Definition of Pramana
Knowledge as has been said in the foregoing may be true or false. Sri Madhwacharya defines philosophy as tatvanirnaya i.e., the determination of things as they are in themselves. In other words, Philosophy is the true knowledge of things (tatvajnana). The ways of obtaining true knowledge therefore form or constitute a fundamental part of epistemology (Epistemology, is theory of knowledge on which, metaphysics which is theory of substance is based). The means of true knowledge are called Pramanas. The term Pramana is defined in different ways in the different schools of Indian Philosophy. A definition or lakshana should be such that it distinguishes the entity defined from others and also such that it includes all those that are encompassed in the same category as the entity defined while excluding those that do not belong to that category. When the lakshana does not include all those intended to be classed in the same category it becomes non- pervasive (avyaptha) and when it includes even those foreign to the category in question it becomes over pervasive (ativyapta). If the lakshana is not to be found in the category at all it becomes improbable (asambhavi). Sri Madhwacharya defines Pramana in such a way that it is free from these defects. ‘yathartham pramanam’ (P.L. p.l) is his definition of Pramana. 'artham’ means object and 'yatha' means ‘as it is’. Thus, a pramana is that which reveals an object as it is. When I perceive a shell as a shell the knowledge of the shell reveals to me the shell as it is. i.e., as a shell and when I perceive a shell as a piece of silver, the knowledge of the silver reveals to me the shell as it is not. The knowledge of the shell which reveals the shell as a shell, i.e., as it is. is a Pramana. True knowledge or prama which reveals objects as they are in themselves is a Pramana. Such a prama or true knowledge is produced by my sense of sight. The sense of sight by producing true knowledge which reveals the object as it is, is also a Pramana.
Kevala and Anupramana:
While prama or true knowledge reveals the object as it is directly, the sense of perception reveals the object indirectly through the medium of true knowledge. Hence true knowledge or prama is called kevala Pramana (kevala = direct) and the sense of perception is called Anupramana (Anu = after or indirect). The object revealed is called prameya and the perceiver is called pramata. Kevalapramana which is true knowledge may be external or internal. It may be derived from various means such as the external organs or sense of perception and the internal sense of cognition called ‘Manas' and ‘Sakshi’.
Anupramana which is the means of true knowledge is of three kinds according to Sri Madhwacharya. viz, Pratyakhsa (sense perception). Anumana (inference) and Agama (Scripture). Other epistemologists enumerate Anupramanas differently, but it will be found that there are essentially three kinds of Anupramanas as maintained by Sri Madhwacharya. The different kinds of Anupramanas are included in the three kinds as mentioned by Sri Madhwacharya.
4.1 ANUPRAMANAS
4.1.1 Pratyakhsa:
Pratyaksha reveals objects which are fairly near, which exist at the time of perception and which are limited to a specific confine or field of view. When I observe through my window, I see a tree, a bullock cart passing by and the sky. They are objects confined to a specific field of view at the moment of my perceiving. Anumana reveals objects which may be elsewhere prior to being perceived in knowledge. When I observe a flood in the river when there is no rain in my place. I infer the occurrence of a rain in a place at a higher level upstream and sometime prior to my observation of the flood. The knowledge produced by Anumana can thus extend to objects separated from me in space and time. Agama can, however, reveal objects in an almost untrammeled way. Theoretically there can be no limit to the objects an Agama can reveal to us, no limit to their co-ordinates in space and time. An Agama can produce the true knowledge of events buried in the past or lying in the womb of futurity or to be delivered up to posterity. I can have a true knowledge of the reign of Akbar from an authenticated book of History. I can have a true knowledge of an eclipse taking place six months hence from a scientific book of Astronomical Predictions. The Nautical Almanac is an Agama in so far as it can produce true knowledge of Astronomical events which are predicted to take place. Again, an Agama can produce true knowledge outside the pale of Pratyakhsa and Anumana i.e., of objects which are super sensory (atindriya). The immense potentialities of Agama as a Pramana can thus be easily realized. Agama as a Pramana has a unique place in the metaphysical speculations of all the schools of Vedanta.
Sri Madhwacharya defines Pratyakhsa as the contact of a defectless sense organ with a defectless object (nirdosharthendriya sannikarshah pratyaksham P.L. p i). When the organs of cognition or the objects are defective the knowledge obtained cannot be true. To a jaundiced eye all objects appear yellow and to an astigmatic eye horizontal lines and vertical lines of equal brightness appear to be of unequal brightness. The organs of cognition should be free from such defects. When the object is too far or too near, it cannot be observed properly. When the light is too insufficient a rope may be mistaken for a snake. When the object is situated under favourable conditions appropriate to its proper orientation, the object is said to be defectless (nirdosha). The knowledge arising when a defectless organ of cognition is directed towards a defectless object is true knowledge (prama). The action 'being directed’ constitutes ‘sannikarsha’ or contact. In short, the knowledge produced under normal conditions by the organs of cognition in their normal state constitutes true knowledge and the organs of cognition as well as the true knowledge derived from them constitute Pratyakhsa.
Pratyaksha is of seven kinds viz. the five external senses of cognition, sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell, and the internal organ called Manas and the perceiving entity called Sakshi (sakshi sadindriyabhedena - P.L p.2). The Manas as the internal sense of perception and the Sakshi as the perceiving entity are invoked in order to explain some aspects of experience in the domain of knowledge.
Each sense of cognition has appropriate objects which it can cognize. A lamp post can be perceived by the sense of sight but not by the sense of hearing. Noise can be perceived by the sense of hearing but not by the sense of sight.
Manas and Sakshi as internal organs of cognition
We have in experience some pieces of knowledge which are presumably not derived through any of the five external senses, but which belong indubitably to the domain of knowledge. Memory, Self-knowledge (i.e., ‘I know myself’) and cognition of space and time are not derived from external senses of cognition. To account for such cognition the Manas and Sakshi have to be postulated. I can sit in my chair and run in my ‘mind’s eye' the whole panorama of a pageant I witnessed years ago. I have a succession of pictures passing before me which are the objects of knowledge even as the objects outside are the objects of knowledge of my external senses. To conjure up these images requires an instrument which could present the images in true knowledge. Such an Instrument is the Manas.
Dreams
Again, the stuff of which dreams are made is different from the stuff of the external world. But a dream experience as experience is nevertheless a reality. The happiness and misery I experience in dreams are in no way different from what I experience in the waking state How often have we not wished that some of our dreams might have continued to eternity! Have we not been frightened out of our wits by some dreams? How could we have been frightened if we had no knowledge to frighten us with? Such knowledge surely cannot have been derived from external sense organs. It is suggested that ‘Manas' is the instrument which conjures up dream objects out of impressions that lie deep in it from past experiences registered and gathered in the waking state. The 'Manas’ stores up as it were photographic impressions of experiences and these impressions (samskaras) form the stuff of which dreams are made. Again, the fact of mental pre-occupation argues in favour of ‘Manas' as an internal organ of cognition. When I am deeply absorbed in some abstraction, I am not conscious of things right in front of me. The sense of perception is directed towards the object in front under favorable conditions and yet there is no awareness of objects in front of me. This is because there is a break in the link between the perceiver and the apparatus of perception. The break is attributable to the ‘Manas’ being preoccupied and being out of contact with the external organs of cognition. The 'Manas’ is thus to be invoked to explain the fact of mental pre-occupation.
