QUEST. XII. What are the decrees of God?
ANSW. God’s decrees are the wise, free, and holy acts of the counsel of his will; whereby, from all eternity, he hath, for his own glory, unchangeably fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass in time; especially concerning angels and men.
QUEST. XIII. What hath God especially decreed concerning angels and men?
ANSW. God, by an eternal and immutable decree out of his mere love, for the praise of his glorious grace, to be manifested in due time, hath elected some angels to glory, and, in Christ, hath chosen some men to eternal life, and the means thereof; and also, according to his sovereign power, and the unsearchable counsel of his own will (whereby he extendeth, or with-holdeth favour, as he pleaseth) hath passed by, and fore-ordained the rest to dishonour and wrath, to be for their sin inflicted, to the praise of the glory of his justice.
Having considered the perfections of the divine nature, and the Personal glories of the Father, Son, and Spirit, the next thing to be insisted on is, what God has purposed to do from eternity, or does, or will do, in pursuance thereof; the former we call his decrees; the latter, the execution of them. The object of his decree is whatever comes to pass, which is the most large and comprehensive sense of his purpose: but whereas his determinations, in a particular manner, respect angels and men, or the intelligent part of the creation, and more especially the eternal happiness of some, or the display of his righteous judgments against others; in these respects, they being taken in a more limited sense, are called as relating to the former, election, and, with respect to the latter, reprobation, which is the subject matter of these two answers. And, before we proceed to insist on this sublime and difficult subject, it may not be inexpedient for us to premise some things concerning it in general.
1. It is well known that there is no doctrine, contained in scripture, which is more contested than this, which lies before us; and it is not only denied by some, but treated with the utmost dislike or detestation, and that to such a degree, that we must either wholly forbear to mention it in public discourses, or writings, or else must be liable to the hard fate of being censured by those who will not do that justice to the argument, to consider what may be advanced in defence thereof, as though it were to be taken for granted that we are maintaining a doctrine that is not only indefensible, but injurious to mankind, and subversive of all religion.
2. If there be any who give just occasion to these prejudices, by the methods which they have used in explaining, as well as the weakness of their arguments in defending it, or by laying themselves open to those popular objections, which are usually brought against it, we cannot but conclude that they are highly to blame; and therefore we are far from approving of any unguarded expressions, which are to be met with in some writings, whereby a stumbling-block is laid in the way of those who are disposed to make men offenders for a word, rather than to judge impartially of the main drift of their discourse: it is to be owned, that this has done dis-service to the cause, which might have been better defended.
3. If these prejudices against this doctrine are ill grounded, and the objections only founded on the popular cry, by which it is endeavoured to be run down, and condemned with reproach and censure; and if persons know not, nor desire to know what may be said in defence thereof, how such-like objections may be answered; the disgust and opposition is both unreasonable and uncharitable, and contains a capricious resolution not to be undeceived, and consequently renders the person thus prejudiced, highly culpable in the sight of God, especially if there be any ground to conclude that his cause is therein maintained.
4. Let it be farther considered, that it is not a new doctrine, or such as was altogether unheard of in the world before; nor has it been only defended by the more ignorant or licentious part of mankind, or those who have been bold and presumptuous in affirming that for truth, which they had not duly weighed, or been convinced of, from the strongest evidence. Whether it be as ancient as scripture, and, indeed, founded upon it, we shall leave others to judge, when we have considered what may be said from it in defence thereof.
5. It was generally asserted, and publicly owned in most of the confessions of faith of the reformed churches in the last age, and, in particular, in the church of England, as contained in one of the articles thereof, and there is no apparent ambiguity in the words themselves, however, some have endeavoured, of late, to strain the sense thereof, and put such a meaning on them, as is very different from the writings of those who compiled them, which might serve as a comment on them.
And to this we may add, that it was maintained by far the greatest number of divines, in their public discourses and writings in the last century, how much soever the contrary doctrines are maintained at this day: however, we do not insist on this as a proof of the truth thereof, as though it needed to be supported by numbers of advocates for it, or were founded thereon; nor do we suppose, that when it has been most strenuously, and almost universally defended, there were not at the same time, others who opposed it. This I only mention, that I may, if possible, remove those prejudices that are inconsistent with persons judging impartially of it.
Since we are considering the head of prejudices against this doctrine, we think it necessary to add, that we shall endeavour to vindicate it, from the reproach that is generally cast on it, by those who suppose that it cannot be defended, without asserting God to be the author of sin, or supposing him to be severe, cruel, and unjust to his creatures, as some conclude we represent him to be, by unjust consequences deduced from it. We are far from asserting, as will hereafter appear, that God from all eternity, purposed to damn a great part of the world, as the result of his mere sovereign will, without the foresight of sin, which would render them liable to that condemnation.
