8-39. Are countersurveillance measures included in formation SOPs?
8-40. What nonlethal technology is available? How is the force trained to use it? Do the ROE authorize its employment?
8-41. What controls exist on using personal equipment?
8-42. What units are available to the command and when are they available?
8-43. What are the multinational airspace control measures?
8-44. What training is required once deployed?
8-45. Has a PSYOP program been developed to support the operation?
8-46. Have PSYOP assets been requested?
8-47. What multinational space control assets are available?
8-48. Has a computer network operations plan been developed to support the operation?
8-49. Have computer network operations assets been requested?
8-50. Has a vulnerability assessment been made of friendly high value facilities?
8-51. Has a multinational operation protection coordination center been established?
8-52. Are there sufficient military police or similar forces available for area and route security in the AO?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
8-7
Chapter 8
GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE FORCE PLANNING
The Army air defense artillery is to protect the force from enemy interference from the air. This checklist assumes that the multinational air force has not neutralized a credible air threat.
8-53. Stability operations and PSO may not have a credible air threat. If that is the case, is there a real need for ground-based air defense?
8-54. Which ground-based air defense package does the warfighting, low to high intensity conflict, require?
8-55. What is the multinational force structure?
8-56. What maritime and air assets will support the multinational force?
8-57. What is the desired ground-based air defense orbit for early entry forces?
8-58. What is the desired order of arrival of ground-based air defense assets?
8-59. What is the commander’s intent?
8-60. What is the multinational command structure for ground-based air defense?
8-61. What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aircraft system use?
8-62. Is there a requirement for a multinational airspace management cell at division or force level?
8-63. What will be the command relationships for ground-based air defense assets in OPCON versus TACON situations?
8-64. What national sensitivities exist concerning the use of national ground-based air defense assets?
8-65. What international procedures will apply during the operations—for example, NATO or ABCA?
8-66. What national ground-based air defense command arrangements are required to support the multinational command structure?
8-67. What are the national requirements for LNOs?
8-68. Will there be a multinational ground-based air defense C2 system? If not, how will national systems such as forward area AD; command, control, communications, and intelligence; and AD communications and information systems be integrated?
8-69. What multinational bearer communication system will be used? (Examples include mobile subscriber equipment.)
8-70. Will the low-level air picture interface be used?
8-71. What are the multinational real estate procedures for ground-based air defense assets?
8-72. What battlefield coordination detachment requirements are available to coordinate land component commander requirements in the air operations center?
Intelligence
8-73. Has a multinational IPB, including air IPB, and estimate process been conducted? What factors were deduced by the multinational force headquarters?
8-74. Is there a multinational G-3 geospatial database to assist in defining likely air avenues of approach and, consequently, the ground-based air defense deployment plan?
8-75. What multinational force assets will need protection—seaport of disembarkation, aerial port of disembarkation, LOCs, force logistics areas, force concentration area, forward battle area, or a combination of these?
8-8
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Protection
AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM
8-76. Will the joint force air component commander concept be employed by the multinational force? If so, who is the multinational air component commander and where is he or she located?
8-77. Will the multinational air component commander produce the airspace control plan, the airspace coordination order, and the air tasking order and act as the airspace control authority for the operation? If not, who will?
8-78. What interface will there be with the HN civil aviation authority prior to the commencement of hostilities?
8-79. Where will the combined air operations center for the force be located?
8-80. Will the airspace control system aim for positive control or will national ground-based air defense C2 limitations force it back to procedural control?
SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
8-81. What type of recognized air picture and local air picture system is available?
8-82. Will there be a recognized air picture?
8-83. How will maritime, land, air, and space units contribute to it?
8-84. What tactical data link system will be used?
8-85. Who will be the identification authority for the recognized air picture (multinational air operations center or sector operations center)?
8-86. Who will be the identification authority for situational understanding?
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
8-87. What will be the multinational ROE before hostilities and after committing the first hostile act?
8-88. Will the policy on pre-emptive air strikes be contained within the multinational ROE?
8-89. Who will define weapon control statuses such as weapons free, weapons tight, and weapons hold?
8-90. What mechanism will exist to update ROE during the operation?
IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE
8-91. What identification, friend or foe systems will be used?
8-92. What identification, friend or foe types are fitted to ground-based air defense systems?
ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES
8-93. What electronic countermeasure policy will be put in place by the force J6?