Pratyabhijna
Lastly recognition (pratyabhijna) is a unique experience calling forth the existence of ‘Manas’. When I meet a long-lost friend the knowledge relative to the friend is of the nature of recognition in which I identify my friend ‘now’ with my friend I met ‘then’. The knowledge of identity, however, is not a deliverance of perception. All that perception reveals is a person before me. That the person revealed as the object of perception is the same as the person revealed at an earlier perception is not given either in the present perception or in the last perception. The element of recognition in knowledge must have been derived from an entirely different source. It is suggested again that ‘Manas’ is the source producing the element of identity in recognition. The past perception has left an impression in the ‘Manas’ and the perception of my friend ‘now’ activates the old impression and the ‘Manas' generates the knowledge of identity or recognition. Memory (smrithi - manaspratyakhsajanya smrthihi (P.L. p.2)) is the direct perception or pratyakhsa of Manas just as the knowledge of a chair is a direct perception of the sense of sight.
The Sakshi (etymologically the direct witness - sakshat eekshateti saksihi), the seventh kind of pratyaksha is the innermost perceiver to whom the knowledge of the object dawns. It is the knower par-excellence. The Sakshi is the seer or percipient and all experience relates to it as the experiencer or subject. The self, the impression of the Manas, happiness and misery, space and time, are objects perceived in the knowledge cognized by the Sakshi (See next chapter for the concept of Sakshi). The Jivatman or soul is the Sakshi (the perceiving aspect of Jivatman).
External knowledge arises through a chain of mechanism. The object perceived in knowledge must be in appropriate relation with the appropriate sense of cognition. Such a relation or contact is called sannikarsha. The internal organ 'Manas’ must at the same time be directed towards the external sense of cognition. This will be realized from the fact that when pre-occupied in mind we are not aware of objects in front of us. The Sakshi must be directed towards the Manas. When we are in deep sleep, we are not aware of with which we sleep and with which our sense of touch is in contact. This is because the Sakshi is out of contact with the Manas. The Sakshi is then, as it were, drawn towards itself closing the windows of external knowledge. External knowledge thus arises through a chain of mechanism starting from the object at one end and ending with the Sakshi at the other.
The relation between the sense of cognition and the object perceived is conceived of as a peculiar relation unique in character. Sri Madhwacharya calls this relation vishaya-vishayi- sambandha. The Nyaya school of thought, however, seeks to multiply the relation into six kinds. The relation between a pot and the sense of sight is samyoga; that between a quality of the pot like colour and the sense of sight is samyukthasamavetha-samavaya: that between sound and the sense of hearing is samavaya; that between the sense of hearing and the genus of sound is samavethasamavaya and lastly the relation between the sense of sight and the pot perceived In which potness is perceived and not cowness is vishesana-visheshabhava. All such relations are, however, unnecessary to be postulated. It would be economy of concept to regard the relation between the sense of cognition and whateverit cognizes as a unique relation in itself and further interdistinctions are not warranted. As a matter of fact, samavaya as such is a baseless concept and distinctions based on it can have no significance.
Again, according to Nyaya, the knowledge derived from the senses is said to be of two types viz. nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate). The knowledge of an object as merely in existence is said to be indeterminate and the knowledge about the details of the object is said to be determinate. When I perceive a man with a gun my immediate knowledge, it is said, refers to the man before me and my subsequent knowledge refers to the details of the man such as carrying a gun, having a dark complexion etc. The details are said to be of eight categories, viz. dravyavikalpa (such as possessing a gun), gunavikalpa (such as having a dark complexion), kriyavikalpa (such as walking), jativikalpa (the man belonging to the human species), visheshavikalpa (particularization), samavayavikalpa (like the threads interwoven into a cloth), namavikalpa (e.g., the man is named Devadatta) and lastly abhavavikalpa (e g., the man has no horns).
Such a distinction between nirvikalpa and savikalpa knowledge is not acceptable to Sri Madhwacharya. He says there is no warrant in experience in the domain of knowledge for such a distinction. Whenever an object is perceived it is perceived with its attributes which are cognizable in direct perception at the moment. There is no first perception of qualityless object and a later perception of qualities or attributes. Attributes such as carrying a gun and walking are all perceived simultaneously in the first perception itself. It is indeed extremely controversial whether there could be apprehension of attributeless objects at all. All knowledge according to Sri Madhwacharya is savikalpa. The distinctions in savikalpa knowledge do not mean much. They can all be regarded as the immediate deliverances of perception. In fact, some of them are not even given directly in perception. For instance, the namavikalpa is not a deliverance of perception. I cannot have the knowledge of the name of a person by merely perceiving him. I have the knowledge of the absence of the horns from my perception of the 'man without the horns’. I infer the absence of blindness in him from his walking unaided. The samavaya and vishesha -vikalpas have no basis in experience.
Again, it is said sometimes that the result of Pratyaksha is to produce feelings of desire or of avoidance of indifference. But such however is not the case. The reactions due to knowledge are not due to the means of producing knowledge but are due to earlier inhibitions in the Manas of the perceiver. The desire to take a fruit when we see one is due to our knowledge of the fruit as a desirable edible stuff; the desire to avoid a bed of thorns is due to our prior knowledge of thorns as undesirable and harmful; the indifference with which we regard some objects is due to our prior knowledge of their uselessness for our personal needs. The immediate purpose of perception is therefore the immediate revealing of objects with their cognizable attributes.
4.1.2 Anumana :
Anumana is defect less syllogism. Sri Madhwacharya defines Anumana as 'Nirdoshopa pattiranumanam' (P.L. p.l) i.e., Anumana Is a faultless deduction or inference. It is a means of producing awareness or knowledge of an object with which it is invariably connected on which it is concomitant. The perception of smoke on yonder hill produces the knowledge of a fire on the hill. The smoke is an Anumana Pramana in regard to the knowledge of the fire. Smoke, it is well known, is concomitant with fire. There is no smoke without fire. The knowledge of fire is called Anumithi (inferential knowledge). Anumana is embodied in a form or expression having some elements calculated to produce Anumithi. The form or syllogism generally runs thus- the hill yonder has a fire on it; because there is smoke on it; just as there is fire in the smoky kitchen. The fire which is intended to be shown to exist on the hill Is called Sadhya (Major term) and the smoke is called Sadhana or Hetu (Middle Term). The hill on which the fire is shown to exist is called Paksha (Minor term).
