MAINTENANCE SUPPORT
10-47. Maintenance entails keeping materiel in operating condition, returning it to service, or updating and upgrading its capability. It includes recovering and evacuating disabled equipment; replacing forward; performing preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS); increasing battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR); and determining potential maintenance resources in the urban area.
Rapid Recovery Essential
10-48. Disabled vehicles produce obstacles to movement during UO, blocking narrow thoroughfares and creating vulnerable targets for threat forces. This makes rapid recovery operations essential to avoid clogging limited LOCs and mounted avenues with vehicle evacuation operations. Hence, maintenance personnel should be proficient in hastily securing unit maintenance collection sites near the damaged equipment, ensuring route security to and from the disabled vehicle, and methods of egress under fire. The increased potential for the task organization of armored units into smaller attachments during UO (often platoon-sized or smaller) will strain limited recovery assets and increase the need for sections to be well trained and resourced (to include adequate tow-bars and chains) for self-recovery operations. Units must maintain centralized and responsive control over these potentially critical recovery assets and position them as far forward as the situation allows.
Replace Forward
10-49. One of the guiding maintenance principles is to replace forward and fix rear. Maintenance activities, with a forward focus on system replacement, task and use the distribution and evacuation channels to push components and end items to the sustainment level for repair. However, the urban environment may make distribution and evacuation difficult or even impossible. Repairing equipment as far forward as possible will often be vital to maintaining the tempo necessary to succeed in UO. When recovery is required, equipment is moved only as far back as the point where repairs can be made. When selecting a maintenance site, commanders consider:
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Security and force protection measures.
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Sufficient area around equipment for lift or recovery vehicles.
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Availability of existing maintenance facilities or garages.
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10-50. The unforgiving urban terrain will invariably increase damage to man-portable weapons and equipment, particularly electronic equipment
sensitive to jarring. More frequent jarring can also
translate into more frequent calibration
requirements. Although by definition man-
portable weapons and equipment are easier to
transport, evacuating these systems may prove as
difficult as evacuating vehicles and larger, heavier
equipment. Therefore, field support maintenance
support teams (MSTs) will frequently need to
repair equipment at (or as near as possible to) the
point where it was damaged. Equipment operators
are responsible to properly diagnose the fault or
damage. Such action ensures that the correct
repair parts and maintenance personnel are sent
forward to complete necessary repairs. In UO,
US Army Photo
particularly offensive and defensive operations,
units may need to replace rather than repair equipment. Subsequently, sustainment personnel may need to plan for increased replacement of what might normally be repairable equipment, as well as plan for increased repair parts for man-portable items.
Add-On Protection Increases Wear
10-51. To increase protection against small arms, mines, rocket-propelled grenades, and lightweight antiarmor weapons, units may need to attach additional armor and improvised wire-mesh screens and cages to both wheeled and tracked vehicles operating in an urban environment. (Units can also sandbag vehicles to achieve a degree of increased protection.) These modifications, however, increase wear on brakes, springs, suspension, and tires, all of which are already vulnerable to the increased amount of debris present in the urban environment. Over time, this wear will begin to increase failure rates in major assemblies, such as engines, transmissions, and transfers. To offset the increase in wear and, subsequently repair parts requirements, commanders conducting UO should consider emphasizing these aspects during daily operator PMCS and increasing the frequency of scheduled services.
Increased Battle Damage Assessment and Repair
10-52. In UO, operators, crews, MSTs, and recovery teams execute BDAR far more than in other environments. BDAR quickly restores minimum essential combat capabilities for a specific mission (normally of short duration) or allows the equipment to self-recover by expediently fixing or bypassing components. Commanders may need to authorize supervised battlefield cannibalization and controlled exchange when units lack critical parts or cannot bring them forward. Sustainment commanders should consider the use of BDAR kits, specifically designed for the systems they support. The use of these kits, though providing only temporary repair, will extend the availability of combat systems until full repair capability is accessible.
