1. As to the former branch thereof, namely, preterition, or God’s passing by, or rejecting those whom he hath not chosen to salvation, let it be premised; that God, in his eternal purpose, considered all mankind as fallen, which must be supposed to have been foreknown by him, otherwise he would not be said to be omniscient, and the result of his fore-knowledge is his determining to leave a part of them in their fallen state, in which he might have left the whole world to perish without being liable to the least charge of injustice. This is what we call his rejecting them, and accordingly it is opposed to his having chosen the rest to eternal life. These terms of opposition are plainly contained in scripture: thus it is said, The election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded, Rom. xi. 7. not by God’s leading them into mistakes, or giving them false ideas of things, but they were left to the blindness of their minds, which was the result of their apostasy from God; and elsewhere our Saviour says, Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes, Matt. xi. 25. Thou hast hid, that is, not revealed them; and that either objectively, as respecting those who are destitute of the light of the gospel; or subjectively, as he did not effectually, or savingly enlighten them with the light of life, by revealing Christ in them, as the apostle calls it, Gal. i. 16. and therefore it is as though he had said, thou hast determined not to give to some the means of grace, nor to others the saving efficacy thereof, such as they are partakers of, who are chosen to salvation. Accordingly, he is said to have suffered all nations to walk in their own ways, Acts xiv. 16. that is, not to restrain or prevent the breaking forth of corruption, as he might have done; and elsewhere, to have winked at, chap. xvii. 30. that is, as it may be rendered, over-looked the greatest part of the world, which is no other than his rejecting or passing them by; and in this sense we are to understand that difficult mode of speaking used by the apostle, Whom he will he hardeneth, Rom. ix. 18. by which nothing else is intended but his purposing to leave many to the hardness of their own hearts. God forbid that any one should think that there is a positive act contained in those words, as though God infused hardness into the hearts of any; for the meaning is only this, that he determined to deny heart-softening grace to that part of mankind, whom he had not fore-ordained to eternal life. That there was such a purpose relating hereunto, is evident, because whatever God does in the methods of his providence, is the result of an eternal purpose. This no one, who observes the dispensations of God’s providence, and allows as every one must do, that all that he does was pre-concerted by him, can justly deny.
But that which must be farther enquired into, as to this matter, is, whether God’s determining to pass by a part of mankind, be an act of sovereignty or of justice. And this may also be judged of, by the external dispensation of his providence; so far as there is sovereignty, or justice, visible in them, we are to conclude that this purpose, relating thereunto, was the result of one or other of these perfections. In some respects it is an act of sovereignty: As, for instance, that God should give one nation the gospel, or the means of grace, and deny it to another; it is not because he sees any thing in one part of the world, that obliges him thereunto, more than in the other; but the reason is, as was observed in the scripture but now mentioned, because it seemed good in his sight, Matt. xi. 26. Moreover, his giving special grace, whereby some are effectually called and sanctified; and denying it to others, is an act of sovereign pleasure.
But on the other hand, God is said sometimes, in the external dispensations of his providence, to leave men to themselves, to give them up to their own hearts lust, in a judicial way, which supposes not only the commission of sin, but persons being obstinate and resolutely determined to continue in it. Thus God saith concerning his people; Israel would none of me; so I gave them up to their own hearts’ lusts, and they walked in their own counsels, Psal. lxxxi. 11, 12. and the Psalmist says elsewhere, Add iniquity to their iniquity, Psal. lxix. 27. which words I would rather consider as a prediction than a prayer, or as an expression of the church’s acquiescence in God’s righteous judgments, which they had ground to conclude, that he would inflict on an impenitent, incorrigible people; these are expressed, by adding iniquity to iniquity, not as though he designed to infuse any habit of sin into them, for that is inconsistent with the holiness of his nature; but that he would reject, and leave them to themselves, in a judicial way, as a punishment inflicted on them for their iniquities, the consequence whereof would be their own adding iniquity to iniquity. Thus, in different respects, the purpose of God, in passing by a part of mankind, may be considered, either as the result of his sovereign pleasure, or as an act of justice.