Requisites of Anumana:
The essential requisite of an Anumana is the invariable concomitance (Vyapti), between the Hetu and the Sadhya. Smoke is invariably and without exception concomitant with fire. But fire is not so. It can exist without smoke. We cannot infer the existence of smoke from the presence of fire. The fire is called Vyapaka and the smoke Vyapya, there are however instances where Sadhya need not exist with Hetu at the same place and time (as in the case of smoke and fire). I can infer the occurrence of rain at a place upstream from the knowledge of a flood in the river (downstream) in my place when there is no rain in my place and some time prior to my observation of the flood. The Hetu therefore reveals the Sadhya is in its appropriate co-ordinates of space and time. The essential requisites of an Anumana are the concomitance and the existence of Hetu in its appropriate place and time.
The invariable concomitance or Vyapti is a kind of relation between two entitles e.g. smoke and fire. Now the relation between two entitles may be of four types (1) The two may be related as mutually and equally concomitant. A may exist always with B and B always with A. The north pole of a magnet is always associated with the South Pole and vice-versa. (2) The two entitles may be related as existing with unequal concomitance A may always exist with B as smoke exists with fire but B may not always exist with A as fire sometimes does not exist with smoke. The fire which has a greater measure of existence is called Vyapaka and the smoke which has a smaller measure of existence Is called Vyapa. (3) The two entities may exist in a relation of mutual exclusion Wherever A exists B cannot and wherever B exists A cannot. Light cannot exist with darkness and vice-versa. (4) Lastly the two entities may exist in concomitance in some places and non-concomitance in other places A may exist with B in some places and may also exist in the absence of B in some other places. A turban may be an invariable headdress of Indians, but some Indians may also wear hats. In all cases Vyapa produces the knowledge of the Vyapaka and is called Anumana.
Anumana can produce the knowledge or awareness of the Sadhya only to a person who is aware of the concomitance. To a person who has never seen a fire (It Is said that people in an island called Narikeladvipa have never seen a fire (P.P. p.6)), or also who has forgotten the concomitance of smoke and fire the observation of smoke has no special significance. Equally necessary for a true knowledge of the Sadhya is the true knowledge of Hetu. If I mistake a column of dust for smoke and infer the existence of fire the Anumana is not valid.
The knowledge of concomitance and of the Hetu are derived from Pratyaksha or Agama. 1 know from observation that smoke and fire are concomitant, and when I observe smoke, I infer the existence of fire. The Anumana in this case is based on Pratyaksha. Similarly, Anumana may be based on Scripture or Agama. I can Infer the Omniscience of the Creator if I know from the scriptures that a Creator exists. All creatorship must be concomitant with All-knowing. If the basis of an Anumana viz, concomitance which is derived from Pratyaksha or Agama is faulty the Anumana also becomes faulty. Anumana therefore depends for its validity on Pratyaksha or Agama and is therefore called Anumana i.e., that which depends on another Pramana (Manam anusarathithi anumanam).
Types of Anumana:
Anumana is said to be of three types viz, Karyanumana, Karananumana, and Akaryakaranumana. In a Karyanumana. we infer the existence of fire from smoke of which smoke is the cause from the effect e.g., the existence of fire from smoke of which fire is the cause. In a Karananumana we infer the existence of the effect from the cause e.g., the occurrence of rain from overhanging rain-bearing clouds, the clouds being the cause of the rain. In an Akaryakaranumana the Hetu and the Sadhya are not related as cause and effect but there is invariable concomitance between them. Whenever the star Krittika (Pleiades) rises we can infer the rising of the star Rohini (Aldebaran). The two stars are not related as cause and effect. From another point of view Anumana may be said to be of two type viz., observable in particular (drishtam) and observable in general (samanyato drstam). The inference of fire which can be observed later by Pratyaksha is dristhanumana.
Anumana is again of two types from the point of view of the purpose for which it is employed. I may employ an Anumana to establish some fact or deny the existence of something or other. If I am asked why I say there is fire on yonder hillock I would answer 'because I see smoke, there'. Such an Anumana which seeks to establish the existence of something is a sadhananumana.
Tarka:
If now, my friend contests or doubts the existence of fire, I then employ another kind of Anumana to silence him. He admits the existence of the smoke because he sees it but will not admit the existence of the fire. My reply will be that if the fire be not admitted to exist, the smoke too cannot exist because where there is no fire there can be no smoke in experience. Thus, my friend is forced to deny the existence of smoke which he actually sees if he will not admit the existence of fire. An Anumana so employed in which the opponent is forced to accept what he is not otherwise prepared to accept is called dohsananumana or Tarka.
The essence of a Tarka is compelling one to admit a situation or position not agreeable to the opponent consequent on the acceptance of some other situation or position. What is accepted is called adpadaka (e g., the absence of fire) and what is shown as must be accepted is called apadya (the absence of smoke). He is compelled to admit the apadya (the absence of smoke). The admission of the apadya (e.g., the absence of smoke) is not agreeable to him and so in the end he rejects the apadaka (i.e. he rejects the absence of the fire, that is to say he accepts the presence of the fire). In a Tarka. there must be invariable concomitance between the apadaka and apadya (e.g., between non-existence of fire and non-existence of smoke). The apadya must be disagreeable to the opponent against whom the Tarka is directed. The apadya should result in the admission of the contrary. The Tarka should not admit of being contradicted by a counter Tarka and should not itself be useful to the opponent also. Another kind of doshananumana is the demolition of an Anumana of an opponent by pointing out how his Anumana cannot produce the desired knowledge of the sadhya. If a person were to hazard an Anumana like 'fire is not hot because it is perceived’ it can be pointed out to him that the Hetu ‘perceived' cannot prove fire as 'not hot' because fire being 'not hot' is opposed to experience.
The tarkikas classify Anumana into three groups viz. Kevalanvayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki. In a Kevalanvayi it is impossible to think of a place where the Sadhya does not exist. Whatever is known has a name is an example for this kind of Anumana. There are no such things as nameless objects. In a Kevalavyatireki there is invariable concomitance only between the absence of the Sadhya and the absence of the Hetu but there is no example of concomitance between Hetu and Sadhya. 'God is All-knowing because He is an All-creator' is an example of this kind of Anumana. Here we are only aware of the concomitance of limited knowledge (i.e., absence of All-knowledge or omniscience) and absence of All-creatorship in all of us but we are not aware of even one example where All-creatorship and All-knowing are concomitant. In an Anvayavyatireki the Hetu is concomitant with the Sadhya and the absence of the Sadhya is also concomitant with the absence of the Hetu. Smoke and fire are concomitant, and absence of fire and absence of smoke are also concomitant. Such distinctions of Anumana are not acceptable to Sri Madhwacharya, according to whom in the interest of the economy of thought, Anvayanumana alone would be enough in all cases. All other groups can be brought under Anvayanumana. In the Kevalavyatireki the non-existence of the Sadhya and non-existence of the Hetu cannot establish the existence of the Sadhya in the Anumana. From the concomitance between the non-existence of the Sadhya and the non-existence of the Hetu we infer the concomitance of the Hetu and the Sadhya and then apply the same in the given Anumana. From the concomitance of limited knowledge and non- creatorship we infer the concomitance of All-creatorship and All-knowing. This would help us to pose the Anumana ‘God is All-knowing because He is All- creator’. We now have again Anvayanumana in the last analysis even in the Kevalavyatireki. In the Anvayavyatireki the concomitance of Hetu and Sadhya is enough to establish the existence of the Sadhya and we need not bother about the concomitance between the absence of the Sadhya and the absence of Hetu. Thus, for any Anumana the invariable concomitance between the Hetu and the Sadhya (avayavyapthi), the concomitance being derived from any source. Pratyaksha, Anumana or Agama is the only direct requisite.
