The Human Condition by Hannah Arendt - HTML preview

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adding a single useful object to it; the life of an exploiter or slave-

holder and the life of a parasite may be unjust, but they certainly

are human. A life without speech and without action, on the other

hand—and this is the only way of life that in earnest has re-

nounced all appearance and all vanity in the biblical sense of the

word—is literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human

life because it is no longer lived among men.

With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world,

and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and

take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical ap-

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Action

pearance. This insertion is not forced upon us by necessity, like

labor, and it is not prompted by utility, like work. It may be

stimulated by the presence of others whose company we may wish

to join, but it is never conditioned by them; its impulse springs

from the beginning which came into the world when we were

born and to which we respond by beginning something new on

our own initiative.1 To act, in its most general sense, means to

take an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, "to begin,"

"to lead," and eventually "to rule," indicates), to set something into motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin agere).

Because they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of

birth, men take initiative, are prompted into action. [Initium] ergo

ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quern nullus fuit ("that there be a

beginning, man was created before whom there was nobody"),

said Augustine in his political philosophy.2 This beginning is not

the same as the beginning of the world;3 it is not the beginning of

something but of somebody, who is a beginner himself. With the

creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world

itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the

principle of freedom was created when man was created but not

before.

It is in the nature of beginning that something new is started

1. This description is supported by recent findings in psychology and biology

which also stress the inner affinity between speech and action, their spontaneity

and practical purposelessness. See especially Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch: Seine

Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (1955), which gives an excellent summary of the results and interpretations of current scientific research and contains a wealth of valuable insights. That Gehlen, like the scientists upon whose results he bases

his own theories, believes that these specifically human capabilities are also a

"biological necessity," that is, necessary for a biologically weak and ill-fitted organism such as man, is another matter and need not concern us here.

2. De civitate Dei xii. 20.

3. According to Augustine, the two were so different that he used a different

word to indicate the beginning which is man (initium), designating the beginning of the world by principium, which is the standard translation for the first Bible verse. As can be seen from De civitate Dei xi. 32, the word principium carried for Augustine a much less radical meaning; the beginning of the world "does not

mean that nothing was made before (for the angels were)," whereas he adds

explicitly in the phrase quoted above with reference to man that nobody was

before him.

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which cannot be expected from whatever may have happened

before. This character of startling unexpectedness is inherent in

all beginnings and in all origins. Thus, the origin of life from

inorganic matter is an infinite improbability of inorganic proc-

esses, as is the coming into being of the earth viewed from the

standpoint of processes in the universe, or the evolution of human

out of animal life. The new always happens against the over-

whelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, which for

all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new

therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle. The fact that

man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected

from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable.

And this again is possible only because each man is unique, so

that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the

world. With respect to this somebody who is unique it can be

truly said that nobody was there before. If action as beginning

corresponds to the fact of birth, if it is the actualization of the

human condition of natality, then speech corresponds to the fact

of distinctness and is the actualization of the human condition of

plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being among

equals.

Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial

and specifically human act must at the same time contain the

answer to the question asked of every newcomer: "Who are

you?" This disclosure of who somebody is, is implicit in both his

words and his deeds; yet obviously the affinity between speech

and revelation is much closer than that between action and reve-

lation,4 just as the affinity between action and beginning is closer

than that between speech and beginning, although many, and even

most acts, are performed in the manner of speech. Without the

accompaniment of speech, at any rate, action would not only lose

its revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would lose

its subject, as it were; not acting men but performing robots

would achieve what, humanly speaking, would remain incompre-

hensible. Speechless action would no longer be action because

there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of

4. This is the reason why Plato says that lexis ("speech") adheres more closely to truth than praxis.

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Action

deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of

words. The action he begins is humanly disclosed by the word,

and though his deed can be perceived in its brute physical appear-

ance without verbal accompaniment, it becomes relevant only

through the spoken word in wrhich he identifies himself as the

actor, announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do.

