2-62. As depicted earlier in figure 2-1, each element of the infrastructure consists of both a physical (terrain) and human component. For example, the physical component of the electrical segment of the energy infrastructure consists of power stations, substations, a distribution network of lines and wires, and necessary vehicles and repair supplies and equipment. The human component of this same segment consists of the supervisors, engineers, linemen, electricians, and others who operate the system.
Commanders must understand and recognize the physical and human components in their assessments.
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON FUTURE OPERATIONS
2-63. Destroying or incapacitating of any of these elements may impact future operations and inhabitants of the urban area. Destroying urban infrastructure during initial phases of an operation may require commanders to assume responsibility for repair, maintenance and clean up, and operation of those same facilities later. Although exceptions will exist, commanders cannot destroy or significantly damage the infrastructure of a foreign urban center during operations and expect the population to remain friendly to U.S. or allied forces. On the other hand, early repair or restoration of critical or essential infrastructure may improve civil-military relations, speed transition back to competent civilian authorities, and, overall, aid in 26 October 2006
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successful mission accomplishment. Still, support from the urban society (albeit of increased importance in UO) is only one factor that commanders weigh while developing appropriate courses of action.
RESOURCE INTENSIVE
2-64. Requirements to protect, restore, or maintain critical infrastructure may divert substantial amounts of resources and manpower needed elsewhere and place additional constraints on subordinate commanders.
Civilian infrastructure is often more difficult to secure and defend than military infrastructure. The potentially large and sprawling nature of many systems (such as water, power, transportation, communications, and government), make their protection a challenge. Yet, the infrastructure of an urban area may provide commanders with essential logistics and support. Therefore, the initial expenditure of time and other resources may be necessary to support concurrent or future operations. Legal considerations, however, may affect using the infrastructure and acquiring the urban area’s goods and services.
Commanders, their staffs, and subordinates (often down to the individual soldier) must know their limits concerning Army authority to commandeer civilian supplies or equipment to facilitate mission accomplishment (see the legal support discussion in Chapter 9). In stability and civil support operations, the safeguard or restoration of critical urban infrastructure for military or civilian use may be a decisive point in the overall operation.
2-65. Keys to understanding the magnitude of the resources and manpower required to restore the infrastructure are an initial infrastructure assessment and, as soon as practical afterward, a detailed infrastructure survey. An initial assessment provides the commander immediate feedback concerning the status of basic services needed to meet the urgent needs of the urban population. The systems assessed are based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and the commander’s vision of the overall end state. The infrastructure assessment, while typically performed by engineers, may be accomplished by, or in conjunction with, others with sufficient expertise to provide the type and quality of information required. These others may include civil affairs, medical, and chemical personnel. Those tasked with this assessment should routinely consult other Army and coalition forces and governmental and nongovernmental agencies currently operating in the urban area as well as the urban civilian leadership for their informed input.
2-66. While an infrastructure assessment functions to support the resolution of immediate challenges to urban reconstruction and restoration, it also provides the initial basis for determining the conditions for successful transition. However, commanders and planners must continually expand and refine their understanding. As a necessary follow-on, commanders initiate a detailed infrastructure survey. This survey is normally conducted by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel assigned to forward engineer support teams. As with the assessment, the commander should incorporate other technical specialty personnel in the survey team to enhance the quality and accuracy of the product (see FM 3-34.250).
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
2-67. This system is comprised of the facilities and the formal and informal means to transmit information and data from place to place. Understanding communication and information infrastructure of an urban area is important because it ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and the enemy. It includes—
z
Telecommunications, such as telephone (to include wireless), telegraph, radio, television, and computer systems.
z
Police, fire, and rescue communications systems.
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Public address, loudspeaker, and emergency alert systems.
z
The postal system.
z
Newspapers, magazines, billboards and posters, banners, graffiti, and other forms of print media.
z
The informal human interaction that conveys information such as messengers, open-air speeches and protests, and everyday conversations.
z
Other inventive informal means such as burning tires and honking horns.
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2-68. Perhaps more than any other element of the infrastructure, communications and information link all the other elements in an interdependent “system of systems.” It is a critical enabler that helps coordinate, organize, and manage urban activities and influence and control the urban society. Army commanders are acutely aware of the impact that a loss or degradation in communications has on their own operations. The urban environment experiences similar impacts to communication failures; however, urban governments and administrations are generally less prepared to deal with a collapsed communications and information infrastructure than are trained Army forces.
2-69. Militarily, a functioning urban communications and information system can serve as an alternate for both friendly and threat forces and can be easily secured with civilian, off-the-shelf technologies. Threats may make use of commercial systems intertwined with legitimate civilian users, making it unpalatable to prevent use of these assets. Forces can also use these systems to influence public opinion, gain intelligence information, support deception efforts, or otherwise support IO.