Potential Urban Maintenance Resources
10-53. Although urban areas can complicate maintenance, they may contribute to this sustainment function. Analyzing the urban area in the commander’s AO may reveal potential sources of parts, tools, equipment, and facilities, and the expertise necessary to fix equipment, repair components, and fabricate critical parts. Sites of potential value may include automotive repair shops, foundries, car dealerships, parts stores, junkyards, scrap-metal dealers, and machine shops. Urban areas may also serve as key sources for parts and facilities (and theater support contractor personnel) to repair automation and network communication equipment.
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Host Nation Repair Operations: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
During operations in Mosul, Iraq in the summer months of 2003, elements of the 2nd
Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) suffered from a
decline in combat power that outpaced the ability of the distribution-based
sustainment system to provide repair parts. As readiness across the BCT threatened
to degrade operational capability, sustainment personnel from the brigade’s forward
support battalion (FSB)—drawing on lessons learned from the 1990-1991 Gulf War—
scoured the local populace for repair parts, facilities, and expertise in an attempt to offset the losses suffered due to supply shortfalls.
Initially, local retailers provided limited repair parts and facilities to the FSB, but the effect was significant and readiness rates began to stabilize. As time passed,
however, the continued wear on equipment operating in the urban environment,
coupled with the harsh summer weather, began to take a toll on reparable
components and major assemblies. With limited availability in theater, and order-ship times as long as 60 days, requisitions would not be filled before the effect on combat fleet readiness reached a critical point.
Recognizing a trend that threatened the success of the BCT’s urban operations in
Mosul, the FSB established a contract maintenance facility in the brigade support
area, used its contingency contracting officer to hire a group of local mechanics
certified through General Motors, and opened the first host nation repair facility in Iraq. The group repaired major assemblies and reparable components and systems,
maintaining a failure rate consistent with major CONUS rebuild facilities. The effect was immediate: during the first four months of the program, a full two-thirds of the combat platforms repaired and returned to service operated with components or
assemblies rebuilt in the host nation facility.
Over time, the program was expanded to support other divisional units in northern
Iraq. This effort provided maneuver commanders with responsive maintenance
support and demonstrated the effect of sustainment flexibility and sustainability in urban operations. Furthermore, this action met the division commander’s intent of
infusing much-needed funds into the local economy while strengthening American-
Iraqi relations in the region.
TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT
10-54. Transportation supports the concept of the urban operation by moving and transferring units, Soldiers, equipment, and supplies. Transportation incorporates military, commercial, host-nation, and urban area capabilities to establish a flexible system that expands to meet the needs of the force.
Transportation includes movement control, terminal operations, and mode operations.
10-55. Urban areas are often critical to
transportation operations. These areas may serve
as a lodgment or support area for entry of Army
forces and sustainment supplies. The existing
transportation and distribution infrastructure may
be essential to reception, staging, and onward
movement. Theater support contracts, as well as
host-nation support agreements, may greatly
increase the ability of Army forces to use the
urban area’s facilities, which may include docks,
airfields, warehouses, and cargo handling
y Photo
equipment. Urban support may also include skilled
urban workers, such as longshoremen, truck
drivers, and MHE operators.
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Urban Terminals
10-56. In addition to serving as major seaports and aerial ports of debarkation, urban areas may provide additional terminals in the AO. Forces may use these terminals for further staging, loading, discharging, and transferring the handling between various inland transportation modes and carriers (motor, air, rail, and water). These urban terminals—with synchronized movement control—permit commanders to rapidly shift transportation modes and carriers. This increases flexibility and ensures the continued forward movement of equipment and supplies to support ongoing operations. Movement control, particularly in urban areas, relies heavily on support from military police in their maneuver and mobility support role. Without this support, urban LOCs may become congested, hinder movement and maneuver, and degrade force effectiveness (see FM 3-19.4). Urban commanders may need to establish multiple checkpoints, roadblocks, and traffic control points; restrict selected roads to military traffic; and reroute movement to unaffected road networks when civil support and refugee control operations compete for available routes. Again, military police operations are critical in this regard and will require continuous, close coordination with urban civilian police (if available).