8-94. Does the electronic countermeasure policy minimize potential suppression of enemy air defenses against the force ground-based air defense assets?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
8-9
Chapter 8
LOGISTICS
8-95. What major equipment will multinational partners bring to theater?
8-96. What is the logistics structure?
8-97. What arrangements will be in place for multinational resupply of common ammunition?
8-98. What is the multinational policy on the scale of war reserve ground-based air defense systems, by equipment type?
8-99. What will be the in-theater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?
TRAINING
8-100. Where will training take place—at home, en route to operation, or in concentration area? When will training take place?
8-101. Will in-theater ranges be available?
8-102. What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems in-theater?
8-103. What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?
8-104. What collective training will take place?
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS
8-105. What types of explosive hazards have been used in the AO?
8-106. Are there existing mine field maps and/or assessments of the types of mines and patterns used?
8-107. What types of cluster munitions were used and what are their locations?
8-108. What types of booby traps/IEDs have been, or are anticipated to be, used in the AO?
8-109. Is there an ongoing humanitarian demining program in the AO?
8-110. What explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and engineer assets are available in the AO to respond to these threats?
8-10
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Chapter 9
Civil Affairs Operations
As with many areas discussed in this manual, civil affairs operations (CAO), civil-
military operations, or CIMIC does not have a single doctrinal focus that all the
nations share. ( CIMIC is the more commonly used term in the multinational
community.) For example, some nations see CAO as supporting the commander’s
mission. Others believe that CIMIC has a wider scope in that it supports the
commander’s mission as it helps the military troops play their part in a wider
response to a crisis. For those latter nations, CAO funding may come from other
government departments rather than from their defense establishment. Therefore,
CAO for those nations does not support the military mission alone.
The concept of CAO was developed to allow the commander to interface effectively
with all parts of the civilian environment within the joint operations area (JOA).
CAO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions
normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. They may
also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.
It is a function of operations conducted by staffs that are fully integrated into
headquarters at every level. CIMIC activity begins at the highest political levels,
becomes integrated into the campaign plan, and should remain coherent throughout
all operational levels. CIMIC, therefore, contributes to achieving the overall political mission as well as the commander’s mission.
The campaign plan, as agreed by all multinational partners, will–
• Direct the commander on the legal obligations to the civilian sector.
• Prioritize the major tasks.
• Provide the necessary funding.
• Ensure consistency across zones of national responsibility within the JOA.
• Outline the relationships with the strategic decisionmakers.
Commanders should consider the CAO dimension of the operation early in the
planning process.
This chapter aims to provide commanders and staffs with an overview of various
terminology, general principles for using CAO, the key military and civilian players, and assistance in the overall planning and support of CAO. It focuses on the military role while acknowledging a greater overall role for these types of operations.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
9-1
Chapter 9
PURPOSE
9-1. The purpose of CAO is to–
z
Minimize civilian interference with military operations.
z
Maximize support for operations.
z
Meet the commander’s legal responsibilities and moral obligations to civilian populations within the commander’s area of control.
9-2. When possible, a second purpose is to reduce military interference with the civilian populace. This helps to create civil-military conditions that maximize advantages for commanders in accomplishing their missions. The long-term purpose of CAO is to achieve mission success and then create and sustain the conditions to support a lasting solution to a crisis. CAO is the interface between military and civil authorities, agencies, and populations. It must be considered integral to any military operation.
DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
9-3. Many multinational armies have adopted different terminology as this area has developed. The U.S.
Army uses CAO while NATO and ABCA use CIMIC. See the Glossary for all definitions. The following explains the relationship between U.S. and NATO terminology–
z
The U.S. term civil affairs is most closely related to the NATO term CIMIC groups.
z
The U.S. term civil affairs operations refers to the actions of CA personnel. It is related to the NATO term CIMIC.
z
The U.S. term CMOC is most closely related to the NATO term CIMIC center.
COOPERATION
9-4. Fundamental to successful multinational CAO is the establishment and maintenance of sound working relationships with organizations operating within the civil sector. These relationships range from high-level interorganizational to less formal relations that stem from ongoing working interactions. These relationships will form the bedrock on which effective cooperation can occur.
9-5. It will be neither practicable nor necessary to have the same degree of cooperation with all civil agencies. Many mechanisms and activities will underpin this process. These may include general liaison, regular meetings, and standing for an agency collaboratively staffed by both civil and military representatives.
9-6. These mechanisms and activities will facilitate various levels of cooperation ranging from basic information sharing to integrated planning.