Moreover, we shall endeavour to make it appear, in opposition to the calumnies of some, that the decree of God does not destroy, or take away, the liberty of man’s will, with respect to things, within its own sphere; or that considered in itself, it doth not lay a natural necessity on him, to rush into inevitable damnation, as though the destruction of sinners were only to be resolved into the divine purpose, and not their own wickedness. In considering which, we shall maintain, that the decree of God does not lay any force on the will of man, nor preclude the means of grace, as ordained by him, for the salvation of them that do, or shall hereafter, believe unto life everlasting; nor does it obstruct the preaching of the gospel, and therein proclaiming the glad tidings of salvation, to those who set under the sound thereof, as an ordinance for their faith.
And inasmuch as many are prejudiced against this doctrine, as being influenced by that popular out-cry, which is made by some, as though it were of a very pernicious tendency, either, on the one hand, to lead men to presumption, as giving occasion to persons to conclude that they may be saved as being elected though they live as they list; or, on the other hand, that it leads to despair, as supposing, that if there be such a decree, as that of reprobation, they must necessarily be included in it, and, by this means, instead of promoting holiness of life, it is inconsistent therewith: if we cannot maintain this doctrine, without giving just ground for such exceptions, we shall not only think our labour lost, but condemn it as pernicious and unscriptural, as much as they do, as it must of necessity be, if it cannot be defended from such-like exceptions; which, I hope, we shall be able to do, and at the same time, make it appear, that it is not only consistent with, but a very great motive and inducement to practical godliness: and, if this can be made to appear, the greatest part of the censorious prejudices, that are entertained against it, will be removed, and persons will be better able to judge whether truth lies on that side of the question, which we shall endeavour to defend, or the contrary.
I could not but premise these things in our entrance on this subject, as being sensible that such-like reproaches, as these we have mentioned, are brought by many, without duly weighing whether they are well grounded or no; so that this doctrine is often opposed, in such a way of reasoning, that the premises, as well as the conclusions drawn from them, are rather their own than ours; or, at least, if some ideas thereof may be found in the writings, or taken from the unguarded expressions, which some who have defended this doctrine, have made use of; yet they have appeared in such a dress that even they, who are supposed to have advanced them, would have disowned and rejected them. If persons who are in another way of thinking, resolve not to lay aside these misrepresentations, it plainly appears that they are not disposed to lie open to conviction, and then all attempts to defend this doctrine will be to no purpose; the preventing whereof has rendered these prefatory cautions needful.
We shall only add, to what has been said, some rules, by which we desire that the truth, either of this or the opposite doctrine, may be judged of.
1. If we do not confirm what we assert, by proofs taken from scripture, let it not be received; but if we do, whatever may be said of our method of managing this controversy, the greatest deference ought to be paid to the sacred oracles: But since it is very common for persons to answer the arguments taken from one scripture, by producing other scriptures, which seems to assert the contrary, as desirous to shift aside in the dispute, and put us upon solving the difficulties which they suppose to be contained in them; though this is not to be declined, yet a more direct answer must be given before the doctrine itself is overthrown. Whether our explication of those scriptures, on which our faith therein is founded, be just, we shall leave others to judge; and also whether the sense we give of other scriptures that are brought as objections against it, be not equally probable with that of those that bring them; which is all that need be insisted on in such cases.
2. Let that doctrine be received, and the contrary rejected, on which side of the question soever it lies, that is most agreeable to the divine perfections, and explains those scriptures, brought in defence of it, most consistently therewith; which is a fair proposal; and such as ought not only to be applied to this particular head of doctrine, but to the whole of religion, as founded on scripture, which is far from overthrowing the divine glory, the advancement whereof is the great end of it.
3. Let that doctrine be rejected, as inconsistent with itself, and not worthy to be believed or embraced, whether it be ours, or the contrary thereunto, that shall detract from the harmony of the divine perfection, or pretend to set up, or plead for one, and, at the same time militate against the glory of another; and I desire nothing more than that our whole method of reasoning on this subject may be tried by these rules, and be deemed true or false, agreeably to what is contained therein.
In considering this subject, relating to the decrees of God, as in the two answers, which we are explaining, we shall proceed in the following method; and shew,
I. What we are to understand, by God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, according to the counsel of his own will; wherein we shall compare the decree with the execution thereof, and observe how one exactly answers to the other, and is to be a rule for our judging concerning it.
II. We shall prove the truth of that proposition, that God hath fore-ordained whatever shall come to pass, either in time, or to eternity.
