z
The medical and logistic problems associated with operations in an urban area including constant threat interdiction against lines of communications and sustainment bases.
Developing Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operability
1-36. UO training extends from the individual Soldier to the joint level including the integration of conventional and special operations forces. Preparedness also includes enhancing interoperability in regards to urban multinational and interagency operations. Training, as well as campaign and contingency plan creation, should include significant and sustained participation by civilian agencies. Fruitful multinational and interagency relationships must be cultivated before the onset of operations, that is, before Soldiers and their coalition counterparts are making decisions—many with strategic implications and often when they are under fire. Joint, interagency, and multinational collaboration will help design effects, supporting actions, and measures of effectiveness necessary to ensure that military actions in urban environments complement the diplomatic, informational, and economic activities necessary to achieve strategic objectives.
Conducting Live, Virtual, and Constructive Training
1-37. Force preparedness mandates integrating the actual use of urban terrain, exercises at urban training sites, simulations, or any combination into tactical- and operational-level intra- and interservice training.
This type of multi-faceted training will help commanders develop a better understanding of the complexity of the urban environment and enable them to execute missions across full spectrum operations. Careful use of these facilities will also allow Army forces to fully integrate urban operations within self-development, institutional, and operational training.
Ensuring Every Soldier is an Urban Warrior
1-38. In a complex urban environment, every Soldier—regardless of branch or military occupational specialty—must be committed and prepared to close with and kill or capture threat forces in an urban environment. Every Soldier must also be prepared to effectively interact with the urban area’s noncombatant population and assist in his unit’s intelligence collection efforts. Each urban operation will 1-10
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The Urban Outlook
be unique and commanders—given an opportunity to surge and conduct mission-specific post-mobilization and in-theater training—will need to conduct an analysis of the tasks requiring emphasis or modification to fit the conditions of the operational environment. In UO, every soldier will likely be required to—
z
Perform advanced rifle marksmanship to include advanced firing positions, short-range marksmanship, and night firing techniques (unassisted and with the use of optics).
z
Operate their unit’s crew-served weapons.
z
Conduct urban reconnaissance and combat patrolling.
z
Enter and clear buildings and rooms as part of an urban attack or cordon and search operation.
z
Defend an urban area.
z
Act as a member of a combat convoy (including specific drivers training).
z
Control civil disturbances.
z
Navigate in an urban area.
1-39. While not all-inclusive and necessarily urban-specific, other critical individual and collective UO
tasks (often modified for the urban environment) might include—
z
Conduct troop-leading procedures.
z
React to contact, ambush, snipers, indirect fire, and improvised explosive devices.
z
Establish an observation point, personnel or vehicle checkpoint, or roadblock.
z
Secure a disabled vehicle or downed aircraft.
z
Call for indirect fire and close air support.
z
Create and employ explosive charges.
z
Handle detainees and enemy prisoners of war.
z
Treat and evacuate casualties.
z
Accurately report information.
z
Understand the society and culture specific to the area of operations.
z
Use basic commands and phrases in the region’s dominant language.
z
Conduct tactical questioning.
z
Interact with the media.
z
Conduct thorough after-action reviews.
1-40. Commanders must understand that all Soldiers will require urban-specific equipment to conduct many urban-specific tasks. Critically, commanders cannot expect supporting forces to fight alongside and support ground maneuver units in an urban environment without the appropriate equipment and training.
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Figure 1-2. UO and DOTMLPF
Continual Adaptation and Innovation
1-41. Realistic UO training (as well as the conduct of real world operations) has the added benefit of identifying operational requirements and resultant changes necessary in our doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) (see figure 1-2 and FM
100-11). While technology (materiel) and organizational changes are important, confident Soldiers (personnel) remain the decisive means for success. Technology and organizational changes will be a critical enabler to attain better understanding of the urban environment, enhance command and control on the noncontiguous battlefield, and achieve the agile, simultaneous, and precise effects required in UO. In the future, technology may lead to a radically new operational concept and approach to UO. Still, competent leaders and well-trained, disciplined, and adaptive Soldiers will remain the decisive means for the Army to succeed in this complex and multidimensional urban environment.
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Chapter 2
Understanding the Urban Environment
From a planning perspective, commanders view cities not just as a topographic feature but as dynamic entities that include hostile forces, local population, and infrastructure.
Planning for urban operations requires careful IPB, with particular emphasis on the three-dimensional nature of the topography and the intricate social structure of the population.
