Chapter 3 – The Problem of Knowledge
Epistemology or theory of knowledge inquires into the origins and nature of knowledge. It is the preliminary stage of philosophy investigating the means and conditions of obtaining knowledge. Knowledge is of the nature of subjective conviction familiar to all and is what we are aware of when our senses are alert and even when our senses are not alert as in the case of deep sleep ( 6. Some schools of philosophy like the Mimamsa hold that there is no knowledge during deep sleep. Sri Madhwacharya however holds that we have positive knowledge even during deep sleep. See Chapter 5). We have experience of knowledge every instant of our existence as a mental event occasioned under favourable conditions by suitable stimuli. Notwithstanding its familiarity, it is however, an event of profound significance. It claims to be an apprehension of an independent fact or truth.
Knowledge arising in various ways
Knowledge which is essentially awareness of object arises In us in a variety of ways in our daily experience. It is also of different kinds. We have knowledge of things around us such as chairs, roses, trees etc. We have knowledge of our misery or happiness. We have knowledge of ourselves in “I know myself", i.e., in self-knowledge (ahampratyaya). Finally, we have knowledge of space and time. Again, we are conscious of outside objects during the walking state (jagradavastha), of mental objects during the state of dreams (swapnavastha) and of ourselves, of space and of time during the state of deep sleep (susupthiavastha - The consciousness of I, space and time during deep sleep is not admitted by all. Sri Madhwacharya demonstrates that such knowledge does exist). Knowledge, thus, arises in all the three states of daily life. No theory of knowledge can be regarded as satisfactory that does not take into account all the various kinds of knowledge we are aware of in our daily experience. Sri Madhwacharya’s theory of knowledge is based on a thoroughgoing analysis of the different kinds of knowledge arising in various ways and common to all humanity.
Sri Madhwacharya attacks the problem of knowledge on the basis of two fundamental postulates. The first postulate Is that experience is the most secure foundation of philosophy and the second postulate is that whatever is unsublated Is real. All aspects of knowledge are Investigated on the basis of these postulates, in his theory of knowledge.
Internal and External knowledge
At the very outset of his theory of knowledge Sri Madhwacharya draws attention to two types of knowledge which are essentially distinct from one another ‘jnanancha dvividham bahyam thatha anubhavathmakam' he says in Vishnutatva Vinirnaya (p. 4). There are two types of knowledge viz, external, and internal. The latter is always true while the former may be occasionally false. Knowledge generally refers to things outside of us, such as is obtained through our senses of perception. The knowledge of a red rose, the report of a gun, the hardness of a table and the warmth of fire refer to external objects like rose, gun, table, and fire respectively and such knowledge is external knowledge (bahyajnana). Again, we have knowledge that does not refer to things outside of us. We are conscious of our misery or happiness; we are conscious of ourselves. Such knowledge is internal knowledge (antarika jnana). There is however one very essential distinction between external and internal knowledge. Whereas external knowledge may be sometimes sublated, and hence false, internal knowledge is never sublated and is therefore always true.
When I apprehend a shell as a shell my knowledge of the shell is true knowledge. But when I apprehend shell as silver the apprehension of the shell will be sublated by the apprehension of the shell when I go near it and observe it to better advantage. In this sense external knowledge may sometimes be sublated. But internal knowledge can never be sublated. The self- knowledge 'I know myself' is never sublated. At no time do I know myself to be different from myself. In spite of all the changes taking place around me and of the various vicissitudes of my experience I never feel that I am ‘not I’. Again, Sri Madhwacharya says ‘na dukkhanubhavah kvapi mithyanubhavatam vrajet' (A.V.P. 35) no experience of misery can ever become falsified. What I experienced is my experience and there can be no getting over that fact. Nothing that can ever happen to me at a later time can falsify my experience of misery at an earlier time. Sri Madhwacharya lays special emphasis on this essential distinction between the two types of knowledge viz., external, and internal knowledge in his great work Anuvyakhyana again and again. On the basis of this distinction, he is able to deduce some very fundamental metaphysical concepts of his system.
