13-3
Chapter 13
EMBARGOES/MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS
13-15. Maritime forces may be tasked to enforce internationally imposed sanctions. Effectively enforcing sanctions may require sophisticated coordinating military operations at sea with those in the air. This is especially true in areas of armed conflict or high tension, where the absence of commonly understood and accepted ROE can greatly increase the risks to enforcement units. Assigned tasks may include–
z
Stopping, inspecting, seizing, and diverting suspect ships and aircraft.
z
Establishing and enforcing a maritime exclusion zone for the maritime vessels of one or more parties to a conflict.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
13-16. Forces conduct NEO to move personnel from an area where deteriorating security conditions place lives at risk. This type of operation is similar to an amphibious raid, involving swift incursion, temporary occupation of an objective, and fast withdrawal after the mission is completed. During NEO, ROE usually limit the use of force to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Maritime forces may have an integral capability to accomplish NEO without assistance from other forces. If not, ships stationed at sea may provide lift capability and the close, secure staging areas for other forces. By evacuating directly from a secure site to ships outside territorial seas, a very low political profile can be maintained. The evacuation force commander must be prepared to deal with the political sensitivity of the situation that will be monitored, if not controlled, from the highest level.
OPERATIONS IN WARTIME
13-17. In wartime the activities of the maritime force are normally aimed at achieving sea control and projecting power ashore.
SEA CONTROL
13-18. Use of the sea requires a degree of control. Total sea control is rarely possible as long as an adversary continues to threaten forces in the area. Therefore, a degree of sea control is normally established within a designated area for a defined period of time. Sea control must provide security for forces, facilities, and sea LOCs. Large maritime forces using an area for their own purposes can usually achieve and maintain sufficient sea control. Smaller specialist forces and civilian shipping require sea control to be established by other forces or escorts. Sea denial is a subset of sea control. Sea denial is achieved when maritime forces prevent an opposing force from using the sea for its own purposes. Sea denial is normally exercised in a given area and for a limited time.
POWER PROJECTION
13-19. Conflicts at sea are rarely isolated from a land campaign or the pursuit of territorial objectives.
Even when the maritime component is operationally dominant, the ultimate outcome in the theater is likely to depend on success ashore. Maritime forces often must be prepared to operate in the littoral environment to project force ashore as part of joint operations involving naval, air, and land forces. Naval forces are normally the first forces into a crisis area and may comprise the enabling force that allows a joint force access to the region. Naval forces then contribute to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or indirect support of those land operations. It is important to note that a maritime commander responsible for sea control may find it necessary to plan and execute power projection actions—such as a maritime air attack of a littoral enemy air field—to achieve, maintain, or achieve and maintain sea control.
13-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Maritime Operations
CHECKLIST
Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the maritime portion of the operation.
13-20. Has liaison been established with the maritime headquarters?
13-21. Has a maritime component commander been named?
13-22. Has the staff identified the supported and supporting relationships with the maritime element?
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
13-5
This page intentionally left blank.
Chapter 14
Air Operations
Multinational air operations aim to gain and maintain sufficient control of the air for exploiting air power to achieve the multinational commander’s objectives or achieve
strategic goals through a multinational campaign. Unified action is essential for
effectively using air power. To achieve its greatest effects, air power must be
concentrated at a decisive point in time and space. To attain the strength of unified air action and to ensure that the capabilities of air power are used efficiently as the
overall situation demands, air operations are based on two principles. The first
principle is that unity of command facilitates effectively applying air power to meet the multinational objectives. This is normally achieved by designating a multinational air component commander. The second principle is that centralized control and
decentralized execution of air and space power provides theater-wide focus while
allowing operational flexibility to meet theater objectives.
MULTINATIONAL AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER
14-1. The multinational commander may designate a multinational air component commander to control the capabilities of air operations. The multinational commander establishes the authority and command relationships of the multinational air component commander and assigns responsibilities. These include the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of joint air operations based on the multinational commander’s concept of operations and air apportionment decision. These activities rely on the full representation and expertise of all elements of the multinational force contributing to the air operation plan.
At the tactical level of operations, the multinational air component commander’s authority typically includes exercising TACOM over assigned and attached forces and TACON over other military capabilities or forces made available for tasking.