FM 3-0
Of all the environments in which to conduct operations, the urban environment
confronts Army commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found
elsewhere. Its distinct characteristics result from an intricate topography and high population density. The topography’s complexity stems from the man-made features
and supporting infrastructure superimposed on the natural terrain. Hundreds,
thousands, or millions of civilians may be near or intermingled with soldiers—
friendly and enemy. This second factor, and the human dimension it represents, is
potentially the most important and perplexing for commanders and their staffs to
understand and evaluate. To this end, this chapter provides information essential to understanding the urban environment and conducting an effective intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (see FM 2-01.3, FMI 2-91.4, and Appendix B).
Although urban areas possess general similarities, each environment is distinct and
will react to and affect the presence and operations of Army forces differently. A
tactical technique effective in one area may not be effective in another area due to physical differences, such as street patterns or the type of building construction. An Army policy popular with one urban group may cause resentment and hostility in
another due to diverse cultural differences. All difficulties potentially exist, and they increase the complexity for Army forces operating in urban areas. These difficulties range from conventional military forces to disease and starvation (see Chapter 3) to a pervasive media—often acutely present in intricate combinations. Thus, commanders
at all levels must make extraordinary efforts to assess and understand their particular urban environment to plan, prepare for, and execute effective urban operations (UO).
A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT
2-1. Urban areas vary depending on their history, the cultures of their inhabitants, their economic development, the local climate, available building materials, and many other factors. This variety exists not only among urban areas but also within any particular area. The ever-changing mix of natural and manmade features in urban areas present commanders with some of the most difficult terrain in which to conduct military operations.
2-2. Although urban areas possess similar characteristics, no two are identical. The sprawl of Los Angeles, for example, bears little physical resemblance to New Delhi. Societal characteristics most significantly affect each area’s uniqueness and complexity. While complex, information about the terrain, its potential effects on operations, and how it changes over time may be determined with some degree of certainty. However, the human dimension is much more difficult to understand and assess, particularly its 26 October 2006
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Chapter 2
effects on military operations. Like any environment, the side that can best understand and exploit the positive and mitigate the negative effects of the urban environment has the best chance of success.
2-3. Whether a large metropolis or a small village, each urban environment has identifiable components that constantly change and interact. This “system of systems” consists of the terrain, the society, and the infrastructure that links the two (see figure 2-1).
2-4. These systems are not separate and distinct categories, but rather overlapping and interdependent systems, acting dynamically with each other. Thoroughly analyzing these elements, along with the other factors of mission, enemy, weather, troops and support available, and time—
z
Contributes to the accuracy of the commanders’ situational understanding.
z
Potentially lessens the number and cost of close combat engagements.
z
Allows commanders to develop courses of action that apply appropriate resources against decisive points.
2-5. In stability operations and civil support operations, this understanding allows commanders to engage and dominate the decisive points critical to maintaining peace or restoring normalcy to the urban environment. Although each system is categorized into subordinate components or subsystems, commanders must often “step back” and visualize each system, the complex urban environment, and their area of operations (AO) as a unified whole. This “systems thinking” aids commanders in uncovering key relationships and intersections that can help reveal centers of gravity (COGs) and decisive points.
2-6. To comprehend the urban environment and its components to the fullest extent possible, commanders must carefully integrate and employ tactical reconnaissance forces, special operations forces (SOF)—to include psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units—and a myriad of other human intelligence (HUMINT) assets and regional, language, and
cultural experts. The societal aspects and integrating
infrastructure will challenge commanders’ assessment and
understanding. These aspects will also require greater
dependence on nonmilitary and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and host-nation agencies for their
information, knowledge, and expertise. This last
consideration requires commanders to develop effective
techniques and procedures for coordinating, interacting,
and, to the greatest extent possible, synchronizing
activities with these agencies.
Figure 2-1. Keys to understanding the
urban environment
URBAN TERRAIN
2-7. Although complex and difficult to penetrate with many intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, the terrain is the most recognizable aspect of an urban area. Truly understanding it, however, requires comprehending its multidimensional nature. The terrain consists of natural and man-made features, with man-made features dominating; an analysis considers both. Buildings, streets, and other infrastructure have varied patterns, forms, and sizes. The infinite ways in which these factors can intertwine make it difficult to describe a “typical” urban area. However, these various factors provide a framework for understanding the complex terrain in an urban area. Furthermore, man-made features significantly affect military systems and Soldiers, and thus tactics and operations. General effects on urban operations are discussed in this chapter. Specific effects on warfighting functions (see Chapters 4 and 10) and the spectrum of operations (see Chapters 7, 8, and 9) are interwoven throughout the manual.