No other human performance requires speech to the same

extent as action. In all other performances speech plays a subordi-

nate role, as a means of communication or a mere accompaniment

to something that could also be achieved in silence. It is true that

speech is extremely useful as a means of communication and in-

formation, but as such it could be replaced by a sign language,

which then might prove to be even more useful and expedient to

convey certain meanings, as in mathematics and other scientific

disciplines or in certain forms of teamwork. Thus, it is also true

that man's capacity to act, and especially to act in concert, is

extremely useful for purposes of self-defense or of pursuit of

interests; but if nothing more were at stake here than to use action

as a means to an end, it is obvious that the same end could be

much more easily attained in mute violence, so that action seems

a not very efficient substitute for violence, just as speech, from

the viewpoint of sheer utility, seems an awkward substitute for

sign language.

In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively

their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in

the human world, while their physical identities appear without

any activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and

sound of the voice. This disclosure of "who" in contradistinction

to "what" somebody is—his qualities, gifts, talents, and short-

comings, which he may display or hide—is implicit in everything

somebody says and does. It can be hidden only in complete silence

and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never be

achieved as a wilful purpose, as though one possessed and could

dispose of this "who" in the same manner he has and can dispose

of his qualities. On the contrary, it is more than likely that the

"who," which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others,

remains hidden from the person himself, like the daimon in Greek

religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, always

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The Human Condition

looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those

he encounters.

This revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore

where people are with others and neither for nor against them—

that is, in sheer human togetherness. Although nobody knows

whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or word, he

must be willing to risk the disclosure, and this neither the doer of

good works, who must be without self and preserve complete

anonymity, nor the criminal, who must hide himself from others,

can take upon themselves. Both are lonely figures, the one being

for, the other against, all men; they, therefore, remain outside the

pale of human intercourse and are, politically, marginal figures

who usually enter the historical scene in times of corruption, dis-

integration, and political bankruptcy. Because of its inherent

tendency to disclose the agent together with the act, action needs

for its full appearance the shining brightness we once called glory,

and which is possible only in the public realm.

Without the disclosure of the agent in the act, action loses its

specific character and becomes one form of achievement among

others. It is then indeed no less a means to an end than making is

a means to produce an object. This happens whenever human

togetherness is lost, that is, when people are only for or against

other people, as for instance in modern warfare, where men go

into action and use means of violence in order to achieve certain

objectives for their own side and against the enemy. In these

instances, which of course have always existed, speech becomes

indeed "mere talk," simply one more means toward the end,

whether it serves to deceive the enemy or to dazzle everybody

with propaganda; here words reveal nothing, disclosure comes

only from the deed itself, and this achievement, like all other

achievements, cannot disclose the "who," the unique and distinct

identity of the agent.

In these instances action has lost the quality through which it

transcends mere productive activity, which, from the humble

making of use objects to the inspired creation of art works, has

no more meaning than is revealed in the finished product and does

not intend to show more than is plainly visible at the end of the

production process. Action without a name, a "who" attached to

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Action

it, is meaningless, whereas an art work retains its relevance

whether or not we know the master's name. The monuments to

the "Unknown Soldier" after World War I bear testimony to the

then still existing need for glorification, for finding a "who," an

identifiable somebody whom four years of mass slaughter should

have revealed. The frustration of this wish and the unwillingness

to resign oneself to the brutal fact that the agent of the war was

actually nobody inspired the erection of the monuments to the

"unknown," to all those whom the war had failed to make known

and had robbed thereby, not of their achievement, but of their

human dignity.8

25

T H E W E B O F R E L A T I O N S H I P S A N D

T H E E N A C T E D S T O R I E S

The manifestation of who the speaker and doer unexchangeably

is, though it is plainly visible, retains a curious intangibility that

confounds all efforts toward unequivocal verbal expression. The

moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary

leads us astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in a de-

scription of qualities he necessarily shares with others like him;

we begin to describe a type or a "character" in the old meaning

of the word, with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes us.