Anumana. it is again said is of two kinds viz, swartanumana and pararthanumana. The swartanumana is for oneself and pararthanumana is for producing knowledge to others. When I see a column of smoke, I immediately know the occurrence of fire if 1 remember the concomitance of smoke and fire. This is a swairthanumana. When I want my friend to know about the occurrence of fire when I cannot show the fire to him, I may employ an Anumana. I may tell him ‘yonder hillock has a fire because it has a smoke’. Such an Anumana is called pararthanumana.
According to the Nyaya school in a pararthanumana there must always be five necessary limbs or consecutive elements (avayavas) viz. pratigna, hetu, udaharana, upanaya, and nigamana. According to them the complete form of the Anumana would be thus: there is fire on yonder hillock (pratigna); ‘because there is smoke on the hill’ (hetu). 'just as there is fire in the smoky kitchen’ (udaharana); the hillock too has smoke on it' (upanaya); ‘therefore there is fire on the hillock' (nigamana). The Bhattas admit of only three limbs (avayavas) viz. pratigna, hetu and udaharana. The Buddhist school says that udaharana and upanaya are the only two necessary limbs.
But according to Sri Madhwacharya there need be no limitation of limbs. The number of limbs depends on the pre-knowledge of the person concerned to whom the pararthanumana is addressed. Only those elements as are required to produce knowledge of the Sadhya be specified. To a person who is aware of the concomitance of smoke and fire the mere statement that the hillock has a fire on it because it has smoke or the single statement that the smoky hill has a fire on it is enough. Again, if a person asks what the evidence for fire on the hillock is, the answer is because it has smoke, is enough to produce the knowledge of the fire. Or again the yonder hill which has a smoke on it, has a fire on it as in a kitchen, expresses the Anumana in a single statement.
Fallacies of Anumana:
Anumana, is, as has been already said, a defectless syllogism. If an Anumana has defects it ceases to be an Anumana and becomes incapable of producing the knowledge of the Sadhya. The defects or fallacies of an Anumana are numerous. But they can all be classified under two kinds viz, virodha and asangati. Other schools of epistemology enumerate the fallacies of Anumana In a variety of ways. But Sri Madhwacharya is able to subsume them all within the two groups of fallacies, virodha and asangati. (i) Virodha is the impossibility of concomitance between what is adduced as the Hetu and what is sought to be established as the Sadhya. ‘Fire is not hot because it is perceived’ is an example of an Anumana with the defect of virodha. There can be no concomitance between being ‘perceived’ and being ‘not hot’, (ii) Asangati is the attempt to prove or establish a Sadhya which is either already established or which is not required to be established. 'Fire is hot because it gives light, whatever gives light is also hot' is an example of an Anumana with the defect of asangati because fire is known in experience to be hot and no further proof is called for. To say to a believer in God 'God exists as the Creator of the world because the world is an effect’ is also an example of an Anumana with the defect of asangati. Existence of God need not be established to a believer in God.
Again, the virodha may be present in respect of pratigna, hetu or drishtanta. The pratignvirodha may be of two kinds viz. pramana virodha and svavachana virodha. The pramana virodha is again of two kinds viz, prabalapramanavirodha and samabalapramanavirodha. ‘The world is Mithya because it is perceived - Is an example of prabalapramanavirodha (conflict with superior evidence) because we can have an Anumana like the world has no Creator like the Atman - (which is accepted to have no creator), opposing it. svavachana virodha again is of two kinds viz. apasiddhanta and jati. Apasiddhanta is contradiction of what is accepted in one’s own school of thought. It would be apasiddhanta or a person belonging to an Atheistic school to accept God. Contradiction in one's own words is called jati, e.g., the statement ‘my mother has no children’. The virodha in respect of the hetu may be of two kinds viz, swarupasiddhi and avyapthi. In the swarupasiddhi, the Hetu does not exist at all as in the Anumana posed thus: 'sound is eternal because it is perceived by the sense of sight’. Here the Hetu being 'perceived by the sense of sight’ does not at all exist in sound because sound cannot be perceived by the sense of sight and is perceived only by the sense of hearing. In the avyapthi the Hetu sometimes exists with the Sadhya and sometimes exists in the absence of the Sadhya. There is smoke on the hill because ‘there is fire on it’ is an example of avyapthi. Now fire can exist sometimes with smoke and sometimes without smoke. The virodha in respect of dristhanta (example or illustration) is of two kinds viz, sadhyavikala and sadhanavikala. ‘Man is eternal because he is born just as the crow’ is an example of sadhyavikala dristhanta. In the illustration the ‘crow' the Sadhya viz, ‘being eternal' is absent because he is born just as ‘Brahman' is an example of sadhanavikala dristhanta. In the illustration ‘Brahman’ the sadhana or Hetu 'being born’ is absent because Brahman is well known as the Unborn.
In the adumbration of an Anumana, defects or fallacies due to words or language creep in, especially, in argumentation, when defects due to persons arguing also might come up. The fallacies due to the words can be grouped under two heads viz. nyuna and adhika (nyunadhike vachanike (P.L. p.2)). Nyuna is insufficient or inadequate description and adhika is an excessive or unnecessary statement. ‘The hillock has fire just like a kitchen’ is an example of nyuna because the Hetu which is an essential ingredient of Anumana is missing. ‘The hillock yonder has a fire because it has smoke and because it is luminous' is an example of adhika because the statement ‘because it is luminous' is not necessary. The fallacies or defects due to persons employing an Anumana are of two kinds viz. samvada and anukthi. Samvada is the acceptance of the matter under dispute. When a person is arguing about the existence of fire on a hillock and when he is told that his argument is not valid if he says ‘let there be no fire on the hillock’ the fallacy is samvada. Anukthi is the non-statement of what is required to convey the desired meaning. ‘Words are eternal because they are so-so’ is an example of anukthi because the Hetu is not mentioned properly.
The twenty-four Nigrahasthanas
The fallacies of Anumana are enumerated differently in the different schools of epistemology. The fallacies due to words and persons in argumentation are enumerated as of twenty-four kinds called Nigrahasthanas in the Nyaya school. But it is found possible to include all these fallacies in the six fallacies viz. virodha, asangati, nyuna, adhika, samvada, and anukthi as enumerated by Sri Madhwacharya. Such a demonstration would, however, take us beyond the limits of this treatise. The readers' attention is directed to the masterly treatment of this topic in the pages of Pramanapaddhati and the Tika on Pramanalakshana.