2. We shall now proceed to consider the other branch of reprobation, which some call pre-damnation, or (to use the scripture-expression before referred to) God’s fore-ordaining those who shall not be saved, to that condemnation, which they shall fall under, as exposing themselves to it by their own wickedness; which is nothing else but his determining, from all eternity, to punish those, as a judge, who should, by their own crimes, deserve it, and thereby to vindicate the holiness of his nature and law. Here let it be observed, that when this doctrine is reproached or misrepresented, it is described as an act of divine sovereignty, but that we are as ready to deny and oppose as they are, since, according to the description we have given of it, it can be no other than an act of justice; for, if to condemn, or punish, be an act of justice, then the decree, relating hereunto, must be equally so, for one is to be judged of by the other. If God cannot punish creatures as such, but as criminals and rebels, then he must be supposed to have considered them as such, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to punish them. No man can style this an act of cruelty, or severity in God, but those who reckon the punishing of sin to be so, and are disposed to charge the Judge of all with not doing right, or offering an injury to his creatures, when he pours forth the vials of his wrath on them, who, by their bold and wilful crimes, render themselves obnoxious thereunto.
Here let it be considered, that God, in his actual providence, is not the author of sin, though he suffer it to be committed in the world. And, since his permitting, or not hindering it, cannot be said to be the cause of its being committed, there being no cause thereof, but the will of man; it follows, from hence, that God’s punishing sin, is not to be resolved into his permission of it, as the cause thereof, but into the rebellion of man’s will, as refusing to be subject to the divine law; and thus God considered men, when, in his eternal purpose, he determined to condemn those, whose desert of this punishment was foreseen, by him, from all eternity. And is this a doctrine to be so much decried?
I cannot but wonder the learned author, whom I have before referred to, as opposing this doctrine,[213] should so far give into the common and popular way of misrepresenting it, unless he designed, by this way of opposing it to render it detested; when he speaks concerning them, mentioned in Jude, ver. 4. who were before, of old, ordained to this condemnation, he says, “This cannot be meant of any divine ordination, or appointment of them, to eternal condemnation, because it cannot be thought, without horror, that God doth thus ordain men to perdition, before they had a being.” If he had expressed his horror and resentment against God’s ordaining men to perdition, as creatures, it had been just; but to express this detestation against God’s ordaining men to perdition, who are described as these are, is to expose this doctrine without reason; and it is still more strange that he should cast this censure upon it, when he owns in his farther explication of this text, “That God ordaineth none to punishment but sinners, and ungodly men, as these persons here are styled, and that these were men of whom it was before written, or prophesied, that they should be condemned for their wickedness;” since there is not much difference in the method of reasoning, between saying that the condemnation of sinners, for their wickedness, was before written, or prophesied, and saying, that God fore-ordained them to eternal punishment.