This frustration has the closest affinity with the well-known

philosophic impossibility to arrive at a definition of man, all defi-

nitions being determinations or interpretations of what man is, of

qualities, therefore, which he could possibly share with other

living beings, whereas his specific difference would be found in

a determination of what kind of a "who" he is. Yet apart from

this philosophic perplexity, the impossibility, as it were, to

solidify in words the living essence of the person as it shows

itself in the flux of action and speech, has great bearing upon the

whole realm of human affairs, where we exist primarily as acting

and speaking beings. It excludes in principle our ever being able

to handle these affairs as we handle things whose nature is at our

5. William Faulkner's A Fable (1954) surpasses almost all of World War I

literature in perceptivcness and clarity because its hero is the Unknown Soldier.

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The Human Condition

disposal because we can name them. The point is that the manifes-

tation of the "who" comes to pass in the same manner as the no-

toriously unreliable manifestations of ancient oracles, which, ac-

cording to Heraclitus, "neither reveal nor hide in words, but give

manifest signs."6 This is a basic factor in the equally notorious

uncertainty not only of all political matters, but of all affairs that

go on between men directly, without the intermediary, stabilizing,

and solidifying influence of things.7

This is only the first of many frustrations by which action, and

consequently the togetherness and intercourse of men, are ridden.

It is perhaps the most fundamental of those we shall deal with, in

so far as it does not rise out of comparisons with more reliable

and productive activities, such as fabrication or contemplation or

cognition or even labor, but indicates something that frustrates

action in terms of its own purposes. What is at stake is the revela-

tory character without which action and speech would lose all

human relevance.

Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed

toward them, and they retain their agent-revealing capacity even

if their content is exclusively "objective," concerned with the

matters of the world of things in which men move, which physi-

cally lies between them and out of which arise their specific, ob-

jective, worldly interests. These interests constitute, in the word's

most literal significance, something which inter-est, which lies be-

tween people and therefore can relate and bind them together.

Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between, which

varies with each group of people, so that most words and deeds

are about some worldly objective reality in addition to being a

disclosure of the acting and speaking agent. Since this disclosure

of the subject is an integral part of all, even the most "objective"

intercourse, the physical, worldy in-between along with its inter-

6. Oute legei oute kryptei alia semainei (Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker [4th ed., 1922], frag. B93).

7. Socrates used the same word as Heraclitus, semainein ("to show and give signs"), for the manifestation of his daimonion (Xenophon Memorabilia I. 1. 2, 4).

If we are to trust Xenophon, Socrates likened his daimonion to the oracles and insisted that both should be used only for human affairs, where nothing is certain,

and not for problems of the arts and crafts, where everything is predictable

(ibid. 7-9).

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Action

ests is overlaid and, as it were, overgrown with an altogether dif-

ferent in-between which consists of deeds and words and owes

its origin exclusively to men's acting and speaking directly to one

another. This second, subjective in-between is not tangible, since

there are no tangible objects into which it could solidify; the

process of acting and speaking can leave behind no such results

and end products. But for all its intangibility, this in-between is

no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common.

We call this reality the "web" of human relationships, indicating

by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality.

To be sure, this web is no less bound to the objective world of

things than speech is to the existence of a living body, but the rela-

tionship is not like that of a facade or, in Marxian terminology,

of an essentially superfluous superstructure affixed to the useful

structure of the building itself. The basic error of all materialism

in politics—and this materialism is not Marxian and not even

modern in origin, but as old as our history of political theory8—

is to overlook the inevitability with which men disclose them-

selves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons, even when they

wholly concentrate upon reaching an altogether worldly, material

object. To dispense with this disclosure, if indeed it could ever be

done, would mean to transform men into something they are not;

to deny, on the other hand, that this disclosure is real and has

consequences of its own is simply unrealistic.