III. We shall then particularly consider intelligent creatures, such as angels and men, and that both good and bad, with respect to their present, or future state, as the objects of God’s eternal decree or purpose, and so shall proceed to speak concerning the decree of election, and reprobation, as contained in the latter of these answers.
IV. We shall lay down some propositions concerning each of these, tending to explain and prove them, and that more especially as to what respects the election and reprobation of men.
V. We shall consider the properties thereof, and how the divine perfections are displayed therein, and endeavour to make it appear, in various instances, that the account we shall give thereof is agreeable thereunto, as well as founded on scripture.
VI. We shall enquire whether the contrary doctrine defended by those who deny election and reprobation, be not derogatory to, and subversive of the divine perfections, or, at least, inconsistent with the harmony thereof; or whether it doth not, in many respects, make God altogether such an one as ourselves.
VII. We shall endeavour to prove that their reasoning from scripture, who maintain the contrary doctrine, is not sufficiently conclusive; and that the sense they give of those scriptures, generally brought to support it, does not so well agree with the divine perfections, as it ought to do, but that they may be explained in a different way, more consistent therewith.
VIII. We shall endeavour to answer the most material objections that are usually brought against the doctrine that we are maintaining. And,
IX. Shew how it is practically to be improved by us, to the glory of God, and our spiritual good and advantage.
I. What we are to understand by God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, according to the counsel of his own will.
1. By God’s fore-ordaining whatever comes to pass, we do not understand barely his fore-knowledge of all things, that are, or shall be done in time, and to eternity, although this be included in, and inseparably connected with his eternal purpose, since no one can purpose to act without the foreknowledge thereof; yet more than this is certainly contained therein; therefore,
2. God’s pre-determining, or fore-ordaining whatsoever comes to pass, includes not only an act of the divine understanding, but an act of his sovereign will: It is not only his knowing what shall come to pass, but his determining, by his own agency, or efficiency, what he will produce in time, or to eternity. Accordingly, some call the decrees of God his eternal providence, and the execution thereof his actual providence; by the former, he determines what he will do; by the latter, he brings his determinations to pass, or effects what he before designed to do. It follows therefore,
3. That God’s fore-ordaining whatsoever shall come to pass, is vastly different from his bringing things to pass: the one is an internal act of his will; the other, an external act of his almighty power: He fore-ordained that they should come to pass, and therefore, till then, they are considered as future; though this determination necessarily secures the event, unless we suppose it possible for his eternal purpose to be defeated, which is disagreeable to the divine perfections, as will farther appear under some following heads. And, on the other hand, when we consider him, as bringing all things to pass, or producing them by his power, this renders what was before future, present. With respect to the former, he decrees what shall be; and, with respect to the latter, his decree takes effect, and is executed accordingly.
They who treat of this matter, generally consider things, either as possible or future. Things are said to be possible, with respect to the power of God, as every thing that he can do, is possible to be done, though some things, which he could have done, he never will do. As for instance: He could have made more worlds, had he pleased; or have produced more men upon earth, or more species of creatures; or have given a greater degree of perfection to creatures, than he has done, or will do; for it is certain, that he never acted to the utmost of his power, accordingly he could have done many things that he will never do; and those things are said to be possible, but not future.
Moreover, things future are rendered so, by the will of God, or his having fore-ordained, or determined to produce them; this is what we call the decree of God, which respects the event, or determines whatever shall come to pass.
We are now to consider, what we are to understand by God’s fore-ordaining all things, according to the counsel of his will; which is a mode of speaking used in scripture, in Eph. i. 11. Being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.
1. We are not hereby to understand that the decrees of God are the result of deliberation, or his debating matters within himself, as reasoning in his own mind about the expediency, or inexpediency of things, or calling in the advice of others, as creatures are said to do, when acting with counsel; for he must not be supposed to determine things in such a way, since that would argue an imperfection in the divine mind; With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and taught him in the paths of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding? Isa. xl. 14. But,
2. It implies, that his decrees are infinitely wise. As what is done with counsel is said, according to human modes of speaking, to be done advisedly, in opposition to its being done rashly, or with precipitation; accordingly all the works of God are done with wisdom, therefore all his purposes and determinations to do what is done in time, are infinitely wise, which, according to our way of speaking, is called the counsel of his will: thus it is said, He is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in working, chap. xxviii. 29.