Increasing Impact of Computers
2-70. In many urban areas, computers link other elements of the urban infrastructure. They link functions and systems in the urban area and connect the area to other parts of the world. This latter aspect creates important implications for commanders of a major operation. Operations involving this cybernetic function may produce undesirable effects on a greater scale than initially intended. For example, commanders may be able to close or obstruct an urban area’s banking system; however, this system may impact the international monetary exchange with unwanted or even unknown effects. The authority to conduct these types of IO will often be retained at the strategic level.
Pervasive Media
2-71. The media is central to the communications and information infrastructure and a critical operational concern. Compared to other operational environments (jungles, deserts, mountains, and cold weather areas), the media has more access to urban operations. This is due largely to airports, sea and river ports, and major road networks; ready access to power sources and telecommunications facilities; as well as access to existing local media structures. Hence, media presence may be pervasive and IO even more critical to success in UO than operations in many other environments.
A Complex Relationship
2-72. A complex relationship exists among information, the public, and policy formulation. Although the degree and manner in which public opinion shapes government policy are difficult to accurately determine, negative visual images of military operations presented by the media can change political objectives and, subsequently, military objectives. As important, media reporting can influence civilian activity in an urban AO to either the advantage or disadvantage of the commander.
Whoever coined the phrase ‘The Theatre of Operations’ was very prescient. We are conducting operations now as though we are on a stage, in an amphitheatre, or Roman arena; there are at least two producers and directors working in opposition to each other, the players, each with their own idea of the script, are more often than not mixed up with the stage hands, ticket collectors and ice cream vendors, while a factional audience, its attention focused on that part of the auditorium where it is noisiest, views and gains an understanding of events by peering down the drinking straws of their soft drink packs.
General Sir Rupert Smith
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Induce Cooperation Through Credibility
2-73. Commanders do not control the media; however, they monitor the flow of information that the news media receives and subsequently reports. Consequently, commanders should plan and execute PA operations that will induce cooperation between the media and Army forces. Successful relations between 26 October 2006
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urban Army forces and the news media evolve from regular interaction based on credibility and trust. More information is usually better than less, except when the release of such information may jeopardize security and the success of the operations and threaten the safety of Soldiers. However, commanders cannot simply withhold information to protect the command from embarrassment. They consider media interests as part of the normal planning process and work to ensure that information presented to the news media is accurate, timely, and consistent with operations security. Since the media will likely arrive in the urban area before the conduct of operations, early deployment of PA assets may be critical. Commanders should synchronize PA activities with CMO and PSYOP. Such action eliminates duplicated effort and ensures a unity of purpose consistent with the IO concept of support (see Chapter 4).
2-74. Failure to provide sufficient information can hamper a commander’s ability to conduct the mission.
Commanders cannot refuse to deal with particular news media because they consistently report a negative image of Army forces and operations. Poor relationships with any media can result in inaccurate and even biased reporting. Such reporting can cause a public reaction that influences the ability to achieve operational objectives. During the Russian 1994-95 battle against Chechen separatists in Grozny, for example, the Russian military refused to communicate with reporters. The media reported primarily from the perspective of the Chechen rebels. This encouraged both local and international support for the rebels.
It also allowed the Chechens, who lacked sophisticated information systems, to use the media to broadcast operational guidance to their forces. (During their second Chechnya campaign of 1999-2000, Russia learned this lesson well and the Russian view of the war dominated domestic public opinion.) On the other hand, successfully engaging the media can serve as a force multiplier. The Army’s open and responsive interaction with the media during peacekeeping operations in Bosnian urban areas helped to explain the challenges and successes of Army forces in the Balkans to the public. This helped maintain domestic, international, and local political support for NATO operations and, with a successful command information program, helped maintain Soldiers’ morale.
TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION
2-75. This element of the infrastructure consists of—
z
Networked highways and railways to include bridges, subways and tunnels, underpasses and overpasses, ferries, and fords.
z
Ports, harbors, and inland waterways.
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Airports, seaplane stations, and heliports.
z
Mass transit.
z
Cableways and tramways.
z
Transport companies and delivery services that facilitate the movement of supplies, equipment, and people.
Similar to communications and information, this facet provides the physical link to all other elements of the infrastructure.
2-76. Army forces deploying into a theater of operations depend on ports and airfields; seizure and protection of these critical transportation nodes may impact the projection of combat power. Once in theater, transportation and distribution systems in the urban area can contribute greatly to the movement of forces, maneuver, and logistic operations throughout the entire AO. Control of decisive points in this infrastructure may be important to the military operation and to the normal functioning of the urban area (and surrounding rural areas). Supplies traveling through the transportation and distribution system may be military-specific supplies (such as ammunition and repair parts) and supplies for both the military and urban population (such as food, medicine, oil, and gas). The system may also support the movement of military forces and the urban area’s population (for which it was designed). Therefore, commanders of a major operation may have to develop innovative methods that limit the transit of threat supplies and reinforcements while facilitating the movement of their own resources and those of civilians. This last consideration attempts to minimize hardship and promote normalcy in the urban area and will increase in significance as the need for legitimacy increases.
