.)
6-65. What are the procedures for providing support such as transportation, housing, and meals to diplomats and distinguished visitors? What coordination is there with the joint visitor’s bureau on this?
6-66. What is the system for preventing fraud, waste, and abuse?
6-67. How does the command assess logistics requests, requirements, and actions to ensure