We are now to consider the object of God’s decree; This, as has been before observed, is every thing that has, or shall come to pass, and it may be considered in different respects. There are some things which he has determined to effect, namely, such as are the objects of his power; or all things, which have a natural or moral goodness in them, which are becoming an infinitely holy God to produce: and this includes in it every thing but sin, which God does not produce, it not being the object of power: Nevertheless, this must be supposed to be committed by his permission, and therefore it is the consequence of his decree to permit, though not, as other things, of his decree to effect; it is one thing to suffer sin to be committed in the world, and another thing to be the author of it. But this we shall have occasion to enlarge on, under a following head.
II. We shall now proceed to prove the truth of what is laid down in this answer, namely, that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. This will evidently appear, if we consider the five following propositions in their due connexion.
1. Nothing comes to pass by chance, with respect to God, but by the direction of his providence, which we are bound to assert against the Deists, who speak of God, as though he were not the Governor of the world. This cannot be denied by any, who think, with any degree of modesty, concerning, or pay a due deference to the divine perfections, since God may as well be denied to be the Creator as the Governor of the world.[183]
2. It follows from hence, that nothing is done without the divine influence, or permission. The former (as was before observed) respects things that are good, which are the effects of his power; the latter, sin. That nothing comes to pass without the divine influence, or permission, is evident; for if any thing came to pass, which is the object of power, without the divine influence, then the creature would be said to exist, or act independently on the power of God; and, if so, then it would follow, that it would exist, or act necessarily; but necessary existence is a perfection appropriate to God.
As to what respects the latter, namely, sins being committed by divine permission, it is evident, that if it might be committed without the divine permission, it could not be restrained by God: and to suppose that he could not hinder the commission of sin, is to suppose that sin might proceed to the greatest height, without any possible check or controul, which would argue a great defect in the divine government of the world, as it is also contrary to daily experience, as well as scripture. Certainly he who sets bounds to the sea, and says to its proud waves, Hitherto shall ye come, and no farther, must be supposed to set bounds to the corrupt passions of wicked men: thus the Psalmist says, Surely the wrath of men shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain, Psal. lxxvi. 10.
Notwithstanding, this does not argue his approbation of sin, or that he is the author of it; since it is one thing to suffer, or not to hinder, and another thing to be the author of any thing. Thus it is said, These things hast thou done, and I kept silence, Psal. l. 21. that is, I did not restrain thee from doing them, as I could have done; so it is said, in times past he suffered all nations to walk in their own ways. Acts xiv. 16.
3. God never acts or suffers any thing to be done, but he knows, beforehand, what he will do or suffer. This an intelligent creature, acting as such, is said do, therefore it must not be denied of him, who is omniscient, and infinitely wise: He who knows all things that others will do, cannot but know what himself will do, or what others will do by the interposition of his providence, or what he will suffer to be done, before it is acted.
4. Whatever God does, and consequently knows before-hand that he will do it, that he must be supposed to have before determined to do: This must be allowed, or else it argues him defective in wisdom. As no wise man acts precipitantly or without judgment, much less must the wise God be supposed to do so; concerning whom it is said, that all his ways are judgment, Deut. xxxii. 4.
5. It therefore appears, even to a demonstration, that God before determined, or fore-ordained, whatever comes to pass, which was the thing to be proved.
And inasmuch, as he never began to determine, as he never began to exist, or as he never was without purposes of what he would do; therefore it is evident, that he before ordained, from eternity, whatever should come to pass, either in time, or to eternity.
It farther appears, that God fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass, otherwise he did not determine to create all things before he gave being to them; and then it could not be said, O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all, Psal. civ. 24. There are, indeed, many admirable discoveries of wisdom, as well as power, in the effects produced; but to suppose that all this was done without fore-thought, or that there was no eternal purpose relating thereunto, would be such a reflection on the glory of this perfection, as is inconsistent with the idea of a God. Moreover, if herein he designed his own glory, as he certainly did, since every intelligent being designs some end, and the highest and most excellent end must be designed by a God of infinite wisdom; and, if he did all this for his own glory, then it must be allowed, that it was the result of an eternal purpose: all which, I am persuaded, will not be denied by those on the other side of the question, who defend their own cause with any measure of judgment.
To this we may farther add, that to deny that God fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, is, in effect, to deny a providence, or, at least, that God governs the world in such a way, as that what he does therein was pre-concerted. And herein we expect to meet with no opposition from any but the Deists, or those who deny a God; and if it be taken for granted that there is a providence, or that God is the Governor of the world, we cannot but conclude from hence, that all the displays of his glory therein, are the result of his eternal purpose. This is also agreeable to what is said concerning him, that he doth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, Dan. iv. 35. the meaning of which is not barely this, (which is a great truth) that he acts without controul, inasmuch as his power is infinite: But that all he does is pursuant to his will; and, indeed, it cannot be otherwise, if we suppose that the divine power, and will, are so inseparably connected, that he cannot be said to produce any thing, but by the word of his power; or when he willeth that any thing should come to pass, it is not in an efficacious will, as ours is, for want of power, to effect what we have done. Therefore for God to will the present existence of things, is to effect them, which seems to be the reason of that mode of speaking, which was used when he produced all things at first; he said, let them exist in that form, or perfection, which he had before designed to give them, and the effect immediately followed, Gen. i. 3, 6, 9, &c.