14-2. The multinational commander may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate operations. The commander retains the option of controlling air operations directly using the multinational headquarters staff. The multinational commander will normally vest authority in a component commander to carry out the duties of the airspace control authority and air defense commander.
Because the multinational air component commander is responsible for air operations and airspace control measures and AD operations have an integrated relationship, the multinational air component commander would be the most likely choice for appointment as the air control authority and air defense commander.
Any division of these responsibilities would require detailed coordination for safe and effective air operations.
AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING AND TASKING
14-3. Air operations planning involves–
z
Identifying air objectives that contribute to the multinational campaign objectives.
z
Determining the air strategy to exploit multinational air assets to support the multinational objectives.
z
Identifying centers of gravity to satisfy the multinational force’s strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
14-1
Chapter 14
14-4. Air operations planning also involves developing the concept of operations that describes the best course of action and produces the air OPLAN. This plan articulates and communicates multinational air component commander’s strategy for achieving the multinational commander’s OPLAN.
14-5. The air tasking cycle is used to promote efficient and effective use of the available multinational air capabilities and assets. It begins with the multinational commander’s air apportionment process and culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions and sorties. The cycle provides a repetitive process for the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of air missions and sorties while following the multinational commander’s guidance. The cycle accommodates changes in the operational situation or to the commander’s guidance. It also accommodates late notice requests for support from other commanders. The air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements to produce an air tasking order. A timely multinational air tasking order is critical. Other commanders conduct planning and operations based on the content and scheduling in the air tasking order and depend on its accuracy.
AIRSPACE CONTROL
14-6. Airspace control primarily complements and supports the multinational commander’s campaign plan without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of any multinational forces. Each commander must be able to use the airspace with maximum freedom consistent with the degree of operational risk directed by the multinational commander. Airspace control procedures are designed to–
z
Prevent mutual interference.
z
Facilitate AD identification.
z
Accommodate and expedite the safe flow of all air traffic.
z
Enhance combat effectiveness in support of the multinational objectives.
z
Prevent fratricide.
14-7. When designated by the multinational commander, the air control authority must–
z
Establish an airspace control system.
z
Prepare the airspace control plan.
z
Promulgate the relevant airspace control orders.
z
Implement airspace control means.
z
Harmonize regional airspace control plans.
14-8. Rapidly distributing the airspace control orders and their updates to all commanders within the force in the area of responsibility is a crucial factor in the operation of an airspace control system. The airspace control authority is supported by the airspace coordination center where all component commanders with air assets are represented. All component commanders must comply with the airspace control plan.
However, the multinational commander provides procedures to adjudicate differences that the airspace control authority and the component commanders cannot resolve. Centralized direction by the airspace control authority does not imply that it assumes OPCON or TACON over any air assets.
14-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Air Operations
AIR DEFENSE
14-9. AD is an overall multinational force responsibility. Multinational AD integrates the capabilities of all component AD assets to protect and influence the operational environment associated with the multinational campaign plan. The air defense commander should plan and direct the multinational AD
assets that the component commanders will execute. The air defense commander–
z
Protects the force from hostile air activity.
z
Integrates and coordinates the force’s AD assets into a multinational AD plan (including the HN
AD systems).
z
Promulgates and employs common procedures for air battle management and the reduction of mutual interference.
z
Controls and coordinates all AD operations by the component commanders.
z
Coordinates with the air component authority to ensure that the airspace control plan best supports AD operations.
MISSILE DEFENSE
14-10. The U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) is the U.S. Army’s operational lead for Army theater air and missile defense. In wartime, the AAMDC deploys into the theater of operations in support of the ARFOR commander or, if designated, the joint force land component commander, and the joint force air component commander ensuring that Army theater air and missile defense operations are properly coordinated and integrated with those of joint and multinational forces.
14-11. Also, based on METT-TC and augmentation with Army and joint, interagency, and multinational personnel, the AAMDC has the capability to serve as an operational protection integrator for the ARFOR
or the joint force. In peacetime, the AAMDC ensures Army echelons above corps AD forces are properly trained and ready to support theater air and missile defense operations. The AAMDC plans and executes a variety of training activities, exercises, and simulations to ensure force readiness. It also coordinates with joint and multinational partners to develop procedures for combined theater air and missile defense operations, interoperability, and training. The AAMDC may also support homeland defense operations.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
14-3
Chapter 14
CHECKLIST
Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the air portion of the operation.