Obstacles to Ground Transportation
10-57. Although urban areas can contribute to transportation operations, rubble and other damage can become obstacles to ground movement. Even in an undamaged urban environment, road and bridge weight restrictions, barriers and medians, steep embankments, large drainage systems, and other urban structures may limit transportation operations. Urban route maintenance, to include reinforcing bridges and constructing bypasses, may become a priority task for engineer units. Bypassed pockets of resistance and ambushes pose a constant threat along urban supply routes and routes in close proximity to urban areas.
Urban convoy and resupply operations will often require increased security in the form of continuous route security operations, regular (daily, if necessary) mine and improvised explosive device (IED) clearance operations, numerous observation posts, attack helicopter support, a larger, more mobile tactical combat force, and adequate communications capabilities among convoy vehicles and with supporting forces and higher headquarters. While the level of security and force protection may vary, convoy operations are never considered an “administrative” operation (see FM 4-01.45). Security needs may increase manpower requirements for sustaining operations and potentially reduce resources from decisive operations. Moving critical supplies may require heavily armed convoys and armored vehicles. Drivers must be well trained in convoy operations, rehearsed, and alert. They must recognize and avoid potential mines and IEDs (stationary and vehicle-borne) and be able to react rapidly to ambushes. Additionally, commanders may need to institute deception measures such as randomly closing and opening supply routes to confuse threat pattern analysis. As before, aerial resupply can alleviate problems due to ground obstacles, but the air defense threat and proximity of threat forces may preclude their routine use.
Population Effects
10-58. The ability of Army forces to use vital urban transportation facilities depends largely on the civilians and the threat. The civilian population can affect the transportation system if they do not support the goals of Army operations. Urban transportation systems—such as ports, railroads, and rivers—require many specialists to operate. Without these specialists, the system’s utility is degraded and may not function at all. In urban stability or civil support operations, Army forces will share the system with civilians and other agencies. Civilian authorities may refuse to allow Army forces to use any portions of an urban area’s transportation system. Negotiating for access to that system under these circumstances then becomes a command priority.
Threat Effects
10-59. The threat can significantly affect urban transportation systems. Many are composed of smaller subsystems. Each subsystem is vulnerable to attack, which in turn often shuts down the whole system. A large canal system, for example, may have entrance and exit facilities, the canal itself, a means to pull the vessel along such as a locomotive engine, and the civilians that run each of these subsystems. Both an attacker and defender understand the components of the particular transportation system. If important to 26 October 2006
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current or subsequent operations, defending forces then develop plans and allocate forces to protect these subsystems. Attacking forces, on the other hand, often avoid collateral damage to the system, while simultaneously preventing enemy destruction of the facilities.
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION
10-60. Force health protection (FHP) consists of all services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel in the Army and, as directed, for other services, agencies, and organizations. FHP conserves the force by—
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Preventing DNBIs and controlling combat stress.
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Clearing the urban area of casualties.
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Providing forward medical treatment and hospitalization and en route care during medical evacuation.
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Providing required veterinary, dental, and laboratory services.
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Ensuring that adequate Class VIII supplies, medical equipment, and blood are available.
10-61. FHP operations minimize the effects of wounds, injuries, disease, urban environmental hazards, and psychological stresses on unit effectiveness, readiness, and morale. Effective UO require acclimated Soldiers trained in specific urban tactics, techniques, and procedures. FHP helps maintain the health of urban forces, thereby conserving that trained manpower. Historically, urban combat operations have generated three- to six-times greater casualty rates than operations in any other type environment. (Greater enemy wounded and a need to provide care for them will also exacerbate this situation.) FHP operations that maintain the health and readiness of Army forces reduce the strain on the replacement and evacuation systems. Such care allows Soldiers to concentrate on the task at hand instead of the increased risks associated with UO.
10-62. As part of the overall LPT, commanders and medical planners must analyze and continuously assess the urban area. They must identify medical threats, required medical resources, and the quality and availability of medical facilities and resources (to include civilian medical personnel). This assessment prevents duplicated services and permits more effectively and efficiently organized medical resources.