4.1.3 Agama:
Agama is a defectless verbal composition. Knowledge of objects can be derived from words and when objects exist as the words reveal, the words become a pramana and constitute an Agama. Words can of course produce wrong knowledge of objects and when they do so they constitute apramana. A defectless word is a pramana because it produces true knowledge of the object to which it refers.
Possible defects of words:
The defects of words or groups of words may be of the following types :
(1) Abodhakatva - incapacity to impart any meaning either because the words have no meaning according to any lexicon or dictionary or the words bear no grammatical relation with one another. A word like ‘kptma' not found in any dictionary or lexicon or a group of words like 'I horse mountain’ suffer from such a defect.
(2) Viparitabodhakatva - imparting an altogether contrary meaning. ‘A biped has four legs' is an example of such a defect.
(3) Jrtatajnapakatva - imparting knowledge already known as in the sentence 'the fire is hot.'
(4) Aprayojanatva - producing useless knowledge. Words which describe the complexion of the man in the moon suffer from such a defect.
(5) Anabhimataprayojanatva - producing knowledge which is not wanted e.g., the words conveying the knowledge of the weapons of war to a confirmed pacifist.
(6) Ahsakyasadhanapratipadana - describing the impossible e.g., words describing the attempt to make two parallel lines meet.
(7) Gurupayopadeshah - prescribing a difficult means of attaining a result when an easy one is available. To advise a thirsty man to dig a well for water when there is a river nearby is an example of words possessing this defect.
An Agama consists of words free from such defects. Generally, an Agama is a work containing a number of sentences conveying a definite meaning producing true knowledge. A sentence (vakya) has a complete import and consists of words (padas) which have appropriate grammatical terminations assembled into an array in proper juxtaposition. There is a world of difference in the import conveyed by the same set of words in different juxtapositions as in the group of words ‘A cat killed a rat' and 'A rat killed a cat'. In a sentence each word used has a definite purpose and only such words which convey the desired meaning should be there in a sentence if the latter is to be an Agama.
The Characteristics of words
Words again should have three characteristics called yogyata, sannidhi, and akanksha to produce proper meanings. The words in the sentence 'I eat milk and drink bread' lack yogyata, i.e., they have no capacity to convey proper sense or meaning. If I say 'bring' today and 'a fruit' tomorrow, the sense of 'bring a fruit' cannot be conveyed. The words lack sannidhi i.e., association in space and time. The words 'give me’ do not convey complete sense because of the characteristic of akanksha i.e. the necessity of other words to complete the meaning. The sentence lacks the object of the transitive verb ‘give’. 'Give me a fruit’ would convey a proper sense. The words in an Agama therefore should possess the three characteristics yogyata, sannidhi, and akanksha.
In so far as an Agama can produce true knowledge it is similar to Pratyaksha. But whereas in Pratyaksha one can know of things which one never knew before, an Agama can produce knowledge only to those who are aware of the meanings of words in it. A Latin work makes no sense to me, but I can know the shape of the Latin alphabet by seeing a work of Latin even though I do not know the meaning of Latin words.
Words, therefore, are significant only when we know their proper meanings. There must be some relation between words and their meanings. This relation is called sakthi (padpadrthayovachyavachakasambandah sakthihi (M.S.S. p.38)) and is conceived of differently in the different schools. The Bhattas say that words refer to universal (jati) rather than to the particular (vyakthi). The word 'cow' refers to the universal cowness' rather than to the particular cow before me because when I see a cow, I perceive first a ‘cowness' as different from ‘horseness’ in the animal before me. 'Cow' therefore means an animal possessing 'cowness'.
According to Vaisheshikas a word refers to a particular (vyakthi) with the stamp of the universal (jati). A cow' refers to the 'cow' before me with 'cowness' in it.
The school of grammarians says that some words refer to universal and some to particulars.
The Nyaya school says that words like jar refer to universals like jarness, words like ’Rama’ refer to individuals (vyakthi), words like horn refer to shape (akara) and words like horse refer to the particular animal (vyakthi), to the universal (jati) horseness in it and to its shape (akara).
The Bauddhas say that words imply only negation of the opposites. According to them ‘cow’ implies the negation of ‘non-cowness’.
Shakti - Yoga, Rudhi. Yogarudhi
According to Sri Madhwacharya, however, the true significance or shakthi of words is whatever one becomes aware of when one hears them. When my servant says there is a cow in my garden, I am aware of a particular ’cow’ as an intruder in my garden and also of its ‘cowness' as different from ‘horseness’. The word ‘gone’ in He Is gone signifies the act of having gone and the person who was gone in whom the action is inferred. Again, the word flagstaff indicates both a flag and a staff with the flag. Thus, it follows that words have various kinds of capacities or sakthis in experience. Such a shakthi may be of three kinds viz. yoga, rudhi, and yogarudhi. The word calorimeter means a vessel in which quantities of heat are measured in experiments. Calorie is the name of a heat unit and meter means measurer. The word calorimeter thus has a meaning implied by its parts calorie and meter. Such a usage of a word to indicate the meaning from the significance of its parts is called yoga (e.g., Padmanabha means Vishnu who has in his navel (nabhi) a lotus (padma)). The word ’ghata' means pot by convention of language. Such a usage of a word is called rudhi. The word ‘pankaja’ means a lotus both by convention (rudhi) and by yoga (implied by the parts). The word panka means what is born in mud viz, lotus. Such a usage of words constitutes yogarudhi.
Again, the object or idea signified by a word is called vachya or literal. Words, however, may be used in a literal or a metaphorical sense. When we say the Ganges flows into the Bay of Bengal, we refer to the waters of the Ganges in a literal sense, by the word Ganges. When we say Benares is a city on the Ganges, we refer to the bank of Ganges by the word Ganges. The bank is metaphorically called Ganges. Such a metaphorical usage of a word is called lakshanavritti. (Some schools adumbrate a third one called jahadajahallakshana. The illustration is in the case of tatvamasi according to Advaita, Tat refers to Ishwara having attributes like creation etc., and tvam refers to jiva with limitations. Since they are said to be identical, in each the attribute part is rejected (jahat) and the chit part retained (ajahat) and identity is established on jahadajahallakshana).
Lakshanas are of two types: Jahallakshana, Ajahallakshana. In the jahallakshana usage of a word the literal meaning of the word is discarded as in the example Benares is a city on the Ganges’ in which the literal meaning of the word Ganges as a river is discarded. In the ajahallakshana usage the literal meaning and the metaphorical meanings are both taken. When a crowd carrying flags is advancing, we say, ‘the flags are advancing' and by the word flags we mean both the flags and the men carrying the flags.