14-12. Has a multinational air component commander been designated by the multinational commander?
14-13. Has an airspace control authority been designated by the multinational commander?
14-14. Has an area air defense commander been designated by the multinational commander?
14-15. Has liaison been established between the multinational air operations center and the other appropriate headquarters?
14-16. What are the capabilities and limitations of multinational airpower? Have commanders and staffs been briefed?
14-17. Have planner’s considered all elements of airpower in the employment of multinational fires?
14-18. What is the desired AD organization for early entry forces?
14-19. Has the multinational air component commander published special instructions? Are they consistent with the ROE?
14-4
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Appendix A
Capabilities
PLANNING
A-1. Representatives of each nation must be present during planning. If a unit is given a mission it is incapable of performing, the plan will not work. National representatives can ensure that the taskings are appropriate to the force. If possible, national representatives should be available in each staff element.
They must thoroughly understand their nation’s capabilities and limitations.
A-2. Within the ABCA Armies program, ABCA Standard 1030 provides a format for providing specific details of each nation’s forces to guide planning decisions. Listed equipment is restricted to that which materially affects the organization’s combat power and equipment unique to the organization. Using the format in ABCA Standard 1030 presents an option for obtaining information. This document can be found on the ABCA Web site www.abca-armies.org/.
INTEGRATION
A-3. Each of the multinational member nations provides its own distinct units and capabilities to a multinational force. These capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. Orchestrating these capabilities into multinational operations depends on understanding the differences in organization, capabilities, and doctrine. The greater the number of nations involved, the greater these differences will be for the multinational force.
A-4. Understanding these differences can determine if multinational operations are a success or failure.
Units of the same type in one nation’s army may not perform the same functions as units in another army.
An engineer unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another may be limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions.
A-5. The commander of the multinational force must be able to integrate force capabilities to achieve the desired end state. Selecting the right mix is a challenge. The multinational staff must be proactive in understanding the capabilities and limitations of the nations in the multinational force.
A-6. Doctrine is another important issue. If a nation does not understand or train for a mission, it will probably fail. National forces will normally operate using their own doctrine internally, while externally their actions should conform to the overall direction of the multinational force. To make this work, however, multinational commanders must know the differences in the other nation’s doctrine. This can be accomplished with LNOs or by augmentees and/or supplemental staff officers. When U.S. forces are operating with NATO or ABCA countries as part of a multinational military command, they will follow the doctrine and procedures imbedded in U.S. field manuals from previously ratified STANAGs and ABCA standards.
A-7. Conventional multinational force capabilities should include the following assets and operations: z
AD.
z
Armor.
z
Aviation.
z
Engineer.
z
Field artillery.
z
Infantry.
z
Intelligence.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
A-1
Appendix A
z
Medical.
z
Military police.
z
CBRN defense.
z
Ordnance.
z
Personnel.
z
Quartermaster.
z
Signal.
z
Transportation.
z
Aviation.
A-8. The following are aviation information requirements needed prior to deployment: z
Determine the aviation assets, capabilities, and requirements of the multinational force.
z
Identify the aviation logistics capabilities of the multinational force.
z
Identify current and projected requirements for an air LOC.
z
Determine aviation support required from multinational forces.
z
Identify the intended base of operations.
z
Identify the personnel recovery plan in theater. (Rotary-wing units should be prepared to execute organic personnel recovery or depending on capabilities, theater-wide recovery.) z
Identify secure communications capabilities of the higher headquarters and supported units.
ENGINEERS
A-9. QSTAG 1175 covers engineer support capabilities, utilities requirements and other information required prior to deployment. This QSTAG is equally applicable to phases during operations with little modification. In addition to QSTAG 1175, specific information on obstacles; equipment capabilities; future engineer planning; engineer order of battle; and command, control, communications, and intelligence is required. The following engineer information is required prior to a deployment:
z
Identify terrain visualization requirements.
z
Determine types and capabilities of engineer units for the multinational and other services.
z
Determine the facility support requirements, such as latrines and base camp construction, from the multinational force and its supported units.
z
Determine the condition of and requirements for infrastructure in the civil-military operations such as roads, airfields, ports, and power generation facilities.
z
Identify the availability and type of engineer resources in the operating area.
z
Determine real estate support requirements.
z
Identify humanitarian and nation assistance engineering requirements.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
A-10. Special operations forces can be a very valuable asset to a multinational force. These forces possess unique capabilities that can compliment conventional capabilities. Selected special operations forces are regionally oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures found in the AO. They can assist with liaison to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces. When the use of special operations forces is considered, it is very important to understand their capabilities and properly apply those capabilities.