Bipolar character of knowledge
All knowledge says Sri Madhwacharya. whether internal or external possesses some common characteristics. An examination of these characteristics and their appreciation is of very great importance In the Epistemology of his system. Sri Madhwacharya is able to deduce many fundamental concepts from such an examination on the basis of the two postulates referred to viz., experience and unsublatedness. The most obvious characteristic of knowledge is that it is bipolar. The essence of knowledge is awareness, and the knowledge is no knowledge if it is devoid of awareness. Awareness is an activity induced when knowledge is occasioned. Awareness is occasioned to an entity which becomes aware of and refers to another entity about which the former becomes aware.
Perception can occur to an entity which perceives and refers to an object as perceived. A stone for instance, cannot have knowledge. Now that entity or agency which perceives or knows or to which knowledge dawns is the subject or knower (jnatru) and that about which there is knowledge is the object or known (jneya). All knowledge is thus bipolar having the subject and object as its poles at either end. Such polarity is an essential characteristic of all knowledge. There is no evidence of knowledge devoid of such polarity as Sri Madhwacharya observes Nacha ‘jnatrujneyarahitam jnanam kvapi drstam' (V.T.V.P 17). Pure knowledge as such without a knower and known is as inconceivable to Sri Madhwacharya as dinner without the diner and food (bhokthrubhogyatahhiam bhojanameva syat - A.V.P.61). Knowledge as mere consciousness having no internal subject-object relationship does not exist. In other words, knowledge is not partless (akhanda) and attributeless (nirvishesha) as Adwaita regards it to be. Whenever I have any piece of knowledge the form or content of my knowledge is 'I know this thing to be here and now'; the subject I and the object ‘this thing' are the very necessary and essential ingredients of all knowledge.
Spatial and Temporal elements in knowledge
A second characteristic of all knowledge is the spatial and temporal aspects concomitant with knowledge. The elements of space and time are always associated with all pieces of knowledge. Whenever I perceive an object my perception is not ‘a bare perception' of the object. There is a perception of the elements of space and time also. When I perceive a rose in my garden, I am conscious not only of the rose but of the rose as ‘being out there' in my garden and ‘now’ at the time of my perception. The ‘being out ‘there’ and ‘now’ are respectively the elements of space and time. That these elements are present by the fact that I stretch my hand to pluck the rose. If I did not believe the rose to exist ‘out there 1 and ‘now’ I would not have stretched my hand. I do not pick it up when I apprehend it as a piece of silver. In both cases I believe that there exists the shell or the silver and I am indifferent to shell but cupid enough to pick up what appears to be silver. In this sense ‘seeing’ is ‘believing’. If I did not believe in ‘space’ I would not have stretched my hand and if I did not believe in time' I would not have stretched my hand now. Thus, all knowledge possesses the elements of space and time. Sri Madhwacharya considers these elements of space and time as the true deliverances of perception in contradistinction with the views of some philosophers who hold that they are the superimpositions of the perceiving mind on some substratum of perception. Space and time are objective to Sri Madhwacharya while other philosophers regard them as subjective.
Prama and Bhrama
Knowledge, however, may be true (prama) or false (bhrama). We say that a given knowledge is true if the object of the knowledge exists as perceived in knowledge and false if it does not so exist. The apprehension of a rope as a rope is true knowledge while the apprehension of rope as a snake is false knowledge. Now what is the essential difference between true knowledge and false knowledge? Sri Madhwacharya answers by an appeal to experience. How do I decide what I perceive to be a rope or a snake? I go near the object and observe it to better advantage. I see a rope where I thought I saw a snake. The latter perception (or knowledge) of the rope falsifies or stultifies or sublates the earlier perception (or knowledge) of the snake. The earlier knowledge of the snake has been sublated by the later knowledge of the rope. Becoming sublated is the characteristic of false knowledge. If my earlier perception was of a rope and when I go near, my later perception is also of a rope the earlier perception is not sublated by the later one. It is unsublated and hence true. Being unsublated (abadhya) is the characteristic of true knowledge.