Hitherto, I presume, our argument will not be much contested; for the main thing in controversy is what relates to the divine determination respecting intelligent creatures, which will be considered under a following head: What I have hitherto attempted to prove is, the proposition in general, namely, that whatever God brings to pass, or is the effect of power, is the result of his determinate purpose. And herein, I think, I have carefully distinguished between God’s will to effect, and his will to permit; but that will be farther explained, when we speak of the decrees of God, with a particular application to angels and men, under the head of election.
Having endeavoured to prove that God hath fore-ordained whatever comes to pass, we shall lay down the following propositions relating to his end and design in all his purposes, together with the nature of things, as coming to pass pursuant thereunto, and the method in which we are to conceive of the decree, when compared with the execution thereof.
1. God cannot design any thing, in his eternal purpose, as the highest end, but his own glory, which is here assigned, as the end of his decrees. As this is the principal motive, or reason, inducing him to produce whatever comes to pass; so it must be considered as the end of his purpose relating thereunto: This is very evident; for since the divine glory is the most excellent of all things, he cannot, as an infinitely wise God, design any thing short of it, as the great motive or inducement for him to act; therefore, whatever lower ends are designed by him, they are all resolved into this as the principal, to wit, the advancement of his divine perfections. Though God designs his own glory as the highest end, yet he has purposed not only that this should be brought about, by means conducive thereunto, but that there should be a subserviency of one thing to another, all which are the objects of his decree, as well as the highest end, namely, his own glory. As, for instance, he determines that the life and health of man shall be maintained by the use of proper means and medicine, or that grace shall be wrought instrumentally by those means, which he has ordained, in order thereunto: thus his purpose respects the end and means, together with the connexion that there is between them.
2. According to the natural order of things, the divine purpose is antecedent to the execution thereof. Therefore it seems very absurd to distinguish the decree of God, as some do, into antecedent and consequent, one going before the use of means, the other following, of which more hereafter: It is certain, that every intelligent being first determines to act, and then executes his determinations; so that nothing can be more absurd, than to say, that a person determines to do a thing which is already done. Therefore we conclude, that God first decreed what shall come to pass, and then brings it to pass: Accordingly he first determined to create the world, and then created it; he first determined to bestow the means of grace on men, and to render them effectual to the salvation of all who shall be saved, and then he does this accordingly; so, with respect to his judicial actings, he first determined by a permissive decree, not to prevent the commission of sin, though infinitely opposite to his holiness, and then, knowing the consequence of this permissive decree, or that men, through the mutability or corruption of their nature, would rebel against him, he determined to punish sin after it should be committed. Thus the decree of God is, in all respects, antecedent to the execution of it; or his eternal providence, as his decrees are sometimes called, is antecedent to, and the ground and reason of, his actual providence.
3. Though the purpose of God be before the execution thereof, yet the execution of it is first known by us; and so it is by this that we are to judge of his decree and purpose, which is altogether secret, with respect to us, till he reveals it; therefore we first observe the discoveries thereof, as contained in his word, or made visible in his actual providence, and from thence we infer his eternal purpose relating thereunto. Every thing that is first in the order of nature, is not first with respect to the order of our knowing it: thus the cause is before the effect, but the effect is often known before the cause; the sun is, in the order of nature, before the enlightening the world by it; but we first see the light, and then we know there is a sun, which is the fountain thereof: or, to illustrate it by another similitude, which comes nearer the matter before us; A legislator determines first to make a law, which determination is antecedent to the making, and that to the promulgation of it, whereby his subjects come to the knowledge thereof, and act in conformity thereunto; but, according to our method of judging concerning it, we must first know that there is such a law, and from thence we conclude, that there was a purpose relating to it, in him that gave it; Thus we conclude, that though the decree of God be the ground and reason of the execution thereof, yet we know that there was such a decree by its execution, or, at least, by some other way designed to discover this to us.
These things being duly considered, may obviate an objection, which is no other than a misrepresentation of the doctrine we are maintaining, as though we asserted, that our conduct of life, and the judgment we are to pass concerning ourselves, relating to our hope of future blessedness, were to be principally, if not altogether regulated, by God’s secret purpose or decree; as though we were first to consi