I am sensible that many are led into this mistake, by supposing that we give a very injurious and perverse sense of that text, in which the doctrine of reprobation is contained, which, it may be, has occasioned this reproach to be cast upon it. For when the apostle says, in Rom. ix. 22. What if God willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, some suppose that we understand this text, as though these vessels of wrath were, from all eternity, prepared for destruction by God, and that his eternal purpose, is his fitting them for it, as intending to bring about that end, viz. his destroying them. But if any have expressed themselves in such a way, as is equivalent thereunto, let them be accountable for their own sense of the text; though this I may say, that some, even of them, who give into the Supralapsarian way of explaining the doctrine of predestination, have not understood it in this sense;[214] and the sense which I would give of it is this, that those, whom the apostle speaks of as vessels of wrath, are persons whom God had rejected, and from the foresight of the sins which they would commit, he had appointed them to wrath, which is an expression the apostle uses elsewhere, 1 Thess. v. 9. but they were appointed to wrath, not as creatures, but as sinners; they are described as fitted to destruction, not by God’s act, but their own, and that is the reason of their being fore-ordained to it.[215]
There is another scripture, which is generally cited by those who treat on this subject, that we are to use the utmost caution in explaining, lest we give just occasion, to those who oppose it, to express their abhorrence of it, as inconsistent with the divine perfections, namely, what the apostle says concerning those that were not elected, whom he calls the rest of the Jewish nation, in Rom. xi. 7-10. that they were blinded, and that God had given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear; and he speaks of their table being made a snare, and a trap and a stumbling-block, and a recompense to them; let their eyes be darkened, that they may not see, and bow down their back always. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose that we put upon this scripture, is, that they, who are reprobated, have, as a consequence thereof, occasions of sin laid in their way, some things designed to blind their minds, cast a mist before their eyes, and so lead them out of the way, and other things, that prove a snare to them, a trap, and occasion of sin, and all this with a design to bring about that damnation which God had ordained for them, in this decree of reprobation; which sense of this scripture never was, nor could be given, by any one, who has a due regard to the divine perfections.
And shall this doctrine be judged of hereby, when it is very hard to find any, how unguarded soever they are in their modes of speaking, that understand this text as they represent it? We shall therefore consider what is probably the meaning of this scripture, with which the doctrine we have laid down is very consistent. It is not to be understood as though God were the author of these sins, which they are said to be charged with; but this blindness and stupidity, which is called, A spirit of slumber as it is connected with the idea of their being rejected of God, and his determining not to give them the contrary graces, is considered, as the consequence, not the effect thereof, and that not the immediate, but the remote consequence thereof, in the same sense as stealing is the consequence of poverty, in those who have a vicious inclination thereunto. Thus when a person, who has contracted those habits of sin, that tend to turn men aside from God, is destitute of preventing and restraining grace, the consequence thereof, is, that these corruptions will break forth with greater violence; and God is not obliged to give this grace to an apostate, fallen creature, much less to one who has misimproved the means of grace, by which a multitude of sins might have been prevented; so that nothing is intended hereby but this, that they are left to themselves, and permitted to stumble and fall, and to commit those abominations, which, if they had not been thus judicially left, would have been prevented, and as the consequence thereof, they run into many sins, which they might have avoided; for though we suppose that it is not in a man’s own power, as destitute of the grace of God, to bring himself into a regenerate or converted state, (as will be farther considered, in its proper place) nevertheless, we do not deny but that men might, in the right use of the gifts of nature, avoid many sins, which they, who are said to be thus blinded, and hardened, run into, and so increase their guilt and misery, especially where they are not prevented by the grace of God, which he may, without any impeachment of his providence, deny to those whom he has not chosen to eternal life, as he might, had he pleased, have denied it to the whole world, and much more to those who have not improved the common grace, which they received, but have, through the wickedness of their nature, proceeded from one degree of sin unto another.
There is another scripture, which, some suppose we understand in such a sense, as gives the like occasion of prejudice to many against this doctrine, in 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12. For this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness; the meaning whereof is this, that God suffered them to be deluded, who, in the following verse, are represented as not receiving the love of the truth; not that God was the author of these delusions, or deceived them by a false representation of things to them, or by exciting or inclining them to adhere to the suggestions of those who lie in wait to deceive; but, since he did not design to give them grace under the means of grace, or to enable them to receive the truth in the love thereof, which he was not obliged to do to any, much less to those who rebelled against the light that had been already given them; hereupon, through the blindness of their own minds, they became an easy prey to those who endeavoured to ensnare or delude them; so that the decree of God only respects his denying preventing grace to those, who, through the corruption of their own nature, took occasion, from thence, to run greater lengths in their apostasy from, and rebellion against God. And as for that mode of speaking here used, that God shall send them strong delusions, that only respects his will to permit it, and not his design to delude them.