The realm of human affairs, strictly speaking, consists of the

8. Materialism in political theory is at least as old as the Platonic-Aristotelian

assumption that political communities (poleis)—and not only family life or the coexistence of several households (oikiai)—owe their existence to material necessity. (For Plato see Republic 369, where the polis' origin is seen in our wants and lack of self-sufficiency. For Aristotle, who here as elsewhere is closer to current

Greek opinion than Plato, see Politics 1252b29: "The. polis comes into existence for the sake of living, but remains in existence for the sake of living well.") The Aristotelian concept of sympheron, which we later encounter in Cicero's utilitas, must be understood in this context. Both, in turn, are forerunners of the later

interest theory which is fully developed as early as Bodin—as kings rule over

peoples, Interest rules over kings. In the modern development, Marx is outstand-

ing not because of his materialism, but because he is the only political thinker who was consistent enough to base his theory of material interest on a demonstrably

material human activity, on laboring—that is, on the metabolism of the human

body with matter.

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web of human relationships which exists wherever men live to-

gether. The disclosure of the "who" through speech, and the

setting of a new beginning through action, always fall into an

already existing web where their immediate consequences can be

felt. Together they start a new process which eventually emerges

as the unique life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the

life stories of all those with whom he comes into contact. It is

because of this already existing web of human relationships, with

its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions, that action al-

most never achieves its purpose; but it is also because of this

medium, in which action alone is real, that it "produces" stories

with or without intention as naturally as fabrication produces

tangible things. These stories may then be recorded in documents

and monuments, they may be visible in use objects or art works,

they may be told and retold and worked into all kinds of material.

They themselves, in their living reality, are of an altogether dif-

ferent nature than these reifications. They tell us more about their

subjects, the "hero" in the center of each story, than any product

of human hands ever tells us about the master who produced it,

and yet they are not products, properly speaking. Although

everybody started his life by inserting himself into the human

world through action and speech, nobody is the author or producer

of his own life story. In other words, the stories, the results of

action and speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is not an author

or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold

sense of the word, namely, its actor and sufferer, but nobody is

its author.

That every individual life between birth and death can even-

tually be told as a story with beginning and end is the prepolitical

and prehistorical condition of history, the great story without

beginning and end. But the reason why each human life tells its

story and why history ultimately becomes the storybook of man-

kind, with many actors and speakers and yet without any tangible

authors, is that both are the outcome of action. For the great

unknown in history, that has baffled the philosophy of history in

the modern age, arises not only when one considers history as a

whole and finds that its subject, mankind, is an abstraction which

never can become an active agent; the same unknown has baffled

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political philosophy from its beginning in antiquity and contrib-

uted to the general contempt in which philosophers since Plato

have held the realm of human affairs. The perplexity is that in

any series of events that together form a story with a unique mean-

ing we can at best isolate the agent who set the whole process into

motion; and although this agent frequently remains the subject,

the "hero" of the story, we never can point unequivocally to him

as the author of its eventual outcome.

It is for this reason that Plato thought that human affairs (ta ton

anthropon pragmatd), the outcome of action (praxis), should not be

treated with great seriousness; the actions of men appear like the

gestures of puppets led by an invisible hand behind the scene, so

that man seems to be a kind of plaything of a god.9 It is note-

worthy that Plato, who had no inkling of the modern concept of

history, should have been the first to invent the metaphor of an

actor behind the scenes who, behind the backs of acting men, pulls

the strings and is responsible for the story. The Platonic god is

but a symbol for the fact that real stories, in distinction from those

we invent, have no author; as such, he is the true forerunner of

Providence, the "invisible hand," Nature, the "world spirit,"

class interest, and the like, with which Christian and modern

philosophers of history tried to solve the perplexing problem that

although history owes its existence to men, it is still obviously

not "made" by them. (Nothing in fact indicates more clearly the

political nature of history—its being a story of action and deeds

rather than of trends and forces or ideas—than the introduction of

an invisible actor behind the scenes whom we find in all philoso-

phies of history, which for this reason alone can be recognized as

political philosophies in disguise. By the same token, the simple

fact that Adam Smith needed an "invisible hand" to guide econom-

ic dealings on the exchange market shows plainly that more than

sheer economic activity is involved