MULTIDIMENSIONAL BATTLEFIELD
2-8. Urban areas present an extraordinary blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural relief, drainage, and vegetation. An urban area may appear dwarfed on 2-2
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Understanding the Urban Environment
a map by the surrounding countryside. In fact, the size and extent of the urban area of operations is many times that of a similarly sized portion of undeveloped natural terrain. A multi-storied building may take up the same surface area as a small field, but each story or floor contains approximately an equal area as the ground upon which it sits. In effect, a ten-story building can have eleven times more defensible area than
“bare” ground—ten floors and the roof. It is the sheer volume and density created by this urban geometry that makes UO resource intensive in time, manpower, and materiel.
2-9. Like natural disasters, UO can
radically alter the physical
characteristics of the urban terrain in
ways not experienced in other environments. They may cause (either
intentionally or not) uncontrollable fires
or the loss of electricity. A power
outage can cause flooding (especially in
subsurface areas) by shutting down
pumping stations. Entire buildings may
be destroyed, eliminating reference
points, leaving large piles of rubble,
altering fields of fire, and making
movement and transportation extremely
difficult. Additionally, buildings and
other urban structures, damaged but not
destroyed, can become (or remain)
effective obstacles and possible booby
US Army Photo
traps. Even without enemy exploitation,
their weakened construction and unstable structure increase the risk of injury to Soldiers and civilians moving within them. (Engineer expertise will often be needed to determine whether the buildings can support occupation by Army forces or civilians.) Yet, even the total collapse of a building may not eliminate its defenders. Of additional concern, the likely presence of toxic industrial material (TIM) can create additional obstacles and health hazards.
2-10. Commanders in other environments normally address the depth, breadth, and height of their AO in terms of two areas: airspace and surface. In an urban environment, they broaden their scope to include supersurface and subsurface areas (see figure 2-2) that voluminously extend the commanders area of operations. Although spatially separated, each area may be used as an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, line of communications (LOC), or engagement area.
2-11. Supersurface and subsurface areas magnify the complexity of the urban physical environment.
Commanders must consider activities that occur outside buildings and subterranean areas (the external space) as well as the activities happening unseen in buildings and subterranean systems (the internal space). This internal volume further challenges command, control, and intelligence collection activities and increases the combat power required to conduct UO. Commanders must develop methods and techniques to help themselves, their staffs, and their subordinate commanders and staffs to represent, visualize, and reference these multiple dimensions. Increasing the difficulty, such dimensions can change rapidly simply due to continued urban growth or, as described earlier, the effects of nature and UO themselves.
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Chapter 2
Figure 2-2. The multidimensional urban battlefield
Airspace
2-12. As in all other environments, aircraft and aerial munitions use the airspace as rapid avenues of approach in urbanized areas. Forces can use aviation assets for observation and reconnaissance, aerial attack, or high-speed insertion and extraction of Soldiers, supplies, and equipment. Some surface obstacles in an urban area, such as rubble, do not affect flight (though they may prevent the take-off and landing of aircraft). Buildings of varying height and the increased density of towers, signs, power lines, and other urban constructions, however, create obstacles to flight and the trajectory of many munitions (masking).
Similarly, these obstacles can restrict a pilot’s line of sight as well as physically limit low-altitude maneuverability in the urban airspace. Excellent cover and concealment afforded enemy gunners in an urban area increases aviation vulnerability to small arms and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), particularly when supporting ground forces. The potential for a high volume of air traffic (military and civilian) over and within urban airspace (including fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft systems) may become another significant hazard and necessitate increased airspace command and control measures.
Surface
2-13. Surface areas apply to exterior ground-level areas, such as parking lots, airfields, highways, streets, sidewalks, fields, and parks. They often provide primary avenues of approach and the means for rapid advance. However, buildings and other structures often canalize forces moving along them. As such, obstacles on urban surface areas usually have more effect than those in open terrain since bypass often requires entering and transiting buildings or radical changes to selected routes. Where urban areas border the ocean or sea, large lakes, and major rivers, the surface of these bodies of water may provide key friendly and threat avenues of approach or essential LOCs—a significant consideration for Army commanders. As such, amphibious, river-crossing, and river operations may be integral parts of the overall urban operation (see FM 3-05.212 and FM 3-90.12).
2-14. Larger open areas—such as stadiums, sports fields, school playgrounds, and parking lots—are often critical areas during urban operations. They can provide locations for displaced civilians, interrogation centers, and prisoner of war holding facilities. These areas also can afford suitable aircraft landing and pickup zones and artillery firing locations. They can provide logistic support areas and aerial resupply 2-4
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Understanding the Urban Environment
possibilities because they are often centrally located. Finally, large open areas (and immense or unusually shaped structures) within urban areas are often easier to see—especially from the air—and can serve as excellent target reference points from which to shift or control fires.