An Agama is then a defectless scripture or verbal composition in which the words are free from the defects already adumbrated and possess different capacities for meanings and have several kinds of usages. Now, how do the defects in words come into being? Words in themselves are defectless because a word is defined as a group of letters signifying an understandable meaning. The group of letters ‘klprts’ is no word at all since it conveys no meaning while the group of letters ‘king’ is a word because it has an understandable meaning. When the word ‘spoon' is uttered or read its meaning is grasped by the mind or the bearer. When my servant says there is a cow in my garden, I get the knowledge of the cow that it is ‘out there' even as I would know that it is ‘out there' when I see myself. The words of my servant therefore constitute a pramana for me at the moment of the existence of the cow. But if a cow were not there my servant's words would constitute an apramana and the knowledge of the cow as being ‘out there’ would be false. The fault, however, is not in the words but in my servant, who is either deliberately lying or himself under a delusion. He might have fancied he saw a cow and reported to me. The defects in words therefore arise from the person using them although the words in themselves are defectless (nirdosha). The defects are paurusheya, i.e., derived from a person or traceable to a person employing them.
Paurusheya Agama
Words will be defectless if a person using them is a person of veracity. If he is a person who always speaks the truth, who will not deceive, who is not deluded, his worlds will convey the true knowledge. Such a person is called apta and a work composed by him constitutes a paurusheya agama. The Bhagavad Gita attributed to Sri Krishna, the Bhagavata, the Mahabharata and the Brahmasutras attributed to Sri Vedavyasa are paurusheya agamas being the works of divine authors of unquestioned veracity. The apthi or the characteristic by which the words of an author become a pramana, says Sri Madhwacharya is of three kinds, viz, apthi in the preceptor, apthi in the student and apthi in the circumstances in which the preceptor imparts knowledge to the student (vakthrushrotruprasaktheenam yadapthitranukulatha (A.V. p2)). If the preceptor is not a person of undoubted veracity, or the student is not fit to receive the knowledge, or if the circumstances are not favourable for imparting the knowledge, the words employed cannot be regarded as pramana. The words of Buddha are not acceptable to a Jaina. The words imparted to a student not in earnest cannot constitute a pramana, or again the words imparted to an earnest student when he is otherwise engaged do not constitute a pramana. Sri Madhwacharya says that all three kinds of apthi are to be found in the Bhagavadgita or the Brahmasutras. In the Bhagavadgita, the preceptor is Sri Krishna, and the student is Arjuna who is in dead earnest. Although a mighty battle is to be waged, Arjuna throws down his bow and wants Sri Krishna to enlighten him. Again, in the Brahmasutras, the preceptor is Sri Vedavyasa, the students are Brahma and other deities, and they implore Sri Vedavyasa to enlighten them.
Apaurusheya Agama
Hindu epistemologists have also conceived of a body of words not composed by any author human or divine called apaurusheya Agama. The concept of apaurusheya Agama is unique in the field of epistemology and is peculiar to Hindu thinkers. The concept is difficult to grasp and on the face of it appears an impossible one. An authorless composition would seem to be a contradiction in terms. Such a concept is not. however, difficult to grasp to a Hindu mind. Such a body of words, if it exists, must be essentially defectless since defects if any are due to authors composing the works. The Vedas and the Upanishads are regarded as Apauruseya and therefore as pramanas of inestimable value.
Now words are assemblages of letters and letters are eternal. When I hear the letter 'K' being pronounced 1 recognize it as having heard before (pratyabhigna). I identify the sound of ‘K’ now with the sound of ‘K‘ I have heard before. Such an identification presupposes the identity of the sounds now and then. The only explanation of such identity is that the letter ‘K’ is eternal and all-pervading. When I pronounce the letter ‘K’ the sound produced is only a manifestation of the eternal letter ‘K’. Thus, letters are all-pervading and words which are assemblages of letters can also be eternal. The eternal words which are assemblages of eternal letters forming a particular sequence (krama) form the apaurusheya Vedas. Such a sequence is also eternal and hence uncomposed. The sequence is eternally the same. When I hear a Vedic hymn the sequence of its words is the same as it ever was and as it ever will be. This is the meaning of saying that the Vedas are Apaurusheya. The concept of Apaurusheyatva implies the eternal character of the sequence of words.
Again, it is incumbent on all those who accept supersensory elements (atindriya) to accept the existence and validity of an Apaurusheya Agama. There is such a thing in the world as belief in supersensory elements like virtue, God, and the like. The notion of sin and virtue implies a belief in ‘the other world’. How could such a belief have arisen in the human beast? Not surely from Pratyaksha or Anumana based on Pratyaksha, because what is supersensory is beyond the reach of Pratyaksha. Nor can the work of any author be responsible for the belief because the author like any of us is limited in capacities and different supposed authors speak differently of supersensory matters. We must therefore have recourse only to an Apaurusheya Agama through which alone the belief in supersensory elements must have been derived. No Agama due to any person can be regarded infallible in matters supersensory. The moral values of life can be derived only from an Apaurusheya Agama in a manner such as no other agency can hope to inform us. The Vedas are known from time immemorial as Apaurusheya.
Vedas as Apaurusheya
The Vedas are considered to be Apauruseya or authorless because there is an unbroken tradition of their authorlessness. The Vedas have been handed down from preceptor to pupil as a body of words uncomposed by any author and as having been always imparted from time immemorial as such. The eternal Vedas came out of the mouth of Brahman during the dawn of creation says the Shruti, ‘anadinldhanavagutshrustasawayambhuva'. However far back we may go we find there was no time when the Vedas did not exist, and they have always been handed down as eternal and authorless. Just as there is an unbroken tradition that Raghuvamsha was composed by Kalidasa, there is an unbroken tradition that Vedas are authorless. The Rigveda refers to Vedas as eternal words (vacha virupa nityaya (R.V.6.5.25)). The Rigveda again says that the Vedas or vak are as pervading in space and time as Brahman (yavad brahmavishtitam tavativak (R.V.8.6.17)). Paingi Shruti says that the shruti (the Veda) is eternal and smriti (the Puranas) non- eternal. The Brahmanda purana says that the Vedas are eternal and that they are produced or manifested by Vishnu (Brahman) during every cycle of creation as a body of words in the same sequence with the same words, with the same letters and with the same intonations. And because says the Brahmanda purana they are always heard by all persons but never composed by any they are known as shrutis i.e., as those that are always heard only. The Vedas are perceived in the mind’s eye of the Vedic seers (who are of course not the composers) by the grace of Vasudeva and are named after them (the Vedic seers).
The Purusha Suktha says that Rigveda, Samaveda etc., were born from the Purusha. The Vedas are said to be born in the sense of being manifested. The words used as synonyms for the Vedas like Shruti, Veda, amanya imply the eternal character of the Vedas. Shruti means that which is heard only and not composed. Veda means that which is always existing and amanya means that which is always pronounced in the same sequence. There are, however, references to personalities like kings and rishis in the Vedas and such references to essentially non¬ permanent beings would seem to imply the non-permanent character of the Vedas. But such however is not the case. The Vedas refer to persons who appear in the eternal cycles of creation and therefore are eternal in character. The Vedas refer to such cycles of creation in which the Creator creates each cycle as a copy of the previous cycle, as is declared in the Shruti ‘dhata yathapurvamakalpayat'.