A-2
FM 3-16
20 May 2010
Capabilities
A-11. The multinational force commander may designate a joint special operations task force composed of forces from more than one service to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations in the AO. This commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite C2. The commander would exercise day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached Special Operations Forces and allocate forces against tasks in support of command. The command may define a special operations area for use by the special operations forces. The establishment of a joint special operations area may delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.
A-12. The commander must determine where in the organization certain Special Operations Forces best fit.
For example, as components, under the G-3 or S-3, or some other structure. The G-3 or S-3 normally integrates both CA operations and PSYOP developed by the respective staff officers into the operation order. Due to the political sensitivity of these areas, approval authority for these operations normally remains with multinational establishing authorities.
A-13. At the earliest opportunity, you must identify to the command’s higher headquarters the requirement for CAO and PSYOP units and staff augmentation. These units may require reserve component augmentation to be fully capable. This should be taken into consideration when requesting these assets because of the process and lead-time necessary to obtain them. CAO, PSYOP, and PA actions can dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy of peace operations. CAO should reinforce and be reinforced by PSYOP themes and actions. PSYOP themes and actions should be coordinated with PA office initiatives to avoid creating a dichotomy, whether real or perceived.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
A-3
This page intentionally left blank.
Appendix B
Threat Assessment
B-1. The threat assessment should consider the following:
z
The adversary’s military ISTAR assets and capabilities. Can it detect and locate friendly activities?
z
The adversary’s espionage and covert intelligence capability. Does it have operatives in the AO?
z
The adversary’s capability to conduct IO and C2 warfare activities, including those aimed at audiences or targets outside the AO.
z
The adversary’s early warning—including distant early warning—capability. Can it intercept, direction find, jam, or interfere with friendly transmissions? Does it possess distant early warning? Laser blinding weapons are currently available on the international market, and other weapon systems will probably be fielded in the near future.
z
The adversary’s WMD capability. This should consider political intent, industrial infrastructure, delivery systems, and warheads. It should also consider the potential impact of strikes in terms of degradation, casualties, loss of tempo, and their physical and psychological effect on allies and civil populace.
z
The adversary’s capability to conduct long range operations, particularly with its longer-range strike assets. Can its main forces interfere with the multinational’s sustaining operations? The adversary’s weapons, logistics, doctrine, training, intent, and performance in recent conflicts should be considered. Factors include air, surface-to-surface missiles, air-delivered forces, naval and marine assets, Special Operations Forces, operational level forward and raiding
detachments, and operational maneuver groups.
B-2. The threat assessment should also consider–
z
Adversary sympathizers, agents, and partisans in the AO. Will they conduct information gathering, espionage, guerrilla acts, or a combination of activities against us?
z
Terrorist, criminal, and insurgent organizations. What are their aims, capabilities, and methods?
z
In stability operations, the adversary’s antiair and antiarmor capability. Is additional protection (such as defensive aid suites) required? An antiair and antiarmor capability is assumed in warfighting.
z
The attitude of the civil population (by region if appropriate) to the force presence. Are they hostile, neutral, or favorably disposed towards us? Could the population’s perceptions be altered by friendly or adversary actions, including IO?
z
Sabotage, in the form of planned attacks by adversary special forces or other agents, or more spontaneous activities by locally employed civilians.
z
Subversion and hostile PSYOP. An adversary will usually attempt to subvert friendly forces, either individually, to gain leverage, or collectively for political and military advantage.
20 May 2010
FM 3-16
B-1
Appendix B
z
Likelihood of theft. This can be a significant problem in poorer countries.
z
Health risks. These include endemic and sexually transmitted diseases, climatic extremes, and environmental and pollution hazards that may include residual WMD contamination and the prevalence of illegal drugs.
z
Mines. The presence and location of vehicle and antipersonnel mines in the AO. Current and earlier conflicts must be considered.
z
Road conditions and local driving patterns. In Bosnia, road deaths outnumber those killed by military action.
z
Fire hazards. Weather and vegetation may create fire