10-63. FHP analysis also identifies available hospitals, clinics, medical treatment facilities, and medical supplies and equipment (including production facilities) in the urban area. It may also identify NGOs capable of providing medical services and supplies. (However, stringent federal regulations, standards of medical care, and a need for unavailable advanced technologies may limit their use by Army forces. But, this analysis will still be crucial in determining whether urban medical facilities can support civilian requirements.) FHP personnel keep abreast of the operational situation and its impact on FHP and the urban population. Peace operations, for example, may rapidly transition to high-intensity offensive and defensive operations requiring medical support able to handle potential mass casualty scenarios which may include civilians.
Care of Civilians
10-64. During combat operations, the military normally does not provide injured civilians with medical care, instead relying on civilian medical personnel to provide this service. However, based on METT-TC
and requirements under Geneva Conventions, commanders may need to recover, evacuate, and treat numerous civilians (particularly in urban civil support or stability operations) until local civilian medical personnel and facilities can be reconstituted and supplied. In urban civil support operations involving weapons of mass destruction, the primary focus of Army support may be FHP.
10-65. If commanders provide civilian medical support, they adhere to the UO fundamental of transitioning control and transferring responsibilities for medical care of civilians to another agency or into civilian hands as soon as is practical. In UO, commanders consider and address the medical treatment of civilians (enemy and friendly) early in the planning process. Any initial assessment or survey teams therefore contain medical representatives. Of significant concern, commanders may need to ensure that adequate supplies and equipment are on hand to treat the urban population’s children as combat health service support is normally focused on the treatment of adult Soldiers. Additionally, follow-on military 10-16
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care for civilians after treatment at a combat support hospital is often nonexistent or extremely limited to a case-by-case basis necessitating the quick restoration of civilian hospital capabilities. Finally, military health practitioners must also assess and consider cultural factors related to civilian medical treatment. (For example, male doctors may not be able to examine or treat indigenous women.) To alleviate confusion and preclude avoidable negative repercussions and unrealistic expectations, commanders may need to develop specific medical policies, directives, and standing operating procedures. These “medical rules of engagement” (ROE) ensure that subordinates know how much medical care they may provide to—
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The urban population.
z
Other host-nation and third-country civilians.
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Coalition and host-nation forces.
z
Contractor personnel.
10-66. Commanders should also consider that medical aid to the local urban population and other civilians can be a powerful influential tool. Properly planned and executed, its potential benefits for Army forces include enhanced security and intelligence collection created by increasing the willingness of civilians to interact with Soldiers. These effects cannot be left to happenstance. They should be a conscious part of the information operations campaign nested within the overall UO plan. Consideration must also be given, however, to mitigating the potential negative consequences involved in the inevitable reduction or curtailing of medical assistance by Army FHP personnel. As with any aspect of UO, providing care without considering the longer-term consequences could result in far greater disadvantages than benefits.
Disease and Nonbattle Injury
10-67. DNBI is a major medical threat during all operations and presents additional risk during UO.
Urban pollution hazards and potential exposure to TIM may increase the risk to soldier health. Some urban areas, particularly those in developing countries, are already large sources of communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, cholera, typhus, hepatitis, malaria, dengue, and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). Other factors that increase the number of disease vectors and the potential for the transmission of infectious diseases might include—
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Physical damage or deterioration of urban infrastructure—such as electricity, water, and sewage services.
z
Industries that use or produce hazardous materials.
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Increased habitats for rodents and other pests due to rubble, debris, and uncollected trash.
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Inability for the threat or local authorities to recover and dispose of human remains and animal carcasses.
z
Greater threat of animal diseases transmittable to humans due to larger numbers of animals wounded or injured by the effects of UO.
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Greater susceptibility of urban civilians to infectious diseases—increasing the potential of person-to-person disease transmission—due to declining public health capabilities and nutrition levels.
10-68. The density of the environment extends these urban medical risks to Army forces. Commanders should establish a medical epidemiological surveillance system early to assess the health of the force and promptly identify unusual or local occurrences that may signal preventive medicine problems or the influence of biological or chemical agents. These potential hazards, particularly the release of TIM, will influence the type of medical supplies needed by medical personnel and will also necessitate critical planning and preparation for potential mass casualties (civilian as well as military).