4.2 EPISTEMOLOGY IN OTHER SCHOOLS
Attention may now be briefly drawn to a few points of difference between the epistemology of Sri Madhwacharya and that of the other schools. In the first place pramana is defined in different ways. According to Sri Madhwacharya true knowledge and the means of producing true knowledge are pramanas. The evidence why I believe there is a rose in my garden is that I have seen the rose with my eyes and have knowledge of the rose. It is the true knowledge of the rose that compels me to believe in the existence of the rose as a rose and not as a horse and such true knowledge is produced by my sense of sight. Hence both the sense of sight and the true knowledge of the rose are pramanas in respect of the rose in my garden. Many schools of epistemologists have lost sight of the distinction between the means of true knowledge (anupramana) and true knowledge (kevalapramana) and their definitions of pramanas are therefore unsatisfactory. The definition of pramana must cover both true knowledge and the means of producing true knowledge. Sri Madhwacharya therefore defines pramana as ‘yathartham’ and such a definition meaning capacity to reveal an object as it is. holds both for true knowledge and the means of producing true knowledge.
The Bauddhas define pramana as the knowledge which reveals indeterminate (nirvikalpa) objects. Such a definition is open to the objection that there is no knowledge in which the object is indeterminate. All pieces of knowledge are determinate (savikalpa) in experience.
The Jainas define pramana as knowledge which is free from doubts, falsity, mere probability, and indetermination (this definition excludes the means of true knowledge).
The Sankhyas define pramana as ‘pramakarana’ - the means of producing true knowledge. Such a definition excludes true knowledge from the sphere of pramanas and is hence inadequate.
The Nyaya school defines pramana as the instrument of true knowledge ‘samyaganubhavasadhanam pramanam’. Such a definition again excludes true knowledge.
The Prabhakaras define pramana as 'anubhuti'. By anubhuti they mean knowledge other than memory. Such a definition is however, doubly defective. Knowledge may mean true or false knowledge and the means of true knowledge are again excluded in this definition. Also, it Is wrong to exclude memory from the domain of pramanas. Memory is a pramana as must be admitted by all. The Bhattas define pramana as the means of prama and by prama they mean a characteristic called jnatata in the object of knowledge. Such a definition Is not acceptable because there is no evidence for the existence of such a characteristic called jnatata in the object. All that we know in knowledge is the object with its cognizable attributes. No attribute like jnatata as suggested by the Bhattas is known in experience. The Bhattas give another definition of pramana as the knowledge different from memory and revealing the object as it is (anadhigatatathabhutharthajnanam pramanam (P.P.p.3)). This definition is adopted in the Adwaita school also. Such a definition, again, excludes memory and the means of' true knowledge and is hence unsatisfactory.
The Vishishtadvaita school adopts the definition of pramana as ‘pramakarana' i.e., means of true knowledge and lends itself open to the objection that such a definition excludes true knowledge from the sphere of pramanas.
The pramanas are enumerated differently in different schools of epistemology. The Charvakas believe only in Pratyaksha as pramana. The Bauddhas admit of Anumana as an additional pramana. The Sankhyas enumerate the pramanas as three in number viz. Pratyaksha. Anumana, and Agama in the same way as the Vishishtadvaita school and the school of Sri Madhwacharya. According to Jainas the Pramanas are Pratyakhsa, Memory, Recognition (Pratyabhigna), Tarka, Anumana. Upamana (similarity), and Agama. The Nyaya and Vaisheshika schools enumerate pramanas as Pratyaksha, Anumana, Agama, and Upamana. The Vaisheshikas in particular seek to include Agama and Upamana in Anumana. The Prabhakaras mention Pratyaksha, Anumana, Agama, Upamana, and Arthapatti. In the Agama pramana the Prabhakaras retain the Apauruseya Agama as an independent pramana and include Paurusheya Agama in Anumana. The Bhattas while accepting the five independent pramanas as given by the Prabhakaras add one more pramana called Abhava which reveals the absence of objects like 'there is no pot here'. The Adwaita school enumerates the pramanas as Pratyaksha, Anumana, Agama, Arthapatti and Anupalabhi (Abhava).
Sri Madhwacharya while classifying all pramanas as belonging to three groups viz. Pratyakhsa, Anumana and Agama demonstrates how all other kinds mentioned as pramanas can be included within the three groups. ‘Arthapattyupame Anuma visesah' (P.L. pi) says Sri Madhwacharya. Arthapatti and Upamana are specific types of Anumana. When 1 visit my friend’s house and do not find him there, I know he is elsewhere. Such knowledge is said to be true due to Arthapatti. Such knowledge is however an indirect inference because so long as my friend is in the land of the living he must be elsewhere if not in his house. When a person has seen a cow and when he later sees a quadruped resembling a cow, he cognizes the object before him as a cow by similarity. But such a similarity or Upamana need not be regarded as an independent pramana since it can be included in Anumana. The person seeing the quadruped may infer thus: what I see before me is a cow because it resembles a cow I have seen before; whatever animal resembles the cow 1 have seen before must itself be a cow. Sri Madhwacharya includes Abhava under Pratyaksha or Anumana as the case may be (abhavo anumapratyakshancha (P.Lp.l)). The knowledge of the absence of a pot on the table and the knowledge of the sense of hearing of my friend are examples of knowledge, occasioned by Abhava pramana. But the knowledge of the absence of the pot on the table is derived from Pratyaksha directly. When I see the table minus the pot, I know there is no pot or for that matter no rose or other thing on the table. The absence of the sense of hearing of my friend, I infer, from my one-sided conversation with him. His helpless blank look betrays his deafness or absence of the sense of hearing.
Pratyabhigna (Recognition) is pratyaksha aided by memory. Memory is merely the Pratyaksha of the Manas (manaspratyakshaja smrthihi (P.Lp.2)). Tarka mentioned by the Jainas as an independent pramana is a special type of Anumana. Some schools mention Sambhava and Parishesha as independent pramanas (some regard Upamana and Aitihya as pramanas. Upamana is Anumana and Aitihya is Agama). Sri Madhwacharya, however, includes these under Anumana (sabmhavapariiesavanuma (P.L.p.2)). My knowledge that my friend having hundred rupees, has fifty rupees also is an example of Sambhava. This, however, is Anumana 'My friend has fifty rupees because he has hundred rupees just like me' is the form of this Anumana. My knowledge that of two balls one red and the other green, my friend has a green ball in his left hand if I know he has a red one in his right hand is said to be due to Parishesha pramana. This too is an Anumana of the form since there are only two balls one red and the other green and since the red ball is in his right hand the green ball must be in his left hand.