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2-77. Most urban areas (particularly in developing countries) have two forms of transportation and distribution systems that exist simultaneously: a formal system and an informal or paratransit system. Large organizations, bureaucracy, imported technology, scheduled services, and fixed fares or rates characterize formal systems. Low barriers to entry; family and individual entrepreneur organizations; adapted technology; flexible routes, destinations, and times of service; and negotiated prices characterize the informal system. The informal system is more decentralized and covers a much greater portion of the urban area than the formal system. The informal transportation and distribution system often includes a waterborne element, is more likely to function through turbulence and conflict, and can extend hundreds of kilometers beyond the urban area. Accordingly, commanders should understand both systems to establish effective movement control.
ENERGY
2-78. The energy system provides the power to run the urban area. It consists of the industries and facilities that produce, store, and distribute electricity, coal, oil, wood, and natural gas. This area also encompasses alternate energy sources, such as nuclear, solar, hydroelectric, and geothermal power. Energy is needed for industrial production and is therefore vital to economics and commerce. Among many other things, this system also provides the fuels to heat, cool, and light homes and hospitals, cook and preserve food, power communications, and run the transportation necessary to move people and their supplies throughout the urban area. Loss of an important energy source such as electricity or gasoline, especially for those accustomed to having it, will become an immense area of discontent that the commander of a major urban operation will need to quickly address. Therefore some threats, particularly terrorists and insurgents, may actively target this element of the urban area’s infrastructure to erode support for civilian authorities and Army forces.
2-79. Sources of energy may be tens or hundreds of miles away from the urban area itself. Therefore, commanders may exert control without applying combat power directly to the urban area itself by controlling or destroying the source (power generation or refinement plant) or the method of distribution (pipelines or power lines). With electrical energy that cannot be stored in any sizable amount, the latter may be the best means as most major urban areas receive this energy from more than one source in a network of power grids. However, control may be as simple as securing a power station or plant and turning off switches or removing a vital component that could later be restored. On the other hand, lengthy pipelines and power lines may compound security and protection of this element of the infrastructure.
2-80. The number of nations that have invested in nuclear power and nuclear research is increasing. With this increase, the potential for Army forces to operate in urban areas that include (or are near) these facilities also increases. Damage to one of these facilities and potential radiation hazards will present special challenges to commanders of a major operation. To safeguard friendly forces and civilians, commanders will need to employ a blend of peacetime and tactical nuclear contamination avoidance principles (see FM
3-11.14).
ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE
2-81. This system encompasses—
z
Business and financial centers to include stores, shops, restaurants, hotels, marketplaces, banks, trading centers, and business offices.
z
Recreational facilities such as amusement parks, golf courses, and stadiums.
z
Outlying industrial, mineral, and agricultural features to include strip malls, farms, food processing and storage centers, manufacturing plants, mines, and mills.
2-82. An essential aspect of this area during operations may be the political sensitivity of U.S. or allied industries investing and operating in a foreign country, particularly during stability operations. An enemy or a disgruntled civilian population may attack or disrupt commercial activities as a political statement against the United States or our allies. Food production facilities also may assist commanders in Army food services and may be an essential concern during relief operations. During long-term stability operations, 26 October 2006
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visible, material, and tangible economic progress consisting of the creation or restoration (and protection) of businesses, agriculture, and overall jobs will often be critical to—
z
Generating or maintaining the urban population’s support to Army forces and operations.
z
Reducing support to threat forces and operations to include eliminating civilians as a potential manpower pool for insurgent or terrorist organizations and activities.
z
Lowering other hostile civilian activities such as protests and riots.
z
Transitioning the urban area back to legitimate civilian responsibility and control.
2-83. This element of the infrastructure also consists of the production and storage of toxic industrial chemicals used in agriculture (insecticides, herbicides, and fertilizers), manufacturing, cleaning, and research (to include biological agents). Fertilizer plants may be of specific concern as they contribute to providing a key material in terrorist and insurgent bomb-making activities. A thorough analysis of this element of the infrastructure may also be essential to understanding how urban insurgencies are funded and supported. This helps commanders to understand the true organization of the insurgency as well as to suggest methods to isolate insurgents from their economic or financial support. In their overall assessment of this area of the infrastructure, commanders should also consider the activities and influence of criminal organizations or elements.