There is another scripture to the same purpose, in Psal. lxxxi. 12. So I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust, and they walked in their own counsels; the meaning of which is, that God left them to themselves, and then lust, or the corrupt habits of sin, which they had acquired, conceived, and, as the apostle James speaks, brought forth sin, chap i. 15. or greater acts of sin, which exposed them to a greater degree of condemnation; and all this is to be resolved into God’s permissive will, or purpose, to leave man, in his fallen state, to himself, which he might do, without giving occasion to any to say, on the one hand, that he is the author of sin; or, on the other, that he deals injuriously with the sinful creature.
And to this we may add our Saviour’s words concerning the Jews, in John xii. 39, 40. Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them. The sense which they, who misrepresent this doctrine, suppose we put upon them, and conclude, that no other is consistent with the argument we are maintaining, is, that the unbelief, which the Jews are charged with, was principally, if not altogether, resolved into God’s eternal purpose, to blind their eyes, and harden their hearts, namely, by some positive act, as a cause producing this effect, with this view, that they should not be converted, and saved, that thereby his decree to condemn them, might take effect. It is no wonder to find persons prejudiced against this doctrine, when set in such a light; but as this is very remote from the explication we have given thereof, so our Saviour’s design, in this text, is to give an account why those miracles, which he wrought before the Jews, were ineffectual for their conviction; the more immediate cause whereof was the blindness of their mind, and the hardness of their hearts, inasmuch as they had shut their eyes against the light, and, through the corruption of their nature, had hardened their own hearts. As to what God is said to have done, in a judicial way, agreeable to the mode of speaking here used, when it is said, He hath hardened their hearts, it imports nothing else but his leaving them to the hardness of their own hearts, or denying them heart-softening grace, which would have been an effectual remedy against it. And may not God deny his grace to sinners, without being charged as the author of sin, or the blame thereof devolved on him, and not themselves? And, since this judicial act of providence cannot but be the result of an eternal purpose, is there any thing, in this decree, that reflects on his perfections, any more than there is in the execution thereof?
There is another scripture, in Prov. xvi. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil; from whence they infer, that the doctrine of reprobation, which they suppose to be founded on a perverse sense given of it, includes in it the divine purpose to make man to damn him; for they conclude that we understand it in that sense; and they proceed a little farther than this, and pretend that we infer from it, that God made men wicked, or that he made them wicked for his glory, as if he had need of sinful man for that end. I should never have thought that so vile a consequence could be drawn from this doctrine, if the learned writer, before mentioned, had not told the world that we infer this from it;[216] and, to give countenance to this suggestion, he quotes a passage out of Dr. Twiss;[217] his words are these: “That all, besides the elect, God hath ordained to bring them forth into the world in their corrupt mass, and to permit them to themselves, to go on in their own ways, and so finally to persevere in sin; and, lastly, to damn them for their sin, for the manifestation of the glory of his justice on them.”