Memory (smrithi) must be regarded as a pramana included in the pratyaksha of the Manas. Some schools of epistemology are disposed to discard memory as a pramana. Sri Madhwacharya is, however, emphatic in declaring memory as pramana. If memory is not admitted as pramana, says Sri Madhwacharya. there can be no evidence for a past experience. My repugnance towards quinine is due to my memory of bitterness of quinine when I see quinine. The knowledge of bitterness is occasioned as memory in the Manas acting as the means of such knowledge. Again, says Sri Madhwacharya, when we learn of some news, we sometimes say we knew this before and when we repeat any act, we say we have done this before. Thus, In experience we do have knowledge derived from the Manas as memory and to reject such knowledge as not pramana would go against experience (vignatam manasa purvam mayetat kritam ityapi ..saksadanu- bhAvasiddham (A.V.p.2)).
4.3 SUPERIORITY OR INFERIORITY OF A PRAMANA
The Jainas regard Pratyakhsa as a superior (Jyeshta) pramana and refer to the knowledge derived from Pratyaksha as samvyavaharika pratyaksha. The knowledge derived from other pramanas is called paroksha pramanas having a lower status. The question therefore arises as to which of the three pramanas is the most superior. The question in itself is somewhat absurd since there can be no superiority or inferiority in pramanas as pramanas. The question however becomes valid, when two pramanas cognizing the same object appear to differ m their deliverances. In such a case which of the two pramanas should be accepted as giving the true knowledge of the object?
Upajivaka and Upajivya Pramanas
For this purpose, Sri Madhwacharya classifies pramanas as upajivaka. i.e. dependent and upajivya i.e.. that on which the former is dependent. In matters cognizable by only Pratyaksha. the other pramanas viz. Anumana and Agama are upajivakas and in matters cognizable only by Agama the other two pramanas are upajivakas. As a rule, upajivya is superior in validity to the upajivaka. The upajivaka has to be so understood that the knowledge derived from it will not conflict with the knowledge derived from the upajivya. For example. Pratyaksha shows that fire is hot. No argument or inference trying to prove the non-hotness of fire or no Agama declaring the Pratyaksha which shows the hotness of the fire. Again, in supersensory matters Agama alone is pramana and no Pratyaksha or Anumana can pit itself against the Agama. In Agama again an Agama whose meaning is unequivocal or admits of no alternative meaning (niravakasha) is superior to one which admits of alternative meanings (savakasha). An Agama with a reasoning in it is superior to one without reasoning in it.
4.4 TRUE AND FALSE KNOWLEDGE
Now we ask ourselves the question how does truth in true knowledge and falsity in wrong knowledge arise and how truth or falsity of knowledge is grasped? Again, different schools of epistemology answer differently. Truth or falsity of knowledge may be svatah or paratah. By svatah is meant that truth or falsity arise by the same instrument that produces or comprehends knowledge. By paratah is meant that truth or falsity arise by some other agency.
The Sankhyas say that truth or falsity of knowledge are both svatah i.e., are both generated by the instrument of knowledge which produces knowledge.
The Nyaya school maintains that both truth and falsity of knowledge arise from some agency different from those producing knowledges. The truth of true knowledge is due to some attribute in the instrument of true knowledge and falsity of wrong knowledge is due to some defect in the instrument producing knowledge. When I see a rose and know it to be a rose, the truth of my knowledge is due to an attribute in my sense of sight. When I see a cat and I know it as a dog the falsity of my knowledge is due to some defect in my sense of sight. In both cases the truth or falsity of knowledge owes its existence to an agency like an attribute or defect other than the mere instrument, viz. the sense of sight. In this sense, says the Nyaya school, truth or falsity of knowledge is paratah.
The Bauddhas say that truth of knowledge is paratah and falsity of knowledge is svatah.
Sri Madhwacharya however says that truth of knowledge is svatah and falsity of knowledge is paratha (pramanyam svatah parato apramanyam (V.T.V.p2)). The instrument which produces true knowledge also is responsible for the truth of knowledge no other agency being called for, for the purpose. The falsity of knowledge, is however, due to defects in the instruments producing knowledge. Similarly, the Sakshi which is the perceiver of knowledge grasps both knowledge and truth of knowledge. No other agency is required to grasp the truth of knowledge. In the case of false knowledge, the Sakshi perceives only knowledge and infers the falsity from the attendant circumstances.
Bhranti
When I perceive a piece of shell before me as silver the knowledge of the silver is false knowledge (Bhranti). Now what is the essence or content of such false knowledge? False knowledge or Bhranti Is explained in the different epistemological schools In different ways According to the Buddhist way of thinking the content of false knowledge is asat or non-existence. This view of Bhranti is called asatkhyati (kyati means appearance is knowledge). To the extent that the silver as perceived in shell is asat or non-existent, this view is acceptable to Sri Madhwacharya. But the situation deserves a closer examination. According to Prabhakaras all knowledge derived from pramanas is true knowledge.
But then how can Bhranti be explained? In the illusion of silver in shell, say the Prabhakaras, there are two bits of knowledge, one derived from pratyaksha which is true, the other derived from memory which is false. In the Bhranti ‘this is silver’, the part ‘silver’ is derived from memory. The latter knowledge is false. The bhranti or illusion is due to non-recognition of the difference between these two pieces of knowledge. Since there is no awareness or knowledge of the difference between these two elements bhranti is produced. Such a view of bhranti is called akhyati. In the Kumarila or Bhatta school the explanation of bhranti is called viparitakhyati. In the bhranti ‘this is silver', the knowledge of ‘this’ produced by pratyaksha appears identified with the prior knowledge of silver produced in an earlier experience. It is this identity which is responsible for the bhranti. The Tarkikas say that silver which is real elsewhere appears in the present knowledge (bhranti). Such a view is called anyathakhyati. The Adwaita school explains the bhranti as anirvachaniyakhyati. According to this school the silver is neither real, nor unreal, but is different from real and unreal i.e., it is anirvachaniya. In the Vishishtadvaita school the explanation of bhranti is called yatharthakhyati. According to them there is no such thing as wrong or false knowledge. The knowledge of silver in the shell is also true knowledge because there is silver in shell in a microscopic degree and it is this silver that is perceived in knowledge.
Abhinavanyatakhyati
Sri Madhwacharya, however, rejects all these views and bases his explanation on the solid basis of experience. When a person who apprehends silver in a piece of shell goes near the shell and apprehends the shell as shell, he says to himself ‘unreal silver appeared to exist in the place where I now see shell'. In accordance with this experience, we must regard the silver perceived in bhranti as unreal or asat and what was unreal appeared as real i.e., in a different form. The shell appeared in the bhranti as unreal or asat and what was unreal appeared as real. i.e., in a different form. The shell appeared in the bhranti as the object of a knowledge not as shell but as silver. Such a view is called abhinavanyathakhyati (See Nyayasudha for further elucidation).The view expressed here differs from asatkhyati in as much as it goes beyond what is expressed in asatkhyati and says that what is real as shell appears as what is not real as silver. The view also differs from anyathakhyati of the Nyaya school because in the Nyaya school the real silver elsewhere is correlated with the shell In a way not warranted by experience.