ADMINISTRATION AND HUMAN SERVICES
2-84. This wide-ranging system covers urban administrative organizations and service functions concerned with an urban area’s public governance, health, safety, and welfare. Together, it encompasses—
z
Governmental services that include embassies and diplomatic organizations.
z
Activities that manage vital records, such as birth certificates and deeds.
z
The judicial system.
z
Hospitals and other medical services and facilities.
z
Public housing and shelter.
z
Water supply systems.
z
Waste and hazardous material storage and processing facilities.
z
Emergency and first-responder services such as police, fire, and rescue.
z
Prisons.
z
Welfare and social service systems.
CULTURAL
2-85. This system encompasses many organizations and structures that provide the urban populace with its social identity and reflect its culture. (This infrastructure system overlaps with many recreational facilities included under the economics and commerce infrastructure. For example, an urban society may radically follow soccer matches and teams. Hence, soccer stadiums relate to the society’s cultural infrastructure.) Some of these facilities, particularly religious structures, will be protected targets and others may require security and law enforcement protection from looting and pilferage. However, commanders will need to quickly educate, inform, and continually remind the urban populace (and the media) that cultural infrastructure may lose its protected status when used by threats for military purposes. Cultural infrastructure may include—
z
Religious organizations, places of worship, and shrines.
z
Schools and universities.
z
Museums and archeological sites.
z
Historic monuments.
z
Libraries.
z
Theaters.
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RESTORING AND PROTECTING ESSENTIAL SERVICES
2-86. Losing the support of essential elements of the infrastructure will have an immediate, destabilizing, and life-threatening impact on the inhabitants of the urban area. In stability and civil support operations, numerous parts of the administrative and human services and energy infrastructure often rise to critical importance before all other elements. Again, however, complete restoration of these essential services is often a lengthy, resource-intensive civil-military operation. (Following the end of major combat operations of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, most units developed one or more of their logical lines of operations oriented along the restoration or improvement of urban infrastructure and essential services. An acronym used by many units to focus and track critical activities within this line of operation was sewer, water, electricity, and trash (SWET). Later, other units modified this acronym to SWEAT and then SWEAT-MS
to include concerns for restoring academics [or schools], revitalizing medical facilities, and establishing security [police and host-nation security forces].) Of critical importance will be a simultaneous IO
campaign that includes efforts to help ensure that the urban population develops realistic expectations about Army abilities to restore their essential urban infrastructure.
Understanding the Urban Environment: Paris – 1944
The summer of 1944 confronted German General Dietrich von Choltitz with a
dilemma. As military commander of greater Paris, he was to eliminate French
Resistance internal to the city while defending against approaching Allied units,
missions for which he had insufficient forces. (Notably, General Eisenhower, the
commander of the Allied forces, wanted to bypass Paris to sustain the offensive.
Seizing the French capital would task his forces with the support of tens of thousands of civilians. Eisenhower was nevertheless ordered to capture the city. A political
decision resulted in civilian assistance taking precedence over combat operations.)
Choltitz’s situation was further complicated by Hitler’s demand that he destroy the
city, an action the general saw as needlessly destructive (and infeasible given his
scant resources). Choltitz’s seniors directed the preparation, and later the
destruction, of Paris’s 45 Seine River bridges. They were the only remaining crossing points over that waterway given Allied bombing of others outside the French capital.
Premature destruction would trap German forces defending to their north, a second-
order effect that Choltitz used to justify his disobedience of orders demanding the
bridges’ demolition.
The German general also recognized that some mission-critical elements were part
of Paris’s social rather than physical infrastructure: the leadership of the various resistance groups and the relationships between them. Choltitz understood that he
lacked resources to defeat the many separate factions; he therefore chose the
unorthodox (asymmetric) approach of accepting an intermediary’s offer of a truce
with these groups. Such an agreement provided some measure of the stability
needed while Choltitz awaited promised reinforcements. Further, he realized that the resistance factions were by no means united in their goals. Communist elements
sought a much different end than those looking toward a de Gaulle-led postwar
government. A truce thus set the French Communists (who sought an uprising so as
to legitimize their claims to power) against others trying to buy time until Allied forces arrived, forces that included Free French units supportive of de Gaulle.
Although his defense of the capital failed, Choltitz succeeded in harboring his
available resources, reducing the effectiveness of the resistance organizations
fighting his soldiers, and maintaining withdrawal routes for units north of the Seine.
The German commander’s analysis in support of these efforts was effective in part
because of his insightful (1) identification of critical points that included elements of terrain, citizenry, and infrastructure; (2) understanding of the relationships between these parts; and (3) use of an asymmetric approach to address his lack of sufficient force to otherwise handle the urban densities that challenged him.
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Chapter 3
Understanding the Urban Threat
… [T]he United States could be forced to intervene in unexpected crises against
opponents with a wide range of capabilities. Moreover, these interventions may take place in distant regions where urban environments, other complex terrain, and varied climatic conditions present major operational challenges.
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001
As the strategic environment has become less stable, more uncertain, and more
dangerous, Army force