FUNCTIONS
9-7. The headquarters CAO staff should carry out the following core functions–
z
Civil-military liaison.
z
Support to the civil environment.
z
Support to the force.
CIVIL-MILITARY LIAISON
9-8. This liaison provides the coordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of operations. Such liaison early in the planning process and immediately following the deployment of forces provides the basis for the other two core CAO functions.
9-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Civil Affairs Operations
SUPPORT TO THE CIVIL ENVIRONMENT
9-9. Support to the civil environment can involve a wide range of military resources: information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise, or training. Decisions on depth, duration, and extent of this support should be made at the highest appropriate level. Decisions must take into account political as well as military and civil factors. Nations will likely have different national agendas as to their extent, type, and purpose of support to the civil environment. The coalition commander will need to understand these positions.
SUPPORT TO THE FORCE
9-10. Commanders, depending on the circumstances at the time, may require significant civilian support within the JOA. They also may require coordination of efforts to minimize disruption to military operations such as population and resources control operations. The force may be partially dependent on civilian resources and information from civilian sources. Commanders will also seek as much tacit civilian support for operations as possible.
GUIDELINES
9-11. CAO implies neither military control of civilian organizations or agencies nor the reverse. It recognizes that–
z
The military normally will only be responsible for security related tasks and limited logistics, communication, or other support. It may be possible to support the appropriate civil authority for implementing civil tasks. However, this is possible only if the mandated civil authorities if applicable, and the appropriate military commander have agreed in accordance with the campaign plan.
z
In exceptional circumstances subject to political sanction by the governments of troop-contributing nations, the force may be required to take on tasks normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority. This may involve civil administration operations.
z
These tasks should only be accepted where the appropriate civil body is not present or is unable to carry out its mandate.
z
The military should be prepared to undertake such tasks necessary to maintain momentum towards a lasting solution to a crisis until the mandated civil authority or agency is prepared and able to assume them.
z
Responsibility for civil related tasks will be handed over to the appropriate civil authority, organization, or agency as soon as is practical. Responsibility will be handed over in as smooth a manner as possible.
PRINCIPLES
9-12. The following principles will assist multinational forces in conducting CAO:
z
Coordination.
z
Unity of effort.
z
Minimize the impact.
z
Impartiality.
z
Transparency.
z
Identification of common goals.
z
Primacy of the military mission.
z
Economy of effort.
z
Relationships.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
9-3
Chapter 9
COORDINATION
9-13. CAO is a key strand of the overall operational plan and not an activity apart. It requires close coordination with other military capabilities and actions. It facilitates creating interfaces with the civil environment necessary for the conduct of other functions such as HN support or engineering activities.
UNITY OF EFFORT
9-14. Unity of effort is essential to achieve effective CAO. Activities in theater should have central direction, be closely coordinated, and where necessary be deconflicted without prejudicing the needs of lower levels of command. Explicit policies and procedures must be established specifying what subordinate commanders are cleared to do and what must first be coordinated with higher headquarters.
MINIMIZE THE IMPACT
9-15. Commanders should strive to minimize the military impact on the civil environment and minimize the civil environment impact on military operations. The military often requires access to local civilian resources. In such circumstances, every effort should be made to avoid adversely impacting local populations, economies, or infrastructure.
9-16. The military should take on civil tasks only–
z
Where no other practical solution exists.
z
Where an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise.
z
Where it has the available resources.
9-17. Creating a “dependency culture” is likely to prejudice the successful achievement of the overall mission. Responsibility for civil related tasks should be handed back to the civil sector as quickly and as smoothly as possible. Likewise, every effort should be made to reduce the civil environment impact on military operations. An example of this includes the impact of dislocated civilians on the main routes for providing supply and relief aid. This will require careful planning.
IMPARTIALITY
9-18. Not only should strict impartiality be shown towards all sections of the local population when conducting CAO activities, but also every practical effort should be made to avoid compromising the neutrality of civil humanitarian agencies. This may often be difficult, but commanders and staffs must be sensitive to the issue and exercise their judgment.
TRANSPARENCY
9-19. Tension within a civil military relationship is detrimental to the overall goal. Transparency in all CAO activities is the best way to minimize potential tension.
IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON GOALS
9-20. To maximize the effectiveness of CAO, military and civilian organizations should try to identify and share common goals. Such goals should be established early in planning, incorporating political guidance.