I am not ashamed to own my very great esteem of this excellently learned and pious writer, who was as considerable for that part of learning, which his works discover him to have been conversant in, as most in his day; though I cannot think myself obliged, in every respect, to explain this doctrine as he does; and Dr. Whitby knew very well, that if such an inference, as what we have been speaking of, were to be deduced from the writings of any, who maintain the doctrine of reprobation, it must be from one who gives into the Supralapsarian way of explaining it; and this expression, which, it may be, was a little unguarded, seems to bid as fair for it as any other he could have found out: But any one that reads it, without prejudice, and especially that compares it with what is connected therewith, would not suppose that any thing is intended hereby, that gives the least ground to conclude that God made men wicked for the manifestation of his justice. The most obnoxious part of this quotation, is, God ordained to bring forth into the world the non-elect, in their corrupt mass, that is, that persons, who are every day born into the world, are the seed of corrupt and fallen man, and so have the habits of sin propagated with their nature, which many other divines have endeavoured to maintain. What my sentiments are concerning this matter, I shall rather choose to insist on, under a following answer, in which we shall be lead to speak of the doctrine of original sin, and of that corruption of nature, which is the consequence of it; therefore, passing this by, there is nothing, in what remains of this quotation, but what is very defensible, and far from making God the author of sin; for we may observe, that all he says, concerning the providence of God relating to this matter, is only, that he permits, or leaves them to themselves, and he supposes them finally to persevere in sin, without which they cannot be liable to damnation, or the display of the justice of God therein; and if the author, who brings this quotation, had duly considered the words immediately before, he might have seen the reason to have saved himself the trouble of making this reflection upon it; for Dr. Twiss, who, though a Supralapsarian, says, “That he reckons that controversy, relating to the order of God’s decrees, to be merely Apex Logicus, as he calls it, a logical nicety;” and adds, “That his opinion about it is well known, namely, that God doth not ordain any man to damnation, before the consideration of sin;” and, a few lines after, he says, “That God, of his mere pleasure, created all, but, of his mere pleasure, he damneth none; but every one that is damned, is damned for his sin, and that wilfully committed, and contumaciously continued in by them that come to ripe years.” And if nothing more than this is intended by the doctrine of reprobation, it ought not to be so misrepresented, with a design to cast an odium upon it.
But to return to the scripture but now mentioned: When God is said to have made the wicked for the day of evil, the meaning is not that man’s damnation was the end designed by God, in creating him, for there are some other ideas that intervene between God’s purpose to create and condemn him; he must be considered not barely as a creature, but as a sinner; now, as God did not create man that he might sin, he could not be said to create him, that he might condemn him. Accordingly, the sense which some give of this text, is, that God is said to have made all things for himself, to wit, for his own glory. And inasmuch as some will be ready to object, that God will have no glory from the wicked, who oppose his name and interest in the world; the answer to this is, that in them, from whom he shall have no glory, as a Saviour, he will, notwithstanding, be glorified as a Judge; which judicial act, though it be deferred for a time, while his long-suffering waits upon them, yet it shall fall heavily on them, in the day of evil: which is very remote from that supposition, that God made man to damn him. And there is a sense given of it by some, who are on the other side of the question, which seems equally probable, or agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost, and is not in the least subversive of the doctrine we are maintaining, namely, “That the Lord disposeth all things throughout the world, to serve such ends as he thinks fit to design, which they cannot refuse to comply withal; for if any man be so wicked as to oppose his will, he will not lose their service; but when he brings a public calamity upon a country, employ them to be the executioners of his wrath: Of this there was a remarkable instance in the destruction of Jerusalem, by the Roman soldiers, whom our Saviour used, to punish his crucifiers, not that they undertook that war out of any design or desire to do our blessed Saviour right, but out of an ambition to enslave the world; yet God made use of them for another design, as public executioners, by whom he punished the ungodly[218].” So the Assyrian is said, in Isa. x. 5, 6. to be the rod of God’s anger, and to be sent against the people of Israel, and to lead them captive, and therein to tread them down, like the mire in the streets[219]. And as to what concerns the purpose of God, on which these judicial proceedings depend, this is to be judged of by the execution thereof, as is evidently to be inferred from thence. And this is the sense in which we understand the doctrine of reprobation, as in the foregoing argument.