10-69. Adhering to the UO fundamental of preserving critical infrastructure will likely prevent surges in DNBI. Preventive medicine personnel must identify the diseases and recommend control and preventive measures. In urban areas, they may also conduct civilian health screening, health education, and immunization programs. Medical screening of military personnel, particularly multinational forces, may be required to prevent introducing new diseases (especially drug-resistant strains) into an urban area. A new disease may tax the medical system and introduce a new medical problem into an area already in crisis.
Lastly, field sanitation training (to include a general emphasis on hand washing; training in the use of 26 October 2006
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barrier protection such as latex gloves when rendering care to any person; and animal, rodent, and pest control), equipment, and supplies are part of overall preventive medicine measures and considerations.
Combat Stress
10-70. Stress occurs in every operation and type of environment; while limited stress levels are beneficial, too much is harmful. Controlled combat stress can invoke positive, adaptive reactions such as loyalty, selflessness, and heroism. On the other hand, uncontrolled combat stress can result in negative, harmful behavior and combat stress casualties. Such behaviors and casualties—battle fatigue, misconduct stress behaviors, and post-traumatic stress disorder—can interfere with the unit’s mission. Physical and mental factors leading to combat stress result from the environment and the deliberate enemy actions aimed at killing, wounding, or demoralizing Soldiers. However, many stressors are also generated from the Soldier’s own leaders and mission demands.
Combat Stress: Chechnya – 1994 to 1996
Russia’s 1994-1996 conflict with Chechnya, a republic in the southwestern part of the Russian Federation, produced an increased number of psychological trauma and
combat stress casualties. One medical survey found 72 percent of the soldiers
screened had some sort of psychological disorder symptoms. Of that, 46 percent
exhibited asthenic depression (a weak, apathetic, or retarded motor state). The other 26 percent exhibited psychotic reactions such as high states of anxiety, excitement, or aggressiveness and a deterioration of moral values or interpersonal relations. The statistics showed more troops experienced combat stress disorders than during their
1980s war in Afghanistan. One primary difference was that in Chechnya, Russian
forces conducted combat mostly in cities rather than in mountains, valleys, and other rural areas.
Combat always invokes fear in soldiers. However, poor training and planning,
uncertainty in their cause, and urban populations that resented their presence
exacerbated the psychological climate for the Russian forces in Chechnya. Acts of
subversion and terrorism by Chechen guerrillas kept the Russians in a constant, high state of readiness and anxiety; the soldiers viewed every civilian—young or old, male or female—as a potential enemy. This psychological pressure was not simply a by-product, but an objective of information operations and a prime reason for taking the fight into the close confines of Chechnya’s urban areas. Torture and mutilation of
prisoners; immediate execution of captured pilots; imitative electromagnetic
deception (Chechens mimicked Russian radio transmissions and directed Russian
close air support against their own forces); and propaganda to convince civilians that Russia’s actions had a religious bias against Muslims and Islam were conducted to
exert intense, unremitting psychological pressure on Russian forces—with great
success.
The characteristics of urban areas combined with Chechen insurgent activities and
information operations, civilians that did not welcome foreigners, and an unpopular
and poorly supported conflict with an open-ended mission reinforced the need for a
national will to strengthen and support the urban fight. These characteristics also
reinforce the need for clear objectives, proper leadership and training, and available medical assets able to properly diagnose and treat combat stress casualties.
10-71. During UO, compartmented urban combat leads to physical isolation while difficulties in transmitting radio signals lead to communications isolation; together, they create an overwhelming sense of loneliness. Snipers, mines, and IEDs combined with the closeness and high intensity of urban combat contribute to an unremitting fear of attack from any quarter that further increases stress casualties.
Additionally, seeing and perhaps accidentally inflicting casualties on civilians (especially women and children) increase battle fatigue. If civilians are hostile or a threat uses the population as cover and concealment, then the potential for misconduct stress behaviors often increases. Ur