PRIMACY OF THE MILITARY MISSION
9-21. Ideally, no conflict will exist between military objectives and those of most of the civilian organizations working in the JOA. Nonetheless, only the commander can decide how much to commit military resources to CAO tasks. Indeed, additional tasks should not be assumed without assessing the resources, in coordination with civilian agencies, and prioritizing military tasks.
9-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Civil Affairs Operations
ECONOMY OF EFFORT
9-22. Commanders should aim to minimize the use of military assets in civil tasks and encourage maximum use of civil resources. Equally commanders must avoid creating long-term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government, international organizations, or NGOs. Once provided, withdrawing or reducing resources may strain civil relations or retard the growth of civil-military relations. Also, withdrawing or reducing resources could cause lasting damage to public confidence in the military force.
RELATIONSHIPS
9-23. Commanders must establish close working relationships between the key decisionmakers, military and civilian, thus developing mutual respect and understanding. As the operation matures, commanders must recognize the impact made with the turnover of civilian and military staff.
LEGAL PARAMETERS
9-24. One of the key aspects of CAO is the role that it plays in winning the battle for moral authority and legitimacy. In this respect, legal parameters and frameworks that form the basis for CAO elements of the overall plan can be used to win the battle for moral authority. In addition there are significant legal issues that will have a bearing on various planning factors, particularly as concerns logistics. The overriding feature of CAO is that they are integral to meeting the obligations arising from the legal principle of command responsibility.
9-25. Legal parameters will vary according to the type of operation and its position in full spectrum operations. The domestic legal restrictions that apply to coalition partners will vary in the extent and nature of their involvement in CAO. Coalition partners may also interpret differently the international laws applicable to all the partners. It is critical that consultation be ongoing to illuminate these differences and, where possible, resolve or provide for them in operational planning. The legal staffs of coalition partners must be involved in developing CAO plans and able to consult amongst themselves at the earliest opportunity.
KEY FACTORS
9-26. If an operation is taking place under a UN Security Council resolution, then the terms of the resolution are binding on all UN members. Where the terms of the resolution specifically or indirectly authorize CAO activity or initiatives, the resolution takes precedence over impediments that may have otherwise existed arising from the law of the affected nation in which operations are occurring. This will be the case particularly in Chapter VII (of the UN charter) operations where “all necessary means” are authorized to achieve such tasks as securing humanitarian relief activities or restoring peace and order.
9-27. An operation may be affected, to varying degrees, by HN laws such as those related to customs and contracting. Such issues should be flagged in the IPB process when developing the CAO plan. As part of dealing with the host nation or in dealing with states that are hosting forward operating bases, SOFAs may also clarify issues relating to logistics activity and jurisdiction. The terms of the SOFA may significantly impact CMOC planning and should be well known to CAO planners. SOFAs are also discussed in Chapter 3.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
9-5
Chapter 9
9-28. The logistics aspects of CAO could also be affected or assisted by ASCA existing among coalition partners. These agreements can materially facilitate standardization and streamlining of procurement and supply. Chapter 5 discusses logistics in detail.
9-29. Domestic law considerations for coalition partners can greatly affect the activities that a particular contingent or national personnel may undertake. For example, the National Foreign Assistance Act may contain certain provisions that govern national involvement in issues such as the raising and training of foreign police forces. These provisions may impact on the activities that coalition partners undertake and should be understood as early as possible before beginning an operation.
9-30. The most significant legal factor that may need to be considered in CAO is the possible application of international humanitarian law. The law of this class that has the most direct bearing on CAO is the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and related instruments. This body of law sets out in detail the rights and obligations which may be relied upon to authorize a wide spectrum of CAO which may be deemed important to mission success. CAO also needs to consider the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. In particular, Article 25 lays out a basic minimum standard of living.
ADMINISTRATION IN HOSTILE OR OCCUPIED TERRITORY
9-31. Alliances, coalition forces, or nations may be required to conduct civil administration activities across the range of military operations and particularly in the collapsed state context, acting on the authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the UN. The territory under administration is effectively under military control. The occupying force has rights and obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure public order and safety as well as the just and effective administration of and support to a hostile or occupied territory.
9-32. Within its capabilities and subject to the principle of military necessity arising from any ongoing combat or security operations, the occupying force must maintain an orderly administration and must have as its ultimate goal the handover to an effective civilian administration/government as soon as possible.
Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the multinational force commander must analyze military activities likely to increase tensions as well as those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to civil administration or government. This is especially important in multiethnic or multicultural environments where a chosen course of action will almost invariably be seen as partisan by one or more of the parties to a conflict.
9-33. Many d