Thus we have endeavoured to prove the doctrine of election and reprobation, and defend it from the reproaches and misrepresentations cast upon it by considering it, not only as agreeable to the divine perfections, but as founded on scripture. We shall therefore proceed,
VI. To enquire, whether the contrary doctrine as defended by some, be not derogatory to the divine perfections, and therefore does not contain greater absurdities; or, if expressions of detestation were a sufficient argument to set it aside, whether we have not as much reason to testify our dislike that way, as they have against the doctrine we are maintaining? As to that part of the charge brought against us, as though we represented God as severe and cruel to his creatures; or that it is inconsistent with his goodness to suppose that he leaves any to themselves in their fallen state, so as not to give them the means of grace, when he knew that being destitute thereof, they could not believe, and so would fall short of salvation, pursuant to his eternal purpose relating thereunto: can this be said to be inconsistent with his goodness, any more than all his other displays of vindictive justice? If they suppose that it is, we might easily retort the argument upon them since they will not assert, that the whole race of fallen man shall be saved; and, if so, must we not suppose that God certainly fore-knew this, otherwise where is his infinite understanding? And if he knew that this would be the consequence of their being born, and living in the world, where is his goodness in bringing them into it? If it be said that they have a free-will to choose what is good, and so had a power to attain salvation; therefore their not attaining it, is wholly owing to themselves. Suppose this were taken for granted, without entering on that subject at present; yet it must be farther enquired whether they will allow that God fore-know that they would abuse this freedom of will, or power to make themselves holy or happy; and, if so, could he not have prevented this? Did he make a will that he could not govern or restrain? Could he not have prevented the sin that he knew they would commit? And, if he could, why did he not do it, and thereby prevent their ruin, which he knew would be the consequence hereof? So that if men are disposed to find fault with the divine dispensation, it is no difficult matter to invent some methods of reasoning to give umbrage to it; and, indeed this objection is not so much against God’s fore-ordaining what comes to pass, as it is a spurning at his judicial hand, and finding fault with the equity of his proceedings, when he takes vengeance on sinners for their iniquities; or charging severity on God, because all mankind are not the objects of his goodness, and consequently not elected to eternal life.
But passing by this, we shall proceed to consider how, in several instances, the methods used to oppose the doctrine, which we are maintaining, are attended with many absurd consequences, derogatory to the divine perfections; which farther discovers the unreasonableness of their opposition to it; particularly,
1. It represents God as indeterminate, or unresolved what to do, which is the plain sense of their asserting that he has not fore-ordained whatever comes to pass. To suppose him destitute of any determination, is directly contrary to his wisdom and sovereignty, and it would argue that there are some excellencies and perfections belonging to intelligent creatures, which are to be denied to him, who is a God of infinite perfection: but if, on the other hand, they suppose that every thing, which comes to pass, is determined by him; nevertheless, that his determinations, as they respect the actions of intelligent creatures, are not certain and peremptory, but such as may be disannulled, or rendered ineffectual as taking his measures from the uncertain determinations of man’s will; this is, in effect to say, that they are not determined by God; for an uncertain determination, or a conditional purpose, cannot properly be called a determination. Thus for God to determine, that he that believes shall be saved, without resolving to give that faith which is necessary to salvation, is, in effect, not to determine that any shall be saved; for, since they suppose that it is left to man’s free-will to believe or not, and liberty is generally explained by them, as implying that a person might, had he pleased, have done the contrary to that which he is said to do freely; it follows that all mankind might not have believed, and repented, and consequently that they might have missed of salvation, and then the purpose of God, relating thereunto, is the same as though he had been indeterminate, as to that matter. But, if, on the other hand, they suppose that to prevent this disappointment, God over-rules the free actions of men, in order to the accomplishment of his own purpose, then they give up their own cause, and allow us all that we contend for; but this they are not disposed to do; therefore we cannot see how the independency of the divine will can be defended by them, consistently with their method of opposing this doctrine.
Again, if it be supposed, as an expedient to fence against this absurd consequence, that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and that his determinations were the result thereof, and, consequently, that the event is as certain as the divine fore-knowledge, this is what is not universally allowed of by them; for many are sensible that it is as hard to prove, that God fore-knew what must certainly come to pass, without inferring the inevitable necessity of things, as it is to assert that, he willed or determined them, whereby they are rendered eventually necessary. And if they suppose that God fore-knew what his creatures would do, and, particularly, that they would convert themselves, and improve the liberty of their will, so as to render themselves objects fit for divine grace, without su