Supersurface
2-15. These areas include the internal floors or levels (intrasurface areas) and external roofs or tops of buildings, stadiums, towers, or other vertical structures. They can provide cover and concealment; limit or enhance observation and fields of fire; and restrict, canalize, or block movement. However, forces can move within and between supersurface areas creating additional, though normally secondary, avenues of approach. Rooftops may offer ideal locations for landing helicopters for small-scale air assaults and aerial resupply. First, however, engineers must analyze buildings for their structural integrity and obstacles. Such obstacles include electrical wires, antennas, and enemy-emplaced mines (although personnel may be inserted by jumping, rappelling, or fast roping from a hovering helicopter and extracted by hoist mechanisms). Some rooftops are designed as helipads. Roofs and other supersurface areas may also provide excellent locations for snipers; lightweight, handheld antitank weapons; MANPADS; and communications retransmission sites. They enable top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft. Overall, elevated firing positions reduce the value of any cover in surrounding open areas and permit engagement at close range with less risk of immediate close assault.
This area (and the subsurface area) requires commanders to think, plan, and execute ground operations vertically as well as horizontally. In this latter regard, UO share strong similarities with mountain operations (see FM 3-97.6).
Subsurface
2-16. Subsurface areas are below the surface level. They may serve as secondary and, in fewer instances, primary avenues of approach at lower tactical levels. When thoroughly reconnoitered and controlled, they offer excellent covered and concealed LOCs for moving supplies and evacuating casualties. They may also provide sites for caching and stockpiling supplies. Subsurface areas include subterranean areas such as subways, mines, tunnels, sewers, drainage systems, cellars, civil defense shelters, and other various underground utility systems. In older cities, they may include ancient hand-dug tunnels and catacombs.
Both attacker and defender can use subsurface areas to gain surprise and maneuver against the rear and flanks of a threat and to conduct ambushes. However, these areas are often the most restrictive and easiest to defend or block. Their effectiveness depends on superior knowledge of their existence and overall design. Army commanders may also need to consider potential avenues of approach afforded by the subsurface areas of rivers and major bodies of water that border urban areas. This particularly applies when operating as part of a joint task force (JTF) task organized with SOF or when opposing a threat with similar capabilities.
MAJOR URBAN PATTERNS
2-17. Four major urban patterns (satellite, network, linear, and segment) can influence UO (see figure 2-3).
Central to two of the patterns (satellite and network) is the hub or dominant urban area or pattern around which outlying urban areas or patterns radiate. (A segmented urban area, because it tends to be a larger urban area, can often be a hub.) In offensive and defensive operations, the hub serves as a pivot or strong point; as such, it can become a major obstacle to an attacker. If the attacker chooses to bypass the urban area (hub) located along his axis of advance without first isolating the area, he may expose his flank or LOC to attack from the hub as well as dependent urban areas or subordinate satellite patterns. Because the focus of stability and civil support operations is normally on people, commanders should understand the value and influence of the hub to the economic, political, or cultural well being of the surrounding area.
Generally the larger the hub, the greater influence it has on satellite urban areas and surrounding rural areas. Commanders must remember that urban areas are not islands; all are connected to the surrounding rural (and other urban) areas through fluid and permeable boundaries and LOCs.
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Chapter 2
Figure 2-3. Major urban patterns
Satellite Pattern
2-18. This common pattern consists of a central hub surrounded by smaller, dependent urban areas. LOCs tend to converge on the hub. Outlying areas often support the principal urban area at the hub with means of reinforcement, resupply, and evacuation. In some instances, they may serve as mutually supporting battle positions. Commanders should consider the effects of the outlying urban areas on operations within the hub, and, conversely, the effects of operations within the hub on outlying urban areas. Information operations (IO), for example, targeted primarily at key leaders and other civilians located within the hub of a satellite pattern may subsequently influence civilians in outlying urban areas and achieve necessary effects without having to commit specific resources to these outlying areas.
Network Pattern
2-19. The network pattern represents the interlocking of the primary hubs of subordinate satellite patterns.
Its elements are more self-sufficient and less supportive of each other, although a dominant hub may exist.
Major LOCs in a network extend more than in a satellite pattern and take more of a rectangular rather than a convergent form. Its natural terrain may vary more than in a single satellite array. Operations in one area may or may not easily influence, or be influenced by, other urban areas in the pattern.
Linear Pattern
2-20. Potentially a subelement of the previous two patterns, the linear pattern may form one ray of the satellite pattern or be found along connecting links between the hubs of a network. Most frequently, this pattern results from the stringing of minor urban ar